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Abstract 
This thesis explores the role and influence of institutions on agricultural labour 
transactions in Isunga  village in Kiryandongo  District, Midwestern Uganda. It 
primarily focuses on how farmers structure, maintain and enforce their labour 
relationships during crop farming. The study is based on semi-structured interviews of 
twenty households and unstructured interviews with representatives of farmers 
associations. These interviews show that other than household labour, the other 
common labour arrangements in the village include farm work sharing, labour 
exchanges and casual wage labour. Farm work sharing and labour exchanges involve 
farmers temporarily pooling their labour into work groups to complete tasks such as 
planting, weeding or harvesting crops on members’ farms in succession. This is done 
under strict rules and rewarded with ‘good’ beer and food. Against this background, the 
study asks what institutions really are, why they matter and what we can learn about 
them. Literature suggests that institutions influence labour transactions by their effects 
on transaction costs and the protection of contractual rights. However, literature does 
not suggest which institutions are best for agricultural labour transactions. Taking 
institutions to be the ‘rules of the game’, with farmers as ‘players’ who strategically use 
these rules to their advantage, the study focused on the interaction between institutions 
and farmers. The major findings of the study are: (a) farmers’ choices of institutions are 
influenced by the characteristics of transactions, the costs of using institutions for 
handling labour dealings, the fairness and predictability of the outcome of contract 
enforcement mechanisms, and socio-cultural factors such as kin/ethnic status, morality 
and affection, (b) formal institutions in Isunga are either weak, ineffective or absent. 
So, farmers rely heavily on institutions embedded in social norms and networks to 
structure their transactional relationships, to ensure the performance of the respective 
parties, and to settle disputes if they arise. The study concludes that agricultural labour 
transactions in Isunga involve judgements of personal characteristics and social roles 
expressed as reputation and trustworthiness.  
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Women of Africa 
Sweeper  
Smearing floors and walls 
With cow dung and black soil 
Cook, ayah, the baby on your back 
 
Washer of dishes, 
Planting, weeding, harvesting 
Store-keeper, builder, 
Runner of errands, 
Cart, lorry, donkey… 
 
Women of Africa, 
What are you not? 
 
Okot p’Bitek  
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Glossary 
In this thesis, I have tried to use English words for local terms are as far as possible. However, 
sometimes local words have slipped through and I hope that this glossary will help to guide you 
(...and dampen your frustrations). 
 
Awak  (Lwo) Communal work/work party 
Aleya  (Lwo) rotational labour 
Askari  (Swahili) a guard; soldier 
Boda-Boda  Motorbike or bicycle taxi 
Bonna Bagaggawale  (Luganda) Prosperity for all 
Diira  (Lwo) Work party on credit 
Dog-bur  (Lwo) Advance payment 
Gurub  (Corrupted from the English word group) Farmer Group 
Jo-Palwo  (Lwo) The people of Palwo 
Kalulu  Lottery 
Katala  Work stint/task 
Kuku-kuku  (Lwo) Labour dispute 
Kwete  (Lwo) Local brew made millet, maize or sorghum 
Kwere-kwere  (Lwo) Shoddy work 
Kwon  (Lwo) Mingled maize, millet or sorghum bread 
Ladit  (Lwo) Address of respect given to elderly men, or men who are senior 
to you. 
Lakan Lim  (Lwo) Treasurer 
Leja-leja  Casual work labour, usually in form of task for cash 
Malaya  (Swahili) Prostitute 
Malwa  Local brew made from millet or sorghum drunk with long straw. 
Nywere-nywere  Misunderstanding 
Patana  (Swahili) Negotiation or striking a leja-leja deal 
Posho  (Swahili) Maize flour 
Pur kongo  Farmer groups/associations for Kwete beer 
Pur Cente  Farmer groups/associations working for cash 13 
Rudi  (Lwo) twins 
Rwot Keri  (Lwo) Chief of Hoe 
Shamba  (Swahili) Garden/plot/farm 
Tal  (Lwo) A 2 meters long measuring stick 
Uhuru  (Swahili) Freedom, and refers to independence in Uganda 
Ugali  (Lwo) Mingled maize bread 
Winye  (Lwo) Work sharing or labour transactions agreement 
Wonkom  (Lwo) Chairperson 
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Abbreviations 
CBO  Civil Society Organisation 
CBR  Centre for Basic Research 
CMB  Coffee Marketing Board 
DAO  District Agricultural Officer 
DLO  District Labour Officer 
DSIP  Agricultural Sector Development Strategy & Investment Plan 
GOU  Government of Uganda 
LC  Local Council 
LMB  Lint Marketing Board  
LRM/A  Lords Resistance Movement/Army 
MAAIF  Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries 
MFPED  Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
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NARO  National Agriculture Research Organisation 
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PMA   Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture 
TBA  Traditional Birth Attendant 
UBOS  Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
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Dollar values in the thesis are based on the conversion rate of Uganda shillings 
(January 2009). 
UPC  Uganda People’s Congress 
UPE  Universal Primary Education 
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Map 1: Location of Kiryandongo District and Bunyoro Kingdom in Uganda. 
Source: Drawn by Anni Hoffrén, Department of Urban and Rural Development, SLU 
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1  Setting the research agenda 
This study has its roots in Masindi District in Midwestern Uganda. From 1999 
to 2003, I facilitated a summer course there and was struck by the ways 
farmers shared resources in everyday life and during farming activities. I saw 
how farmers temporarily pooled their labour into work groups to complete 
specific tasks on members’ fields in succession and sometimes rewarded with 
beer and food. This behaviour conflicts with the view of Uganda’s market-
driven agriculture based on neoclassical economics, in which individuals are 
perceived as disembodied asocial beings, and economic exchanges are rational, 
utility-maximising processes performed by atomised individuals  (cf GOU, 
2010a; Bahiigwa et al., 2005; Collier & Reinikka, 2001). The fact that work 
sharing and labour exchanges exist means they are important to users. This 
kept me wondering why such labour behaviour has not received any attention 
from those concerned with agricultural development in Uganda. Caught 
between theory and practice, many questions went through my mind: why do 
labour exchanges or work sharing arise, how are they organised and what 
rules govern their operations? Are work parties just social events or 
meaningful economic activities, or a combination of both? Would the roles and 
character of the work groups change with increased commercialisation? These 
observations and questions motivated me to learn more about how farmers 
structure and enforce their labour relationships. I later found that institutions 
that are embedded in social structures and networks, such as personal ties, 
trust, reputation and ethnic identity are instrumental.  
1.1  Background to the research issues 
Before discussing the research, it seems important to provide a brief 
presentation of Isunga, where the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted.  
   18 
1.1.1  Introducing Isunga 
The village of Isunga is located in located in Kakwokwo Parish in Mutunda 
Sub-county, Kiryandongo District. The village covers about 21 sq. km and it is 
traversed by the Katulikire-Mutunda feeder road (see map 2 below). 
Map 2: Sketch Map of Isunga village.
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2008. 
Geography and economy 
The vegetation cover of Isunga village and surrounding areas consists of 
savannah grassland, woodlands, swamps and tropical forests (MDLG, 2006). 
The soils are predominantly deep and loamy, with varying proportions of sand 
and clay. The rainfall pattern is bimodal, from March to May and August to 
October. There is an average rainfall of about 1200 mm per year, and the 
heaviest rain is normally seen during the first period (March to May). Daily 
temperature varies between 17 and 27 degrees Celsius. The combination of clay 
loam soils, moderate and ample bimodal rainfall, makes Isunga and surrounding 
areas  favourable for agriculture. Nearly 90 per cent of farming is done by 
smallholder farmers on limited land holdings of about three acres on average. 
Women’s involvement in crop production is substantial (MDLG, 2006).  
Maize growing is the most popular farming activity. Almost all farming 
households are actively engaged in maize cultivation. They grow it for food 
and money, although the prices are not always good. Most farmers use simple 19 
farming implements such as hoes (jembes), machetes (pangas) and harrowing 
sticks. This kind of farming gives poor yields, as it is dependent on weather 
conditions, which are not easy to guarantee. Apart from maize, farmers also 
grow crops like cassava, potatoes, beans, sorghum, millet and groundnuts, 
peas, Irish potatoes, bananas, tomatoes and cabbages, mainly for subsistence 
purposes. Specific cash crops include tobacco, sunflower and cotton. People 
also keep livestock such as sheep, cattle, pigs and goats, and engage in diverse 
and multiple income-generating  activities. Besides, trade in agricultural 
produce and livestock, sale of used clothing, consumables, pottery and 
informal trading practices are common. 
Crop farming in Isunga relies primarily on human work efforts and the 
social mobilisation and management of labour. Thus, labour is extremely 
important in Isunga’s rain fed farming system, and it is a social factor used to 
increase crop production. Apart from household labour, the other common 
labour arrangements in the village are rotational labour exchange, work parties, 
and casual and seasonal wage labour.
1  Under a typical form of labour 
exchange, farmers temporarily pool their labour into work groups to complete 
tasks such as planting, weeding or harvesting on member’s farms. Labour is 
shared or exchanged under strict rules and rewarded with things other than 
cash; most often ‘good’ beer and food.  
Population and settlement 
According to Palwo elders, Isunga was formerly a small temporary shelter for 
people displaced when the Government of Uganda created state-run ranches in 
Kiruli, Kazebe and on the southern frontier of Nyamakere central forest reserve 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the soils are good for agriculture, many people 
chose to settle permanently. The village also had the advantage of being on the 
way to the Atura ferry-crossing site on the River Nile, linking the then Lango 
and  Bunyoro  Districts. Some of the road construction workers also settled 
permanently in the village. When the government ranches were restructured 
and privatised in the early 1990s, a number of people returned to their original 
homes or acquired land in the area. Isunga’s trading centre also started taking 
shape at this time. With the arrival of IDPs from Northern Uganda, many trees 
were cut down in Nyamakere  forest reserve to be used for charcoal and 
firewood. They subsequently needed somewhere to collect and sell the 
charcoal and firewood. This resulted in the development of Isunga  trading 
centre, which later became a trading hub with dukas (kiosks), maize mills, 
churches, clinic and beer drinking joints. 
                                                        
1 These are presented and discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 20 
In 2006, the population of the village was estimated at 1,950 people, with 
235 adult men, 330 adult women (including 40 widows), 190 so-called 
“youths” and the rest were children (MDLG, 2006). Isunga is multi-ethnic, and 
the predominant ethnic group is the Acholi. Other groups include the Lango, 
Palwo, Alur, Lugbara, Kuku, Barulli, Banyoro and Lendu in that order.
2 
The Palwo, however, are the indigenous inhabitants of the area and they own 
most of the land used for cultivation.
3 The other ethnic groups buy, rent or 
borrow land from them.  
However, in the last 30 years, there has been considerable migration to and 
from Isunga for various reasons. In the early 1980s, many people left the area, 
because it was considered unsafe due to the bush war being fought by the 
National Resistance Army (which later became the National Resistance 
Movement, the current ruling party in Uganda) in the neighbouring 
Nakasongola District. The reverse was the case in the late 1980s, 1990s and 
early 2000s, when the village and the surrounding areas saw an  influx of 
people fleeing the insurgencies in the Acholi, Lango, West Nile and Teso sub 
regions. Following a period of relative stability in the West Nile and Teso 
regions in the early 2000s, many of those who had moved to Isunga and the 
surrounding areas returned to their homes. In 2007 and 2008, a significant 
number of IDPs from the Acholi and Lango sub regions also returned to their 
home villages once relative peace had been restored there. 
Common services and the institutional landscape of the village 
The residents of Isunga share the limited public services found in the village 
with residents of neighbouring villages. Education is the most important 
service being shared. Isunga Primary School (a UPE school) has about 684 
pupils, but there are not enough classrooms and most classes are overcrowded. 
There is no secondary school in the village. In the struggle to reduce illiteracy 
among adults in the village, there is one functional adult literacy class run by 
the Kamdini Study Circle. There is no government-aided health facility in the 
village either. So, traditional healers and traditional birth attendants provide 
services to the villagers. However, some private individuals have opened ‘poor 
quality’ drug stores. There are about three such stores and one of them 
provides maternity services to expectant mothers. 
A market is held twice a week on Wednesdays and Saturdays at the trading 
centre. It attracts farmers from nearby areas and buyers from towns as far away 
                                                        
2 The Acholi and Lango ethnic groups are former Internally Displaced Persons who fled the 25 
year-long  armed conflict between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance 
Movement that ended in 2008. 
3 The notion of ethnicity and its role in labour transactions is discussed briefly in Chapter 3.  21 
as Gulu and Masindi. There are also retail shops at the trading centre where 
locals can buy consumer goods. The sale of local brews (e.g. Waragi, Kwete, 
Malwa and Kipanga) is a thriving business in the area. Men come together 
early in the morning, during the day or after work to sit, talk and drink (an 
activity termed ‘sitting’ in the village). The village has only one borehole, two 
unprotected dams and a stream (see Map 2).
4 Locals use the water sources to 
get water for drinking, bathing, washing clothes and to water their livestock. 
The villagers themselves are responsible for protecting and maintaining the 
water points. There are also four privately owned milling machines in the 
village, which are very important to households, as the mills grind their maize, 
millet and sorghum seeds and dried cassava  into flour. Small ‘restaurants’ 
selling tea and food can also be found, especially on market days.  
The other important institution in the village is the local council (LC1). The 
Isunga LC1 (or village government) consists of eight committee members. It is 
a formally established government institution. Villagers consider it to be 
useless, but they still use because it provides a link to other levels of 
government. The LC1 is legally responsible for development activities in the 
village. Yet in practice, villagers dislike it for a number of reasons (see Chapter 
7). The LCI helps in resolving conflicts in the village, and it has been 
instrumental in ensuring maintenance of the community roads and the only 
water dam. It also mobilises the community if there are any meetings or 
developmental activities in the area.
5 
Culture and religion 
The majority of the people in Isunga are religious. According to the Isunga 
LC1 office, there is a blend of religions in the village, with the Anglican 
Church of Uganda being the predominant religion. This is closely followed by 
Catholicism, Islam, as well as several ‘Born Again Christians’ (in that order). 
Traditional religion and cultural sites at Panyadoli hills are used by the Jo-
Palwo people to get ‘blessings’ from their gods  and ancestors. In fact, 
occasional consultation with traditional religious is not uncommon, even by 
those who adhere to formal religions. Since religion is known to have played 
some role in political factionalism in Uganda, and continues to do so today, 
this study did not explore farmers’ political and religious allegiances.
6 
Nonetheless, there were no indications during the fieldwork that religion is a 
divisive force in Isunga.  
                                                        
4 Queuing at the borehole for a 20 litre jerry-can of water can take up to four hours. 
5 Major incomes of the Isunga LC1 include market dues, fines, land fees, livestock movement 
permits, and beer permits. 
6 See Kasozi (1994) and Karugire (1980) 22 
Why Isunga? 
At the start of the study in 2006, the plan was to conduct fieldwork in five 
villages, representing the main agricultural activities in the old Masindi 
District: a village on the northern frontier of Budongo Forest, chosen because 
of its mixed farming system (community forestry, crop farming and livestock 
keeping); a fishing village on the eastern shore of Lake Albert to cover fishery; 
a village in Bujenje County to cover pastoral livelihood, a unique way of life, 
which is seriously threatened by population growth and conflict over land and 
water resources; a village in the middle of Budongo central forest reserve that 
exhibits a unique relationship between a conservation area and community 
forestry as a way of life; and the village of Kawiti  in  Kakwokwo  Parish, 
Mutunda Sub-county, Kibanda County (now Kiryandongo District) to capture 
the importance of reciprocal behaviour among vulnerable communities, the 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Northern Uganda. Barely a year 
later, I realised how ill-conceived the idea was, as it would involve huge 
resources, especially time, human and finance, which were not available to me. 
I then narrowed the scope of the study to Kawiti in Mutunda sub-county. This 
too, did not work in my favour, and I had to abandon it for security reasons. 
When I arrived in Kawiti in 2006, I learned of a bitter and violent conflict over 
land between the Banyarwanda cattle keepers and crop farmers (mainly the 
IDPs and Palwo). Three persons were killed the week I arrived. This prompted 
me to look for an alternative location, Isunga village, which was far away from 
the conflict area. Thus Isunga became the location of my research, because of 
the sad circumstances in Kawiti  and some unexpected logistical challenges 
(primarily money and time). An added advantage of Isunga was that did not 
need an interpreter, since I was able to speak and understand most of the 
languages spoken by the various farmers.
7 Moreover, the ethnic mix of the 
village offers a rich environment for studying the social dynamics of labour 
relationships in a changing society, with mixed cultures and increased 
commercialisation of the economy.
8 
Isunga village and the trading centre exhibit the characteristics of a rural 
growth centre, attracting ‘modern’ behaviour. It is quite common to  find 
                                                        
7 This fitted into Marshall & Rossman’s (1995) recommendations that an ideal study site for 
qualitative research should be one where entry is possible, with a high probability that a rich mix 
of the processes, people and structures of interest are present. Also, the site should provide space 
for the researcher to be able to build trusting relations with the participants of the study, and 
where data quality and credibility are reasonably assured. The village of Isunga  meets these 
recommendations. 
8 See Vincent’s (1971) work on the dynamics of a polyethnic community in Teso where she 
found that different ethnic groups in Gondo township use land and labour as facilities in their 
power struggles. 23 
young people at the trading centre drinking bottled malt beer (Nile Special, 
Bell, Club etc.) and playing pool as seen at outskirts of  Kampala city.
9 The 
trading centre is vibrant – in high season it is like a beehive, full of activity. 
People move between buildings throughout the day. See below some snippets 
of conversations and accounts from my field trip in 2007, which provide a feel 
of what life is like in Isunga. 
A day at the trading centre  
As I approached the trading centre, a little distance away, laughter drifts from a 
hut, out of which a man staggered followed by a woman yelling, “….why did 
you pretend that you had money when you had nothing? No one drinks my beer 
for free”. She holds his bicycle, takes it inside the house and returns to the next 
hut where a ‘murmuring’ like conversation could be heard. A woman passing 
through the trading centre on her way home, with a 5 litre jerry-can (plastic) 
container filled with Kipanga balanced on her head, met the LC1 Chairperson, 
who asked, “…are you still at it?” The woman smiled and did not answer. He 
followed her to her home on the southern end of the trading centre. After a 
while, when he had left, I passed by and overheard the woman tell her 
neighbours, “...that pig took my income for two days as licence and now he 
wants more. I refused and he threatened to punish me. He even called me a 
prostitute”. One lady shouted in response, “...get a knife and castrate him next 
time when he comes back...I will help you if I am around”. Laughter ensued. 
Two women entered the traditional healer’s house (Dr Mulunglungu). He is 
said to be able to cure sterility and impotence, and to help with luck in love and 
punish bad people. Out of curiosity, I also entered the house and saw some of 
his medicines spread out on a huge table. One of the women bought a piece of 
moulded  clay for stomach pain. But when I wanted to buy the same, Dr 
Mulunglungu refused to sell it to me. “...it does not work on people with big 
stomachs like yours”, he said. A young Murulli  man arrived as I was 
leaving…rolled up his shirt to have some incisions made and medicines rolled 
into his right arm. “This will induce the woman he has been chasing to love him 
for months”, Dr Mulunglungu whispered to me. On my way home from the 
trading centre, a mother stood in her compound shouting instructions to a girl of 
about six, “...come back quickly...no playing on the way with the sugar and if 
you drop it, don’t come back. I will break your neck!”, she said with a smile on 
her face. The young girl ran off without looking back.  
Two  Boda-Boda  cyclists returning from  Mutunda  stopped at the bicycle 
repair ‘workshop’ under a mango tree. They admired a new motorcycle parked 
nearby, and went into a hut to drink Kwete beer, probably to quench their thirst 
                                                        
9 Football (soccer), especially the English Premier League, is very popular in Isunga and 
surrounding areas (particularly among men). Parents have named their kids Beckham, Wenger, 
Rooney, van Persie, and even Ibra (I assume that this is short for Zlatan Ibrahimovic, the 
Swedish Footballer). At weekends, discussions at the trading centre are often about football, 
with lengthy debates about who should play what position in which team. 24 
and quell their hunger. A man, visibly under the influence of alcohol, sang and 
recited commentaries on life to mixed approval of the people around. From a 
nearby house, a middle-aged woman appeared with a long stick chasing a rat, 
which disappeared among the pumpkins at the edge of the homestead. Children 
cheered, laughed and generally looked amused at this. A few meters away, rude 
remarks were hurled at a young woman wearing a short, tight skirt. One elderly 
man remarked“...it is sad and disgraceful that women do not respect themselves 
these days. If it were in Amin’s days, the soldiers would have taught her a good 
lesson. We had a law banning such silly clothes and that was probably the best 
thing that damn man did for the country”, the Mzee told an amused audience of 
drunkards, as they peered at the woman’s ‘behind’ disappear from view.  
Beer and beer drinking Isunga-style 
The people of Isunga  love their Kwete 
and Malwa beer, as well as their local 
gin,  Kipanga. They make, drink, talk, 
and think about beer so much that it 
plays a vital role in their social 
relationships, including accessing farm 
labour. Friends share a glass of Kipanga 
and drink Malwa from the same pot or 
Kwete from the same calabash. ‘Big day’ 
celebrations such as Uhuru, Christmas 
and Easter are difficult to imagine 
without a large supply of beer. Even 
offering sacrifices to the gods of Palwo 
at Panyadoli hills would be incomplete 
without Kipanga and Kwete. Moreover, 
there is no age limit on alcohol 
consumption in the village and children 
develop beer drinking habits quite early 
(see picture 1). Political functions are also familiar with the free flow of beer. In 
a conversation with the Isunga LC1 Chairperson in 2009, he remarked, “my 
campaign was expensive because I had to buy voters Kwete, Kipanga and 
Malwa every time I held a rally. It costed me a lot of money and this is why I 
charge them for everything that needs my signature and stamp” and smiled.  
It should, however, be underlined that people are not only rewarded with 
beer in Isunga; it is  also extracted from those who break social rules. For 
instance, among the Acholi community, the ‘fine’ for domestic violence, or 
disrespect of elders, abuse or theft, includes large quantities of beer. In a 
conversation with my ‘beer pot’ friends, I was also told that the most severe 
Picture 1: Child drinking Malwa beer. 
Courtesy: Ochan, 2012. 25 
punishment given to a friend is to be excluded from their Malwa beer drinking 
sessions. It is therefore clear that beer defines both the socially valued and the 
socially censured roles associated with it (See also McAllister, 2004; Carlson, 
1990;  Stone  et al., 1990;  Saul, 1983;  Netting, 1964;  Sangree, 1962). With 
respect to crop farming, certain farm works are repaid in beer. For example, 
farm clearing (digging and ploughing), weeding and harvesting are activities 
on which beer parties can mobilise large work groups. Such parties facilitate 
cooperation among villagers, and the fact that no cash is required is a definite 
advantage for many farmers (cf McAllister, 2004; Geschiere, 1995; Netting, 
1964). But perhaps the most striking thing is the unique position that beer 
occupies in Isunga. Walking through the village, you are immediately struck by 
the smell of beer. Reputation, selfishness and generosity are sometimes 
phrased in terms of withholding or giving beer on credit, and those who do not 
give beer on credit are often denied labour when they asked for it.  
Well, this is Isunga village where I did my field research. So diverse is what 
goes on in it that I found it at first, difficult to distinguish between social and 
economic activities, yet most social and economic relationships seem focused 
on personal character and social behaviours expressed in terms of 
trustworthiness and reputation. Hence, my empirical research points to the 
importance of personal ties, trust and reputation in labour transactions in 
Isunga. 
1.1.2  Commercialisation of agriculture 
The agricultural sector remains the major source of livelihood for the majority 
of rural Ugandans. In recognition of this, the government has made 
modernising agriculture (understood as market-driven agriculture) one of the 
key themes for development in the country (GOU, 2011; 2010a).
10 With the 
agricultural modernisation efforts, the government expects the rural economy 
to move from subsistence agricultural production towards an integrated 
production and exchange system based on greater specialisation and market 
transactions (commercialisation). Since 1986, various efforts have been made 
to transform subsistence agriculture into a commercially viable, profitable, 
sustainable and dynamic sector that would improve the wellbeing of rural 
Ugandans by increasing household incomes, employment and food security 
(GOU, 2010b; 2010a; 2000). The government notes that, 
 
                                                        
10 The importance of agriculture in Uganda, and the various reforms are discussed in Chapter 
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“…improving the welfare of poor subsistence farmers will require that they re-
orient their production towards the market. More of their production must be 
marketed to enable them to earn higher incomes” (ibid, 2000:4) 
The significance of agriculture labour in the transformation process and for 
rural employment cannot be overestimated, given that agriculture employs 
about 90 per cent of rural Ugandans (GOU, 2011; 2010b).
11 Moreover, apart 
from being a critical factor of agricultural production, in some households, 
labour is the only productive asset they have and ‘selling’ labour power is an 
important source of income (GOU, 2007;  UBOS, 2007). Thus, given its 
importance in relative and absolute terms, it is surprising that when reading 
Uganda’s policy and programme documents on agriculture, the space given to 
the nature and role of labour in the country’s agricultural development is 
negligible (GOU, 2011; 2010b; 2010a; 2000). Instead, the impetus and nature 
of agricultural development has been framed with an emphasis on 
technological change to increase yield and productivity through market-driven 
practices  (ibid, 2010a). This is problematic considering that markets are 
abstracts, and how they operate in practice usually contradicts what economic 
models want. 
While markets for agricultural produce and inputs are underscored in 
Uganda’s agricultural modernisation drive, those who talk warmly of it think of 
the ‘market’ as an abstract ideal (what should be). They rarely make references 
to how commodity or input markets work in practice. This way of understanding 
markets has been criticised by Harriss-White  (2003)  for not taking into 
consideration the influence of history, institutions and socio-cultural factors. 
Apthorpe & Gasper (1996) also criticise mainstream economists for using the 
term ‘market’ as a ‘metaphor’ for mechanism, with emphasis on how the forces 
of supply and demand fix prices, even though there are other aspects of markets 
worth considering (cf Wiegratz, 2010; Klijn & Pain, 2007).  
1.1.3  Agricultural labour in rain fed farming
12 
Labour is a key asset for farming households in rural Uganda. The quality and 
quantity of labour available to the households, in terms of numbers, skills, health 
and education level, constitute the basis for constructing their farming activities. 
In Isunga, where farm mechanisation is virtually non-existent and most farm 
work is done manually, having access to necessary labour for crop production 
                                                        
11 As the country’s largest employer, the majority of women (83 per cent) are engaged in 
agriculture as primary producers (GOU, 2011). 
12 The term ‘agricultural labour’ refers to men and women who sell their labour for cash or ‘in 
kind’, and engage in reciprocal labour exchanges and work parties under a variety of contractual 
arrangements, including seasonal, casual and piece contract. 27 
directly affects the outcome and household incomes (UBOS, 2007). Besides, 
household labour supplies may change suddenly for various reasons. Sickness, 
death and wars, for example, can have a very detrimental impact on the 
availability of farm labour and crop yields (GOU, 2007). Because returns on crop 
production are so unpredictable, farming for the market does not necessarily 
provide farmers with the means to hire labour on a regular basis (ibid, 2007). 
This begs the question: what do farmers do when faced with labour shortages? 
The CS15-OJM (Rwakmot) story below offers some answers to the question and 
identifies some of the issues this thesis seeks to address.
13  
 
Rwakmot is an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) in Isunga. He is 43 years old 
and married to Leah, who is about 40 years old. They have two unmarried sons 
Daniel and Jacob who are 20 and 18 years old respectively, and they also take 
care of Peter (Leah’s brother) aged 12. Peter is a former child soldier with the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group that was active in northern 
Uganda, which prompted them to leave their home village in Acholi.
14 The 
Rwakmots  claimed ownership over three acres of land in Nyamakere  forest 
reserve, which is now used to grow food crops. The family also borrows two 
acres of land from a neighbour to grow sunflowers for cash. They pay for it in a 
50/50 arrangement, which entitles the land owner to roughly 50 per cent of the 
income. Their farming calendar is similar to those of the other farmers in Isunga, 
i.e. largely controlled by the arrival and availability of rain. Certain farming 
periods demand a large amount of labour (planting, weeding and harvesting). 
During such periods, they organise aleya  (rotational labour) or awak  (work 
parties) labour exchanges, “…which calls for good relationship with people 
around you”,  according to Rwakmot. The boys sometime ‘sell’ their labour 
(leja-leja) when they need money. Rwakmot also said that having good relations 
with neighbours and their few friends was crucial. Rwakmot expanded on this by 
saying,  “...they give us some help...especially food and labour whenever we 
need extra assistance. We also help those who help us; otherwise they stop 
helping us, you know”. Rwakmot is also a member of the Bed-Mot Group (…a 
beer drinking group), which is big source of conflict in the family, but represents 
an important source of farm labour to the household.
15 The group meets every 
Saturday afternoon around a beer pot to ‘sit’ and chat. Members also support 
each other with farming tasks when called upon. 
                                                        
13 Each household case study has been given a code referring which includes the household 
number,  the name of head of the household and his/her  sex. Thus, CS15-OJM is case study 
number 15; OJ is the name of the head of household and he is a male (M). It should be noted that 
respondents’ names (e.g. Rwakmot) are aliases, in order to protect their privacy. 
14 For an up-to-date scholarly work on the LRA and the Acholi people, see Finnström’s (2008) 
publication entitled Living with Bad Surroundings. 
15 Leah remarked that Rwakmot spends a lot of money on drinks, and they have quarrelled 
about it many times.  28 
The story tells us that apart from household labour, casual wage labour (leja-
leja), work parties (awak, diira and gurub) and reciprocal labour (aleya) are 
other labour arrangements farmers turn to during crop production.
16 The CS15-
OJM narrative also suggests that Isunga farmers are socialised actors and their 
labour behaviour, decisions and actions are shaped and constrained by the 
social context of the village, where trust, reputation, norms and social 
connections are important for accessing productive resources and livelihood 
opportunities. This calls into question the government’s assumption that rural 
dwellers are self-interested individuals who can easily turn to the market for 
their farming needs (GOU, 2010a), and the denial of  the ‘market’ as a social 
construction.
17 As mentioned earlier, markets are not simply forces of supply 
and demand. There are also social forces at play that maximise other gains. 
Rwakmot’s labour behaviour is by no means atypical or particular to just 
Isunga. Scholarly works from other parts of the world show the importance of 
‘interpersonal ties’ as a key social and economic means necessary for directing 
the flow of critical resources, information and power in society.
18 Shipton 
(2007), Donham (1999) and Seppälä (1998) have shown the socially embedded 
nature of rural labour relations in East Africa where access to labour, and 
rewards for work done, are determined by social and cultural factors (norms, 
custom, ethnicity, religion, age and gender). This is also true of Isunga and 
most of rural Uganda.
19 Yet, apart from Wiegratz’s (2010)  moral economy 
approach to the restructuring of produce trade in the Bugisu (Elgonia) region in 
eastern Uganda, there is little documentation on how socially embedded 
relationships are influenced by increased commercialisation and marketisation 
of the economy, or how commercialisation is affected by socially embedded 
relationships in polyethnic communities like Isunga.  
 
                                                        
16 These are described and discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
17 Bryceson  (2008), Wiegratz (2010), Harris-White  (2004), Havnevik & Hårsmar (1999), 
Seppälä (1998) and Apthorpe & Gasper (1996) have all alluded to markets as social institutions. 
18 See Portes (2010),  Harris-White  (2004),  Donham  (1999),  Landa  (1994), Hydén (2001; 
1983), Granovetter (1992; 1985), Seppälä (1998), Klijn & Pain (2007), Shipton (2007) among 
others. 
19 See Jones (2008) for an interesting contribution from Uganda’s Teso region. 29 
 
Picture 2: Finding farm labour in ‘gurub’. 
Photo: Opira Otto, SLU. 
Considering the efforts of the Ugandan government on market-driven 
agricultural practices since the mid-1980s, you would expect more labour 
‘selling and buying’ and less work-sharing. Yet as Rwakmot’s story suggests, 
labour dealings (including casual wage labour) are nested in social interactions 
and decision-making processes characterised by affection, moral and other 
socio-cultural factors (cf Harris-White, 2004:159). This, however, has received 
little attention in Uganda’s agricultural and rural development discourses, and 
the ‘oversight’ cannot be due to the infrequency of labour exchanges or a lack 
of knowledge of their existence. It should also be noted that, although the role 
of personal ties and social connections is important for accessing agriculture 
labour in the case study village, these social resources are not distributed 
equally. Those who do not belong to a particular ‘network’ of unique personal 
ties are denied the benefits of such relationships. But how are such ‘networks’ 
of personal ties organised, and how are they affected by increased 
‘monetisation’ of the economy? An exploration of how these various labour 
practices operate should provide insight into the dynamics of agricultural 
labour relationships in the study area. 30 
1.2  Issues of study 
This study examines the role and influence of institutions on agriculture labour 
transactions in Isunga  village, where the fieldwork for this study was 
performed. The objective is to understand how farmers structure, regulate and 
enforce their labour dealings in crop farming. The main issues of the study are 
presented below.  
1.2.1  The institutional concern 
Uganda’s agricultural modernisation agenda mentioned above is essentially a 
narrative of commercialisation and institutional change. The narrative includes 
creating the necessary conditions for increasing rural households’ incomes, 
employment and the fulfilment of secured food security through market-driven 
agriculture (GOU, 2011; 2010b; 2010a). Undeniably, such a process does not 
take place in a vacuum. It requires an institutional framework that supports 
commercialisation, and carried out in an institutional setting, subject to certain 
rules, regulations and procedures, as well as patterns of behaviour and attitudes 
(cf  North, 2006;  1995;  1990). Therefore, one of the requirements for the 
agricultural modernisation effort has been the development of an institutional 
framework that supports market-driven agricultural practices in the country. 
However, the main emphasis has been on the development of a legal and 
regulatory framework (formal institution) for transactions of farm inputs and 
outputs to function according to market mechanism (GOU, 2011; GOU, 2010b; 
2010a).
20 As a result, many laws and rules have been passed with the aim of 
easing market-driven agriculture in the country.
21 Yet with respect to making 
the reform more practical, many questions remain to be answered, including 
what influence institutions really have on labour transactions, how institutions 
work in reality, which institutions function well and which institutions matter 
to farmers. This is because of evidence indicating that ‘other’ institutions are 
more important to the users than the  ‘legal and regulatory framework’  for 
promoting agricultural modernisation. Therefore, there is need for a deeper 
understanding of the character of the ‘other’ institutions and the roles they play 
in the agricultural modernisation efforts.  
Many scholars have discussed the importance of institutions in economic 
transactions, social change or/and agrarian change in various settings (see Portes, 
2010; Schmidt, 2008; Hodgson, 2007; Searle, 2005; Williamson, 2000; Hall & 
Taylor, 1996;  North, 1990). Although some of these scholarly works are 
                                                        
20  By institutional reforms, the government means “…a favourable legal, policy and 
institutional framework that facilitate private sector expansion and increased profitability along 
the entire value chain developed” (GOU, 2010a:35). 
21 See GOU (2010b; 2010a; 2006c; 2006b; 2006a; 1998; 1997; 1995) 31 
discussed in Chapter 3, I will raise some of the issues here to set the agenda. 
Firstly, studying institutions is not the distinctive domain of any one discipline. 
Economists, sociologists, lawyers and anthropologists all lay claim to an interest 
in understanding and studying the role and influence of institutions in society, 
though with quite different starting points and focal areas.
22 Inevitably, the 
definitions and descriptions of institutions that emerge from these disciplines 
vary in scope and substance, and tend to open for criticism from other 
disciplines.
23 Moreover, the methods and actors involved in studying the role and 
influence of institutions vary from one discipline to the other. 
A useful starting point for defining institutions in this thesis is provided by 
North (1990) ‘…humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ 
and are ‘…devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in 
exchange’  (ibid, 1990:3). These encompass formal rules and informal 
constraints that determine what activities individuals are allowed to undertake 
and how.
24Along with scarcity and technology, institutions determine the 
opportunity set for individuals and the incentives they face (North, 2006; 
Roland, 2004). This thesis therefore defines institutions as,  
 
“…the socially established norms and rules that govern social interactions, with 
both enabling and constraining implications for individual freedom of action”
25 
I also recognise that while scholarly progress has been made in understanding 
institutions, it remains ambiguous and undecided as to what institutions are and 
why and how they matter. Therefore, this thesis goes beyond stating that 
institutions matter, to detailing which institutions matter in labour transactions, 
                                                        
22 C.f. Kasozi (2004) 
23 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss why and how the notion of institutions has 
developed to become widespread in use, even though it lacks a unified definition. Nonetheless, I 
acknowledge the existence of diverse and differing scholarship relating to the idea of institutions 
outside and within economics. In Chapter 3, there is a section on the synopsis of the different 
perspectives on institutions. However, this thesis uses the rational choice approach to explore 
agriculture labour transactions at a local (village) level, and the reasons for adapting it are 
described in Chapter 3. 
24 North’s (2006; 1995; 1991; 1990) description emphasizes institutions as: rules, constraining 
and enabling, shaping human interaction. However, Portes (2010) and other sociologists are not 
comfortable with this description (see Chapter 3). 
25 How I arrived at this definition is discussed in Chapter 3. However, the definitional ideas 
consist of three elements: (a) human relations and interactions, (b) the effects of rules on human 
activities and behaviour  (rules of the game)  and (c) constraining and enabling elements of 
institutions. 32 
and how and why they matter in a real-life context (i.e. the role, influence and 
outcomes).
26  
1.2.2  Interrelations of transaction, costs and institutions 
A labour transaction is an agreement between the provider and the recipient. It, 
be it work sharing, rotational labour and/or wage labour, requires cooperation 
between the persons involved, and the activities between them are not costless. 
Recipients and providers of labour must communicate to establish contact and 
enter into agreements, carry out the agreements, reward the labour provider(s) 
and resolve disputes when it arises. The costs involved in communicating and 
enforcing labour relations and the relational property rights that they are based 
on are known as ‘transaction costs’ (Furubotn & Richter, 2005; Williamson, 
1998; 1985)
27. They are incurred in order to reduce the risks of loss from 
transactions failure. If transaction costs or the risks of loss from transaction 
failure are too high, they will cancel out the benefits of such relationships, and 
labour transactions do not take place, with a subsequent loss of benefits to the 
parties involved. As rational beings, when structuring their labour 
relationships, farmers consider both the benefits and costs involved. This is 
probably what Coase (1992:716)  meant when he wrote, “…if the costs of 
making an exchange are greater than the gains which that exchange would 
bring, that exchange would not take place”.  
So, what are the specific sources of such transaction costs? In short, these 
lie in defining and securing property rights, identifying and establishing the 
terms of transactions, keeping track of those transactions, and ensuring that 
each agent involved in the transaction is in fact discharging his or her assigned 
role as agreed (Williamson, 1998; 1985). On the other hand, Shipton (2007) 
contends that whenever individuals borrow and lend resources, there are kin 
groups or other groups behind them with strong interests in their transactions, 
since individual interests are always  hidden behind group interests. 
Nonetheless, the creation and protection of the right to enter into a transaction, 
or the right to decline to do so, is fundamental. Thus, for a labour transaction to 
occur at all, it must be clear what types of activity a provider or recipient may 
effectively enter into. To ease the process, societies develop general rules to 
govern such transactions (North, 2006; Williamson, 1998; North, 1995; 1990). 
                                                        
26 This indicates that my research strategy has two aspects: (a) an extensive review of the 
theoretical literature on institutions; and (b) an empirical study of institutions within a chosen case 
study setting. 
27 A theoretical consensus on what transaction costs are is still out of sight. Therefore, to 
reduce the risk of misunderstanding this study, it is important to note that in empirical studies, 
direct measurement of transaction costs means many things. Refer to Chapter 3 for a detailed 
discussion.  33 
These rules are either voluntarily accepted or enforced by social sanctions and 
by law. The significance of institutions is that they not only mediate in labour 
relations that would otherwise be costly to arrange, but they also make possible 
undertakings that would not occur if they did not exist.  
Notwithstanding the above, literature on the topic reveals that when 
information is costly and property rights are poorly protected, agreements 
become hard to reach and enforce, and transaction costs become high 
(Furubotn & Richter, 2005;  North, 1991;  Williamson, 1985;  Coase, 1960). 
This results in fewer transactions, as high transaction costs may prevent many 
agreements from being reached. But if institutions increase the certainty that 
agreements will be honoured and property rights will be protected, then the 
parties concerned will be more willing to undertake transactions, including 
those that are impersonal and complex (Benham & Benham, 2001; 
Williamson, 2000). Although consensus exists among economists that 
institutions can influence people’s behaviour and relationships by their effects 
on transaction costs and the protection of contractual rights, it does not in any 
way suggest which institutions are best, or which type of institution is more 
advantageous to agricultural labour transactions.
28  
In the context of Isunga’s rain fed farming system too, the seasonality of 
crop production creates uncertainty and makes farming a risky business.
29 
Farmers therefore weigh up the different options available to them, and turn to 
the institutions that raise certainty and minimise transaction costs. If the cost of 
sharing or exchanging labour is greater than the gains it would bring, then the 
transaction might not take place (see Chapters 5 and 6).  
1.2.3  Focus on social embeddedness 
The concept of a transaction cost is useful for providing insight into the 
determinants of labour relationships through time (the process of how farmers 
identify and choose their labour partners, enter into agreements, implement and 
enforce agreements, including dispute settlement). North (2005; 1994; 1990), 
Furubotn & Richter (2005), Williamson (2000; 1998; 1985) and others have 
shown that many institutions are involved in resource transfers and economic 
exchanges, each with its own task, but their shared function is to reduce 
transaction costs, to protect property rights and thereby create incentives for 
transactions. This assertion, however, is disputed by scholars such as Portes 
(2010) and Granovetter (2005; 1992; 1985), who maintain that all economic 
actions are socially embedded and people’s actions are facilitated and 
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29 Refer to Chapter 2 to further discussions. 34 
constrained by the structure and resources available in the networks in which 
they are embedded. They are supported by Swedberg (1991), Uzzi (1997) and 
Landa  (1994), who argue that markets are socially structured institutions, 
infused with cultural norms and meanings. These scholarly positions are 
relevant for exploring labour behaviour and decisions in the ethnically rich and 
culturally mixed context of Isunga. 
To the architects of the Uganda’s agricultural modernisation plan, ‘modern’ 
stands for progress, the use of science, the application of impersonal 
instrumental rationality and its embodiment in institutions like the state and the 
law of contract (GOU, 2010a; 2000). This does not take into consideration 
farmer’s labour behaviour and decisions that are embedded in social and 
cultural relations, which are important to farmers like Rwakmot (CS15-OJM) 
since they allow them to share their labour power (and other resources), 
thereby diffusing farm labour ‘headache’  and ensuring collective welfare 
(security). The labour behaviours of farmers in Isunga are embedded in and 
mediated by a complex web of social relations. This is made possible by 
available institutions that guide such behaviour. Thus exploring their forms and 
consequences could highlight some of the issues (e.g. trust, reputation, norms, 
moral, affections) often overlooked by the transaction cost analysis; and raise 
some questions about the impact of ‘commercialisation’ on the institutions that 
guide and support it. 
Although Portes (2010) and Portes & Sensenbrenner (1993) have explained 
how embeddedness corresponds to trust and ‘social capital’, a critical reading 
of their contributions implicate them for portraying the notion of social 
embeddedness as a simple and convenient shorthand for social ties assumed 
simply to modify and enhance human economic interactions. Still, 
‘embeddedness’ (in terms of social connections, reciprocity and trust) is an 
important attribute of agriculture labour relationships in Isunga, and forms an 
important part of the framework to analyse the interplay of the economic and 
the social aspects of labour transactions in the village.
30 It may therefore be 
possible to find trappings of ‘market’ activities (in an economic sense) within 
social ties and covered in social institutions here. The embeddedness concept is 
therefore not used as an antithesis of the transaction costs analysis, but for its 
strength in a study that seeks to explain how the content and roles of certain 
institutions change over time. The likely tension between transaction costs and 
embeddedness brings to light how ‘the social’ and ‘the economic’ are entwined 
in Isunga farmer’s labour relationships. This helps explain whether and how 
the role and character of social institutions become more economic. 
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1.3  Research objectives and questions 
Although the Ugandan government recognises the role of institutions in its 
agricultural modernisation drive, it perceives them as ‘formal institutions’ with 
an emphasis on the policy, legal and regulatory framework within which to 
‘transform subsistence farming to commercial farming’  and modernise the 
agricultural sector (GOU, 2010b; GOU, 2010a). This thesis focuses on the 
‘other’ institutions (e.g. kinship/ethnic identity, trust and reputation, morality, 
affection) that the Ugandan government ignores. These are the institutions that 
farmers like Rwakmot (CS15-OJM) use in their farming activities and in their 
search for livelihood security. The fact that they exist means that they are 
important to users. Therefore, knowing why they exist in the first place and 
how they operate in specific contexts would shed light on the consequences of 
commercialisation on agricultural labour relationships, and what role they (the 
‘other’ institutions) play in the commercialisation process. The study is limited 
to agricultural labour, because it remains on the periphery of Uganda’s 
agricultural development efforts.  
Scholars from various disciplines acknowledge that institutions matter and 
play a significant role in governing and guiding human interactions and 
behaviours. Yet acknowledging their existence is not the same as 
understanding them. Therefore, by exploring the role and influence of 
institutions on agriculture labour relationships in Isunga, it is possible to 
establish, in some detail, which institutions really matter to farmers, as well as 
how they matter. My ambition is to investigate how the content and roles of the 
‘other’ institutions  ignored by the Ugandan government change with the 
increased monetisation of the economy. This involves an exploration of the 
rules that govern and regulate farmers’ labour behaviour and decisions in crop 
farming. In so doing, the study identifies the institutions that actually regulate 
and govern labour relationships in Isunga, and explains the effects of increased 
commercialisation  on such institutions. The general aim of the study is to 
contribute to the body of knowledge about the role and influence of institutions 
on labour transactions in rural Uganda. The specific objectives are: 
 
1.  To examine how institutions matter in a real-life context. 
2.  To investigate the institutions that structure, regulate and enforce 
farmers’ labour relationships, and identify which institutions actually 
regulate farmers’ labour behaviour and why they are used. 
3.  To explore how increased monetisation of the economy affects the 
role and character of social institutions in the village.  36 
Based on these objectives, it is clear that the study brings together theoretical 
and empirical considerations to answer the main research question: what role 
and influence do institutions have on agricultural labour transactions in rural 
Uganda? The following questions guide the thesis:
31  
 
1.  How do institutions influence agricultural labour transactions?  
2.  What institutions actually regulate agricultural labour transactions in 
Isunga, and why are they preferred over others? 
3.  How do social institutions affect the commercialisation of agriculture 
in rural Uganda (and/or vice versa)? 
The open-ended nature of the research questions is appropriate for studying 
what institutions are, what their roles are, as well as why and how they matter. 
This called for an understanding of the history of labour, institutions and the 
nature of crop farming in the study area. It involved direct interaction with 
farmers during the fieldwork, and formulating and reformulating conversations 
to elicit the required information. Answering the research questions involved 
investigating how farmers identify and locate their labour partners, reach 
agreements, maintain their labour relations, handle risks of disputes and how 
the latter are resolved when they arise.  
In short, the theoretical goal is to place farmers’ strategic decision-making 
about labour into the conceptual discussions of institutions, transaction costs 
and social embeddedness outlined above. The review of literature addresses 
questions relating to the theoretical definition: what institutions are, and how 
they can be identified and described. The empirical goal, on the other hand, is 
to understand the role and influence of institutions on labour relationships: 
which institutions are important, and why and how do they influence farmer’s 
labour behaviour and decisions? This called for a need to find and describe the 
different labour arrangements that farmers in Isunga  turn to during crop 
farming, as well as the different strategies they use to structure, regulate and 
enforce their labour relations. Therefore, the study does not aim to quantify the 
adaptation of the different strategies, but to understand why and how they are 
used. I used the case study approach because it is best suited for describing and 
addressing the exploratory and explanatory questions outlined above (Yin, 
2008). It also allowed exploration of the socio-cultural-historical context, and 
could accommodate the ambiguous boundaries between the institutions in 
question and their contexts. 
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1.4  Outline of the thesis 
This thesis contains eight chapters. The next chapter presents the study area 
and its context in relation to agriculture in general, and crop farming in 
particular. The purpose is to prepare readers for the empirical study. Apart 
from providing background information on its physical, economic and social 
dimensions  and describing rain fed crop production systems, there is an 
emphasis on Uganda’s agricultural development from an institutional 
perspective due to its strong bearings on this thesis. All these are intended to 
provide a broad understanding of the multiple factors that impact crop 
production and life in general in the study area. This understanding is an 
essential prerequisite for exploring the complex set of constraints, 
opportunities and dilemmas that farmers face in their everyday struggles to 
survive, as well as the institutional arrangements that make them survive. 
Chapter 3 introduces and discusses the theoretical concepts used to guide 
this thesis. The key purpose of the chapter is to explain the theories that this 
study relies on and anchor it in relation to relevant literature. It begins by 
looking at what institutions are (how they are identified and described), and 
then discusses the role of institutions through transaction costs and relational 
property rights theories. Insights generated from these theories help to 
understand the significance of institutions in labour transactions. The 
discussion then focuses on institutions that are important to farmers as social 
actors and economic agents. In the second part of the chapter, insights from the 
theoretical review in the previous section are used to develop and propose a 
framework for investigating agricultural labour relationships in Isunga. 
Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology (approach, design and 
process) of the study, based on the research questions outlined in Chapter 1. It 
sets the scene with a discussion of the qualitative dimension of the case study 
research approach. This includes the relevant epistemological and ontological 
issues, followed by an account of how the study was conducted. The chapter 
also explains how the case households were selected, the methods used in data 
collection and how data was processed and analysed. The chapter concludes 
with a consideration of the problems encountered during the field study and 
how these were overcome. 
Through an exploration of the household case studies, farmers groups and 
fieldwork experience, Chapter 5 investigates the various forms of labour 
exchange in the village. It concentrates on their existence, characteristics and 
functions. The chapter focuses on the major sources of labour: family labour 
(including child borrowing and lending), cooperative labour (aleya, awak, diira 
and pur kongo) and hired labour (leja-leja casual wage labour, seasonal wage 38 
labour and gurub’s pur cente). It also discusses how farmers find farm labour 
through gurubs (farmers groups). 
Chapter 6 examines the rules regulating labour exchange relations, the 
extent to which households make use of these and how they operate in practice. 
It begins with an investigation of how farmers locate their labour partners, how 
they enter into labour relationships, how they maintain them, and how they 
manage any disputes that may arise. 
 Chapter 7 examines the durability of informality in the village of Isunga. It 
argues that the prevalence of this informality is due to the absence and 
weakness of state structures in Isunga. This is clarified by looking into how 
labour disputes are settled by the Isunga  LC court and other bodies. Other 
factors that affect farmers’ choices of labour exchange institutions are also 
mentioned, as they facilitate an understanding of the persistence of certain 
labour practices. The findings are discussed along the following themes: (a) the 
costs of using institutions for handling labour dealings, (b) outcomes of 
enforcement mechanisms, (c) the ineffectiveness of the village council, and (d) 
the socially embedded character of labour transactions and how supporting 
institutions become more economics in contents and roles. 
In the concluding Chapter 8, I discuss my main arguments and reflect upon 
the theoretical and methodological aspects of the study as well as implications 
of the study. 39 
2  The Research Context 
2.1  Introduction  
This chapter presents the study area and its context in relation to agriculture in 
general, and crop farming in particular. According to North et al. (2007:47), 
context is, “…the existing social order, as determined by the organisation of 
society and the ways in which economic, political systems contribute to that 
organisation”.  Hence, this chapter provides information about the current 
situation in the study area not mentioned in Chapter 1. Isunga is what North et 
al., (2007) would refer to as a lower level social order, which also takes into 
consideration geography, place and people as important components. Indeed 
most Ugandans live and work at this level. The purpose is to prepare readers 
for the empirical study. Section 2.2 discusses labour transformation in rural 
Uganda during the last 100 years with a focus on Bunyoro. Section 2.3 expands 
on the introduction of Isunga provided in Chapter 1 by exploring livelihoods in 
the village, with focus on crop farming, before making some concluding 
remarks in section 2.4. All the above explorations are intended to provide a 
broad understanding of the multiple factors that impact farming and life in the 
study area. This understanding is an essential prerequisite for exploring the 
complex set of constraints, opportunities and dilemmas that farmers face in 
their everyday struggle for survival, as well as the institutional arrangements 
that make them survive (cf Pain & Kantor, 2010). 
2.2  Institutional and historical perspectives 
This section presents Uganda’s agricultural modernisation efforts from historical 
and institutional angles. The purpose is to identify the institutions involved in 
Uganda’s agricultural development process, and then to explore the different 
roles they have played in the transformation of labour in northern Bunyoro, 40 
where the case study village (Isunga) is located. In this way, I hope to show that 
the completeness of Uganda’s agricultural modernisation story depends on a 
good understanding of the different types of institutions involved, the roles they 
have played or the influence they have had in transforming labour in the area in 
question. Thus, the transformation of rural labour and resulting development 
outcomes are described below. The discussion is structured according to three 
well-defined periods in which the agricultural sector transformed into its current 
form: (a) colonialism and the introduction of the cash economy and cash 
cropping which saw a dramatic transformation of labour in the country; (b) the 
post-colonial state intervention era (1962 to 1981) during which the state 
established and institutionalised its dominant role in agriculture; and (c) the 
reform and liberalisation epoch (1981 to now) in which the Ugandan state rolled 
back its own intervention and redefined the basis of participation for activities in 
the country’s agricultural sector. These phases are described and analysed to 
determine the key events, influences and agricultural development implications 
for the whole period (i.e. from the colonial era to the present day); but first, a 
note on the Palwo special relationship with the Banyoro. 
A note on Palwo-Banyoro relationship 
The Palwo of northern Bunyoro are a cluster group of Lwo ethnicity. They 
settled in the area (present day Mutunda sub-county) around 1856 when their 
ancestors conquered the Chwezi (Karugire, 1980; Adefuye, 1971b). Although 
the Banyoro and the Palwo are culturally different – the former are Bantu and the 
latter Nilotic – they share a lot of history. The close interaction, which began 
long ago with the establishment of the Lwo-Babito dynasty, remains solid 
(p'Bitek, 1978). Adefuye (1971b) adds that the Palwo-Banyoro relationship is a 
special one, and has affected Palwo history, population density, customs and 
culture in many ways. For instance, through the practice of every Omukama 
marrying at least one Palwo woman, the Palwo saw themselves as the proud 
builders of the Bunyoro Kitara Kingdom (ibid, 1971b; 1971a). And, each time 
the status quo is tampered with, the Palwo would take to arm and fight Kitara 
rulers, not because they did not want to be part of the Kingdom, but because they 
want the special relationship unchanged. For an Omukama to be legitimate by 
Palwo standards, he has to be a full-blooded Lwo born of a Palwo woman, and a 
Mubito man (Adefuye, 1971b).  According to Adefuye  (1971b;  1971a),  the 
Palwo has never expressed the desire to break off from Bunyoro Kitara, a 
Kingdom which they founded and proud to be part of. To do justice to the Palwo, 
this thesis looks at the colonial history of Bunyoro and Palwo through the same 
lens. Thus, in my presentation and discussion of labour transformation and 
institutional changes in Bunyoro from the colonial era onwards, no attempt is 41 
made to treat the Palwo differently. This is because the drivers of change were 
externally initiated  and never treated the Palwo  favourably.  However, where 
necessary, references are specifically made to the Palwo.  
2.2.1  Colonialism, cash economy and rural labour transformations 
The most defining event for agricultural development in Uganda was the 
formation of the state of Uganda. This historical event set in motion other 
changes in the institutional landscape that can today be seen as the defining 
characteristics of the country’s agricultural development efforts. British 
colonialism created a new institutional reality that enabled the creation and 
establishment of a cash economy and the introduction of tobacco, coffee and 
cotton as traded commodities in Bunyoro (Doyle, 2006; Bazaara, 1997; Opio-
Odongo, 1992). These developments included the deliberate creation of 
codified institutional arrangements at all levels of the new Ugandan society. 
Existing institutions such as the kingdoms, chieftaincies and households 
evolved, and new ones such as the Uganda modern state and its organs 
emerged (ibid, 2006; Kanyeihamba, 2002; Mamdani, 1996).
32 
The 1902 Order in Council established British sovereignty and political, 
legislative, economic, administrative dominance over the indigenous rulers and 
people (Batungi, 2008; Kanyeihamba, 2002; Karugire, 1980). This created a 
new national authoritative identity around which other interests and identities 
had to adjust. The Governor, with his rule-making and rule-enforcing powers 
became the new reality of a dominant colonial administration. The interests of 
the Imperial British Crown rather than those of the traditional rulers now 
reigned supreme. Kings and chiefs were marginalised and lost a great deal of 
power  and authority. In Bunyoro  for example, even the chiefs that were 
previously under the sole patronage of the Omukama were forcefully made 
agents of the colonial administration or dismissed. These changes restricted the 
power of the Omukama and introduced new state powers and national interests 
of the colonial executive (Doyle, 2006). 
New forms of land tenure 
One major act of institutional legislation of the colonial authority was the 
introduction of a new form of land tenure in the country (Batungi, 2008; 
Bazaara, 1997). Bunyoro is a rather unique case in this regard, because when 
Uganda became a British protectorate in 1894, the Banyoro took up arms to 
resist British domination. However, when the British joined forces with the 
Kingdom of Buganda to fight Bunyoro, Nyoro military resistance was crushed 
and the Kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara ended up as conquered territory belonging 
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to the Imperial British Crown (Onek, 2009;  Doyle, 2006). One dire 
consequence of this move was that, more than half the land became the 
property of the Imperial British Crown property and designated as wildlife and 
central forest reserves.
33 A considerable portion of Nyoro land was taken from 
the kingdom and forcefully made part of Buganda (the so-called ‘lost 
counties’). Land was also distributed in plots to Baganda-appointed chiefs who 
held this property in private ownership (ibid, 2006). This new form of property 
rights introduced the potential for alienation, land sales and opportunities for 
personal agricultural husbandry. Land ownership and wealth creation from that 
time on, slipped out of the hands and direct patronage of the Omukama and his 
chiefs (Batungi, 2008; Doyle, 2006; Bazaara, 1992).  
Colonial legislation introduced new rules that  changed the social 
relationships and interactions that hitherto existed. These new rules were 
explicit in the sense that they were written down, and the rights they conferred 
to people were specified and codified. The rules were also implicit in that they 
represented a shift of decision-making authority over land from the traditional 
hereditary arrangements to the British Crown (Batungi, 2008; Karugire, 1980). 
These institutional arrangements created new and different enablement and 
constraints that dramatically changed the relationships and interactions 
involving the land, the state and the people of Bunyoro, and Uganda at large 
(Onek, 2009; Batungi, 2008; Doyle, 2006).  
Emergence of the cash economy 
Along with the new political order, there were also new forms of economic 
activities. The colonialists brought with them merchants and plantation farmers 
seeking to grow cash crops (cotton, tobacco, coffee  and  tea)  for export. 
Reading Doyle (2006), Thompson (2003) and Opio-Odongo (1992), it is clear 
that European farming interests put great pressure on the colonial authorities to 
establish reserves and land for growing cash crops.
34 Hence, an economy that 
was previously composed of subsistence activities, reciprocal exchanges and 
commodity bartering, began to be transformed under the institutional guidance 
of a unified state authority. Overnight, there were new interests and new roles 
for the new actors (bankers, merchants, agents of the British state, etc.) to 
engage in new economic activities. Commercial farming and trading emerged, 
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34 In 1921, the Carter Commission observed that Uganda had twice as much high quality land 
as Kenya and was therefore more attractive as a home for large-scale plantations. It recommended 
that the natives (Africans) should provide labour and be restricted to subsistence (and not 
commercial) farming, but the idea was never fully embraced, and was later dropped (Thompson, 
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expanded and became established under the protection and supervision of the 
colonial administration. However, the prospects of large-scale white settlement 
in Uganda, which had seemed so bright at first, faded with time into nothing 
(Opio-Odongo, 1992).
35 For the ‘natives’ though, the collapse of plantation 
agriculture represented a new opportunity for them as landowners. A 
smallholding class emerged, and Ugandans seized the opportunity and began 
growing small-scale cash crops, thus establishing a pattern of agriculture that 
remains institutionally dominant even today.
36  
Literature on the topic also suggests that the involvement in cash crops in 
Bunyoro was a marginal activity for inhabitants, which gave them leverage 
over colonial bureaucracy. This was because the whole political and economic 
infrastructure depended on their willingness to produce cash crops, yet they did 
not depend on the cash crops for anything more than paying taxes, buying 
clothes and other consumer goods.
37 It could also be argued that it was the on-
going shift in ways of living associated with the establishment of a cash 
economy that created the context within which the specific institutional and 
personal motivations to cultivate cash crops were derived, eventually becoming 
institutionalised in the form of cash crop smallholdings.  
The example below is about the tobacco sector in northern Bunyoro. 
Tobacco is picked for two reasons: firstly, it is widely grown in Isunga and 
surrounding areas, with a lot of labour challenges and socio-economic related 
problems due to the ‘contract’ nature of its production;
38  secondly, the 
introduction of tobacco production in Bunyoro  heavily transformed labour 
relationships there.
39 
Cash crop smallholdings: the case of tobacco growing 
The commercial production of tobacco in Bunyoro started in 1927, and since 
then it has remained an important cash crop and a part of everyday life for many 
people. This development was made possible by a complex interplay of rules and 
regulations, practices and customs, which defined roles and allocated specific 
activities in the tobacco sector to different groups in the Nyoro society (Doyle, 
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Association and British Board of Trade to expand cotton production in Uganda, and (c) the 
collapse in prices in 1920 which dealt plantation agriculture its final blow.   
36 With time, Banyoro were both encouraged and coerced by the colonial administration to 
cultivate food and cash crops. 
37 C.f. Batungi (2008), Doyle (2006), Kanyeihamba (2002) and Opio-Odongo (1992) 
38 See CS19-LOM, CS4-MOJM, CS20-COM, CS15-MOF narratives in chapters 5 and 6. 
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2006). The infrastructure and mechanisms needed to produce, process, and 
market tobacco were established. The ‘natives’ produced tobacco on 
smallholdings, while foreign private interests carried out the processing and 
trade.
40 This established some roles that have persisted to the present day, with 
smallholdings remaining the preserve of smallholder farmers whilst processing 
and trade is controlled by the British American Tobacco (U) Ltd, a foreign 
company. As cultivation of the crop expanded and export quality grew, new 
tobacco regulations were introduced (Bazaara, 1997;  Muhereza, 1995;  Opio-
Odongo, 1992). 
Along with the official colonial measures and restrictions, a mix of 
mutually reinforcing norms and customary practices also developed. For 
instance, having been identified as a cash crop, it became the norm for Banyoro 
farmers to be encouraged and coerced into growing it. The patronage chiefs 
and village headmen enforced tobacco growing and management practices by 
the book (Doyle, 2006; Muhereza, 1995; Bazaara, 1991). The enforcements 
were harsh, and poor husbandry was cruelly punished, sometimes even with 
whipping (ibid, 2006).
41 These unwritten norms of enforced cash cropping and 
smallholding were further strengthened by written  restrictions such as the 
establishment of controlled markets requiring colonial permits to participate in 
processing and trading in tobacco. In a few cases, when farmers and Asian 
traders managed to organise themselves into associations in attempts to gain 
greater control of tobacco production or processing, they were frustrated by 
contracting and licensing arrangements, as well as colonial regulations such as 
the Native Produce Ordnances, through which the colonial administration was 
able to control agricultural participation to the benefit of European farmers and 
their commercial interests (Doyle, 2006; Tosh, 1978).
42 
Since its introduction as a cash crop, the people of Bunyoro never enjoyed 
growing tobacco, and even today there are many negative comments about it 
such as Gafabusa nka Agalima Simonko (growing tobacco is wasted effort) or 
Okumatara nka Kalima Simonko (drifting aimlessly as a tobacco grower). Yet 
farmers still continue to grow tobacco for BAT, whilst their children suffer 
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exports/trades remained in the hands of a few dominant European and Asian merchants. 
41 On the use of force labour in Palwoland,  Doyle  (2006:129)  writes,  “…the District 
Commissioner orders all women were taken to grow sweet potatoes for about three months for a 
planter. Whoever resisted this forced labour was severely beaten. Consequently, most Palwo 
escaped from such ill treatment to Acholi District”.  
42 In the cotton sector for instance, each time an Asian businessman or native proposed 
installing a hand-gin machine in Bunyoro, the colonial government rejected the idea or 
application, arguing that there was no room for the small businessman in Ugandan cotton (cf 
Doyle, 2006:132). 45 
from a lack of food and ill health (e.g. kwashiorkor) as BAT extension workers 
strive for quality tobacco leaves for the market, a legacy of colonial practice 
(Muhereza, 1995). 
With tobacco contract farming, farmers keep their land rights, get access to 
markets and value chains, as well as support with finance, training, seeds, 
fertilisers, pesticides and so on (ibid, 1995). However, tobacco has an intense 
cultivation pattern and demands constant attention, leaving minimal time or 
resources for growing other crops (including food crops).
43 Of course, entering 
into such contracts is a private choice, but how much choice do farmers really 
have if their only access to markets is via a single dominant buyer? How much 
benefit can this arrangement bring the farmer if the buyer can dictate the terms 
of that contract? In essence, farmers end up as disempowered labourers on their 
own land, and that is probably why tobacco growers are referred to as the 
‘poorest of the poor’ (GOU, 2007; Muhereza, 1995). 
Taxation and coercion 
The motivations behind increased involvement of the ‘natives’ in the 
cultivation of tobacco and  cotton  were complex. Documentation and 
commentaries suggest that it was a mix of institutional and non-institutional 
encouragement, coercion and hindrance (Onek, 2009; Doyle, 2006; Thompson, 
2003; Bazaara, 1997). In Bunyoro, for example, it was customary that women 
worked on the land, while men took care of the cattle and fought wars. 
Moreover, it was considered degrading for men to work as labourers for other 
men (Bazaara, 1992; 1991).
44 It was not until men needed money and realised 
that it could be earned by growing cash crops that they did so (ibid, 1991). 
Together with the official encouragement, use of raw force by the colonial 
administration, and the population’s increasing willingness to work on farms of 
wealthy landowners, cash cropping was effectively established in Bunyoro. 
Reading  Thompson  (2003)  and Doyle (2006)  though, it appears that the 
colonialists were more occupied with how best to create a labour force in their 
colonial economy without really increasing wages and large-scale forced 
labour. After all, slavery and forced labour were ‘prohibited’; hence the only 
possible solution for the new country was work based on the ‘work of men’, 
who give their labour power because they desire the fruits of their labour. 
Therefore, it was essential for the terms of successful labour contracts to be 
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the Banyoro were lazy, backward and intractable (cf Doyle, 2006). In Mamdani (1976), reference 
is made to Nyoro as a word used in Buganda to refer to anything of low quality, dirty and locally 
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reasonable. There also had to be a consensus between the parties i.e. the true 
basis of all contracts (Seidman, 1973). 
To ensure sufficient supply of labour without resorting to raising wages and 
without violating the principle that the agreement should be voluntarily entered 
into, the colonial government found the solution in the poll and hut taxes, 
levied upon every male adult (Doyle, 2006; Thompson, 2003; Opio-Odongo, 
1992). The colonial administration considered taxation  the only possible 
method of compelling ‘natives’ to leave their villages to find work.
45 In this 
way, the cost of living for the inhabitants of the Bunyoro Kingdom increased, 
and it is on this that the supply of labour and the price of labour depended. 
Raising wages, the colonialists argued, would diminish the supply of labour 
since fewer external workers would then be able to earn the money required to 
cover a family’s hut or poll tax. Therefore, the insistence that the ‘natives’ 
should contribute their fair share to the revenue of the newly created country 
by paying his tax was all that was necessary on the part of the colonial 
administrators to ensure the ‘natives’ taking a share in life’s labour which no 
human being should avoid (Lugard, 1922).  
Accordingly, poll tax laws were enacted. Although the amount and form 
changed over time, the poll tax remained the major instrument for instilling a 
desire to earn money among the natives, something that the colonial 
administration so relentlessly pursued, indeed very efficiently throughout 
Bunyoro. This law greatly affected all adult men’s decisions, yet they had no 
control of it whatsoever. The introduction of the poll tax was a smart move 
since it also served as a labour recruitment device in Bunyoro and other parts 
of the country. In 2008, the Principal Private Secretary to the Omukama of 
Bunyoro in 2008 said,  
 
“...the  Bazungus  (European officials) in Hoima  (...the district headquarter of 
Bunyoro during colonialism) kept diaries...each time they visit a village, they 
would ask the village headman to arraign tax defaulters. The district officials 
would order them sent either to the few European farmers in the south of 
Bunyoro, or to work off their taxes on road works for the colonial government.” 
(Interview with Yolamu Nsamba in Hoima on 06/11/2008)  
Poll tax and hut tax laws were supplemented by other laws, but with the same 
effect. For instance, after crushing the Banyoro  armed resistance of 
colonialism, numerous Banyoro were forced to live in less fertile settlements as 
the fertile land were turned into game parks and forest reserves. Most of the 
settlements were too small for the populations imposed upon them, thus 
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forcing most Banyoro  to migrate to other parts of Uganda, especially to 
Buganda and Busoga, in search of employment (Doyle, 2006).  
As mentioned earlier, despite the prevailing official ideology of voluntary 
labour, forced labour was common. Compulsory labour for community projects 
was authorised for able-bodied adult males between the ages of 18 and 45.  
Male  Banyoro  who had been employed for three months of the preceding 
twelve months, were exempted from compulsory labour. Unless self-employed, 
they were subject to compulsory labour for sixty days each year. To avoid the 
effects of the Compulsory Labour Ordinance, many Banyoro preferred to work 
for the colonial administration, thus enabling them to choose when and where 
to work (Doyle, 2006; Bazaara, 1991).  
To ensure that ‘natives’ (employees) continued to work for their employers, 
ordinary contract remedies were deemed insufficient. Subsequently, Master-
Servant Ordinances were introduced and stringently implemented. For 
example, leaving employment without permission of the employer was a crime 
punishable by fine or imprisonment (Seidman, 1973; Brown et al., 1945). The 
Employment of Servants Ordinance of 1937 (paragraph 58) accorded state 
power to every employer. It was a crime to get drunk during working hours and 
to neglect to perform any required tasks. It was also a crime to carelessly or 
improperly perform any work in the contract, to use abusive language towards 
employers, or refuse to obey employers’ commands (or any other legally 
authorised person) (Brown et al., 1945). In short, the colonial administration 
used some innovative ideas to commoditise labour. However, it should be 
underlined that the laws were not always enforced or observed.
46  
Important institutional changes 
With  the onset of colonialism, Bunyoro underwent significant institutional 
changes as earlier values or beliefs had to make way or/and adapt to new 
influential institutions. This represented a significant change in the rule-making 
mechanisms of the kingdom. They introduced a new authority with direct 
power to regulate and enforce particular patterns of economic activity and 
behaviour. They enabled the new state authority to create constitutional rules in 
the new Uganda. These allowed changes in subsidiary institutions and 
associated rules that created and structured the activities, relationships and 
obligations between individuals and the state (Kanyeihamba, 2002; Mamdani, 
1996; Karugire, 1980). Traditional leaders’ customary authority no longer had 
a judicial, administrative or political monopoly. Traditional organs of 
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chiefs were dismissed for failing to follow orders from above, ordinances etc., and the common 
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discussion and customary elaboration that involved the Omukama  and his 
chiefs in law-making and adjudication were sidestepped. Indeed the Omukama 
eventually ceased being the prime political figurehead embodying law, 
traditions and customs of the Nyoro people (Doyle, 2006). This meant that 
within the emergent cash economy and cash crops production in Bunyoro, 
various actors looked increasingly to newly established authorities and 
institutions as sources of law and law enforcement.  
Over time the socio-economic activities of those persons involved in 
agricultural practices were regulated and enforced by various institutions and 
organisations. These included the colonial controls and ordnances that created 
the overall legal and administrative rules that regulated agricultural activities, 
and led to the creation of commodity boards for cotton, coffee and tea, which 
acted as the ‘crooked’ arm of the state, charged with overseeing the 
development and execution of state policy, as well as the observance and 
sanction of various sector regulations (Doyle, 2006). With changes in 
authority, there were also changes with respect to guidance and information 
about the rules. The colonial administration introduced and guaranteed rules 
that govern the agricultural sector. These new rules were more concerned with 
promoting the cash economy and less concerned with preserving the traditional 
subsistence economy (Doyle, 2006; Thompson, 2003; Bazaara, 1991). Thus 
actors were faced with new rules, which offered them opportunities that led 
them away from subsistence farming to cash cropping.  
Even the existence of a traditional administration that was forcefully 
modified to include the new responsibility for policing and enforcing new 
regulations within their traditional role, enabled effective enforcement. Hence, 
effective enforcement and compliance created new economic choices, such as 
provision of land and labour for farming, as well as farming activities 
(planting, harvesting, drying and marketing of crops). Individuals’ choices to 
participate as smallholders were to become institutionalised within a rather 
modified traditional setting: the cash crop smallholding.  
2.2.2  Post-colonial state interventions in agriculture 
A short period of relative high economic growth immediately after 
independence was followed by twenty years of political turbulence, military 
dictatorship, civil wars and collapse in the country’s economic fortunes 
(Bazaara, 1997; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1996). This era also saw the transformation 
of the agricultural sector from colonial embodiment into an indigenously 
controlled post-colonial manifestation. The driving force, however, was the 
constant search for political and economic progress and stability, and the 49 
relentless cycles of political strife and economic volatility (Bazaara, 1997; 
Kasozi, 1994; Karugire, 1980).  
After gaining independence from the British in 1962, Uganda went in 
search of political independence, economic development and 
‘Ugandanisation’.
47 This involved an ideological departure from the policies 
that dominated the colonial era. However, the focus was on controlling the 
economy, and a political drive to create the political and economic conditions 
designed to rid the new Uganda of the relics of colonial control and continuing 
dependency on the UK (Kanyeihamba, 2002; Bazaara, 1997). However, most 
strategies reflected the all-embracing role of a dominant state. Over the years, 
the socio-political and economic developments included a series of 
governmental changes, including military coups and civil wars;
48 sweeping 
constitutional and administrative changes;
49 as well as a collapse of the 
economy and the deterioration of social welfare.
50 
This period was dominated by state interventions and regulation of private 
economic activities. The move towards a predominantly interventionist state 
with an extended scope of activity was initially reflected in national political 
pronouncements and policy statements, such as the Move to the Left and the 
Common Man’s Charter 1969 (Onek, 2009; Kanyeihamba, 2002; Mamdani, 
1983). It was later to be overtly expressed in presidential written orders, such 
as the Nakivubo  pronouncements of 1970, decrees and national legislation 
establishing greater state control of national assets.
51 It also saw the extension 
of governmental control over non-state organisations (Banking Act 1969; 
Cooperative Statutes Act 1970; Trade Unions Act 1970). 
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48 The short period of relative economic growth was followed by more politically and 
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military proclamation in 1971 followed by rule by military decrees and proclamations between 
1971 and 1979, and again in 1985 when the military took power for the second time. 
50 A collapse of key social development indicators, hundreds of thousands of people lost their 
lives or were persecuted, political intolerance and violence led to a civil war in the southern part 
of the country from 1981 to 1987, followed by another one in northern Uganda from 1987 to 
2008. 
51 The Nakivubo Pronouncement was a commitment issued by President Milton Obote, 
outlining the increased nationalization of major industries as part of the move to towards 
socialism described by the Common Man’s Charter of 1969 (the ‘Move to the Left’). 50 
State interventionism embedded in national institutions emerged, as the 
Lancaster (independence) constitution was itself being transformed by 
constitutional and non-constitutional means, first into a unitary republic, then 
into a one-party state and eventually into a military dictatorship. Rulemaking 
mechanisms at the national level were transformed. Subsequently, parliamentary 
rule, an independent judiciary and an elected executive gave way to rule by 
pronouncements and decrees. The Omukama and his fellow traditional rulers and 
authorities were overshadowed as central government-  appointed chiefs, 
bureaucrats and executive presidents became more powerful and authoritarian. 
The government became increasingly characterised by bureaucratic control and 
intervention; and compliance was often achieved through intimidation, patronage 
or coercion (Onek, 2009; Mamdani, 1996). The state apparatus also expanded 
with the nationalisation of private foreign enterprises and the appropriation of 
property, often benefiting favoured ethnic groups, bureaucrats, politicians and 
military appointees. State laws were propagated to change established notions of 
property and tenure. As shall be explained below, state control and a regulation 
of channels to market were the dominant feature of this period, as various crop 
marketing boards were created (Bazaara, 1997). 
Commodity marketing boards as tool of intervention  
The post-independence transformation of the agricultural sector began with the 
creation of various cash crop marketing boards such as the Lint Marketing 
Board (LMB) and the Coffee Marketing Board (CMB). The marketing boards 
were more interventionist in character than the various industry boards created 
by the colonial administration. The boards were created as government 
monophonies encompassing a wider regulatory, buying, promotional and 
marketing remit than the cotton, coffee and tea industry boards that were 
created during colonialism. The boards had additional authority over the 
marketing of cash crops throughout the country. The state also used the 
marketing boards to regulate the value and benefits accruing to participants in 
the specific cash crop sector. Private sector companies and local cooperatives 
were restricted to primary processing (Bazaara, 1997). Since cotton was more 
popular than the other crops in northern Bunyoro during this time, it is used 
here to explain the interventionist characters of the Lint Marketing Board. 
The case of the Lint Marketing Board 
As mentioned above, the British colonial administration introduced cotton as a 
cash crop in Uganda quite early (1903). It was to serve the dual purpose of 
introducing a cash economy in the new country, as well as a raw material for 
industries in Europe (Doyle, 2006; Opio-Odongo, 1992). Consequently, the 51 
ginning and marketing of cotton was regulated under the Cotton Act, revised in 
1964, and the Lint Marketing Board Act of 1959, later amended in 1976. The 
LMB had a monopoly for cotton lint and seed sales, both domestically and 
internationally. Thus, acting as a government agency, the LMB was meant to 
protect cotton farmers, control prices and protect foreign exchange earnings, 
extract taxes and promote growth and quality.  
The 1976 amendment gave the LMB further and more complete 
monopsonistic powers to encompass all marketing, processing, regulating and 
exports of cotton. The intent of the government was to promote the health and 
growth of the sector and to protect it from price fluctuations, manage exchange 
earnings, ensure quality control and administer tax and customs revenues. 
Bazaara  (1997)  claims that whilst the LMB was used to enforce the state 
institutional intervention, it was distinctively different from the direct coercion 
of the colonial administration. However, farmers were faced with the mixed 
motivational effects of a state institutional arrangement (backed by state 
agents) impinging on farmers’ choices and behaviours by offering the incentive 
of possible personal benefits or the avoidance of personal losses.
52 
Until 1976, the LMB did a good job acting as the prime regulator, buyer, 
processor and exporter for the cotton sector. But the next ten years saw 
Uganda’s economic performance decline under the diktat and economic 
mismanagement of the Amin’s military regime. The role and significance of 
the LMB for cotton production and marketing followed an uneven path. Firstly, 
it grew and then collapsed when farmers turned their backs on cotton 
production. Moreover, the continued nationalisation of key industries and 
commercial organisations, together with the expulsion of the entrepreneurial 
and productive Asian communities in 1973, led to huge outflow of expatriates 
and professionals from the country (Bazaara, 1997;  Bigsten & Kayizzi 
Mugerwa, 1995). Moreover, the ensuing mismanagements of the nationalised 
industries, commercial organisations and other properties or businesses, led to 
a collapse in tax revenues (Otto, 1997; Ochieng, 1991).
53 
The LMB, together with many of the other nationalised organisations, 
suffered enormously from political interference, patronage and poor 
remuneration. It was in no position to meet its challenge – the LMB and other 
state bodies were therefore criticised for  being inefficient, badly managed, 
counterproductive regulatory interventions. Moreover, the LMB lacked the 
sectoral oversight and governance it was created for, and it never took   
                                                        
52 The activities of the LMB were similar to state participations in other cash cropping or 
commercial activities. 
53 The more the national revenues fell, the more the country became dependent on its 
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smallholder interests into consideration (Otto, 1997). In short, the LMB was 
simply a vehicle for extracting rents and taxes from cotton growers and 
primary processors, thus providing revenues for an unpopular government that 
was unable to collect revenues in other ways, yet lining the pockets of 
politically appointed ‘big men’ and senior officials. Otto (1997) found that the 
institutional and administrative activities of the LMB led to a decline in 
farmers’ morale and a dramatic decline in cotton production during this period 
(ibid, 1997). Smallholders switched their attentions to food crops such as 
maize, beans, millet and cassava. Moreover, the quality of cotton lint declined 
as there was no advantage in selling high quality cotton (safi), and those few 
farmers who grew cotton chose to sell it as kafifi (poor quality cotton). Cotton 
exports fell sharply as the amount of quality cotton that the LMB was able to 
attract from smallholders declined dramatically (ibid, 1997).  
Apart from the dominant and restricting role of the LMB in the cotton 
sector, farmers too faced numerous restrictions and constraints initiated by 
political and economic developments at the macro level. For instance, in the 
late 1960s, all crown land in the country was vested in the state. This had huge 
impact on ownership and tenure security in Bunyoro as it reminded them of the 
agony of British colonialism, when it was declared that all land in Bunyoro 
was ‘British Crown Land’ when Bunyoro was conquered.
54 Together with the 
nationalisation agenda and setting up of the land commission by the UPC 
government of Milton Obote, Idi Amin’s confiscation of Asian properties, land 
reform decree led to reduced confidence in land ownership and title (Batungi, 
2008). Dominated by restrictive institutions and difficult socio-political 
environments, the cotton sector more or less collapsed. 
Effects of state intervention on agriculture 
The creation of a state republic with a powerful executive president, along with 
unchallenged interventionist socialist ideologies, created an environment in 
which new administrative arrangements were set up (Kanyeihamba, 2002; 
Karugire, 1980). As the state used its institutional influence to expand its 
domain of political and economic control, it reallocated the roles and proceeds 
of agriculture, as well as enforced specific patterns of farming through 
regulation, institutionalised coercion, intimidation, patronage and 
organisational controls (Bazaara, 1997; 1995). The state became an influential 
reality in every citizen’s day-to-day activities. It was not only the control of 
land, labour and capital that passed to state institutions; the state also 
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intervened to control commodities distribution and pricing through state 
institutions such as Food and Beverages Ltd, Produce Marketing Board (PMB) 
and others (Bazaara, 1997). 
With the extension of state control and influence, new groups of interests 
emerged. For instance, when the country was faced with the vacuum left by the 
expelled Asian businesses and with the mixed incentives of economic 
necessity, political coercion and rewards, new groups of bureaucrats, 
entrepreneurs, soldiers and politicians used their positions to go into agri-
businesses, as well as engage in rent-seeking activities (Bazaara, 1997). Not 
surprisingly therefore, the new actors did not prioritise programmes for 
agricultural development, or the redistribution of wealth to aid the poorer, rural 
population (ibid, 1997). This new gathering of ‘big men’ overshadowed the 
appointed leaders that had dominated the latter era of colonialism.  
Bazaara  (1997)  also claims that a culture of rent-seeking and wealth 
acquisition emerged, and established roots in Bunyoro and beyond. This 
created a new set of social and economic winners and losers. But with 
smallholders too many and scattered to control directly and too important to 
the national economy to be ignored, they were able to continue with their 
farming activities, remaining well beyond the direct control of the ‘heartless’ 
state. Even so, with the state able to manage and control commodity markets 
and producer prices, smallholders’ incomes became even more subject to state 
policy and regulation (cf Bazaara, 1997; Muhereza, 1995). Subsequently, faced 
with high prices of purchased goods, shortages of farm inputs and higher 
taxation, farmers experienced falling incomes and declining returns. They 
responded to this state of affairs by refusing to participate in the state-
controlled market space. Most smallholders simply abandoned cultivating the 
traditional cash crops (tobacco and cotton) in favour of food crops (Belshaw et 
al., 1999; Otto, 1997; Bazaara, 1992). 
2.2.3  Economic liberalisation and structural reforms  
Following the liberation war that toppled Amin’s military regime in 1979, 
increased oil prices during 1973-1974 and 1979-80, deteriorating terms of trade 
for primary exports and rising interest rates, the country and economy was in 
deep crisis (Bigsten & Kayizzi Mugerwa, 1995; Ochieng, 1991). The country 
faced high levels of inflation, macroeconomic imbalances and balance of 
payment pressures. Much of the infrastructure was in a poor condition, 
agriculture was severely disrupted and most sectors of the economy were in a 
poor state (World Bank, 2006;  Collier & Reinikka, 2001;  Belshaw  et al., 
1999). Moreover, the country had experienced great losses of the economically 
active population and skilled personnel as a result of war, disease (especially 54 
HIV/AIDS) and exile. The civil administration had been weakened and 
political participation was almost abandoned. There had effectively been a 
complete  collapse in all sectors of the economy, with dire effects on crop 
farming and citizens’ wellbeing (Bazaara, 1997; Ochieng, 1991). 
The ideological focus was on reform, rehabilitation and liberalisation, as well 
as the intervening influences of international financial institutions and donor 
countries  (Jones, 2008;  Bazaara, 1997;  Bigsten & Kayizzi Mugerwa, 1995; 
Mamdani, 1990b). The period between 1987 and 1990 in particular was 
dominated by the Economic Recovery Programmes, which had dramatic effects 
on the economy. The country’s economic decline was reversed and there was 
annual average GDP growth of 7 per cent during this period (Bahiigwa et al., 
2005;  Collier & Reinikka, 2001;  Bazaara, 1997). A broad programme of 
institutional reforms underpinned the reform policies, which was initiated by a 
government desperately in need of money (foreign currency), sponsored by the 
IMF and World Bank and supported by the wider donor community.
55 The 
programme involved rolling back the reach and scope of state interventions, and 
the direct state involvement in regulating and controlling social and economic 
activities across different sectors of the economy. It also involved constitutional 
reform to counter the effects of many years of political strife, disruption of 
administration, and a disregard of property rights (cf  Kanyeihamba, 2002; 
Nsibambi, 1998). The key institutional features representing these changes were 
the establishment of local administrative councils with local people electing their 
own representatives, the restoration of an elected parliament, the introduction of 
‘no-party’ democracy, and later multi-party political processes, as well as the 
introduction of legislation to reform key sectors of the economy such as banking, 
agriculture, health and education (Mwenda & Tangri, 2005; Collier & Reinikka, 
2001; Nsibambi, 1998). The effect of this institutional change on agriculture is 
discussed below.   
Institutional change within the agricultural sector  
Within the agricultural sector, the liberalisation era was characterised by 
widespread institutional reforms aimed at stimulating sectoral production (yield 
and productivity), processing and trade through liberalisation, and encouraging 
non-state participation and investments  (Wiegratz, 2010). In practice, this 
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involved tax and regulatory changes, as well as organisational reform (Ellis & 
Bahiigwa, 2003; Collier & Reinikka, 2001; GOU, 2000). As part of the reform, 
taxation on farm produce, exports and sales was abolished. Pre-financing 
arrangements and joint ventures with foreign companies were permitted. Private 
participation in all aspects of agricultural production, processing, trade and 
export were permitted. Moreover, the country’s liberalised foreign exchange 
markets made it possible for foreign companies to enjoy tax holidays for up to 
two years, as well as to freely repatriate profits to their owners across the globe 
(Belshaw et al., 1999). As part of the regulatory and institutional reforms, all 
state-run marketing boards were abolished and their regulatory roles were 
restricted. Eventually, the market for agricultural inputs and outputs was freed to 
open up for participation. The role of the state was limited to protect property 
rights, though some new authorities, including the Uganda Cotton Development 
Organisation, Uganda Coffee Development Authority and Uganda Tea 
Development Agency, were established as new statutory regulatory bodies to 
monitor and regulate production, and to advise the government on policy matters 
(GOU, 2011; GOU, 2010a; GOU, 2010b; GOU, 2000).  
The reforms were meant to create an environment for the development of 
effective private and competitive markets for agricultural produce and inputs in 
the country. Supporters of the reforms argued that farmers would gain more 
freedom in terms of which crops to grow, how to market them and to whom. 
Put simply, the liberalisation of the agricultural sector would provide 
conditions for greater competition in agricultural markets among rural farmers, 
simulate growth  and facilitate a move out of poverty (GOU, 2004;  2000; 
Collier, 1999; Lateef, 1991; Ochieng, 1991). On the other hand, critics of the 
reforms raised concerns stating that the presumed impact of liberalisation 
policies, stimulating increased production due to increased prices and/or 
incomes, was not tenable because of other constraints on agricultural 
production.
56 At worst, the reforms would destabilise prices, widen the income 
distribution gap in the country and reduce farmers’ access to low-cost inputs 
(Dijkstra & Kees van Donge, 2001; Belshaw et al., 1997; Mamdani, 1991; 
1990b).  Mamdani  (1990b)  observed that supporters of liberalisation 
programmes tended to presume that Uganda’s rural areas were 
undifferentiated, and that the benefits of increased prices would benefit rural 
dwellers equally. Yet rural Ugandans are differentiated along social, gender 
and ethnic lines. This differentiation meant that certain social categories had 
limited access to productive resources (land, capital and agricultural labour), 
and would therefore not benefit from increased prices (cf Bazaara, 1991). 
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Effects of liberalisation on agriculture 
The effects of the liberalisation of agriculture were diverse and dramatic. Most 
notably, there was a rapid influx of re-entrants and new entrants to various 
agricultural activities. Increases in prices excited many farmers, although they 
later dropped again (GOU, 2001). Yet farmers were sometimes accused of 
paying less attention to quality in their rush to get crops to market, whilst 
middlemen were accused of cheating farmers with poor quality assessment, 
tampering with measuring scales, and putting undue pressure on farmers to sell 
their produce even when the crops were not yet ready for harvest (cf Wiegratz, 
2010). Some exporters even began to develop closer links with middlemen and 
farmers, employing commissioned field agents to extend their reach deeper into 
the villages to find securer and cheaper sources of produce (Bazaara, 1997).  
The intervention of international financial institutions and donor agencies 
with the power to influence state authority and policy played a crucial role in 
initiating actions to reform Uganda’s agricultural sector and reduce state 
influence and involvement in agricultural production and marketing. The 
changes meant that farmers could produce more for the market. Subsequently, 
the availability and significance of inputs (labour, land and capital)  for 
agricultural production, as well as trade in both agricultural inputs and outputs, 
increased  (World Bank, 2006;  Collier & Reinikka, 2001;  Bazaara, 1997). 
Increased and open access to various agricultural markets also meant that 
across the entire production and marketing chain, increases in relative possible 
returns were associated with increases in relative risks. Farmers could get more 
for their produce, but were no longer protected by government-guaranteed 
prices. Renewed incentives to dedicate capital, labour and land to agricultural 
production increasingly depended on ability, knowledge and information. As 
such, success increasingly became dependent on business acumen, innovation 
and the ability to acquire, manage and utilise factors of production (cf World 
Bank, 2006; Launder, 1998). 
Irrespectively, the change from the economic practices of the interventionist 
epoch represented a remarkable institutional change. The interventionist laws 
and norms, associated with institutions of earlier post-colonial governments were 
dismantled. Instead, focus was now on setting constitutional and administrative 
rules and avoiding getting involved in details of regulatory rules. A new ideology 
was also emerging at the national level, in addition to a sense of identity that was 
to shape national and agricultural socio-economic behaviour (Kabwegyere, 2002; 
Nsibambi, 1998). Farmers were once again free to associate on the basis of 
shared interests, and to lobby the government to meet these interests. Farmers 
groups, cooperatives and other local non-governmental associations were formed 
and they were no longer seen as competing with the authority of the state. Hence, 57 
more decisions and practices were left to farmers to handle. Formal and informal 
codes of practice thereby emerged. Such wider participation also meant more 
individual choices and risk of falling prey to unexpected outcomes such as price 
instability, ‘immorality’, and climate and weather changes.
57 The country’s 
agricultural sector became multifaceted and complex, with new roles requiring a 
wider range of abilities and competence. Nonetheless, there was (and still is) a 
need for more informal interactions to gather information and share resources for 
farming. Thus, greater attention is given to identifying shared interests, and 
developing new ways of cooperating and competing. After all, individual farmers 
and other actors could no longer limit their concern to just the immediate 
activities affecting them locally, as agricultural market prices became 
increasingly subject to international influences (World Bank, 2006; Collier & 
Reinikka, 2001). 
2.2.4  Decentralisation and plans for modernising agriculture 
Decentralisation is another important institutional reform that has a bearing on 
this study. Uganda implemented major decentralisation programmes from the 
late 1980s to the mid-1990s, where a highly centralised state underwent 
considerable decentralisation following the transfer of powers, functions and 
services from central government to local councils (Kabwegyere, 2002; 
Nsibambi, 1998; GOU, 1997; 1995). The decentralisation agenda included the 
transfer of real power to the districts, bringing political, economic and 
administrative control over services to where they are delivered, improving 
financial accountability by closing the gap between tax collection and service 
provision, as well as achieving democracy involving people at all levels (Jones, 
2008; Bahiigwa et al., 2004; Nsibambi, 1998). The above were to contribute to 
development by empowering the people and institutions at every level of the 
Ugandan society; improving access to basic services; increasing people’s 
participation in decision-making; assisting in developing people’s capacities, as 
well as enhancing governmental responsiveness, transparency and 
accountability (Ahmad & Brosio, 2009; Onyach-Olaa, 2003; Nsibambi, 1998). 
Decentralisation therefore provides the framework within which the pillars of 
the agricultural modernisation agenda are to be implemented.
58 
The transfer of power and responsibility to the local people received praise 
from a number of international scholars. Francis & James  (2003:325)  for 
instance write, “…it is one of the most far reaching local government reform 
programs in the developing world”; whilst Mitchinson (2003:241) described it 
as  “…one of the most radical devolution initiatives of any country at this 
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time”. Jones (2008:63) noted that, “...the transfer of decision-making powers 
closer to the point of delivery, was the signature of reform of the 1990s, and 
links Uganda into a much larger story of political reform across the African 
continent”. Even so, it has to be stressed that the rationale for decentralisation 
in Uganda was political. It came at a time when there were loud calls for a need 
to restore democracy and return power to the people. Hence, there was a clear 
need to implement it speedily and holistically, for the political strategy to 
install a participatory, grassroots-based and popular democracy to work 
(Steiner, 2006; Mitchinson, 2003; Khadiagala, 2001).
59  
The decentralisation programmes are run through a pyramid-shaped 
governance structure called 'Local Councils’ (LC). The village-level (LC1) 
formed the base, followed by the parish level (LCII), sub-county (LCIII), 
county (LCIV) and the district (LCV) at the top.
60 Councillors at the LC1, 
LCIII and LCV levels are directly elected by citizens with geographically 
defined constituencies. Members of LCII and LCIV are administrative units 
whose membership is determined by what Bahiigwa et al., (2005:490) refer to 
as “…the council executive of the LCs in the tier below”, meaning the LC1 
executive members select members for LCII and the LCIII executives for the 
LCIV.
61 Every local council is obliged to appoint an executive committee, 
chaired by a chairperson. It is the responsibility of the executive committee to 
initiate and formulate policy for approval by the council; monitor and oversee 
the implementation of policies and programmes; and recommend persons to 
the council to be appointed members of statutory commissions, boards and 
committees. An administrative unit council is not a corporate body, however. 
Its functions are to resolve disputes, monitor the delivery of services and assist 
in the maintenance of law, order and security (Jones, 2008). Administrative 
unit councils at the county level consist of all members of the sub-county 
executive committee in the county; at the parish level, all members of the 
village executive committees in the parish; and at the village level, all persons 
aged over eighteen residing in the village (GOU, 1997; GOU, 1995). 
                                                        
59 See Nsibambi (1998), Kabwegyere (2002), Kanyeihamba (2002) and Mamdani (1990a). 
60 At LC 1 level, all village residents are de facto members of village resistance council, and 
they elect members who constitute the village local council (LC1). At LC 2, members of LC1 
from each village in that parish become members of the parish local council. These members elect 
9 of their peers to constitute the parish local council (LC 2). This same process is repeated to form 
LC3, LC4 and LC5. Each LC is under the organisational leadership of a chairperson. At each LC 
level, there are posts for a Secretary for Mass Mobilisation and a Secretary for Women Affairs. 
The government uses extensively the LC system as a channel for communication. 
61 See Ahmad & Brosio (2009), Francis & James (2003), Kabwegyere (2002), Kanyeihamba 
(2002), Mamdani (1990a), and Nsibambi (1998) for in depth discussions. 59 
Consequences of decentralisation 
Although an important aim of decentralisation is to bring political and 
administrative control over services and to achieve democracy involving people 
at all levels, evidence shows that the contrary is true (Jones, 2008; Onyach-Olaa, 
2003; Khadiagala, 2001). In an interview with the LCV Chairman of Masindi 
District in 2007, he grouped the problems of the decentralisation process into 
three broad categories: (a) the difficulties associated with lack of financial and 
human resources, which have limited the independence of the local governments; 
(b) the complex centre-local relations, whereby political confrontations at the 
centre have tended to spill over to the districts thereby altering policy parameters 
at the local level; and (c) the political and economic dynamics at the local level 
itself, which is ‘bad news’ for a poor district like Masindi as it delays decisions 
on service delivery.  Based on the LCV Chairman’s comments above, it is 
therefore very likely that sectors that are out of favour or poorly represented, 
receive few resources and suffer as a result, especially if the elected councillors 
do not belong to the ruling NRM party. 
2.3  Isunga people and their livelihoods  
Many studies have confirmed that livelihood diversification has become an 
important feature of rural life in Uganda, with off-farm activities accounting for 
an increasing proportion of rural household incomes, particularly for those 
whose members are educated and healthy (Ellis & Bahiigwa, 2003;  Marter, 
2002; Canagarajah et al., 2001; Deininger & Okidi, 2001).
62 Marter (2002) also 
notes that female-headed households that engage in a mix of both farm and 
non/off farm work have risen out of poverty at a faster rate than those only 
engaged in agriculture; and that “…women are diversifying their enterprise 
activities more rapidly than men”  (ibid, 2002:8). However, according to 
Chambers  (1997;  1989), farmers’ livelihoods and the conditions that sustain 
them are usually complex, diverse and risky. Therefore, knowing the factors that 
determine how, why and when farmers adopt certain strategies when faced with 
risks associated with rain fed farming, makes it difficult to define livelihoods.  
For Ellis (1998), livelihoods encompasses not only income in cash and in 
kind, but also the social institutions, the gender relations and property rights 
                                                        
62 The term ‘off-farm’ should not be confused with ‘non-farm’. Off-farm generally refers to 
activities undertaken away from the household’s own farm. Ellis (1998) for instance uses it to 
refer exclusively to agricultural labouring on someone else's land, so ‘off-farm’ is used in this 
sense. Non-farm refers to activities outside the agricultural sector. 60 
required to support and sustain a given standard of living.
63 Anderson et al. 
(1994) on the other hand, describe the concept in terms of strategy.
64 They look 
at it as the overall way in which individuals try to structure their activities and 
actions with a relatively long-term perspective. So, livelihood strategies are 
long-term plans for survival and construct that form general prescriptions for 
action (ibid, 1994:20).
65 These strategies are also choices faced by individuals 
and households face when the going gets tough;
66 and how they make their 
choices, depends on many factors as clearly discussed by Ellis (2000; 1998). 
He writes,  
  
“...the asset status of households, mediated by social factors and exogenous 
trends and shocks, results in the adoption and adaptation overtime of livelihood 
strategies. Livelihood strategies are dynamic, they respond to changing 
pressures and opportunities and they adopt accordingly.”(ibid, 2000:40) 
I have chosen to adopt Ellis’s (2000;  1998)  definition in this study to 
understand the strategies and adaptation made by the people of Isunga when 
faced with farming challenges. The focus will be on finding out how, when and 
why they select certain strategies, and how decisions are made in the 
households. This is also the approach taken by Ellis & Bahiigwa (2003) in one 
of their scholarly works on livelihoods and rural poverty in Uganda. They 
stressed the importance of understanding a household’s asset status, the on-
going activities, as well as the enabling and constraining character of the 
institutional context. 
Through wealth-ranking exercises, observations, interviews and 
discussions, many livelihood-enhancing activities were identified and recorded 
during the field study (see Table 1 below). However, the relative importance of 
these activities has changed over the years and varies in importance, either as a 
source of income or food. For example, at the start of the field study, Isunga 
villagers made it clear that some sources of income, such as brick-making, 
which were less important in the 1990s, were becoming increasingly important; 
others such as selling charcoal were becoming less important due to declining 
availability of suitable trees. Otherwise, it is common for Isunga households to 
                                                        
63 The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines livelihood as the way one earns 
money to live on. 
64 A plan, method or series of manoeuvres for obtaining a specific goal or result. 
65 They include paid and unpaid work, accumulation and investments, migration, borrowing, 
food production, income enterprise, social networking, community managing and cooperation and 
changes in consumption patterns and sharing. 
66 See discussion on households below. 61 
undertake more than one livelihood activity and diversify to increase their 
household income.  
By diversifying into off-farm or non-farm activities, households have been 
able to increase their incomes and thus improve their living standards, although 
not significantly (GOU, 2007; Lawson et al., 2006). Another aspect to consider 
is that these extra activities sometimes have negative influences on crop 
farming. One village elder pointed out that some young men no longer 
participate in crop farming, instead opting to do other non/off-farm activities 
(boda-boda,  charcoal/brick-making and selling) because it generates more 
money than farming. This, according to the old man, has led to risks of hunger 
and other uncertainties in some households, because the money they get is 
sometimes not enough to buy food and other essentials, since the prices are 
much higher these days.
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Table 1: Livelihood sources and activities in Isunga village. 
Livelihood source  Activities 
Crop farming  Production of maize, beans, sunflower, cassava, millet, sorghum, 
groundnuts, sweet potatoes, tobacco, sunflower, cotton, peas, leafy 
vegetables, tomatoes, egg plants and rice, for sale and consumption. 
Livestock 
production 
Keeping cattle, goats, sheep, pigs, rabbits and chicken, for sale as well as 
domestic consumption. Hiring out oxen and ox-ploughs. 
Nyamakere Forest  Wood and non-wood products that include firewood, charcoal, thatch 
grass, wild game, fruits, wild leafy vegetables, mushrooms and fibres. 
Home industry and 
wage labour 
Casual (leja-leja) wage labour, seasonal wage labour, craft, brick-making, 
bicycle repairs, selling local brews made from cassava, maize, millet and/or 
sorghum, preparing and selling cooked food on market days. 
Remittances  Money sent from family members living outside the village. 
Family support  Preparing meals, housekeeping, attending meetings and leisure. 
Others  Salaries (teachers), LC1 councillors sitting allowances and fees 
Source: Fieldwork, 2006-2008. 
The Nyamakere  Forest Reserve also plays a very important role in the 
economy of the village. Apart from being home to the IDPs, the charcoal and 
firewood used and/or sold by villagers comes from the Nyamakere forest. This 
has resulted in considerable deforestation in the reserve. The forest also 
provides other sources of food such as fruits, vegetables, mushrooms, honey 
and game. Since my study is focused on agricultural labour relationships, I will 
                                                        
67 Even competition for some of the activities (charcoal, bricks selling and Kipanga  beer 
selling) is stiff, so other factors (reputation, trustworthiness etc.) weigh in. 62 
focus on the main livelihood activity in the village, crop farming. However, 
first it seems fitting with a synopsis of the households of Isunga. 
2.3.1  The households of Isunga  
The ‘household’ is a common form of social organisation in Isunga, and is the 
unit of analysis of this thesis. It is the primary site for the structuring of 
agricultural labour transactions. Chant & Campling (1997) note that there is a 
consensus in defining households in low-income countries as spatial units 
where members live in the same dwelling and share basic domestic and 
reproductive activities. But this definition is problematic since it may also be 
understood as a kinship unit or an economic unit, rather than a residential unit. 
A household’s reproduction may not depend entirely on those who live in it. 
This is certainly true in Isunga where the household boundaries are not clearly 
defined, and some domestic functions are performed outside of the residential 
unit.
68 Rudie  (1995:228)  refers to a household as, “...a co-residential unit, 
usually family, which takes care of resource management and primary needs of 
its members”.
69 In  Isunga, there are many IDP households and some have 
members that live in other villages far away, because of land availability, and 
are thus not resident in a ‘household’ in Isunga.
70 Others regard a household as 
where people ‘eat from one pot’ and live together under one roof. Within the 
households, members pool resources to meet their various needs (Ellis, 1998; 
1993; Lehmann, 1986). Ellis (1993:14) refers to such a household as ‘a social 
unit defined by the sharing of the same abode or hearth’.  
While a household is an important institution, it cannot be reduced to just a 
unit of strategic economic action with the assumption that members share a 
common interest. In fact, some feminist scholars have argued for the existence of 
multiple voices, gendered interests and an unequal distribution of resources 
within households (Arora-Jonsson, 2005; Tamale, 1999; Adepoju & Oppong, 
1994). There is also evidence that dynamics within households bring about 
gender inequalities with respect to the access to and control of resources in a 
household (Arora-Jonsson, 2005; Creighton & Omari, 2000; Brydon & Chant, 
1993). Creighton & Omari (2000) in particular, stress that although members of a 
household often share the same residence, it is wrong to assume that this leads to 
equality or cooperation among the individuals. There are often considerable 
                                                        
68 For instance, cash generated in towns and remitted to the family. 
69 Note the use of ‘family’ here instead of ‘household’ – an indication that many people use the 
words interchangeably. 
70 For instance, during my second fieldwork in 2007, I observed in one of the case households 
that a particular man could eat in her house, and then rides off to spend his night at Tee-Cwa 
village some 13 kilometres away. Further probing revealed that his ‘real’ house was there (a wife 
and three children), and ‘my’ case household was his ‘other’ house (as my host Bazilio put it). 63 
differences in terms of activities and benefits of household members determined 
by age and gender. In any case, these feminist  scholars  seem to ignore that 
belonging to a household also means security, and that a household is also a unit 
held together by solidarity and affection.
71 Kabeer  (1991)  also contends that 
membership in a household is ‘internally differentiated by material constraints’. 
This may influence access to and control over resources since access and control 
have implications for the behaviour of household members. Hence, the 
household as a unit of production is imperative for understanding the power 
relations in the households and decision-making over labour and other resources. 
So how do the people of Isunga describe their households? 
At the start of the fieldwork,  I was engaged in a debate about what 
constitutes a household in Isunga. One particular argument centred on whether 
a daughter who is not married but has children, has her own hut and is given 
some land to farm within her father’s homestead, qualifies as a keno (i.e. to be 
called a household). One elderly woman gave a traditional account among the 
Palwo  as to why she would not qualify as a household. According to this 
woman, this was because the daughter remained under the ‘roof of the main 
household’, whose family name she still maintained. Further discussions 
revealed the range of situations that are considered as a household: (a) a father, 
mother and children living in a house with land; newly married couple or 
couples without children are also regarded as a household; (b) a polygamous 
household is considered as one unit even if one of the wives lives far away 
from the husband,
72 (c) a household headed by a widow who maintains the 
name of her late husband (even when she is ‘inherited’ (lako)  by a clan 
member); and (d) married sons living in a separate household from the father’s 
households, with their own house and field provided by the father. The son has 
autonomy to use the land to provide for his family, but key decisions such as 
introducing new farming activities have to be done in consultation with the 
father, and his decision is final. The following do not qualify as a household: 
(a) unmarried daughter with children (she still belongs to her father’s 
household), (b) an unmarried son (labot) is regarded a child of the household, 
despite his age and/or social status. It should be noted that these descriptions 
and expressions do not include those who are physically absent. Chant & 
Campling (1997) and Guyer & Peters (1987) noted that apart from being a 
                                                        
71 See arguments on affective ties in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
72 CS1-JSBM is a polygamous family and it was quite tricky handling the household as a unit 
of analysis. After careful consideration, I decided to treat CS2-MDF (Abwoli) and CS3-MAF 
(Atenyi) as different households, because during the second field trip I found out that they no 
longer shared the same granary. Both Abwoli and Atenyi with their respective children cultivate 
different plots and eat from separate granaries and pots. 64 
discrete entity, household boundaries are often very porous. Although a 
household can be identified by a shared residence and economic cooperation, 
the most important members of some households could be those who are not 
even living there, but still contribute with cash remittances, goods and services. 
Since crop farming depends on availability and a tenure security of land, I will 
now address this briefly in the next section. 
2.3.2  Land tenure in Isunga 
The 1995 Constitution vests land in the citizens of Uganda (GOU, 1995), and 
Clause (3) of Article 237 provides for the tenure systems under which land 
should be owned.
73 Those available in Isunga  are leasehold and customary 
tenure systems. Under the leasehold system, land is owned for a particular 
period of time. The lease can be obtained from an individual or the district 
local government for a specific period usually 49 or 99 years (or in between) 
with attached terms and conditions. The leasehold transactions, being 
essentially contractual, allow parties to define the terms and conditions of 
access and usage in such a manner that suits their give-and-take land use 
needs.
74 The grantee of a lease for an agreed period of time is entitled to a 
certificate of title. Land under the customary tenure system, however, is 
communally owned by particular group of people in a particular area. Land use 
under this tenure is usually controlled by elders, clan heads or a group in its 
own well-defined administrative structure and authority.
75 Most land in Isunga 
and the surroundings areas is held on a customary tenure system, and is 
characteristic of the indigenous people of the village, because they have always 
lived on it and been regarded by everyone else as ‘real owners’ of their land. 
                                                        
73 They are mailo, freehold, leasehold, customary and public land. 
74 The beneficiaries of freehold tenure in Isunga village are the National Forest Authority (e.g. 
Nyamakere Forest Reserve) and a few better-off households. 
75 Land held under mailo tenure is mostly confined to the central region of Uganda. The system 
confers freehold granted by the colonial government in exchange for political co-operation under 
the 1900 Buganda Agreement. The mailo tenure system recognises occupancy by tenants (locally 
known as Kibanja holders), whose relationship with their landlords is governed and guided by the 
provisions of the 1998 Land Act (amended in 2009). Mailo land, like freehold is registered under 
the Registration of Titles Act. All transactions must therefore be entered in a register guaranteed 
by the state. Under this tenure, the holder of a mailo land title has absolute ownership of that land. 
Freehold land tenure on the other hand, is a system of owning land in perpetuity and was set up 
by an agreement between the Kingdoms and the British Government. Grants of land in freehold 
were made by the Crown and later by the Uganda Land Commission. The grantee of land in 
freehold is entitled to a certificate of title with the power to abuse, use and dispose. Transactions 
involving freehold land are governed by the Registration of Titles Act (Cap. 230). With public 
land, the government owns land and has the right to lease it to any company, organisation or 
individuals on specific terms and covenants. In most cases, this form of land is not for settlement; 
it is basically for business and usually located in urban areas. 65 
They have no official papers proving that they own the land or have any rights 
to it. In this case, people own their land and have rights to it, but they do not 
have land titles. Some tenants on such land allocate specific areas to 
themselves with known and defined boundaries usually marked by ridges, 
trenches and/or trees. In recent years, attempts have been made to translate 
customary rules into ‘modern’ law, but they have failed due to their complexity 
(Batungi, 2008; Adoko & Levine, 2004). An important task here is to show the 
linkages between land and labour in the village. 
Linkages between land and labour 
The wealth and wellbeing of the people of Isunga  is primarily defined by 
ownership of land. Although land is acquired mainly through inheritance, it is 
also common to buy land nowadays. Even so, the majority of landowners are 
men, with women gaining access through marriage, even though women are 
free to purchase land. Among the Barulli too, parents may allocate land to both 
their sons and daughters (who have returned home after failed marriages). It is 
apparent that there are local rules governing land and that they are constantly 
adapting to new circumstances.  
A crucial dimension of rural institutions that tends to be glossed over, or is at 
least not explicitly addressed in the agricultural modernisation effort, is the fact 
that land and labour are inextricably linked. Crop farming is constrained by both 
land and labour, and transactions in either of them can be interlocked with other 
activities such as sharecropping and labour (see Chapter 5). Cases exist where 
employers act as patrons, providing a range of goods and services, including land 
in a sharecropping arrangement. Such relationships can be seen as exploitative, 
as for example in the case of debt bondage (interlocking of land and capital). 
Nonetheless, in Isunga, many individuals/households access land and other 
resources through these arrangements, and in turn, employers gain access to 
inputs brought in by the tenants, and also have to cope with the problems of 
seasonal availability of labour. Many of those who are relatively well off, do not 
use all their land as farmland, because they do not have enough labour to open up 
more farm land. Hence, they rent or lend their land to those who do not have 
enough.
76 Thus, by sharing their resources, households increase their crop 
production beyond the capacity of each separate household. The arrangement 
might have some negative consequences for the poorer households, but as one 
farmer said, “...it is better than nothing” (CS20-COM). 
                                                        
76 Land is frequently rented out for one production season or more at a cost between 15,000 
and 80,000 UGX per acre per season, depending on the social connections and contacts one has. 
With regards to land borrowing, the borrower normally decides what to give the owner as a token 
of appreciation after harvesting. 66 
2.3.3  Crop farming and seasonality in Isunga 
The Government of Uganda uses three categories for farmers: subsistence, 
semi-commercial and commercial (GOU, 2010a). However, there are only 
subsistence and semi-commercial farmers in Isunga. Indeed only 4 of the 139 
households are semi-commercial farmers – the rest are smallholder subsistence 
farmers.
77 The semi-commercial farmers primarily grow maize, sunflowers, 
and tobacco and/or keep livestock both for consumption and sale. They also 
use improved methods of production (e.g. fertilisers, high-yielding seeds, and 
tractors), hired and household labour, as well as share cropping (see Chapters 5 
and 6). The majority of farmers are from poor households, who cultivate about 
three acres of land on average. They constitute more than 95 per cent of 
Isunga’s farming households, producing mainly for domestic consumption, but 
also small amounts of tobacco, cotton and sunflower for cash. They also keep 
small animals and engage in other non/off farm activities. However, the 
income they generate is not enough to enable them to purchase inputs, hire 
labour or finance necessities such as health and education. The size and quality 
of the basket of commodities consumed by these households places them 
below the poverty line (GOU, 2007; 2003). They depend on household labour, 
which is only able to cover small areas of new land. These farmers are also 
highly vulnerable to risks (price, weather, yields).  
During the fieldwork, Isunga farmers complained that rainfall has become 
quite erratic and unpredictable since the mid-1990s, making crop farming a very 
risky activity. Seasonality is therefore a serious source of risk and vulnerability 
in  Isunga’s  rain fed farming system. Vulnerability here refers to risks of a 
sudden, catastrophic decline in a particular variable, usually access to enough 
food for survival (Ellis & Freeman, 2005; Ellis, 2000). To Ellis (2000), the most 
vulnerable households are those that are both at great risk of adverse external 
events and lack assets that could carry them through periods of adversity.
78  
Seasonality as a source of risk and vulnerability 
Crop production in Isunga is seasonal, with variations in labour requirements 
during the farming calendar. The peak of labour needs relates to timely planting, 
                                                        
77 Two ‘weekend’ farmers based in Kampala would qualify to be commercial farmers, but my 
attempt to interview them was met with negative responses, and comments that they “do not have 
time”. These farmers possess/access critical skills/knowledge; produce for the market for a profit 
motive; engage in specialised production, marketing and processing; use skilled & non skilled 
hired labour.  
78  The vulnerability debate has attracted  contributions from many scholars in different 
disciplines such Chambers (1989),  Dercon  (2005b; 2005a)  Ellis, (2001; 1998), Bankoff  et al 
(2004) and many others. This thesis is more interested in its connection to risks and livelihoods 
and not their in-depth study. 67 
weeding and harvesting. A farming calendar was put together following lengthy 
discussions with the villagers, indicating when the different activities are 
generally carried out (see Tables 2 and 3). 
Table 2: A seasonal calendar for Isunga village. 






January  Some households start land preparation (bush clearing and digging) for 
food crops in mid-January; do off-farm/non-farm income generating 
activities (hunting, charcoal burning, beer brewing and working as 
casual labourers outside Isunga village).  
February  Continue with land preparations and off-farm activities; women collect 
dry grass (raa) and firewood for use during the rainy season. Some very 
poor households start facing food shortages in their homes, and address 












March  Digging/Ploughing; start sowing seeds (mainly cereals) in parts of the 
shambas, and wait for first rainy season in mid/late March – although for 
the last four seasons it came either very early or late. Plant maize, beans, 
millet, sorghum and peas after the arrival of rains. 
April  Continue planting food crops; start weeding all the fields (labour 
demand reaches highest level); digging/ploughing for specific cash crops 
(sunflower, cotton or tobacco). 
May  Continue with weeding. Women harvest fresh vegetables for direct 
consumption in the households, sale or preservation for future use. Plant 
more food crops (especially for late comers), and most of the first season 





June  First rain season ends. Start of a short period of dry spell, start harvesting 
maize, millet, groundnuts, beans, sweet potatoes, etc. plus storing/selling 
some of them. 
July  Peak harvest period for all crops; bush clearing and preparation of 













August  Finish harvesting; prepare ground for second rainy season that normally 
begins in late August; Start planting second maize, beans, cassava, 
millet, groundnuts, sweet potatoes and sunflowers. Second rainy season 
starts in late August. 
September  Harvest tobacco; continue planting second maize, beans, millet, 
groundnuts, sweet potatoes; and weeding second crops 






November  Peak harvest of second season; harvest sorghum, groundnuts etc. 
December  Continue harvesting, dry season and non/off farm activities and too 
much drinking (Kipanga, Waragi, Malwa and Kwete local brews), many 
marriage ceremonies.  
Source: Fieldwork 2006 and 2007. 68 
Based on the calendar, it is clear that rain fed farming in Isunga is seasonal. 
Insufficient labour during critical periods (planting, weeding and harvesting) 
may have a negative impact on crop production. Bangkwon  (CS8-BRM) 
described his story as follows, 
 
We plan our farming activities by following the seasonal variation. I open the first 
shamba towards the end of the long dry period, some weeks before the arrival of 
the first rain; and the other shambas are opened during the short dry spell between 
late June and mid-August. I clear the bushes from the old shambas and cut down 
trees to open new shambas when in need. Then I burn the dry twigs, branches and 
grass after one or two weeks and spread the ashes. It is our fertiliser. Field burning 
is easy. I do it alone and then plough the land using the oxen that I keep for my 
father-in-law. The most difficult and demanding work of the season is weeding, 
because it is intensive and should be done within a short period or else the weeds 
take over the shambas. With more rain, come more weeds…, which calls for a 
constant availability of labour. It is also a period, when every farmer in the village 
wants help with extra labour, yet everyone is busy in his or her samba. So, we just 
plant what is enough, as there is no point planting a lot, when you know you can’t 
get enough labour when you need it the most. When done with weeding beans and 
maize, I plant some cassava and sweet potatoes…both are good ‘banks’ in bad 
times when food is scarce. We harvest maize, beans and groundnuts together. But 
millet and sorghum’s harvest is done by Betty. Sunflowers are my crop. 
Bangkwon’s  story indicates that the question of labour in crop farming is 
critical, both in terms of allocation and utilisation, as well as gender 
inequalities. The table below summarises the division of labour in CS8-BRM’s 
crop production activities.
 
Table 3: Division of labour in crop in CS8-BRM’s crop production activities. 
  Maize/Beans  Millet/Sorghum  Sunflower 
  Labour Sources  Labour Sources  Labour Sources 
Farming activities  Ba  Be  Ot  Ba  Be  Ot   Ba  Be  Ot 
Bush cleaning (February-April)  x  x  Al  x    Al  x  x  Al 
Ox-Ploughing  x  x    x      x  x   
Sowing/planting  x  x   Al  x  x  Aw  x  x   Al 
Weeding  x  x  Al, Aw  x  x  Le, Aw, Al  x  x  Al, Le 
Harvesting  x  x  Al  x  x  Le, Al  x  x   
Transporting crops home  x  x    x  x    x  x   
Processing/storage    x    x  x      x   
Transporting to market    x    x      x     
Note: Ba (Bangkwon); Be (Betty), Ot (Others), Le (Leja-Leja), Al (Aleya), Aw (Awak) 
Source: Fieldwork 2008.  69 
The above table shows that some tasks are exclusively done by men and 
women respectively. Male tasks include felling trees, ploughing with oxen, 
planting and sowing seeds, purchasing and using fertilisers, and the sale of 
crops. Female tasks include sowing, harvesting, head-loading crops, crop 
drying, winnowing and storage. However, tasks such as weeding, bagging and 
storage of popular cash crops like tobacco, sunflower and cotton are performed 
by both men and women. In the CS8-BRM example, Bangkwon is responsible 
for the cash crops in the family, and this seems the case throughout Isunga. 
Crops that generate money, such as tobacco, sunflower, maize and beans, are 
controlled by men. Evidence also exists in other parts of Kiryandongo district 
that some male labour is usually withdrawn from ‘cash’ crops if the 
profitability of the crops decreases, as was the case with cotton (Bazaara, 1997; 
Muhereza, 1995). Isunga villagers consider leafy vegetables, cassava, sweet 
potatoes, sorghum and groundnuts to be female crops, and indeed much of 
their labour is focused on these. In all the ‘typical’ households
79, women also 
contribute a disproportionately high share of their labour to food production 
and post-harvest processing activities, whereas produce-marketing  decisions 
are mostly made by men. This is an indication that Isunga women still shoulder 
the responsibility of food security at the household levels, where their 
production is for household consumption. However, in female-headed 
households, the above differences are irrelevant since they have to take on 
activities previously only performed by men.  
The Isunga farming system is regulated by rain: the amount, duration and 
variations vary year to year.
80 Farmers start clearing their fields quite early 
(about two months) before the onset of the first rain, mainly to avoid the stress of 
doing everything within a short period. After the first ‘soaking rain’, most 
farmers plant maize and beans, and this is the time when all able-bodied persons 
(men, women and children) must work long hours. The timing of various 
farming activities is therefore determined by the ability of households to mobilise 
labour, not only for farming, but to allocate it to other livelihood activities as 
well. The peak periods for labour is the period following the rains, and this is 
when the labour-intensive tasks of digging and weeding have to be done quickly. 
This period usually coincides with food shortages (hunger season) for most of 
the households, and many households engage in other income-generating 
activities, such as working for other people in their shambas. 
                                                        
79 Wife and husband living together under one roof. 
80 For instance in 2006, the village received less rain, yet it came late. Then in 2007, it was the 
opposite as the village received too much rain 
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2.3.4  Cropping activities 
The key crop farming activities during a 12-month farming calendar are 
outlined below. 
Land preparation and planting 
Land preparation for various crops involves bush-clearing and digging, or 
ploughing the soil, cutting and burning crop residues (tobacco, sunflower and 
maize stocks), which usually starts immediately after harvesting.
81 This is done 
using machetes (Pangas) and hand hoes (jembes) between mid-January and 
early March before the first rain, and in July or early August before the second 
rain.
82 In cases where land preparation involves tree-felling and heavy digging, 
men are more involved, while women usually stick to easier clearing tasks and 
burning crop residues. When the crop residues are cut or bushy fields are 
cleared, it is piled together and burnt to provide ash, which serves as fertiliser.  
For households with little land, the more frequently cultivated shambas get 
more covering of secondary grass weed. Such shambas are weeded at least 
three times during the growth of a crop, thus requires more labour inputs. 
Planting begins two to three weeks prior to the expected onset of the rains. This 
is either done by digging holes and placing seeds into the holes or by 
broadcasting the seeds. During discussions with a farmers group (the Kamdini 
Reflect Group) in 2006, farmers explained that they do early planting prior to 
the arrival of the rains so that the labour load is reduced when it is needed 
most. Planting certain crops before the rain begins is therefore regarded as a 
way of allocating scarce labour resources during high intensity periods. It is 
also a way of adapting to erratic rainfall conditions, especially during the 
second rain period, which is shorter than the first one. 
Catching the first rain enables the crops to mature before the rainy season 
ends in late October or early November. Yet throughout the farming calendar, 
farmers are faced with labour constraints. Moreover, not all farmers have full 
control over key decisions such as when to put seeds in the soil or labour 
(quantity and quality). As a result, timing of planting is associated with the 
need to manage labour constraints. Planting before the rains therefore seems to 
be used as a coping strategy by farmers to maximise labour utilisation. 
                                                        
81 I agree with Hill (1986) that the division between food and cash crops is useless as well as a 
misleading term since all crops are apt to be sold for cash. But sometimes I use it to portray the 
gender division of farm labour in the farming households. 
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Crop maintenance
83 
Isunga farmers grow different crops in different fields. Maize and beans are 
often grown on more fertile fields, whereas groundnuts and vegetables are 
grown in fields near the homesteads. Most crops have to be planted quickly, 
because after the onset of the rains, the main fields that have already been 
planted with cereals must be cared for to prevent weeds from destroying the 
crops. This weeding takes place when the crops (plants) are about 15 – 20 
centimetres above the ground, two to three weeks after the first rains. The 
weeding process involves digging the weeds from the crops using hand hoes or 
handpicked if weeding millet or sorghum shambas.  
Farmers regard the process of weeding as the most crucial activity in the 
farming calendar. It is both labour-intensive and the ability to perform weeding 
in time is very important, as poor timing leads to poor crop yields. Weeding an 
acre maize/beans shamba, would take a hard-working person (6 man-hours per 
day) at least a week. In a situation where a household is in need of extra labour, 
the ability to mobilise external labour for weeding is crucial.  
Crop harvesting and storage 
Harvesting is usually done in phases. Some households begin by harvesting 
maize, beans and vegetables in the fields near their homesteads as early as late 
May for immediate consumption. This is when the hunger season starts 
affecting the villagers in earnest, and this early harvesting helps to ensure food 
availability before the start of the main harvesting period (June to mid-July). In 
2007, the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) Co-ordinator for 
Masindi District mentioned that post-harvest losses are one of the many factors 
contributing to food insecurity in Mutunda  sub-county (where Isunga  is 
located). She stated that a considerable amount of the food crops produced is 
lost after being collected from the fields, and the losses are associated with 
processing and storing crops. Farmers are aware of such loses, and do their best 
to minimise these by using local storage techniques (dero). The capacity of this 
traditional storage varies from household to household, but on average, about 
200 kilograms of grains can be stored in each. The seeds for the next season 
are mixed with ash to prevent pest attacks.  
According to one elder, villagers in Isunga started trading in crops (with 
distant traders) in the late 1980s and early 1990s (during trade liberalisation), 
and the main crops sold and bought were maize, beans and cassava. Traders 
came from places as far as away as Bweyale, Masindi and Kampala. However, 
the traders were not popular since farmers felt cheated by them, as they offered 
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low prices for the crops. Nevertheless, many villagers now trade produce.
84 
During maize, beans and groundnuts harvesting, traders even come from places 
as far away as Kampala to buy produce from Isunga. Interestingly, even 
traditionally low-value crops like lady finger (okra), pumpkins, Boo (cowpeas 
leaves) and other leafy vegetables that rural households used to consider as 
purely for domestic consumption, are now being sold at the weekly markets or 
on the roadside, indicating the village’s involvement in the cash economy. 
2.4  Concluding remarks 
By focusing on aspects of geography and agro-climatic conditions, the history 
of labour in Bunyoro, culture and society, readers are better-placed to 
understand the interplay of factors that shape the complex nature of crop 
farming and agricultural labour relations in Isunga. Also, the historical and 
institutional perspectives outlined in the earlier parts of this chapter have 
important implications for the theoretical discussions in the next chapter.  
Whilst identifying institutions indicates the nature of change that occurred in 
Uganda’s agricultural sector, it also shows that in order to describe and explain 
Uganda’s agricultural modernisation efforts, the relationships between various 
institutions and farmers (as implementers/beneficiaries of the modernisation 
drive) at the household and village (local) level are another vital aspect. 
Therefore, the various institutions used to manage labour in Isunga must be 
identified. The institutional analysis of the agricultural labour relationships has to 
be able to place existing institutions in relation to other influential institutions, 
and subsequently implicated in the changes and agricultural developments that 
occur. This is because institutions at each level of the Ugandan society play a 
critical role in shaping the socio-economic activities (e.g. farmers’ labour 
behaviours and decisions). Thus, to understand why institutions are influential, it 
is necessary to flesh out and explain the underlying drivers of change that take 
place in a relationship. This has to be informed by a theoretically-based premise 
that can explain why institutions matter. This insight enables a more complete 
understanding of the influence of institutions on labour transactions that 
encompasses, which institutions matter most, how they matter and why they 
matter. The next chapter presents and discusses some theoretical issues linked to 
labour transactions, and thereafter a framework for analysing agricultural labour 
relationships in Isunga village will be proposed. 
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3  Theoretical considerations and analytical 
framework 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter introduces the theoretical concepts the study draws on. It begins 
by conceptualising institutions and then examines the theoretical issues relating 
to the role of institutions in labour transactions. This provides the basis to 
explore the empirical  evidence of agricultural labour practices in the study 
area. The chapter addresses the following questions: (a) what are institutions 
(i.e. how they are identified, described and categorised), (b) why and how do 
institutions matter in agricultural labour transactions; (c) how do farmers 
choose institutions for handling labour dealings? Section 3.2 looks at how 
institutions are understood in different contexts and by different scholars. This 
is important for defining the scope of the concept of institution used in this 
study. Section 3.3 explores the role of institutions in labour transactions by 
reviewing their impact on transaction costs and relational property rights. The 
insight generated by these theories help to explain the significance of 
institutions in agricultural labour relationships in the study village. Section 3.4 
presents the conceptual framework for analysing agricultural labour relations in 
Isunga, before ending with some concluding remarks in section 3.5. 
3.2  Defining institutions  
Although many scholars have written about institutions and their importance in 
economic development and other contexts, the definition of what institutions 
are remains contested (North, 2006; Williamson, 2000; North, 1990; Ostrom, 
1986). Williamson  (2000)  noted that institutions mean different things in 
different contexts. Ostrom (1986) had earlier observed that,  
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“...the multiple referents for the term ‘institution’ indicate that multiple concepts 
need to be separately identified and treated as separate terms. We cannot 
communicate effectively if signs used by one scholar in a field have different 
referents than the same sign used by another scholar in the same field.” (ibid, 
1986:4) 
Thus, when adopting an institutional approach to study labour transactions at the 
village level, it is essential to ensure that the term ‘institution’ is properly 
understood and clearly defined. Therefore, this section seeks to understand what 
institutions are, as well as how they are identified and described. According to 
Williamson (2000), institutions are “diffuse, abstract and very complex” and 
North  (1990:107)  states that “we cannot see, feel, touch or even measure 
institutions…they are constructs of the human mind”. However, since the study 
of institutions is not the distinctive domain of any one particular discipline, my 
effort to understand what institutions  are, why and how they matter in 
agricultural labour transactions, is based on rational choice economics, even 
though I am well aware that there are other perspectives. For example, Hall and 
Taylor (1996) identify three schools of thought of contemporary institutionalism 
in political science: the historical, the rational choice and the sociological. Each 
of these has particular aspects that distinguish them from others.
85 It is, however, 
beyond the scope of this study to review all these different perspectives. 
However, I will refer to them when necessary.  
3.2.1  Conceptual challenges 
While surveying the various uses of the term ‘institution’ it was evident that 
within economics and across other disciplines, the term is not consistently 
used. Different assumptions inform and underpin the different schools of 
thinking  (Portes, 2010;  Searle, 2005; Nelson & Sampat, 2001; Williamson, 
2000; Hall & Taylor, 1996; North, 1990; Williamson, 1985). It also appears 
that the conceptual ambiguity has been affected by the way the study of 
institutions has embraced contributions from other disciplines. Different 
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for and the broad nature of legally based governance. It is no longer simply assumed that the state 
on its own provides the governance framework essential for a ‘strong’ regime of economic 
activity. The behavioural and social consequences of laws, legal systems and practices have huge 
effects on activities in the economic sphere (ibid, 1998). This is particularly the case in relation to 
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disciplines put different emphasis on what institutions comprise, thereby 
making it a concept that is easily misunderstood.
86 In any case, a review of 
relevant literature reveals that there is a wealth of terms to describe the various 
aspects, effects and types of institutions. Some of the terms include ‘rules of 
the game’ North (2006; 1990), collective action in control and expansion of 
individual actions (Ostrom, 2005),  patterns of behaviour  (Meagher, 2010; 
Portes, 2010) and conventions (Hodgson, 2006).  
Others refer to institutions in terms of cognitive frameworks for interpreting 
sense data (Hodgson, 2006; Searle, 2005; Williamson, 1985), humanly devised 
constraints, informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, norms, customs, traditions 
and codes of conduct)  (North, 2006;  Pejovich, 2006;  1990;  Elster, 1989), 
formal rules (constitutions, laws property rights)  (North, 2006;  Williamson, 
2000;  North, 1990),  money, language  (Searle, 2005;  Williamson, 1985), 
contracts  and  agreements  (Greif & Laitin, 2004;  Greif, 1994;  Williamson, 
1985),  organisations  (Schmid, 2004;  World Bank, 2002),  systems of 
knowledge  belief and moral authority (Scott, 2001), markets  (World Bank, 
2002), government and law (Dixit, 2009). But what is the reason for all these 
different views of institutions? The section below explores the character and 
roles  of institutions, and how they are manifested, to provide a robust 
definition of  institutions. Drawing from the literature and nature of data 
collected from the fieldwork, the discussion is centred on: (a) institutions as 
rules, and (b) the social and relational nature of institutions. 
Institutions as rules  
The rule nature of institutions is often represented by North’s description of 
institutions as “the rules of the game in a society” or more formally, “the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”  encompassing 
formal rules and informal constraints (North, 1990:3). Thus, 
 
“…institutions consist of a set of constraints on behaviour in the form of rules 
and regulations; a set of procedures  to detect deviations from the rules and 
regulations...a set of moral, ethical behavioural norms which define the contours 
that constrain the way in which the rules and regulations are specified and 
enforcement is carried out.” (North, 1991:204) 
North’s definition above not only includes rules and regulations, but also social 
norms and all other constraints imposed by a society’s arrangement of beliefs 
and values. In his view, institutions consist of formal rules and informal 
constraints and the enforcement characteristics of both. These constraints 
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include what individuals are forbidden from doing, or under what conditions 
certain individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities (North, 2006; 
1990). That is, institutions are the frameworks within which human 
interactions take place. Such an institutional framework does not only set the 
costs and consequences of certain conduct in society, but also establishes 
punishments when rules are violated. Based on North’s approach, institutions 
are clearly distinguished as the ‘rules of the game’, while organisations 
(including the individuals that make up the organisations) are ‘the players of 
the game’.  He writes, 
 
“...what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the players. The 
purpose of the rules is to define the way the game is played. But the objective of 
the team within that set of rules is to win the game by a combination of skills, 
strategy and coordination; by fair and sometimes by foul means. Modelling the 
strategies and skills of the team as it develops is a separate process from 
modelling the creation, evolution, and consequences of the rules.” (ibid,1990:4) 
From North’s perspective, banks, for example, are organisations, while laws, 
regulations and other rules relating to the financial system are seen as 
institutions; churches are organisations, but religions are institutions (North, 
2006; 1990). Organisations are made up of groups of individuals held together 
by some common objectives. These organisations have their particular 
purposes and through their members, they develop specific strategies to 
achieve them. Different organisations may have different objectives: political 
parties strive to win elections, universities want to educate students, firms want 
to maximise profits and households seek to fulfil basic needs. However, the 
ultimate objective is survival, because all organisations live in a world of 
scarcity and hence competition.  
North’s approach is shared by many scholars, including Williamson & 
Kerekes  (2011), Alexander (2005)  and  Hall & Soskice  (2001)  who also 
distinguish institutions from organisations. Hall & Soskice  (2001)  describe 
institutions as, 
 
“... a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors generally follow, whether for 
normative, cognitive, or material reasons, and organisations as durable entities 
with formally recognized members, whose rules also contribute to the 
institutions of the political economy.” (ibid, 2001:8-9) 
Still, the difference between institutions and organisations is not clear. While 
institutions and organisations are discrete, they are also interdependent. The rules 
and norms form the institutional framework within which organisations exist, 
operate, and interact with one another to achieve their potential outcomes; and 77 
the existence and development of an organisation is influenced by the 
institutional framework. So, the incentives inbuilt in the institutional framework 
affect organisations’ decisions and their level of investment in acquiring skills 
and knowledge in order to achieve their objectives (North, 1990). He wrote, 
“…organisations influence how the institutional framework evolves” (ibid, 
1990:5). That is, organisations can also act as rule-makers or agents of 
institutional change, meaning that individuals and organisations may design or 
create their own rules, or follow rules developed or designed by others. 
But North’s (2006; 1994; 1991; 1990) rule approach is challenged by other 
scholars  (Portes, 2010;  Hodgson, 2006). For example, Hodgson (2006) 
criticises North (1990) for not referring to the existence of informal 
institutions, nor making a clear distinction between formal and informal 
rules.
87 Instead, he sees institutions as social rule systems that include and 
involve the formal, codified and enforceable rules, as well as the informal 
norms of behaviours and social conventions (cf Hodgson, 2006:3). As a social 
rule system, it is apparent that the force to structure and constrain comes as 
much from the formally specified as well as other implicit aspects that develop 
and reinforce each other over time and become culturally enforced.
88 Also, 
institutions can vary considerably - from the highly codified, often written and 
specific (a legal system of rules) to orally transmitted and unrecorded forms. 
While some are unified and purposeful, such as established markets and 
organisations, others may be diffuse and pervasive, as for example behavioural 
codes. Yet in all cases, the rule perspective is undeniable. 
Elinor  Ostrom  (2005;  1986)  shares  North’s view. She also identifies 
institutions with ‘rules’ that guide and constrain repetitive, interdependent 
relationships and give people predictable prescriptions for what is required, 
permitted or prohibited in their interactions (ibid,2005; 1986). She underscores 
that an institution, as a rule, must consist of the rule component and, the 
enforcement component. The enforcement component lays the foundations for 
violations of rules to be punished, thus validating the institution (Ostrom, 
1986).
89  In this sense, therefore, formal laws should not be considered 
institutions if they are not enforced. She writes, that “enforcement is necessary 
for a law to become a rule” (ibid,1986:6).  Clague  (2003;  1997)  also takes 
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Ostrom’s (1986) line, arguing that for rules to be seen as institutions, there 
must be some degree of obedience; and if the rules are ignored, then they do 
not qualify to be referred to as institutions. But what precisely are rules? 
Advancing a grammar of institutions, Crawford and Ostrom (in Ostrom, 
2005: Chapter 5)  suggest the differentiation of rules, norms and shared 
strategies. They suggest that this differentiation can be made on the basis of: 
(a) the value/attributes of participants in the situation in question; (b) what is 
permitted, obliged or forbidden; (c) specific actions or outcomes that are 
permitted, obliged or forbidden; (d) conditions under which such actions or 
outcomes are permitted, obliged or forbidden; and (e) the sanctions that apply 
if the requirement is contravened. Rules therefore define what specific actions 
and outcomes are permitted, obliged or forbidden, under what conditions, as 
well as the sanctions that apply if the rule is breached.  
Norms on the other hand, define what specific actions and outcomes are 
permitted or forbidden under what conditions, but the sanction is not specified. 
However, this does not mean that norms do not carry sanctions, since the 
shared idea of what is permitted or forbidden creates the shared understanding 
that breaching the norm is contrary to the expected shared behaviour, and thus 
unacceptable and subject to punishment. On this basis, I argue that norms are 
different from rules, but in practice norms can take on a rule-like nature.
90  
Institutions as enabling devices 
In contrast with definitions that regard institutions as constraints, Chang & 
Evans (2000) look at institutions as enabling devices. They write, 
 
“...we need to employ a different rhetoric, namely, seeing institutions as 
‘enabling’ devices rather than constraints. This is of course not to say that 
institutions do not impose constraints. Just about all ‘enabling’ institutions 
involve constraints on some types of behaviour by some people. In many cases 
that involve a collective action problem, these constraints are ‘general’ 
constraints that apply to everyone. In these cases, we are putting constraints on 
everyone’s behaviour so that we can collectively do more things. However, in 
other cases, enabling of some people means constraining others” (ibid, 2000: 8)  
Even though Chang & Evans (2000) view institutions as devices that enable the 
realisation of economic goals, it should nonetheless be stressed that shifting the 
rhetoric to the ‘enabling’ dimension of institutions from their ‘constraining’ 
dimension does not mean that the constraining nature of institutions is negative 
and should be ignored. No conflict exists in saying that institutions are both 
constraining and enabling. These are simply different ways of looking at the 
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same institution and, in a way, this strengthens North’s  (1990)  position that 
institutions provide patterns that regulate people’s or society’s behaviours. Their 
presence reduces uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life; hence 
institutional constraints prohibit certain behaviours, whilst enabling others.  
The World Bank (2002)  too, defines institutions as the rules and 
organisations that facilitate the coordination of human behaviour. These rules 
are both formal (regulations, laws, and constitutions) and informal (from norms 
to traditions).
91  The World Bank (2002)  identifies the key function of 
institutions as: (i) to pick up signals about needs and problems; (ii) to balance 
interests by negotiating change, forging agreements by avoiding conflicts; and 
(iii) to execute and implement solutions by following through on agreements. 
Therefore, in societies with well-functioning institutions, individuals can enter 
into a number of complex agreements and exchanges with low transaction 
costs. This creates an environment that enables members of these societies to 
work together to realise their joint potential (ibid, 2002). In short, the World 
Bank (2002) definition focuses on the enabling aspects of institutions, and it is 
viewed as both rules and organisations. 
The social and relational nature of institutions 
Scholars such as Granovetter (1992; 1985), Landa (1994), Uzzi (1997), Searle 
(2005) and Portes (2010) understand institutions as a unique social structure 
with the potential to change people’s preferences and purposes in life. Human 
beings are biological and social beings, who respond to their environment on 
the basis of their physical and biological needs, as well as their social and 
relational realities. Therefore, it is possible to see individuals and social 
structures co-evolving at different levels of society, thus potentially creating 
new and different social structures. Institutions ‘enable’, and they are the basis 
of both socio-economic change and social continuity. According to Landa 
(1994), to understand the relationship between human beings and their social 
environment, it is crucial to appreciate that individuals are not independent 
actors who are completely isolated and uninfluenced in the way they make 
sense of, and act, in their surroundings (cf Meagher, 2010).  
Reflecting on the tendency to over-socialize or under-socialize the 
individual, Granovetter (1985) suggests that in both situations, the tendency is 
to assume the atomisation of individuals in their relationship with others, and 
in their social responses and actions. Granovetter argues for a more fruitful 
analysis that avoids atomisation and recognises instead that,   
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“…actors do not believe or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they 
adhere strictly to a script written by the particular intersection of social 
categories they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive actions are 
embedded in concrete on going systems of social relationships” (Granovetter, 
1985:487) 
This notion of embeddedness highlights the importance of personal relations 
and structures, and how they generate the trust needed for beliefs to influence 
behaviour and to discourage violation of commitment, customs, rules or 
norms.
92 Granovetter (1985) also notes that standard economic analysis ignores 
past relations of individual interactions, which is critical to understanding the 
nature of existing socio-economic behaviour. Moreover, people learn from 
each other and from the environment they live in, and to paraphrase Searle 
(2005), there are ‘never-ending’ loops of feedback, conscious and unconscious 
reinforcement, as well as evaluation and action. One outstanding result of this 
behaviour is that the valuation of outcomes does not remain the same over 
time, but depends on beliefs and habitual patterns of behaviour.  
Even Tuomela’s (2003) conception of norms and rules, and view of collective 
intentionality highlights the central role and importance of acquired beliefs. By 
seeing norms as involving attribution of intent to the group, with individuals 
believing that the intent they hold is held in common with the rest of the group, 
Tuomela  (2003)  views beliefs as critical to the establishment of rules and 
norms.
93 A norm results in regularised behaviour that is repeated and habitual, 
because there are mutually held beliefs that relate to the intentions and 
expectations of all members of a particular society.
94 For this reason, institutions 
rely on the rules that are embedded in shared habits of thoughts and behaviours, 
and can also be seen as emergent social structures, based on commonly held 
patterns of social behaviour (Granovetter, 2005). The involvement of beliefs and 
habits in the development of patterns of behaviour is important, and contributes 
to understanding the critical interactions between human beings.
95 Habits are 
implicated in relation to rules, norms and customs in that they help to constitute 
and sustain them. It is through habits that individuals carry the marks of their 
unique history (Shipton, 2007; Donham, 1999). 
Thus far, institutions have been shown to have both enabling and 
constraining dimensions. Although institutions may, at an individual level, 
appear to impose constraints, at a collective (village) level, the community may 
be better off as a whole if people are constrained by rules than if they are not 
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(Clague, 2003;  Burki & Perry, 1998). Therefore,  institutions facilitate and 
liberate the community rather than constrain it.
96 Yet institutions that impose 
constraints on individuals are not always good for society. Sometimes 
complicated regulations, procedures and/or weak enforcement mechanisms can 
impose high transaction costs, which may undermine incentives to invest in a 
particular activity or participate fully in economic exchanges (Havnevik et al., 
2007; Burki & Perry, 1998). Institutions may constrain or enable a society, 
depending on the quality of institutions.  
3.2.2  Definition of institutions used in the study 
Whilst there are varied terms and notions of institutions in the social sciences, 
there are also some key features that have to be included in any robust 
definition of institutions. Thus, the definition used in this thesis draws on the 
core ideas which reflect: (a) the structuring of human relationships and 
interactions, (b) the effects of rules on human activities and behaviour, and (c) 
constraint and enablement of human behaviour. Hence, the definition of 
institutions used in this thesis is:  
 
Institutions are the socially established norms and rules  that govern social 
interactions, with both enabling and constraining implications for individual 
freedom of action. 
The definition is broad and includes inter/intra households transacting, the 
legal and regulatory framework, as well as socio-cultural and cognitive 
processes, which provide a norm structure to guide people’s interactions. The 
definition is not dissimilar to North’s (1990) perspective. Thus by adopting the 
‘rule approach’, the study also differentiates institutions from organisations 
(game players). In order to take advantage of both formal rules and informal 
constraints and to “win the game”, farmers in Isunga, as the “players of the 
game of labour transactions or sharing” employs various strategies, acquire 
skills and adopt certain behaviours.
97 The discussion now turns to the key 
concepts applied in this study of labour institutions: (a) transaction costs, (b) 
relational property rights, and (c) social embeddedness. It is very much guided 
by the nature of data and information gathered in Isunga. 
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3.3  Role of institutions in labour transactions 
This section addresses the theoretical question of why and how institutions 
matter in labour transactions, by looking at the notion of transaction costs, 
which is a key concept underlying property rights and relational contracting. I 
will then look at the roles of some of the institutions that are embedded in 
social norms and networks in transactional relationships. They are analysed 
with  reference  to well-defined  concepts such as ‘bounded  rationality’ and 
‘opportunism’ (Furubotn & Richter, 2005; Williamson, 1985). 
3.3.1  Transaction costs 
Farmers in Isunga are both social actors and economic agents. When they sell 
or share their labour, they carefully identify whom they need to sell it to, 
negotiate and reach agreements with, and monitor work and settle labour 
disputes with as necessary. This is a complex process because transactional 
relationships do not operate in a vacuum. They require institutions and rules to 
coordinate them, and the process is not frictionless. They are characterised by 
uncertainty, risks and disparities in how the persons involved perceive each 
other’s realities. As a result, significant transaction costs can arise in 
identifying, conducting and enforcing various labour dealings.  
However, there are different views on the nature and sources of transaction 
costs. Coase (1960)  views transaction costs as the cost of carrying out a 
transaction by means of an exchange or in the open market.
98 North (1990) 
agrees, but stresses that the,  
 
“...costliness of information is the key to the costs of transacting, which consist 
of the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and 
the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements”.  
Transactions costs  cover a wide variety  of costs, largely associated with the 
use of time,  which  are  normally disregarded in standard economic analysis. 
They  include search  and  information costs, bargaining and decision-making 
costs, and policing and enforcement costs.  
Every transaction involves a contract, and the costs of preparing contracts 
(search and information costs) include the costs that may arise through 
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advertising, visiting prospective customers and so on. They also include the 
costs of communication among the prospective labour recipients or labour 
providers, such as mobile telephone expenses and unscheduled visits. Other 
costs relate to gathering information on wages, and the nature of work. There 
are also costs of concluding contracts (costs of bargaining and decision-
making). Bargaining costs are incurred during negotiations over contractual 
provisions. In addition to time, there may even be financial costs to cover legal 
advice, for example. These costs may vary depending on the complexity of 
such contracts. Decision-making costs include making gathered information 
usable, reaching decisions within groups and so on. The costs of enforcing 
contractual obligations are associated with monitoring work, agreed delivery 
times and wages, for example. The costs involved in protecting rights and 
enforcing contractual provisions are also included in this category.
99 
It is apparent that not all transaction costs occur at the point of labour 
transaction or exchange. Some costs occur before the exchange; for example, 
gathering information about potential labour service suppliers or recipients. 
Costs may also be incurred after agreements have been reached, and these may 
include the cost of monitoring performance, inspecting quality, obtaining 
payments and enforcing contracts (North, 1991; 1990). As argued by numerous 
scholars, neoclassical economic theory’s ideal world of costless information 
does not exist, since transaction costs arise due to imperfect and costly 
information (Furubotn & Richter, 2005; Allen, 2000; North, 1990; Williamson, 
1985). North (1990:27) writes that “the costliness of information is the key to 
the costs of transacting”. Williamson (1985:44)  also claims that imperfect 
information acknowledges the limitation on the competence of economic actors 
on the one hand, and “opportunism that substitutes subtle for simple self-
interest seeking” on the other.
100 
The ideas of bounded rationality and opportunism 
In contrast to neoclassical economists who view the decision-maker as a 
perfectly rational individual who acts on calculated rationality, new 
institutionalists assume a situation of bounded rationality where decision-makers 
are not omniscient and have real difficulties in processing information.
101 It 
involves cognitive and perceptive limitations on the one hand and language 
limitations on the other.
102 Therefore,  although an individual is rational, his 
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rationality is limited by his neurophysiologic ability to receive, store, retrieve, 
and process information, as well as by his linguistic ability to make knowledge 
or feelings understood by others (Searle, 2005; Williamson, 1985).  Furubotn & 
Richter (2005) share this view: 
 
“...because of their human limitations, their restricted knowledge, and their 
tendency to make errors, real-world decision makers will always function 
inefficiently relative to the hypothetical decision makers of neoclassical theory” 
(ibid, 2005:39).  
This limitation of human beings poses a problem in an environment 
characterised by risk and uncertainty since transaction costs will arise. 
Moreover, human beings often display opportunistic behaviour, even though 
not all individuals are continuously opportunistic (Williamson, 1985). Such 
behaviour contributes to an increase in transaction costs.  
Opportunism, according to Williamson  (1985:47)  means “self-interest 
seeking with guile”. It is a sort of unconstrained moral consideration and 
includes lying, stealing and cheating. Opportunism arises due to asymmetric 
information, which occurs when a person possesses information that is not 
accessible to the other (Furubotn & Richter, 2005; Williamson, 1985). In other 
words, opportunism is used, not in a moral sense, but as a way of obtaining 
advantages, because of the information available to an individual. Williamson 
(1985) sees parties involved in transactions as ‘contractual men’ who are aware 
of their conditions of bounded rationality.
103 Thus, when establishing 
agreements, they attempt to take advantage of their information and resources 
to satisfy their own interests. As a ‘contractual man’ therefore, an individual 
may exhibit opportunistic behaviour by hiding or obstructing access to some 
information or by being dishonest in order to maximize gains from an 
agreement. But how are transaction costs measured?  
In empirical studies, a direct measurement of transaction costs assesses the 
economic value of resources and time used in locating trading partners and 
executing transactions (Wang, 2003; Allen, 2000; Williamson, 1998; Shelanski 
& Klein, 1995). Another common  measurement  of  transaction  costs  is  the 
difference between the prices paid  by  the buyer  and  received by  the  seller 
(Furubotn & Richter, 2005). Some studies focus more on secondary costs than 
direct costs per se. For example, Williamson (1998) is primarily interested in 
the secondary cost of negotiation and enforcement (i.e. the cost of participating 
and reducing the cost of negotiation and enforcement). Yet some studies find 
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that transaction costs can be agent-specific (i.e. the identity of the transactor 
matters for the cost of conducting transactions).
104  
This thesis considers both the agent-specific and Williamsonian transaction 
cost  research  perspective, since  transaction  costs  provide  the  key  to 
understanding types of agricultural labour organisations in Isunga as well as 
farmers’ contractual labour arrangements. What is important though is the cost 
of conducting transactions in one organisational or contractual form relative to 
the others. Therefore, what matters are not the absolute transaction costs, but 
the relative ranking of transaction costs associated with different organisational 
or contractual choices (Benham & Benham, 2000). Hence, labour transaction 
costs  are  thus  not  directly  measured; instead, the proxies discussed below 
(transaction  frequency, level of dependency and degree of uncertainty)  are 
used,  since these are seen  to  critically affect  the  cost  of  labour  transactions. 
Understanding the relationship between the chosen proxy and organisational 
governance makes the  point  that  economising  on  transaction  costs  is  the 
unifying  logic  behind  various  contractual  arrangements  of  production and 
exchanges  (Williamson, 1998;  1985;  1981). This avoids the problematic 
exercise of quantifying the actual level of labour transaction costs. 
In this thesis, a labour transaction is seen to be an agreement between the 
provider and the recipient of labour. Therefore, with this definition, a 
transaction includes the labour agreement itself, the actions of carrying out the 
agreement and all situations that change the agreements and/or the actions of 
carrying out the agreement. Two proxies are used to measure labour 
transaction costs: (a) frequency with which the transaction occurs and level of 
dependency, and (b) the degree of uncertainty about the future and about other 
parties’ actions. These proxies matter for the preferred institutions’ governance  
(Williamson, 1998).
105  
Frequency of transactions and level of dependency 
The frequency of transactions refers to the length of the transactional 
relationship between the parties involved. According to Williamson  (1998; 
                                                        
104 For example, see Portes (2010), Landa (1999;  1994), Granovetter (2005;  1992;  1985), 
Coleman (1988). 
105 Following Williamson (1998), asset specificity is particularly important and probably the 
most difficult to measure. Asset-specificity  refers to how specific the good or service to be 
exchanged is, and Williamson (1985) defines it as, “…durable investments that are undertaken in 
support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in 
best alternative uses or by alternatives users should the original transaction be prematurely 
terminated.” (ibid, 1985:55). However, its relevance in my study of labour dealings in rain fed 
farming system is not much. I omit it, but recognises the contribution made by Williamson (1998) 
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1985), transaction contracts in short-term relationships are obvious and simple. 
There is little dependency between  the parties and they tend to rely on 
competition as an enforcement mechanism or as a means of settling 
disagreements, since they can turn to alternative sources if they are dissatisfied. 
But when the length of contractual relationships increases, the frequency of 
transactions also increases, and the parties become familiar with each other’s 
norms and backgrounds; to build up trust, the use of informal institutions may 
be preferable (ibid,  1985;  Macaulay, 1963).
106  Private or informal 
arrangements may be chosen to ensure the completion of transactions rather 
than judicial systems. Zenger et al., (2002) support the view outlined above. 
They contend that the use of formal institutions may be preferable in new or 
non-recurring relationships, since non-repeated interactions provide neither a 
‘shadow of the future’ increasing individuals’ perceived benefits from 
cooperation nor a ‘shadow of the past’ promoting the gradual development of 
relational norms and trust (ibid, 2002).  
Costs of using institutions for handling labour dealings 
Choosing to use an institution to handle labour dealings (i.e. the contracting and 
enforcement  mechanism)  also  depends  on  the  cost  of  using  it. The parties 
concerned do not focus only on the costs that are incurred to get an agreement 
enforced, but also on transaction costs of getting the work done. Thus, in a 
transaction, actors are confronted with a variety of potential costs.
107 As alluded 
to earlier, these costs can arise before, during, and even after transactions have 
taken place. According to transaction cost theory, the institutional environment 
can affect these costs. In this sense, the function of institutions is to influence 
actors’ decisions on how to use certain institutions in a given context. 
However, rational behaviour would imply that a more efficient institution (i.e. 
with lower costs) should be preferable to a less efficient one, all other things 
being equal (Coase, 1960).  
Kähkönen & Meagher (1998), Macaulay (1963)  and Telser (1980b) 
amongst others, maintain that parties to a transaction would not use legal 
procedures to settle disputes in court if they involve high costs. They can also 
use a combination of both if such action does not incur high costs (ibid, 1998). 
It appears that whenever contracts are not costly, individuals are tempted to use 
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and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up a contract, to 
undertake the inspection needed to make sure that terms of contracts are being observed, and so 
on (see Coase, 1960:15). 87 
these instruments even when informal agreements alone are self-enforcing, as 
argued by Klein & Shelanski (1996) and Schotter (1981). 
High transaction costs associated with formal institutions, for example, may 
deter parties from using them to carry out transactions. High direct costs of 
formal institutions (in terms of time and money) are, among other things, the 
results of ineffective legal systems. Allen (2000) claims that the more efficient 
the legal system, the lower the costs of enforcement. But with an ineffective 
legal system, reliance on informal ways to carry out transactions may be more 
appropriate to minimise transaction costs (cf Khadiagala, 2001). Johnson et 
al.(2002) and Rodrik (2008) also contend that ambiguity of laws and regulatory 
procedures, and inadequate legal support in the enforcement of contracts lead 
economic actors to place more emphasis on private ordering procedures and 
informal mechanisms to settle disputes. This is an important point, which is 
similar to Telser’s (1980b)  earlier assertion that reliance on self-enforcing 
agreements by the parties to a transaction can be attributed to the fact that it is 
costly to use the assistance  of third parties, such as the courts to enforce 
contracts and to assess damages when they are breached.
108  
Beckmann and Boger (2004) add that using court mechanisms to enforce 
transactional relationships tends to incur indirect costs. Such costs are 
associated with the ‘termination’ of a valuable relationship and the ‘damage’ of 
reputations in business or social networks. Williamson (1985)  makes the 
following observations about the first type of indirect costs, 
 
“...one important purposive difference in arbitration and litigation….is that, 
whereas continuity (at least completion of the contract) is presumed under the 
arbitration machinery, that presumption is much weaker when litigation is 
employed” (1985:71).  
 
“…litigation is strictly for settling claims; concentrated efforts to sustain the 
relation are not made, because the relation is not independently valued” (ibid, 
1985:74).  
Williamson (1985) thus seems to claim that the relationship between transaction 
partners is more likely to end from the moment when they begin to use litigation 
to assist with transactions. Thus, litigation may be used only when the relation 
does not matter, since the use of litigation as a method of contract enforcement 
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may imply the termination of a relationship. If the relationship has no value, then 
indirect costs associated with the abolition of the relationship do not occur. On 
the other hand, if the relationship between transacting parties is valuable, then 
breaking this relationship will incur indirect costs such as the cost of searching 
for new partners (Beckmann & Boger, 2004). The effect of indirect costs is 
obvious when actors are embedded in business or social networks since the use 
of courts damages the reputation of the litigating partner. The principal (or lead 
claimant) may decide to take a less severe enforcement response with a partner 
that is embedded in a dense network, and the potential costs of retaliation are 
likely to mitigate potential benefits of a more severe enforcement response 
(Beckmann & Boger, 2004).  How well institutions solve the problems of 
coordination and production is determined by the motivations of the actors, the 
complexity of the environment, and of course the ability of the players to 
decipher and order the environment, what North (1990) would call ‘measurement 
and enforcement costs’. 
This brings us to another important component of transaction costs, namely 
the issue of property rights in labour transactions. Property rights are highly 
robust institutions that support labour transactions. However, the avenues 
through which property rights in agricultural labour transactions are achieved 
are not adequately identified. This thesis therefore seeks to investigate the 
effects of relational contract enforcements on labour transactions. 
3.3.2  Relational property rights 
According to Furubotn & Richter  (2005), property rights are sanctioned 
ownership rights in material and immaterial things, or claims from contractual 
or non-contractual obligations. The prevailing system of property rights in a 
society can be described as the set of economic and social relations defining 
the position of each individual with respect to the utilisation of scarce 
resources (including agricultural labour). Furubotn & Richter  (2005)  divide 
property rights into two categories: absolute and relational property rights. The 
former refer not only to property rights in terms of tangible assets (e.g. land or 
houses), but also intangibles such as copyrights and patents. The latter can 
result from freely concluded contracts. They comprise, “contractual property 
rights such as credit-debt or purchase-sale relations and legally imposed 
obligations”  (ibid, 2005:82). The main difference between the two is that 
absolute property rights are “directed against all others”, while relational 
property rights “give the owner a power which he can exercise only against one 
or more determined persons” (ibid, 2005:77). Thus contractual rights are a 
component of property rights. 89 
Neoclassical  economics considers  private property rights  as  the  most 
efficient  system  of  resource  allocation  (Furubotn & Richter, 2005;  Coase, 
1960). Coase (1960) claims that only private property rights will further the 
markets  and economic efficiency, thus reducing governmental involvement.  
However, I find Coase’s property  rights  approach problematic,  because  it 
assumes that the main driving force behind institutional change is the search 
for an  efficient use  of property  rights. It is empirically incorrect to base  a 
theory only on the survival  of certain institutional forms and consider them 
to be the most efficient. 
This thesis focuses on relational property rights, because it stresses, 
amongst other things, the functions and dysfunctions of using contracts to 
solve transaction problems. The term ‘contract’ is here used to refer to plans 
for conducting labour transactions.
109 A contract involves the elements of 
rational planning of transactions, with careful provision for future unforeseen 
events and the existence of, or use of actual legal sanctions to encourage 
performance of labour transactions, or to compensate for non-performance. 
Thus, the plans for conducting transactions may be used or exist to create 
various labour relationships, or solve problems that arise during such 
relationships.
110 This is similar to North’s (1990) view on institutions as rules 
that impinge on behaviour by enabling or constraining human beings. The 
fairness and predictability of contract enforcement mechanisms ties in with the 
definition above.   
Fairness and predictability of enforcement mechanisms  
The fairness and the predictability of the outcome of contract enforcement 
mechanisms affect the choices and use of institutional types (Rodrik, 2008; 
Johnson et al., 2002; Kähkönen & Meagher, 1998). According to Kähkönen 
and Meagher (1998), transaction actors may choose courts as an enforcement 
mechanism when the transaction agreement (contract) is well written. They 
argue that written and less complex contracts are more easily enforceable than 
oral, complex and non-standardised ones. They also postulate that, although 
transaction agreements need not be written down or witnessed by a third party, 
it is clearly difficult to enforce them if they are not. If this condition is not met 
or poorly met, those involved may prefer informal mechanisms. Even so, when 
written agreements are imperfect and incomplete, the actors involved may 
choose informal enforcement mechanisms. The reason is that a court does not 
usually enforce unwritten terms or, if it does, then the amount of discretion by 
the court in relation to ambiguous unwritten contractual  terms is limited 
                                                        
109 I do not use it to refer to a writing recording an agreement. 
110 C.f. Furubotn & Richter (2005), Williamson  (1985). 90 
(Kähkönen & Meagher, 1998; 1997). Also, actors may not choose litigation 
through courts as a way of dispute resolution if decisions made by the courts 
are not based on clear legal criteria and/or judges are incompetent, since this 
does not ensure a fair and predictable outcome (ibid, 1998). However, when a 
country’s laws, regulations and formal enforcements are weak and ambiguous, 
citizens may pay more attention to social institutions and informal 
mechanisms. 
In addition to their role in determining transaction costs, institutions also 
have a role in defining and protecting relational contracts. They determine who 
gets what and when (Furubotn & Richter, 2005; Johnson et al., 2002). Hence, 
the extent to which contractual rights are protected affects individuals’ 
incentives to take actions and cooperate, potentially influencing the effective 
use of labour power during crop farming. According to property rights theory 
though, incentives are set optimally when the property rights are clearly 
specified.
111 Pejovich (2006) notes that people take better care of a house if 
they own it rather than they rent, and they are more likely to check and add oil 
to their own car than a rental car. Even so, individuals’ incentives are 
determined by both how the definition of property rights is specified on paper 
and how property rights are protected in practice. If the state is weak, for 
example, parties may seek protection elsewhere (Wood, 2004). So the 
definition, protection and enforcement elements of property rights are vital in 
discussions about labour transaction.  
As noted by Wood (2004), it is not enough to stress the significance of the 
existence of property rights since problems can arise if they are weak. Ostrom 
(2005)  also argues that property rights must be enforceable to achieve the 
desired effects.
112 So, institutions exist not only to define, but also to protect 
contractual rights. The World Bank (2002) asserts that one of the main roles of 
institutions in market transactions is to reduce the potential for disputes and 
help enforce contracts, arguing that when property rights and contracts are 
clearly defined and effectively enforced, then transactions costs will be 
reduced. But how does this work in environments where kinship/ethnic status, 
trust and reputation and/or social norms influence individuals’ behaviours 
more? The section below attempts to answer to this question.  
3.3.3  Social embeddedness  
In theory, institutions arise to reduce transaction costs and facilitate 
interactions and cooperation in an economy. In practice though, institutions can 
generate labour transaction costs as will be explained shortly. In that respect, 
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institutions can contribute to high or low labour transactions costs, and 
effectively or ineffectively protect contractual rights. For example, a formal 
institution (e.g. contract law) made and enforced by government can raise or 
lower transaction costs through the definition and enforcement of property 
rights, through regulations, the level of corruption in society and/or time-
consuming visits to government offices (Meagher, 2010;  Brautigam, 1997). 
Even institutions that are embedded in social norms and networks (ethnic 
identity, moral and affection, trust and reputation) can raise or lower labour 
transaction costs through the enforcement of relational property rights. Rodrik  
(2008), Granovetter (2005; 1992) and Brautigam (1997) have all shown that 
institutions embedded in social norms reduce risks and uncertainty in 
transaction relationships, and also reduce the need for transaction costs linked 
to monitoring, research and gathering information (hence lower costs). 
When transactions are rooted in social networks 
In an explanation of the predominance of relational contracting among a group 
of New York clothing merchants, Uzzi (1997) suggests that apart from risk-
sharing, the preference for relational contracting and resulting long-term 
personal links of trust, loyalty and benevolence among actors have historical, 
social and cultural roots. Hence, actors feel more comfortable in high-trust and 
friendly ‘give-and-take’ relations in which both sides recognise that they also 
have some stake one another’s satisfaction other than in adversarial bargaining 
relationships. This is the opposite of Williamson’s (1985)  approach to 
contracting, where he argues that the high risks associated with idiosyncratic 
goods and services to be transacted, and the pressure for continuity of the 
relationship usually lead to reliance on relational contracts. 
In fact, Granovetter’s (2005; 1992; 1985) embedded argument, described in 
Section 3.2, is a direct challenge to Williamson’s (1985;  1981)  approach 
discussed above. Granovetter’s (1985) states that transactions are embedded in 
social networks, and that the trust generated by personal interactions is helpful 
in discouraging wrongful acts. He accuses Williamson (1981)  for placing 
undue emphasis on legislative control in markets and the control of authority in 
hierarchical structures, while also employing an under socialised assumption of 
‘atomised’ actors. Yet within markets and hierarchies alike, actors’ interactions 
in a relationship network exist and serve as an important form of malfeasance 
control  (Granovetter, 1985). With good will or ‘good’ relational contracts, 
close supervision and heavy enforcement by the authorities becomes 
redundant. Moreover, in some cultural contexts (including Isunga), goodwill is 
vital for economic exchanges, because actors are aware that transactions 
without a trust relationship may involve extremely high costs (cf Landa, 1994). 92 
As suggested by Williamson (1998; 1985), the search for information is a 
major component of transaction costs, and quite correctly, a lack of it may lead 
to opportunistic behaviour. While studying labour markets in the United States, 
Granovetter (1992) also observed that a “clue in how to do the work” makes a 
significant part of workers’ performance, and it is generally exchanged in an 
informal contact network (ibid,1992:251-252). This reasoning is supported by 
Landa  (1994), who argues that whenever economic agents lack  adequate 
information, the search for information represents a significant portion of 
operational costs, and a trust relationship would be valuable in reducing costs 
since it is always a primary source of reliable and abundant information.  
The function of trust in reducing transaction costs is clear, both in terms of 
controlling opportunistic behaviour and searching for information, but to view 
the two terms as substitutes for one another would be incorrect. Trust is 
necessary to transactions in different ways (see below), and Granovetter 
(1985:503)  warns of taking a “Panglossian view” as done by Williamson 
(1981). Simply focusing on institutional arrangements in either markets or in 
hierarchies is not enough to ensure smooth transactions. Some ‘lubricant’ in 
the interface of human interactions is always needed. However, how different 
social relations achieve this in rain fed smallholder farming systems is still not 
fully explored or understood. Thus, by adapting Granovetter’s  (1985) 
embedded argument, this thesis is better placed to examine (and explain) the 
role of specific socio-cultural factors in labour transactions in Isunga.  
Trust and labour transactions 
Trust is a key ingredient in the institutional infrastructure of agricultural labour 
transactions. For example, trust allows for efficient transactions in the face of 
uncertainty and risks, and constrains opportunistic behaviour. Also, trust in 
institutions reduces the costs of rule-enforcement and supports collective action 
(Landa, 1994; North, 1990; Williamson, 1981). I have chosen to focus on trust 
because of its importance for labour dealings under conditions of uncertainty 
(due to seasonality and/or contract ambiguity) and risk of opportunism. 
Coleman (1988) defines trust as a belief that the other agents would act in a 
predictable way and fulfil their obligations  without special sanctions. This 
reveals that trusting relationships develop either through the predictable 
behaviour of the other actors or through mutual obligations to follow accepted 
conventions, which are  voluntarily undertaken. This thesis uses Rose-
Ackerman’s approach, which associates trust with social proximity in the sense 
of sharing the same categories of expected rights and duties, plus shared values 
and interests (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). People feel confident in other people 
when they trust that they have the ability, the desire and the good disposition to 93 
perform an exchange, or when they are familiar with other people so that they 
can make a request. Rose-Ackerman (2001) writes, 
 
“…trust is a relational response, not a result of blind loyalty that permits risks in 
dealing with each other.” (ibid, 2001:543)  
Following Landa (1994) and Tillmar (2005; 2002), when formal institutions 
are seen to be weak, trust arises to reduce uncertainty and risk of opportunistic 
behaviour, thereby reducing transaction costs. Trust can also emerge when 
actors have frequent transactions and become familiar with each other 
(Lazzarini et al., 2002; Tillmar, 2002). Tillmar (2005; 2002) contends that on-
going relationships between people usually develop deep bonds of personal 
trust, and when transactions between economic actors occur more frequently, 
the persons involved get to know each other’s behaviours, backgrounds and 
subsequently develop trust. Moreover, as noted by Coleman (1994), trust can 
also develop via an intermediary. For example, if A is trusted by B who is 
trusted by C, it is likely that C would trust A. Trust can also arise as a result of 
friendships, ethnic status, family relations or reputations that people develop in 
social relationships (cf Meagher, 2010; Portes, 2010; Granovetter, 2005; Landa 
& Lu, 1997; Uzzi, 1997). 
According to Tillmar  (2002), it seems greater trust between economic 
actors, facilitates self-enforcing long-term relationships.
113 Trust reduces costs 
that people incur in managing their relationships. Thus, if labour transactions 
are carried out on the basis of trust, people will spend less time negotiating and 
monitoring, thus reducing transaction costs. As Landa (1994)  points out, 
parties who want to reduce the cost of maintaining their relationships have an 
incentive to develop trust. 
Regarding search costs, labour transaction that takes place on the basis of 
trust resulting from on-going relationships can also help to lower the costs of 
information.  Hence, diligence reduces the costs of searching, and information 
that is accumulated from past labour exchanges is more likely to lead to correct 
assessments (Williamson, 1985; 1981). In fact, Williamson (1981) maintains 
that information collected directly between the parties is cheaper, more detailed 
and more accurate. He also points out other benefits of doing business on a 
continual basis: (a) individuals with whom one has a continuing relationship 
have an economic motivation to be trustworthy, so as not to discourage future 
transactions;
114 (b) continuing economic relations often become overlaid with 
social content that carries strong expectations of trust and abstention from 
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opportunism. To my understanding, this supports Granovetter’s (1992; 1985) 
notion of ‘embeddedness’ stating that economic institutions are ‘social 
constructions’.
115 
Trust can also come from a ‘go-between’ who is in a position of trust.
116 Such 
transactions reduce search costs since the intermediary can provide a kind of 
guarantee (Landa & Lu, 1997; Uzzi, 1997; Coleman, 1988). In this respect, by 
investing in established relationships, farmers (economic actors) can find new 
partners and effectively lower the search costs. Hence, trust acts as the bridge of 
communication and can serve as an informal institution, thereby reducing costs 
of information (Tillmar, 2005; Landa, 1994; Williamson, 1993a; 1981). 
With respect to trust and negotiation costs, a number of scholars agree that 
parties that have developed strong trust in each other may be more likely to 
work out  their disagreements amicably (Tillmar & Lindkvist, 2007;  Uzzi, 
1997;  Landa, 1994;  Williamson, 1993a). However, in cases where people 
distrust each other, they develop less favourable attitudes, and lower levels of 
communication and bargaining behaviours. Instead, they tend to be very 
careful when negotiating labour arrangements. They also spend more time 
arguing, haggling and debating individual goals. This makes the whole 
negotiation process costly in terms of time and money. However, if 
negotiations are carried out in a trusting environment, it is more likely that 
outcomes will suit both parties and they may not have to take all potential 
eventualities into consideration. This is because they believe that equitable 
adjustments will be made as the environment changes. In this sense, the trusted 
individuals may be willing to engage in high-risk behaviour. In such 
circumstances, the cost of reaching agreements is similarly low to the 
negotiation costs, since there is no need to remind each other about what was 
agreed or not.
117  
In the presence of trust too, the requirements of enforcement and 
monitoring are reduced. If the parties involved do not believe that the other 
side will display opportunistic behaviour, both parties can spend less time and 
resources on monitoring and controlling each other’s behaviour (Williamson, 
1993a). Although Williamson (1993a) recognises the role of opportunism in 
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developed, they are closely related. Both are used to evaluate a person’s trustworthiness, so they 
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transactional relationships, he downplays the role of trust, which he simply 
refers to it as ‘clever ways’.
118 He contends that individuals tend to use ‘clever 
ways’ to gain an upper hand, meaning that there is a possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour in every relationship. However, dealings based on trust 
mean that both sides believe they will comply with the agreement.  
Much as individual farmers could act opportunistically for short-term gain, 
such behaviour may incur long-term costs given the high risks and uncertainty 
(rainfall), as well as mutual dependence. Thus, the continuity of relationships 
and  personal reputations can act as enforcement mechanism in labour 
transactions.
119 Tillmar (2002) observes that short-term gain from opportunistic 
behaviour may in fact result in long-term losses if others refuse to do business 
with people who have a bad reputation and who break relationships with their 
business partners.
120  
Issue of ethnic identity in labour relations 
The literature on ethnicity suggests that it is a difficult concept to define. For 
examples, Hale (2004) notes:  
 
“…nothing close to a consensus has emerged about not only what ethnicity’s 
effects are but also what it is in the first place. For some, it is an emotion-
laden sense of belonging or attachment to a particular kind of group…for 
others it is embeddedness in a web of significant symbols. Still others see 
ethnicity as a social construct or a choice to be made…some even call 
ethnicity a biological survival instinct based on nepotism” (ibid, 2004:458).  
 
From the above quote, ethnicity appears to mean different things to different 
people, and rarely exists in a pure form. It is situational and fluid with 
constantly changing boundaries. Thus, it is probably correct to assert that levels 
of ethnic consciousness and resource mobilisation differ amongst groups for a 
number of reasons (cf  Okuku, 2002;  Eriksen, 2001). According to Barth 
(1969), however, ethnicity denotes the complexity of human existence and 
behaviour. It signifies perceptions of common origins, historical memories, 
identity and common ties between people. It has its foundation in memories of 
past experiences and common aspirations, values, norms and expectations. 
This thesis defines ethnicity as a social phenomenon associated with 
interactions among members of different ethnic groups in Isunga. According to 
Barth  (1969), ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by the 
communal character of their boundaries, with the relevant communal factors 
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119 Here reputation is taken as a measurement of trustworthiness. 
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being language, culture or both. He clarifies the link between people and forms 
of culture via the concept of ‘ethnic units’:   
 
“...there are aggregates of people who essentially share a common culture, and 
interconnected differences that distinguish each discrete culture from all others. 
Since culture in nothing but a way to describe human behaviour, it would follow 
that there are discrete group of people, i.e. ethnic units, to correspond to each 
culture” (ibid, 1969:294)    
To Barth (1969), the link between the concepts of culture and ethnic groups is 
so important that he refers to them as ‘cultural bearing unit’, dividing the 
cultural contents of an ethnic group into two: (a) the overt signal or symbols of 
identity such as language, religion, rituals, dress style or dietary preferences 
that members look for and exhibit to show identity, and (b) the underlying 
values, codes of ethics or standards of morality shared by group members (cf 
Landa, 1994; Vincent, 1971). Barth’s (1969) other important contribution is the 
concept of the ethnic boundary. He writes,  
 
“...the ethnic boundary canalizes social life – it entails a frequently quite complex 
organisation of behaviour and social relations. The identification of another person 
as a fellow member of an ethnic group implies a sharing of criteria for evaluation 
and judgement. It thus entails the assumption that the two are fundamentally 
‘playing the same game’....on the other hand, a dichotomization of others as 
strangers, as members of another ethnic group, implies a recognition of limitations 
on shared understandings, differences in criteria for judgement of value and 
performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common 
understanding and mutual interest” (Barth, 1969: 300-301)  
Based on the above, it is clear that the classification of ‘us’ (the insiders whom 
we trust) and the discrimination against ‘them’ (the outsiders whom we 
distrust) is an inherent feature of all ethnic groups.
121 What is relevant here is 
whether ethnic identity facilitates or obstructs labour transactions in a multi-
ethnic village like Isunga. It is also important in the discussion about enforcing 
relational contracts. 
Personal ties as self-enforcing contracts 
According to Baker et al., (2002), relational contracts are unwritten 
understandings of obligations between economic actors, which are sustained by 
the value of future relationships. In this view, relational contracts occur 
between parties in a transaction when they rely on on-going transaction 
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relationships to regulate their contractual relationships (Williamson, 1993b). 
Accordingly, relational contracts are concerned with cooperation (‘the guiding 
principle of contract’), aimed at making actors enter a reasoned dialogue. 
Transactions governed by relational contracts imply strong personal 
involvement, and personal relations such as friendship, family relations, ethnic 
status and other social relations. Any difference or difficulties that arise 
between the parties are tackled by means of cooperation and negotiations. They 
work on the basis of informal relationships based on trust, a history of 
reciprocal dealing, reputation and other social norms. Moreover, they are 
associated with non-legal sanctions such as suffering reputations or 
relationships (Brautigam, 1997; Landa, 1994; Telser, 1980b).  
According to Telser (1980a), it is clear that relational contracts, in which 
transactions are treated as personal relations, and obligations are sustained by 
sentiments and values, lower costs of contract enforcement as well as reduces 
dangers of opportunistic behaviour among actors. This is because relational 
contracts are based on reputational effects, community punishment or self-
enforcement. In advancing his thoughts on the role of ‘relational contracts’ and 
informal mechanisms of enforcement in exchange relationships, Telser (1980a) 
proposed a theory of self-enforcing contracts, which stressed that they could be 
self-enforced without any intervention by third parties. The main element of 
the theory is that an agreement would be fulfilled, because it is in the interest 
of those involved in a relationship to continue with it and to keep exchanging 
goods and services in the future. He writes, 
 
“....a self-enforcing agreement between two parties remains in force as long as 
each party believes himself to be better off by continuing the agreement than he 
would be ending it. It is left to the judgment of the parties concerned to 
determine whether, or not there has been a violation of the agreement. If one 
party violates the terms then the only recourse of the other party is to terminate 
the  agreement after he discovers the violation. No third party intervenes to 
determine whether a violation has taken place or to estimate the damages that 
result from such a violation” (ibid,1980a:27). 
In a self-enforcing agreement, the penalty for failing to comply with terms of 
agreement is to end the transactional relationship with no future relations. 
Therefore, one of the strongest incentives to honour contractual terms is a 
continuing relationship or repetition of transactions.
122 But in situations where 
transactions between certain persons are unlikely to be repeated in the future, 
or there is no benefit from continuing the relationship; a loss of future dealings 
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becomes an ineffective penalty.
123 In this context, substitutes for self-enforcing 
agreements will appear without necessarily involving a third party. For 
example, parties can seek information about the reliability of their potential 
exchange partners (Telser, 1980a). 
In practice, much empirical evidence has also shown that informal rules, trust 
and social norms can facilitate cooperation, by providing channels through which 
individuals (as economic agents and social actors) can access information and by 
offering a means of enforcing contracts without or at low costs. Brautigam’s 
(1997) study of the manufacturing sector in Nnewi in Eastern Nigeria mentioned 
earlier  shows that informal institutions, such as networks, successfully 
compensate for the failure of state institutions in industrial development. In 
explaining the rise of a new industrial axis in Nnewi but not elsewhere, she 
stressed that policy change was not a reason. More important were 
entrepreneurs’ own rules in organising their trade, concluding that 
  
“...close, ethnic-based networks reduce transaction costs associated with 
exchange and with expansion, leading to highly successful distribution systems” 
(ibid,1997:1077)   
Considering the above, it is clear that relational contracting (self-enforcing 
contracts) have many advantages. For instance, the stability of the relationship 
allows greater investment among transaction actors, since the sense of mutual 
obligation holds the relationships together; the relationship of trust and mutual 
dependency allows for a faster flow of information; and it lowers transaction 
costs and lessens the dangers of opportunistic behaviour among transacting 
firms (Tillmar, 2005; 2002; Landa & Lu, 1997; Landa, 1994). Landa (1994) 
strongly argues that relational contracting is associated with lower costs of 
contract enforcement since it is usually based on reputation, community 
punishments or on self-enforcement.  
Meagher  (2010)  disagrees with the above. Based on twenty years of 
research of social networks and the informal economy in south western 
Nigeria, she has noted that although social networks are thought to offer a 
solution to market failure and state incapacity to deliver services, the 
proliferation of socially embedded enterprise networks in Nigeria has 
generated disorder and economic decline rather than development. She 
challenged the assumption that the problem of African development lies in bad 
cultural institutions by arguing that informal economic governance in Nigeria 
is in fact shaped by the disruptive effects of rapid liberalisation, state decline 
and political capture, not culture. Meagher (2010)  illustrates how ties of 
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ethnicity, gender and religion are used to restructure enterprise networks in 
response to contemporary economic challenges in southwest Nigeria.  
Morality and affection in labour relations 
Social norms, customs, traditions, and religious belief in particular, are 
institutions that are associated with conventions embedded in culture 
(Williamson, 2000). Their purpose is to define the way society conducts itself, 
especially where personal relationships based on kinship, ethnic belonging, 
religious affiliation and friendship are valued. Quite often, when faced with 
farming and other livelihood challenges, Isunga’s farmers resort to personal 
networks that offer instant and reliable sources of support; what Hydén (1983) 
calls the ‘economy of affection’. Hydén  (1983;  1980)  provides a clear 
exposition of the importance of the ‘economy of affection’ in African rural 
societies. The concept blends economic and social rationality, and focuses on a 
range  of survival and self-help strategies that would otherwise remain 
undetected or misapprehended (Seppälä, 1998;  Lemarchand, 1989).  Hydén 
(1983) defines the ‘economy of affection’ as  
 
“…a network of support, communications and interaction among structurally 
defined groups connected by blood, kin, community or other activities, for 
example, religion.” (ibid, 1983:8) 
Based on this definition, the economy of affection is a defence mechanism – a 
way for people living in poverty to cope with the circumstances that are 
threatening their livelihoods.
124 It also serves the purpose of maintaining 
existing social relations since human agency is about more than just pursuing 
self-interest. It also implies judgements of responsibility and morally guided 
actions (Hyden, 2002; Lemarchand, 1989; Hydén, 1983). 
The above remarks nothwithstanding, Elster (1989) reminds us that social 
norms are purposively generated behavioural rules; e.g. “Do X” or “Don’t do 
X”, or more complicated rules: “If you do Y, then do X” or “If others do Y, 
then do X” or “Do X if it would be good if everyone did X”. Therefore, to 
become an institution, they have to be shared by other people. In this way, 
social norms can be sustained by people’s approval or disapproval, by the 
feelings of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame of the people who violate 
them, and by some forms of punishment (e.g. ostracism) from members of a 
community. In any case, norms should not be confused with habits, because 
‘violated’ habits are not punishable. Habits are not enforced by other people 
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and their ‘violation’ does not generate self-blame, guilt or anxiety (Raiser, 
2001; Olsson, 1999; Elster, 1989). If habits are ‘enforced’, then it becomes a 
convention; and Olsson  (1999) defines a convention as, 
 
“...a habit that is shared by many people which people follow mainly because 
they do not wish to deviate” (ibid,1999).  
Conventions or habits will, according to Olsson (1999), “become norms when 
the individual feels that he or she ought to take certain actions”.   
‘Custom’ is another concept that has a huge bearing on this study and is 
linked to moral and affection. Schlicht  (2001:3)  defines it as  “...the set of 
habits, attitudes, convictions prevailing in a society, as inherited from the past”. 
From this perspective, conventions, habits, moral attitudes and social norms 
can be seen as units of custom. It is apparent from Schlicht that culture can be 
divided into non-formalised parts (habits, conventions, and moral attitudes) and 
formalised parts (formalised law, religious organisations). In this thesis, 
custom refers to the parts of culture that are not formalised, but emerge and 
stabilise with time.
125 Schlicht (2001) notes that much as social and economic 
structures and processes are thoroughly permeated by customary  ways of 
behaving, thinking and evaluating all kinds of actions and events, custom can 
also be moulded, bent and shaped by the very social and economic processes 
that build on it. Thus, morality and affection (informal institutions) are closely 
related to a society’s culture (Hydén, 1983) and history (North, 1990). They 
come from socially transmitted information and are part of a society’s cultural 
heritage. They are maintained from one generation to another through 
imitation, oral tradition and teaching (North, 1990).  
So far, I have presented the different perspectives of institutions, definitions 
of institutions, important theoretical arguments and some empirical evidence 
for their roles in transactions. Next is a presentation of the conceptual and 
analytical framework used to: (a) guide the research, (b) explore the 
institutions involved in agricultural labour relations, (c) examine the character 
of institutional regulations that matter in agricultural labour transactions (what 
institutions matter and how it matter) in Isunga, and (d) reveal some of the 
factors that influence farmers’ choices of institutions.  
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3.4  Analytical framework 
In agricultural labour transactions in Isunga, the persons involved identify and 
choose the individuals they want to deal with, reach agreements (winye) and 
enforce them, which include solving any disputes that may arise. These 
practices do not take place in a vacuum; institutions are required to coordinate 
them. Yet as discussed earlier, institutions are diffuse and abstract and cover all 
aspects of human behaviour. So, the framework adopted for the analysis of 
agricultural labour transactions in Isunga village is based on the assumption 
that institutions matter in agricultural labour relations. Institutions that are 
rooted in state laws and regulations, as well as social institutions such as 
informal rules, trust, social norms and other informal practices arise to let 
individual farmers structure their transactional relationships, to ensure 
performance of the parties involved, and to settle disputes if they arise.
126 As 
rightly argued by Meagher (2010), Wood (2004) and Landa (1994), when a 
country’s laws, regulations and formal enforcements are weak and ambiguous, 
citizens give more attention to social institutions. Even so, it should be stressed 
that the complexity of individual actors’ decision is very much linked to 
resource availability.  
Although many institutions are involved in structuring and enforcing 
transactional relations, there is a need to empirically investigate the ways and 
degrees to which the institutional environments shapes labour transactions. The 
factors identified to explain farmers’ labour behaviours and guide the empirical 
study are: (a) the characteristics of labour transactions in agriculture, (b) the 
social and cultural factors (kinship and ethnic identity, issues of moral and 
affections, trust and reputation), (c) the costs of using institutions for sharing or 
exchanging agricultural labour, and (d) the fairness and predictability of 
enforcement mechanisms (court rulings, arbitration, mediation).  
3.4.1  Characteristics of labour transactions in agriculture 
Agriculture in Isunga is influenced by seasonality, and crop production carries 
high risks and uncertainty. This has important bearings on labour usage, since 
certain characteristics of transactions affect farmers’ labour behaviour. Because 
of the risks and uncertainty associated with rain fed crop production, farmers of 
Isunga plan their activities and labour practices very carefully within a given 
institutional context. This makes ‘dependency’ between labour actors an 
important characteristic of agricultural labour transactions.
127 Dependency 
could be due to the frequency of transactions (receiving and giving labour) and 
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uncertainty (the disturbances to which the transactions are subject).
128 In cases 
where the level of dependency between labour providers and recipients is high, 
both sides would suffer if their transactional relationships were destroyed. It 
would therefore be in their interests to continue with the relationships and even 
make them stronger (Williamson, 1985). In such a situation, the need for 
increased sharing of information grows. This would make reaching agreements 
and commitment during the transaction complex and time-consuming, and the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour in the relationship would increase, thus raising 
transaction costs (cf Kähkönen & Meagher, 1997).  
Based on the circumstances above, actors may use special governance 
arrangements to structure their labour relationships. It is likely that they would 
choose a governance mechanism with a high degree of trust so that the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour is reduced and the performance of 
transaction actors secured. Indeed there is much evidence to show that trust is 
important in any transactional relationships (Tillmar, 2005; Uzzi, 1997; Landa, 
1994; Williamson, 1985). Williamson (1985:3) notes,  
 
“…other things being equal, an idiosyncratic exchange relation that features 
personal trust will survive greater stress and will display greater adaptability”.  
Accordingly, farmers would deal with those who are perceived as trustworthy 
to avoid risk or use of sophisticated governance mechanisms, which can help 
them minimise risk or opportunism. Furthermore, if the labour relationship is 
considered important, then those involved may choose informal mechanisms to 
settle disputes that may arise in order to preserve the relationship. 
3.4.2  Costs of using institutions for agricultural labour 
The literature discussed above would suggest that farmers should use those 
institutions that benefit them the most in terms of reducing the costs of their 
labour transactions and protecting their contractual rights. Such costs may be 
associated with the processes of locating labour partners, gathering information 
about their reliability, reaching agreements, as well as enforcing the agreement, 
including monitoring the work, reducing risks and uncertainty, and settling 
disputes that might arise from the transactions. These costs could be monetary 
(e.g. court fees, fines or bribes), non-monetary (time spent, loss of a 
relationship or loss of reputation) or both. 
High costs connected with formal institutions can be attributed to the 
insecure nature of the regime, poor written laws, cumbersome procedures, 
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incompetent arbitrators, magistrates or councillors and corruption.
129The logic 
is that weak institutions (including frequent and unpredictable changes) can 
complicate processes of transactions agreements and increase costs. When the 
state is weak and formal institutions are inefficient, for example, rules are 
complex and not understood by the people, or weakly enforced. It thus 
becomes costly for people to use such institutions in their dealings. Thus, 
relying on informal ways to structure and enforce labour relations, makes sense 
according to the economic reasoning advanced by both Williamson  (2000; 
1985) and North (2006; 1991; 1990) above, and seems more appropriate for 
keeping labour transaction costs down. Farmers may make their own rules and 
develop strategies to carry out their labour transactions in ways that ensure 
each other’s performance and avoid misunderstandings. If disputes arise, 
farmers may use informal mechanisms other  than the Isunga  village (LC1) 
court procedures to settle their disputes in order to avoid the high costs 
connected with the LC1 court. In other words, in the absence of adequate 
formal support in structuring and enforcing labour relationships, the role of 
informal arrangements can be expected to be more important since the use of 
formal institutions may incur high costs. Since institutions affect transaction 
costs, these costs can arise before, during or after transactions.  
3.4.3  Fairness and predictability of enforcement mechanisms 
Legal centralism underlines the importance of law and formal enforcement 
mechanisms in social and economic development (Furubotn & Richter, 2005; 
Bakibinga, 2001; Kähkönen & Meagher, 1997). Kähkönen & Meagher (1997) 
suggest that the economic transactions and development of any society 
depends on a system of simple, transparent laws and regulations, consistent 
interpretation and enforcement, just and quick resolution and a social attitude 
of respect for legal and regulatory institutions. North (1991;  1990)  and 
Williamson  (1998;  1985)  add that formal rules and their enforcements are 
problematic and never free from transaction costs. For these reasons, the 
fairness and predictability of outcomes of enforcement are important to explain 
farmers’ transactional behaviours and decisions.  
Unfair and unpredictable outcomes of formal enforcement mechanisms 
such as courts and arbitrations may prevent individual farmers or farming 
households (as economic agents and social actors) from using such 
mechanisms to enforce transactions or settle disputes (cf Johnson et al., 2002; 
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Kähkönen & Meagher, 1997). Put another way, unjust outcomes of the Isunga 
village (LC1) court rulings, for example, may prevent some farmers from using 
it to settle labour disputes.
130This could be attributed either to the weaknesses 
of the local  council system or the legal system in Uganda in general, and 
Isunga in particular, due to contradictory law and regulations, incompetent 
magistrates, arbitrators or local councillors. It could also be due to corruption 
(Khadiagala, 2001).
131 
3.4.4  Social and cultural factors 
Under conditions of labour contract uncertainty, as well as risks and 
uncertainty due to the seasonal nature of crop farming, kinship/ethnic status is 
a valubale asset in Isunga. Individuals are emebdded in social structures with 
‘rules of the game’ that serve to constrain their behaviours. Hence, farmers 
enter into labour relationships with others whom they know to be trustworthy 
and relaible in honouring labour contracts (winye). In this context, agricultural 
labour actors may be reluctant to use externaly imposed (formal) institutions to 
regulate their labour dealings. Thus, social and cultural factors are also used in 
this thesis to explain Isunga farmers’ behaviours and decisions with respect to 
the institutions they use (cf Shipton, 2007; Englund, 1999; Landa, 1994).  
The  above views notwithstanding, moral and affective factors raised by 
Hyden (2004; 2000; 1983; 1980) are also considered in this study, since Isunga 
villagers consider personal relationships such as kinship and friendships to be 
very important. When faced with farming and other livelihood challenges, the 
people of Isunga use personal networks that provide reliable support. Hydén 
(1983) calls such behaviour the ‘economy of affection’, because of numerous 
reasons.
132 For instance, (a) transaction costs could be much lower because it is 
easier for a poor person to approach a neighbour, relative, or friend to give or 
receive labour than associate with strangers; (b) free-riding is not a real 
problem because those who have something extra take pride in sharing with 
those who do not, whilst others use it as a way of consolidating existing 
relationships or for insurance purposes, and (c) the moral hazard is low because 
even if the risks tend to increase with the break-up of old relationships, seeking 
out others informally for solutions is less risky than going through corrupt 
formal institutions, for example.  
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Figure 1 below summarises the theoretical and analytical framework that 
guides this research. The framework helps to investigate, analyse and 
understand labour transactions in crop production in a farming calendar.
133  
Figure 1: Theoretical and analytical framework 
 
Source: Opira Otto (2013) 
In the framework for the analysis of agricultural labour relations, the case study 
approach is used to link the theoretical issues discussed to the context, i.e. the 
behaviour of farmers and existing institutional arrangements, since  farmers 
may act as agents of institutional change or persistence. Thus, in my case study 
of the role and influence of institutions on labour transactions in Isunga, I look 
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at the behaviour of individual farmers, and listen to their arguments in an 
attempt to clarify a rather heterogeneous reality. 
3.5  Summary and key issues 
This chapter was concerned with the conceptualisation of institutions. It explored 
the different ways of viewing institutions and how they are manifested. Whereas 
some scholars see institutions as ‘constraints’, others see them as ‘enabling 
devices’; and much as there is no definition of institutions that is universally 
accepted, some characteristics of institutions, shared by various authors do exist. 
The chapter also provided key conceptual issues for understanding the 
significance of institutions in agricultural labour transactions. It explored the 
theories of transaction costs, relational property rights and social embeddedness. 
The insights generated from these theories suggest that the ideal role of 
institutions is to coordinate transactions by reducing transaction costs and 
protecting contractual rights. Even so, the level of transaction costs and 
protecting contractual rights depends on the quality of institutions as understood 
by the users themselves. Effective institutions will reduce transaction costs and 
effectively protect contractual rights, thereby facilitating impersonal agricultural 
labour transactions. On the contrary, ineffective institutions will generate high 
costs and poorly protect contractual rights.  
Key issues that arose from the discussions were: which institutions are used 
in agricultural labour transactions, and why are they important? A review of 
the literature showed that many institutions are involved in labour transactions. 
Those relevant for this thesis are: codified laws and government regulations; 
trust and reputation; ethnicity and identity; social norms (morality  and 
affection). However, theory failed to show which particular institution is most 
suitable for reducing labour transaction costs and/or enforcing contractual 
rights. Instead, it showed that various institutions can lower/increase 
transaction cost; and thus effectively/poorly protect contractual rights. Two 
aspects of institutions emerged: new institutional economics (NIE) and legal 
centralism. Whilst legal centralism favours law and formal enforcement 
mechanisms in transactions, NIE recognises that institutions such as trust, 
reputation, morality, affection and social norms can not only help to reduce 
transaction costs, but also effectively protect contractual rights. Suggesting 
that, formal contracts and formal enforcement mechanisms can and often are 
imperfect and costly. Therefore, relational contracts and informal enforcement 
mechanisms emerge to govern transaction relationships. Moreover, it was 
shown that no single institution exists in isolation in an economy. A mix of 
institutions or their interactions may be more beneficial to its users. 107 
The theoretical discussions also set the ground for understanding the 
influence of institutions in agricultural labour transactions. By means of a 
review of literature on institutions, I explained that actors engaged in such 
transactions are affected by numerous institutions through transactions costs 
and the protection of relational property rights. Actors act rationally and 
choose the ‘right’ institutions to minimise transaction costs and effectively 
protect their contractual rights. Apart from the costs of using such institutions, 
the unfairness or unpredictability of enforcement mechanisms, certain socio-
cultural factors (e.g. moral, ethnic status or identity, reputation etc.) also 
influence actors’ decisions. Based on these factors, a framework for analysing 
and understanding the role and influence of institutions in agricultural labour 
relationships in Isunga village is proposed. 
The next chapter presents the methodological considerations of the 
research, detailing how the data was collected during the fieldwork, as well as 
how it has been analysed and presented in this thesis. This has been achieved 
by means of a review on the literature on the topic, the research objectives and 
guiding questions, and the practical experiences of the field study in Isunga, in 
the Kiryandongo District of Midwestern Uganda.  
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4  Research methodology, design and 
process 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research approach employed by the study and the 
methods used in the collection of data. In the next section, the epistemological 
and ontological issues adopted for the study are discussed, followed by a 
section on the research design. Section 4.4 presents the various instruments 
used for collecting data, and then explains the research process in section 4.5. 
It describes the different phases of the fieldwork undertaken, identifies the 
households used in the study and the techniques used to select them. It also 
includes a subsection on problems encountered during the research. Section 4.6 
explains how the data and information collected were managed and analysed. It 
also discusses some ethical issues for the research. Section 4.7 provides some 
concluding remarks. 
4.2  Epistemological and ontological issues 
This study seeks to add knowledge about the role and influence of institutions 
in agricultural labour transactions by investigating farmer’s labour behaviour 
and decisions in Isunga  village. Following Lincoln & Guba  (2000;  1994), 
knowledge is seen to be a very complicated concept, and to understand its 
nature and activities one needs a systematic set of assumptions or beliefs (a 
paradigm) about the nature of reality: what the world is and how it is viewed. 
They write, 
 
“…a paradigm may be viewed as a set of basic beliefs…that deals with ultimate 
or first principles. It represents a worldview that defines, for its holder, the 
nature of the world the individual’s place in it, and the range of possible 
relationships to that world and its parts…” (Lincoln & Guba, 1994:109). 110 
They identify three questions as criteria for comparing research paradigms: (a) 
the ontological question: what is the form and nature of reality and what is 
there that can be known about it? (b) The epistemological question: what is the 
nature of the relationship between the ‘knower’ and ‘would-be knower’ and 
what can be known? (c) the methodological question: how can the inquirer 
(would be knower) go about finding out whether s/he believes can be 
known?”(Lincoln & Guba, 2000). In the remainder of this subsection, I discuss 
the ways and nature of knowing about reality in order to explain the underlying 
epistemology for this study.  
4.2.1  A constructivist perspective for the study 
This study does not subscribe to the positivist way of thinking, which assumes 
the existence of ‘a reality out there’  that exists independently of anyone 
observing it, and that the objective knowledge about that reality can be 
acquired as a scientific and value neutral truth. Instead, it adopts a 
constructivist perspective based on the assumption that there exist multiple 
realities depending on the sense making processes. That is, the meaning given 
to it by different people. Hence, knowledge about people’s behaviour is 
socially constructed and reconstructed (Berger & Luckmann, 2002;  Searle, 
1995). Accordingly, a constructivist approach questions research activities 
regarding  their contextual or situational nature (Knorr-Cetina & Cicourel, 
1981). However, this does not mean that our constructivist thinking is problem 
free. Röling (1996) for instance, warns about the danger of constructivism by 
arguing that it is probably too easy to think that every construction can be 
undone, yet it cannot be.  
Following Lincoln & Guba (2000; 1994) therefore, the researcher and the 
object of investigation are interactively linked so that the findings are 
‘accurately’ created as much as possible as the investigation proceeds. But, 
how do the researchers and the objects of investigation (e.g. farmers) know 
what they know?
134  This question has been crucial to positioning the 
constructivist paradigm used here, which aims to understand the dynamics of 
agricultural labour relationships in a Ugandan village. As pointed out in 
Chapter 2, households in the village of Isunga  are heterogeneous. Thus 
different households perceive their labour needs and problems differently, and 
they have different views on how to handle their needs and problems. They 
also have different reasons, motivations and knowledge bases for perceiving 
such problems. Thus, by adopting a constructivist approach in the study, the 
capacity of science to develop new insights into problems concerning 
agricultural labour relationships in rural Uganda is increased. 
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4.2.2  My role in the study 
In this study, I assume the existence of a social reality in Isunga that is open 
to different interpretations. This assumption of a socially constructed reality 
demands a particular stance, partly because constructivism assumes that all 
research is value laden and cannot be objective (Searle, 1997; Knorr-Cetina 
& Cicourel, 1981). It is for this reason that I consider it necessary to clarify 
some of my assumptions. Firstly, my upbringing in Acholi in northern 
Uganda played an important role in choosing this research topic. Throughout 
my adult and academic life, the interplay between interpersonal and 
impersonal ties, and the rules and behaviours of people engaged in various 
activities, have fascinated me. Yet to focus on relationships, one has to face 
up to the challenges of drawing boundaries between people’s knowledge, 
academic disciplines and prejudices. This justifies my constructivist stance in 
studying labour relations with respect to crop farming in a multi-ethnic 
village in rural Uganda. 
It is certainly true that human beings share things and ideas, but as a 
student of economics, I failed to get convincing answers to why resource-
sharing tends to be glossed over, or at least not explicitly addressed in 
economic literatures. I became rather uncomfortable with economic 
argumentation that emphasised individualism, rationality and role of the 
‘market’ to allocate resources or solve human problems. Yet as discussed in 
Chapter 2, livelihoods in rural Uganda blend both economic and social 
rationality. Farmers are rational in the sense of pursuing strategies that are 
embedded in their social context. This has to be recognised in agricultural 
and rural development discourses. 
4.1  Qualitative research methodology 
Based on the brief considerations above, it should be evident that the nature 
of the study is descriptive, exploratory and interpretative.
135 Consequently, 
the methodology employed was primarily qualitative, using interviews, field 
observations and documentary analysis.
136 As Denscombe (2007) points out, 
                                                        
135 The interpretive nature of the study comes about because the findings of the household case 
studies are presented in narrative forms; that is, Isunga farmer’s attitudes and labour exchange 
behaviour is not only described and explored, but interpreted as well. 
136 Johansson (2004; 2002) uses the terms strategy, methodology and methods with specific 
meanings. According to him, methods are the techniques used to collect and analyse data 
(observations, interviews and archival records); a methodology is a recommended set of methods 
for collecting and analysing data, including the standards for the validation of findings; and a 
strategy links methodology to theory. On the other hand, authors like Denscombe (2007) do not 
make a distinction between strategy and methodology. This thesis follows Denscombe. 112 
undertaking a research study requires great consideration as to the 
appropriateness of any chosen methodology, since they easily influence the 
research outcomes. A case study approach, using a qualitative mode of 
inquiry, was deemed best for my need to explore and understand agricultural 
labour relations in Isunga, since it provides for close interaction and is 
designed to observe social interaction and understand people’s perspectives 
(Yin, 2008; Gillham, 2000). 
Denzin & Lincoln (2000:8) indicate that the term ‘qualitative’ in qualitative 
research implies an emphasis on the qualities of entities and on processes and 
meaning that are not experimentally examined, or measured in terms of 
quantity, amount, intensity or frequency; and underscore that,  
 
“…qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the 
intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the 
situational constraints that shape inquiry. They seek answers to questions that 
stress how social experience is created and given meaning.” (ibid,2000:8)  
Following Denzin & Lincoln (2000), the qualitative mode of inquiry makes 
room to discover the motivations and needs behind people’s attitudes and 
behaviours, rather than measuring their rationalised opinions.
137  Unlike 
quantitative research, which seeks to ‘measure and count’, qualitative research 
tries to capture the full complexity of social phenomena through descriptive 
analysis that focuses on the details and nuances of people’s words and actions 
(ibid, 2000). So, qualitative research is usually informal and semi-structured, 
thus allowing people to contribute and share their views and feelings in a 
conversational format, without the ‘constraints’ of a structured questionnaire 
(Creswell, 2003; Pope & Mays, 1995).  
Lincoln & Guba (2000) identify some important underlying assumptions 
that distinguish qualitative research from other types of research (see Table 4). 
The assumptions address five issues: the nature of the reality in question, the 
role of the researcher, the role of values in the research, the rhetoric of the 
study and the methdology used (see also Creswell, 2008; 2003). 
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Table 4: Assumptions underlying qualitative research methodology. 
Assumptions about  Qualitative research methodology 
Ontological issue  
(the nature of reality) 
Multiple realities exist in any given situation: the researcher’s, 
those of individuals being investigated, and the reader or audience 
interpreting the results; these multiple perspectives, or voices, of 
informants are included in the study.  
Epistemological question 
(the relationship of 
researcher to the 
researched) 
The researcher interacts with those he/she studies and actively 
works to minimise the distance between the researcher and those 
being researched 
Axiological issue  
(the role of values) 
The researcher explicitly recognises and acknowledges the value 
laden nature of the research 
Rhetoric of the study 
(language of the study) 
The language is personal, informal and based on definitions that 
evolve during the study 
Methodology  Research is based on inductive forms of logic, categories of 
interest emerge from informants, rather than being identified as a 
priority by the researcher 
The goal is to uncover and discover patterns of theories that help 
explain a phenomenon of interest. Triangulations should be taken 
to ensure the accuracy or validity of findings 
Source: Creswell (2003); Guba and Lincoln, 1994 and 2000. 
In support of the above, Denzin & Lincoln (2000) writes, 
 
“…the gendered, multi culturally situated researcher approaches the world with 
a set of ideas, a framework (theory, ontology) that specifies a set of questions 
(epistemology) that he or she then examines in specific ways (methodology, 
analysis). That is, the researcher collects empirical materials bearing on the 
question and then analyses and writes about them. Every researcher speaks from 
within a distinct interpretive community that configures, in its special way, the 
multicultural, gendered components of the research act.” (ibid,2000:18) 
As Miles and Huberman (1994) also observed, the conversational format of 
qualitative methods directly puts the researcher in touch with participants and 
provides an avenue of getting ‘beneath the surface’ of attitudes and behaviours, 
facilitating a depth of understanding of issues at hand. This allowed me to get a 
feel for a world that cannot be experienced in the numerical data and statistical 
analysis used in quantitative research for example; and of course, to interact 
with the people of Isunga in their own language and on their own terms. Miles 
and Huberman (1994) write, 
 
“…good qualitative data are more likely to lead to serendipitous findings and to 
new integrations; they help researchers get beyond initial conceptions and to 114 
generate or revise conceptual frameworks... the findings from qualitative studies 
have a quality of un deniability. Words, especially organized into incidents or 
stories, have a concrete vivid, meaningful flavour that often proves far more 
convincing to a reader - another researcher, a policy maker, a practitioner - than 
pages of summarized numbers...” (ibid, 1994:1)  
Despite  Miles and Huberman’s  (1994)  advocacy for qualitative research 
analysis, there are criticisms relating to its validity and reliability. Pope & 
Mays (1995) for instance write,  
 
“…the most commonly heard criticisms are, firstly, that qualitative research is 
merely an assembly of anecdote and personal impressions, strongly subject to 
researcher bias; secondly, it is argued that qualitative research lacks 
reproducibility - the research is so personal to the researcher that there is no 
guarantee that a different researcher would not come to radically different 
conclusions; and finally, qualitative research is criticized for lacking 
generalisability since it tends to focus on a small sample size” (ibid,1995:109).  
Silverman  (2005)  too, claims that qualitative research is subjective and 
associated with an unsystematic selection of information from a massive 
amount of data, in ways that are irreducible or even incommunicable. For this 
reason, findings should be questioned, since no one can see how the researcher 
reduced many hours of field notes into conclusions.  
The above criticisms do not hold water and should be challenged because 
research methodologies themselves are not good or bad, but the quality of 
research depends very much on how they are applied. In this study, the most 
crucial issue was to see how the purpose of the study and research questions 
engaged with the case study approach to achieve the research objectives 
outlined in Chapter 1.  
4.1.1  The case study approach 
Following Devine (1995), qualitative research methodology is most 
appropriate first, when the researcher wants to explore people’s experiences 
and the meanings they attach to those experiences; secondly in studying 
processes, and thirdly, when the issue needs to be studied in a specific context 
or social setting. These make the qualitative aspects of a case study approach 
appropriate for this  study since it focuses on understanding the dynamics 
present within single settings. Yin (2003) describes the case study approach as,  
 
“...an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not so obvious.” (ibid, 2003:13) 115 
Therefore, the approach is suitable for answering the ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions about events or phenomenon, because it can provide better 
circumstances for creating mutual trust between the researcher and the 
informants. Moreover, the approach allows for a number of visits to the case 
examples (the households).
138 
Another scholar, Stake (1999), looks at a case study analysis as a process of 
learning about a case, by researchers and readers alike. The more the object of 
a study is specific and unique, the greater its usefulness to answer the question 
“what can be learnt about it?” Miller (2000) also associates the case study 
approach with more breadth and its non-limitation to only a small number of 
variables. Moreover, it is much more exploratory, inductive and less 
constrained by predetermined protocols. 
Atkinson’s  (1998)  viewpoints on life stories also deserves to be 
mentioned. He argues strongly for life stories as ways of understanding and 
defining relationships and group interactions. In his opinion, this can help 
researchers define an individual’s place in the social order of a society and 
the process used to achieve that fit. It can help explain a persons’ 
understanding of social events or how individual members of a group see 
certain events, as well as how they see, experience or interpret those social 
events that link to their individual development.  
The common denominator with the above references is that qualitative 
descriptions of ‘the cases’ explore meanings, variations and perceptual 
experiences of phenomena, and seek to discover relationships and patterns 
based on personal experiences of the phenomena in question. 
Some criticisms of the case study approach 
In this thesis, the epistemological questions raised are: what can be learnt from 
a single case (household)? What can be learnt from different cases 
(households)? However, the case study approach is not without limitations. 
Most critics focus on the fact that it can allow for unlimited scope to the 
inquiry, thereby risking an over-accumulation of data (Johansson, 2002). 
Similarly, Gillham (2000) observes that problems often associated with case 
studies include a lack of rigour in research methods and analysis, lack of 
generalisation, long duration and massive documentation. To counteract this, 
he proposes a carefully thought-out selection of units of analysis and 
observation. I followed Gillham’s advice and selected my cases (households) 
with care in my attempt to understand their labour behaviour and how the 
institutions that guide such behaviour work in the village. This was not in any 
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way to achieve statistical representativeness or generalisation (Flyvbjerg, 2006; 
Yin, 2003).
139 The approach therefore enabled me to probe further, to revisit 
the households many times and to observe them as the fieldwork progressed.  
4.1.2  Using grounded theory principles to gain further insights 
As knowledge is socially constructed, I also had to construct my own 
knowledge about the cases. This was quite a challenge, since it meant moving 
in circles in order to understand the many ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions needed to 
comprehend certain aspects of farmers’ labour behaviours. Hence, the 
grounded theory approach is mentioned here as a way to build theory 
(explanation) from the empirical data in the qualitative case studies. Following 
Strauss and Corbin (1998), grounded theory principles concern a systematic set 
of analytical induction, interpretation, comparison and coding procedures to 
develop a theory (explanation) that is grounded in data collected in the real 
world.
140 In this thesis, some of the concepts and ideas used at the beginning of 
the study were used to help guide the exploratory research questions and the 
findings (the explanation) contextualised to Isunga  village.
141 The grounded 
theory principles offered me the chance to consider concepts, ideas, metaphors 
and methods, which were then reiterated into the emerging relevant 
explanation (theory) of the nature and persistence of various work-sharing and 
labour exchange practices in Isunga. 
4.2  Methods of data collection 
From the household case studies, I looked for evidence to help answer the 
research questions. Hence, no one particular source or piece of evidence was 
sufficient on its own. Multiple instruments were used to collect the necessary 
data and information: (a) Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools and 
techniques, (b) participation and observations, (c) interviews (semi-structured 
interviews with farmers, unstructured (informal) interviews with district 
officials and representatives of certain farmers associations and, (d) 
documentary analysis (secondary data). These methods were chosen based on 
the objectives of the study, the research questions, and the possibility of 
successfully using them in the study area, the financial conditions and other 
difficulties of conducting the study. These methods are discussed below. 
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4.2.1  Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools and techniques 
A number of PRA tools and techniques were used at the initial stage of the 
study in 2006 to collect primary information. They included: (a) village 
resource mapping, (b) wealth ranking to categorise households in Isunga into 
wellbeing groups and selection of the case households, (c) focus group 
discussions on income-generating activities, (d) seasonal calendar. 
4.2.2  Participation and observations 
Observation was a very important instrument in the data collection exercise as it 
involved the systematic description of events and behaviours in the social setting 
chosen for the study. I used both direct and participant observation during my 
field trips. Direct observation can be valuable for collecting data as it enables the 
study of an object, practice or process as it exists, is performed or unfolds in its 
natural setting and the observer notes exactly what is seen with little emotional 
involvement to what is being observed (Patton, 2002). Participant observation on 
the other hand, calls for first-hand involvement in the social world chosen for the 
study (ibid, 2002). This allowed me to see, hear and experience reality as the 
people of Isunga themselves do. During the course of the study, I made repeated 
visits to Isunga and stayed in the village between one to four months at a time. 
Despite the numerous frustrations, this turned out to be extremely valuable. I 
spent a lot of time with the community, and became someone in whose presence 
most issues could be discussed. I also took part in many activities like selling and 
drinking Kipanga gin with members of my host family or the community, being 
part of farm work parties (awak), part of the Akiba Malwa drinking group and 
illegal hunting (poaching) from the Karuma game reserve. These actions gave 
me the opportunity to observe what people do ‘on the ground’ to assess how and 
why they make certain decisions. With time, I developed close relationships with 
some of the individuals.
142 
I also observed the endless Kipanga drinking sprees at the trading centre, 
repetitive daily food-processing such as grinding odii (groundnuts or sesame 
paste), millet or sorghum flour for making ugalli/kwon, borrowing salt, 
saucepans or grinding stones, as well as endless queues at the only borehole in 
the village (plus the quarrels and fighting), mothers carrying their babies on 
their backs working the soil, young girls selling Kipanga or Kwete, buying 
produce and many other activities. All these contributed to my understanding 
of daily life in Isunga. 
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4.2.3  Interviews  
The most commonly  used method for qualitative data collection is 
interviewing. It can be described as an interaction involving the interviewer 
and interviewee with the purpose of obtaining reliable information (Silverman, 
2005;  Stake, 2005;  Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).  Denscombe  (2007)  classifies 
interviews into three types: structured interviews, semi-structured interviews 
and unstructured interviews. What distinguishes them is the degree of control 
exercised by the researcher over the nature of the responses, as well as the 
length of the answers allowed by the respondent” (ibid, 2007:167). 
In structured interviews, the researcher asks the same set of questions, in the 
same order, using the same words, regardless of the situation and with all 
interviewees (May, 2001). The researcher simply repeats the questions without 
“prompting, providing a personal view, interpreting meanings, and 
improvising”  (ibid, 2001:12). Structured interviews are often used in 
questionnaire surveys where researchers collect a large amount of data from a 
wide range of respondents (Denscombe, 2007; May, 2001).  
Unstructured interviews, however, do not have any pre-set questions or 
interview guides. They are informal conversations between the interviewer and 
interviewees enabling them to talk freely about the topic (May, 2001). This 
type of interview enables respondents to challenge the researcher’s 
preconceptions by enabling them to draw upon ideas and meanings attached to 
events. The role of the researcher is thus to generate and develop questions 
according to what the interviewee says. This requires good interpersonal skills 
of the researcher in order to keep the interviews flowing, without losing focus 
of the topics in question (ibid, 2001). Nonetheless, talking freely during 
unstructured interviews can also place the researcher at the risk of going 
beyond the focus of the study.  
The format of semi-structured interviews is somewhere between structured 
and unstructured interviews. They are not standardised, as in structured 
interviews with strict control over the questions and  answers  (Denscombe, 
2007), nor do the interviewer and interviewee “talk freely without any pre-set 
questions”, as in unstructured ones. Unlike structured interviews, semi-
structured interviews do not follow a rigid form. Rather, the interviewer 
prepares an interview guide that includes a list of questions or issues that may 
or may not be explored, depending on the situation on the ground (Yin, 2008; 
Denscombe, 2007; Oka & Shaw, 2000).  
In this study, both semi-structured and unstructured interviews (to obtain 
information from households), and unstructured interviews (to obtain 119 
information from Masindi District officials) were used.
143 In accordance with 
the underlying principles of the case study research, I prepared interview 
guides covering a predefined set of issues (Yin, 2008). This helped to structure 
my interviews and gave me enough room to generate probing questions in my 
attempt to develop interesting areas of inquiry during the interviews, whilst 
keeping the interview more focused on the topic.
144This was particularly 
helpful since the available time for most interviews was often limited, and I 
had to make sure that key topics were covered. Semi-structured interviews with 
the twenty households gave me the opportunity to obtain in-depth information 
about issues such as agricultural labour arrangements in Isunga, the rules 
involved in labour practices, household welfare and livelihood (in)security, 
power relations in the households and gender aspects of labour, which could 
not have been fully explored using other methods. 
At all times and where necessary, the purpose of the interviews was 
explained and permission was sought from heads of the households after 
assuring them of confidentiality, which proved difficult in certain instances. 
For example, CS1-JSBM  (Bazilio), CS2-MDF  (Abwoli)  and CS3-MAF 
(Atenyi) are socially connected;
145 hence there was no way I could talk to one 
of them without the other ones talking about it when I left.  
4.2.4  Group Discussions 
Information from the farmers groups mentioned by households during the 
interviews also added insight to the study. During the various stages of the 
field study, I held meetings with the following farmers groups: (a) Mutunda 
United Rural Development Association, (b) Kamdini  Reflect Group, (c) 
Kabarole Women Group, (d) Labongo Lworo Women Group, (e) Kony Paco 
and (f) Kica Ber Akiba Malwa Drinking Group.
146 Issues discussed included 
the activities of the specific groups, farming activities, labour mobilisation, 
rules involved, their functions and labour practices for specific activities (what 
activity, when it is done, why it is done and how it is done). This kind of 
dialogue is common in qualitative research (c.f. Mikkelsen, 1995). Researchers 
often collect data and information from groups of particularly knowledgeable 
people, or people who have an interest in specific topics.
147 
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semi-structured and unstructured interviews were used. 
144 See Appendix 1: Interview Guides 
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4.2.5  Documentary Analysis 
Documentary analysis was also used to complement data collected from the 
sources mentioned above. Sources included reference books, journals, other 
published materials by various scholars and writers, as well as web-based 
sources. Most of them were found in libraries in Sweden and Uganda. Other 
documents such as government reports and meeting minutes were also used. 
By applying the five research instruments mentioned above, I was able to 
gain an understanding of the challenges involved in rain fed crop farming in 
the study area, and to answer the specific research questions listed in Chapter 
1. Case household interviews in particular, were effective for gathering 
information about what labour exchanges are undertaken by farmers; why a 
particular labour practice is used during a particular period of a farming 
calendar, how they are organised, how they work in practice, and under what 
circumstances they are used.
148 Through the above methods too, I gained an 
understanding of farmers’ attitudes towards their village council (Isunga LC1), 
the only formal institution in the village, and their experience of using it (see 
Chapters 6 and 7). The research process will be described in the section below. 
4.3  The research process 
At the start of this doctoral study, I planned to live in Isunga  and follow 
villagers exchange behaviours during an 18-month farming calendar period, 
and run an econometric analysis of farmers’ production behaviours with certain 
crop outputs as dependent variables. However, this was not possible due to a 
lack of time and financial resources. Instead, the original research questions 
were reworked to develop a set of specific issues and questions for an in-depth 
study. In the process, the data and information gathered were reviewed, leading 
to an iterative process of data collection, and the formation of new questions. 
Figure 2 below gives readers an overview of the research process. 
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Figure 2: Overview of the research process. 
Source: Opira Otto, 2013 
4.3.1  Different phases of the field study 
Data and information were collected in three separate phases between August 
2006 and May 2009. The first (exploratory) phase was from August 2006 to 
October 2006. This was a period of orientation, social and physical resource 
mapping, identifying different crop farming activities using a 12-month 
farming calendar and wealth ranking exercises, as discussed below. I also held 
open discussions with various officials and villagers, with the aim of finding 
out their views on my research and identifying key informants. 122 
Social and physical resource mapping 
Participatory social and resource mapping offered a good introduction to Isunga, 
building an initial understanding of the social structure of the community and the 
availability and location of key resources. It also gave a good perspective on 
access to, and control over these resources. A combined social and resource map 
was an important tool for structuring and conducting subsequent fieldwork. First, 
it provided useful clues regarding the research topics. Second, it also formed the 
basis for selecting key informants and farmers groups for focused discussions 
and further interviews. The social maps were drawn by a small group of well-
informed villagers (four men and four women), and it was my role was to 
facilitate the process.  
Seasonal calendar 
Seasonal diagrams were also applied to understand the seasonal aspects of 
livelihood activities in the village focusing on crop production and marketing, 
livestock production, home industry and wage labour, remittances, crafts, 
forest product collection (from Nyamakere forest) and marketing.
149 But since 
it was difficult for the group to draw seasonal maps, I had to facilitate the 
discussions based on the points listed above, and present these using a chart 
and coloured stones. Modifications were made according to their suggestions. 
Wealth ranking and categorisation of Isunga’s households 
As discussed in Chapter 2, households in Isunga are not homogenous. Thus a 
wealth ranking exercise was done to refine and understand my understanding 
of the socio-economic structures within the village, and to identify clusters of 
households according to their wealth. The wealth ranking exercises were 
carried out with the selected key informants from the main ethnic groups in the 
village noted above. They were also the ones who grouped the households 
according to their wealth categories.
  Here too, my role was limited to 
facilitation. I introduced the process, explained the objectives of the wealth 
ranking and asked the eight informants to describe how many types of wealth 
groups there were in Isunga. Once the households were determined and their 
wealth levels established, a sub-sample were selected for in-depth study.  
The following wealth parameters were used: household sizes, money, 
agricultural labour availability and accessibility, land ownership (size), 
                                                        
149 See Chapter 2. 123 
livestock (cattle, goats, pigs), education and employment, condition of housing 
(permanent or temporary), non-farm income sources, self-sufficiency (food, 
clothes, schooling, etc.), personal security/safety, water, and ox-ploughs. The 
definitions for each wealth category were discussed and modified accordingly. 
Following this, the informants placed each of the households under each 
wealth  category. They were adjusted and confirmed through further 
discussions and clarifications. This resulted in three categories: the ‘better off’, 
the ‘poor’ and the ‘very poor’ households. I should also stress that these wealth 
criteria were not strict rules for belonging to groups, and rather distinctive 
features of households in a certain wealth groups at that time. Therefore, the 
information presented in Table 5  below, are the most common features of 
households in each category at the time of the wealth ranking in 2006.
150 Some 
of the households may well be considered to be in another group today.
151 
Table 5: Characteristics of households in Isunga village. 
Criteria  Better off   Poor   Very Poor 
Household size  10 and above  5-10  Less than 5 
Land ownership 
and accessibility 
5 acres and above; rents 
out land; lends land to 
others 
2-5 acres, borrows and 
rents land from the 
better off 
Less than 2 acres; 




Family labour, including 
child borrowing; work 
parties and hired labour 
(leja-leja and seasonal) 
Family labour; child 
borrowing and lending; 
rotational labour; work 
parties 
Family labour; child 
lending; rotational 
labour; work parties 
Livestock  Cattle, goats, pigs and 
chickens 
Some goats, pigs and 
chickens 
Few chickens, one or 
two goats 
Housing  Permanent or semi-
permanent, with tin roof; 
good latrine 
Better quality huts, good 
latrines 
Poor quality huts, no 
latrines or very poor 
quality latrine 
Education  Children finish primary 
school, and go to 
secondary schools 
Children do not finish 
primary schools 
Children don’t attend 




Produce trading, shop 
keeping, beer brewing, sell 
charcoal, shop keeping  
Sell labour, charcoal, 
firewood, water; brick 
making, petty trading, 
hunting, boda-boda taxi 
Sell labour, water, wild 
fruits, leafy vegetables, 
grass for thatching huts, 
firewood; hunting 
Source: Fieldwork data. 
                                                        
150 During  the July 2007 field trip, it was found that 28 of 139 households in the village 
belonged to the Better off group, 72 households were Poor and 39 households were Very Poor. 
151 See shifts between wealth groups below. 124 
The better-off households 
The better-off households are distinguished by the following: land holdings of 
more than five acres, five or more cattle, five or more goats, external (non-
family) seasonal labour, children attend primary and secondary school, own 
bicycles and possibly motorbikes, as well as non-farming businesses. They 
combine farming with other economic activities such as trade in produce, 
selling charcoal outside the village and brewing Kipanga on a large scale. They 
are mainly of Palwo and Burulli origin and have plenty of land, some of which 
they rent out, lend or use for crop sharing.
152 Because they have land, their 
demand for agricultural labour is always high and they solve it by either 
organising work parties or hiring labour (leja-leja or from the farmers groups) 
or both.
153The better-off households also have permanent or semi-permanent 
housing made from burnt bricks and mabati (tin) roofs. They also keep cattle 
and use ox-plough. Most of them also employ herdsmen.
154 
The poor households 
The poor households have fewer of the assets listed above, and they tend to sell 
rather than buy labour. Their non-farming activities include beer brewing, 
brick selling, charcoal and firewood selling and running, boda-boda (bicycle) 
taxis. This group is dominated by the IDPs from Northern Uganda, and 72 out 
of the 139 households in the village belonged to this group, of which ten were 
used for the case studies in this thesis. Their land holdings are insecure and do 
not have sufficient labour power. 
Although some have worked hard and purchased land (see CS20-COM 
below), the majority still access farm land by borrowing or renting from 
others.
155 The land accessed by these households is insufficient to meet their 
subsistence requirements. Even the slightly better-off households cannot farm 
more land because they do not have the capacity to hire labour. They even 
                                                        
152 Sharecropping is defined as a form of land renting in which a land owner allows a poor 
tenant to use the land in return for a share of the crop produced on the land (e.g. 50 per cent). Hill 
(1986) on the other hand, defines it as a form of renting such that the tenant retains only a portion 
of the crop and the landlord  provides some inputs additional to the land. Following Hill’s 
definition, only the CS4-MOJM and CS18-MOF households fits in. Most of the better offs like 
CS1-JSBM provide only land and not ‘some inputs’.  
153 See chapters 5 and 6 for details. 
154 For instance, my host family (CS1-JSBM) employs a herdsman who grazes cattle daily; he 
is housed, fed two meals a day and a share of the daily milk collection 
155 Of the 20 households, 13 poor and very poor households borrowed or rented land from the 
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struggle to cultivate the little land they do have with their simple technology 
including hand hoes, machetes and harrowing sticks, and they cannot afford to 
hire ox ploughs.
156 In the event of a food shortage, such families sell their 
labour to supplement their crop production yields.  
The very poor households 
The very poor households possess little or no land at all, no cattle and minimal 
livestock (usually a goat or two and a few chickens). They sell their labour to 
others during the hunger seasons and sometimes buy labour during the labour-
intensive farming periods. They do not own bicycles and they have limited 
non-farming employment options apart from brewing local beer on a small 
scale and collecting forest products from Nyamakere reserve to sell, including 
firewood, wild fruits and leafy vegetables, grass for thatching huts, and 
sometimes collecting and selling water. The group is largely comprised of the 
older IDPs, sick people, widows and abandoned wives, as well as young 
households without parents. Even though there is universal primary education, 
‘very poor’ children of school age are not able to attend since they cannot 
afford to pay for the costs associated with schooling (Parent Teachers 
Association fee, school uniforms and other ‘hidden’ costs). 
Shifts between wealth groups 
Short-term shifts (upward and downward, and vice versa) between the wealth 
groups are common, as seen during the various field study periods. One 
particular case (CS13-JKF) moved up and down depending on the season. 
During the rainy season in 2007, CS13-JKF (Mama Toto) was a ‘poor’ 
household, but with the arrival of the dry season it became a ‘better off’ 
household as many villagers came to buy and drink Mama Toto’s Kipanga gin. 
Faced with high demand for the Kipanga gin, and thanks to the fact that the 
ingredients (cassava, maize and millet) were readily available and cheaper 
compared to other periods of the farming calendar, she increased her 
production.  Mama Toto  makes much more money during and after the 
harvesting seasons and climbs up one step on the wealth ladder. Following the 
onset of the rainy season, the household drops back down to the poor group.  
Nevertheless, many factors account for households moving between wealth 
groups, for example: need for school fees, death and sickness from diseases 
that forces people to sell their most valuable assets such as land, livestock and 
                                                        
156 To ox plough a farm of an acre ‘costs’  50,000  UGX, and takes  two to three days to 
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bicycles. Other factors which cause crop failure – drought or too much rain or 
crop diseases can cause a decline in fortunes of  households. However, the 
degree and pace of this decline depends on their asset base (see also Ellis, 
2000). Households faced with food shortages seek help from other villagers or 
have to turn to the market where food items are expensive through selling their 
livestock, labour or collect wild fruits and leafy vegetables from Nyamakere 
forest reserve.  
Having many children also demands a lot of money for school fees and 
other school materials. This can create problems for many households, 
irrespective of their socio-economic stratum, since education is very costly in 
Uganda. As the people in ‘better off’ households grow older, they are likely to 
move downwards, as they have to share land and other resources with their 
older sons, reducing their household asset base. Yet improving fortunes are 
identified among the younger members of the village. Those who are able to 
work hard and save some money to purchase land or generate non-farming 
income can greatly improve their circumstances (e.g. CS20-COM).  
Formalisation phase 
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with the heads of 20 households in 
2007 (July-September) and 2008 (November-December) to obtain information 
about agricultural labour practices in their households and the village at large, the 
rules involved and the institutions that hold them together. Unstructured 
interviews were also used to collect information from then Masindi District 
officials and representatives of certain farmer’s organisations. Group discussions 
were also held with farmers groups (gurubs) to understand more about them and 
their roles in agricultural production.  Lastly, but equally important, I also made 
use of documentary analysis throughout the research process.  
During this phase too, the study focused on documenting agricultural labour 
relationships during specific periods of the farming calendar to obtain the 
necessary details (purpose, how they functioned and organised, rules involved).  
To allow for comparisons and check for consistency of responses, the case 
households were interviewed with a similar set of issues in mind (see 
Appendix 1). Sometimes the interviews too long to complete as respondents 
required considerable time to recall events and asked other households 
members for help.   
Confirmatory phase 
I returned to the study area in 2009 (April to May) to verify certain aspects of 
the study that were missed or not properly understood. Some of the case 
households were revisited to learn more about their memberships in the gurubs 127 
(farmers groups), as well as power and gender issues. I also interviewed the 
Masindi District Labour Officer about the problems of rural labour in general 
and agricultural labour in particular. Lastly, I used this opportunity to share 
some of the emerging issues with those who had assisted me during the field 
study and with colleagues at the Centre for Basic Research (CBR) in Kampala. 
4.3.2  Selecting the case households 
According to Stake  (1999), case study methodology is characterised by a 
purposeful selection of the ‘case’ (household) to be studied. Following the 
wealth ranking exercise referred to above, the next challenge was to select the 
cases that would enable me, as Stake (1999) puts it, “...to maximise what we 
want to learn”. Unlike in probability sampling, where every unit of the 
population has an equal chance of being included, a different set of criteria is 
used to select people or events in non-probability sampling (Denscombe, 
2007). In this study, two types of non-probability sampling: ‘purposive 
sampling’ and ‘snowball sampling’ were used to select participants for the 
interviews, to maximise learning. 
With purposive sampling, I purposely selected the households that were 
likely to produce the most valuable and relevant information for the issues 
under study. This technique was used mainly for selecting households 
belonging to the poor and the very poor wealth groups. In snowball sampling, 
however, the first participants are asked to propose others who satisfy certain 
criteria or certain conditions relating to the research. I used it in selecting the 
better off households. My host (CS1-JSBM), a better-off farmer, was able to 
provide me with a couple of names to aid my research.
157 
The poorer households were purposely selected with help from the 
Chairman of the Isunga Local Council (DO1-LC1) and my host (CS1-JSBM). 
Initial contact with the households was followed by introductions to other 
households. However, two households that were recommended by DO1-LC1 
declined to be involved in the research. Nonetheless, the choice of households 
was based on a need of having a set of households with experience of different 
labour practices during crop farming. The Coordinator of MURDA (DO3-
MURDA) also helped me establish contact with members of various farmers 
groups (gurubs), a key source of finding farm labour in the village.
158 
                                                        
157 Although  Denscombe  (2007)  advises that the  snowballing technique should be used to 
complement purposive sampling; in this study however, I used it for practical reasons as time for 
the interviews was limited. 
158 See finding labour in gurubs in the next chapter on how the groups are formed, what they 
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As mentioned above, the process of selecting the households started during 
the preparatory phase of the fieldwork in 2006 with the identification of 
households through wealth-ranking exercises and focus groups. These 
approaches were supplemented by informal chats with other members of the 
village to learn more about specific households’ livelihood activities and their 
labour practices. Thus, 20 case households were selected and interviewed to 
develop an understanding of labour exchange rules, processes and 
management. Their narratives and information from other sources are used: (a) 
to explore issues related to the organisation and operations of various labour 
arrangements in Isunga and the reasons farmers use them (see Chapter 5); (b) 
to illustrate how farmers structure, maintain and enforce their labour 
relationships (Chapter 6); and (c) to explain the durability of ‘informalism’ in 
Isunga  and how the role and character of social institutions becomes more 
economic (Chapter 7). Appendix 2 summarises some of the key features of the 
case households based on wealth differences. 
4.3.3  The interview process 
I  visited all the selected households to introduce myself and get their 
confirmation before the actual interviews took place. During such visits, the 
purpose of the interview was explained to the respondent, except on those 
occasions when CS1-JSBM introduced it to his wives (CS2-MDF and CS3-
MAF) and when DO3-MURDA introduced me to CS1-JSBM. Three 
households (CS4-MOJM, CS6-BOM and CS17-JOM) were more demanding 
as they wanted to be informed about the topics of the interviews before the 
actual interviews took place.   
Semi-structured interviews 
All the interviews were carried out on the basis of an interview guide (see 
Appendix 1) prepared in advance. This helped me to remember the points to be 
covered  and suggested ways of approaching topics and questions. It also 
helped me ensure that as many topics as possible were covered, and enabled 
participants to talk freely. The interviews varied in length and the degree of 
informality. In any case, I was flexible regarding the order of issues and 
questions, depending on the flow of conversation during the interviews. 
Although I tried to cover all topics that needed to be addressed, the number of 
questions discussed was not the same in every interview. Some questions were 
omitted in one interview, whilst other questions were added in other 
interviews, depending on the mood and circumstances of the interviewees.  
The interviews took between 45 and 60 minutes to complete. In two cases, 
we began in the late morning and spoke for two hours, ending with lunch. In 129 
another case, we started in the late afternoon and ended up ‘sitting’ (drinking 
alcohol together). If a follow-up interview session was deemed necessary, 
arrangements were made for it to take place another day.
159 
Unstructured interviews with Masindi District officials 
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, eight informal (unstructured) 
interviews were conducted with officials of the Masindi  District local 
government and farmers associations. The purpose of these interviews was to 
collect data on agricultural activities, government policies and other 
institutional arrangements relevant to labour transactions in the district. 
Although these unstructured interviews were not the main source of 
information, they were nonetheless important. They were used to supplement 
the other sources of information and to triangulate data obtained from the 
interviews with the households.  
The key informants were purposely selected on the basis of their positions 
and involvement  in issues related to agriculture and labour. Again, the 
snowballing technique was employed to select these participants. The first 
contact was a person working for the National Forestry Authority (NFA) in 
Budongo Forest Reserve. We had first met in 1999, and with his help, it became 
easier for me to approach key people in the District. The officials were: 
Chairperson LCV of the Masindi District Local Council (DO8-LCV), the District 
Agricultural Officer (DO6-MDAO), the District Labour Officer (DO7-MDLO), 
the District NAADS Coordinator (DO5-NAADS), the Mutunda  Sub-County 
Chief (DO2-MSCC), the Chairperson LC1 (DO1-LC1), the Coordinator of the 
Masindi District Farmers Association (DO4-MADFA) and the Chairman of the 
Mutunda Rural Development Association (DO3-MURDA). 
The interviews were informal conversations and there was no set interview 
guide. We discussed issues relating to the research purpose and objectives, 
with a focus on what roles their departments or associations play in agriculture 
and issues concerning agricultural labour relations, such as institutions used for 
enforcing labour relations in Masindi  District, including resolving labour 
disputes. Most interviews took place in their offices during working hours. In 
two cases, they were carried out at social places outside working hours. 
Through these informal interviews, I was able to collect not only qualitative 
but also basic quantitative data, such as the number of extension officers in the 
sub-counties, the number of labour related conflicts resolved by the District 
Labour Office and Local Council Court overtime.  
                                                        
159 The households were interviewed three times on average, depending on the prevailing 
situation (mood, time, rain, etc.) and the data requirements. 130 
4.3.4  Fieldwork experiences and challenges 
Despite my efforts designing and conducting the research, the fieldwork faced 
numerous challenges. The first challenge I encountered was how to fit back into 
the Ugandan social system after years in Sweden. On many occasions I felt 
offended and discriminated when referred to as a ‘black Muzungu’, instead of the 
‘proud Acholi man’ I have always been, simply because I either made some ill-
advised comments associated with Bazungus in Uganda or failed to see how 
Uganda has changed in recent years. In Sweden, everything seems organised and 
orderly, yet I found the opposite to be true of Uganda when I returned.
160  
Another frustrating challenge was the unwillingness of some farmers to be 
interviewed, and  the  suspicions that they deliberately modified their 
responses.
161 In almost all the households interviewed, respondents were 
unwilling to answer all my questions. In particular, they were not always able 
or willing to give details about certain livelihood activities undertaken by other 
members of the household in their absence. The better-off households also 
tended to be less forthcoming with financial information. 
The unpredictability of rain also affected the study as it had a negative 
impact on the mood of the respondents. For example, during the exploratory 
field trip in 2006, the rains were late and Isunga was experiencing a long dry 
season. It greatly frustrated farmers and they mainly talked about the absence 
of rain instead of answering my questions. During the second field trip in 2007, 
it was an excess of rain that was frustrating the farmers. Farmers were 
distraught as most of their crops were either under water, rotting or 
germinating in the fields. They were therefore understandably unenthusiastic 
about talking to me. In cases where we talked, the conversations focused on 
rain, hunger and uncertainties about future. As a result, working conditions 
were arduous and I was forced to shorten the fieldwork period by three months. 
                                                        
160  Isunga villagers too, have their own rules for answering questions (especially if they do not 
want to answer), conducting conversations or discussions, something I knew but ignored for a 
while, until when I realised the advantages. For example, whereas in Sweden we learn not to 
interrupt when somebody else is talking or giving direct answers to direct questions, in Isunga 
these rules do not apply. They (we) talk to each other physically with frequent interjections; and 
verbal responses are given to ensure the other person that one is paying attention. It is quite 
normal for one to stare intensively at the floor, in the sky, twist his or her mouth, laugh, murmur 
words like ehe, hmm, eno ba, erok, eheh every now and then. Failure to do so leads to abrupt 
silence. It took me time to become a ‘native’ again: talking and laughing together at the same 
time, talking in circles when answering questions (some people call it beating around the bush 
instead of direct answers). 
161 For instance, exaggerating hardship with the hope that some financial support might be 
forthcoming, or downplaying it because of shame, or failing to discuss wealth or sources of 
income in the fear that they might be taxed or others might find out. 131 
Qualitative research is very time-consuming, and time becomes an issue 
when interviews interfere with farmers’ daily activities, for example. This was 
particularly true among women farmers, whose days start early (6am) and end 
late (11pm).  It was therefore more convenient to carry out the interviews 
during the day when they had some time to spare; or by going to the market, 
borehole and beer-drinking venues to obtain information. Moreover, the case 
households were spread all over the village, covering a radius of about seven 
kilometres, which I had to walk to catch up for the interviews. 
4.4  Data management, analysis and presentation 
From the start, I was very particular about how the data and information should 
be recorded and managed, since it would influence the process of data analysis, 
interpretation and results presentation later on. This section therefore, discusses 
these issues in some detail.  
4.4.1  Recording data during the interviews 
As noted by Denzin and Lincoln (2005), data obtained during an interview may 
be recorded in a variety of ways, but written and audio recordings are the most 
common. Interview data can be recorded on tape (with the permission of the 
participants) or summarised in notes. During my field study, I used both tape 
recordings and notes at first. However, I later decided against recording 
interviews  after realising that interviewees paid too much attention to their 
voices, and very careful about their choice of words. 
Saunders et al. (2009) and Denzin and Lincoln (2005) spell out various 
factors that may affect the choices of any researcher regarding the pros and 
cons of data recording methods, the place where interviews take place, the 
interview topics, the available resources (tapes, records and so on), the skills of 
the researcher, and even more important, the willingness of interviewees. 
Saunders et al (2009) list the following disadvantages of tape-recording: (i) the 
possibility of adversarial relations between the researcher and the participants 
since it may cause discomfort for interviewees and they may be reluctant to 
talk when they know that what they say is being recorded, (ii) there may be a 
technical problem during the interview, (iii) disruption to conversation when 
changing tapes, and (iv) the time consumed to transcribe the tapes. With these 
points in mind, note-taking was used as the main method to record data in 
order to allow participants to express their views more openly and honestly 
than if they were being recorded and, of course, to avoid the other problems 
listed above. 132 
4.4.2  Data analysis and interpretation 
Data analysis is the process by which one reflects upon the data collected and 
relates it to specific research questions. Both Stake  (2005;  1999)  and  Yin 
(2003; 2002) assert that through the process of analysis, raw data is located in a 
particular context in order to further understanding. The data from the 
interviews, focus group discussions and observations were transcribed from the 
few tapes that were recorded. Notes taken during fieldwork about key themes, 
ideas and opinions were also included in the analysis.  
Although analysis in case study research is a matter of giving meaning to 
first impressions, Stake  (2005;  1999)  recommends that there should be no 
particular moment when it should begin. For this thesis, however, I followed 
Yin’s (2003; 2002) recommendations, and I analysed the data at the stages 
proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994:10-11). They describe the major 
phases of qualitative data analysis as: data reduction, data display, and 
conclusion drawing and verification.  
Phase 1: Data reduction 
This is an initial process by which material is selected and condensed on the 
basis of a conceptual framework. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), 
 
"…data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, 
abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written up field notes or 
transcriptions” (ibid, 1994:10).  
 
This process involves careful reading of the recorded material, identification of 
the main themes of the studied process, behaviour and so on, and categorisation 
of the materials for the purpose of analysis. During the analysis, generalisations 
and interpretations were made. This process continued until the research was 
completed. In the case of participant observation, data reduction occurred at the 
point of interaction with the respondent. Information was collected, processed, 
analysed and the process continued until the research was completed. 
Phase 2: Data display 
Data display goes a step beyond data reduction to provide an organised, 
compressed assembly of information that permits conclusion drawing (ibid, 
1994).  At this stage, data is arranged in ways that make it easier for the 
researcher to identify, focus on and select potential interpretations of data. This 
is the process of assembling information around certain themes and points, 
categorising information in more specific terms and presenting the results in 
some form.  133 
Phase 3: Conclusion drawing and verification  
This phase is the process of drawing interpretations or meaning from displayed 
data (ibid, 1994). It involves making decisions and drawing conclusions related 
to the research questions. Identifying patterns and regularities, discovering 
trends and explanations are aspects of this process. This created room for the 
development of some firm views to guide the research further, namely more 
data collection and reduction, organisation and interpretation and so on. In this 
study, I followed the research process until the data collection yielded nothing 
new. In other words, a saturation point had been reached, beyond which there 
would be repetition (Yin, 2002 & 2008;  Stake, 1999 & 2005;  Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). 
Using Miles and Huberman (1994) three phased approach described above, 
the data from the different sources was analysed separately. Briefly, at the 
‘data reduction’ stage, interview notes were coded, according to the number of 
interviewees (CS1-JSBM to CS20-COM) for the case household interviews, 
DO1-MRDC to DO8-MDLO for the unstructured interviews with Masindi 
District and Masindi  District Farmers Association  (MADFA)  officials, and 
FG1-KWG to FG5-LA for the farmers groups (gurubs) in Isunga.
162 All these 
interviews were read and re-read in order to identify relevant themes and data 
for the research. Irrelevant and low quality data were taken out. As the analysis 
continued, field and interview notes were categorised under topics and 
questions to identify consistency and differences. Where necessary, tables and 
matrixes were employed to categorise information in line with the research 
questions. Finally, the data were interpreted. Apart from exploring the specific 
content of the farmers' views, I also took notes on the relative frequency with 
which certain issues of the study were raised, and the intensity with which they 
were expressed.
163 
4.4.3  Research ethics and writing 
Denscombe (2007) stresses that for a study to be accurate, its findings must be 
reliable and valid. The former means that the findings would be consistently 
the same, if the study could be conducted over again or the study result is 
replicable under a similar methodology (see also Creswell, 2008). In case study 
research, however, this is not to be expected because the case changes over 
time. That is, if investigated again, new and other results might be revealed, but 
this does not necessarily mean something was wrong with the first study (Yin, 
2008). Yin’s advice is to cope with the reliability criteria by documenting 
                                                        
162 See Appendix 2: List of case households, farmers groups and Masindi District officials 
interviewed. 
163 This is rather a unique aspect of quantitative application to qualitative data. 134 
procedural and evidential material, and thereby make it possible for another 
researcher to replicate the study and evaluate its truthfulness (ibid, 2008). For 
that matter, the procedures and methods for data collection should be carefully 
clarified and recorded (Yin, 2008;  Golafshani, 2003). In this chapter, I 
provided information about who was interviewed, how these interviews took 
place, how information was collected from them and analysed, so that the 
study could be replicated.  
The validity of a study relates to the truthfulness of findings. It concerns 
whether the researcher has used the most appropriate research methods for 
what she/he is studying (Golafshani, 2003). In other words, it questions if the 
methods for collecting data and subsequent analysis are appropriate; and 
therefore, the research objectives and questions are in fact addressed. This 
study used several methods of data collection and analysis. However, care was 
taken in conducting them in order to reduce errors and biases associated with 
these research methods. Where called for, triangulation was used as a strategy 
for improving the validity of the study (Yin, 2008; Stake, 2005; 1999). Hence, 
attempts were made to use a combination of different research methods, 
allowing me to overcome the weaknesses of each and reduce biases, and 
thereby ensure the validity of the research. 
It is important to note that when doing a case study in rural Uganda, it is 
reasonable to expect some difficulties in conducting interviews, not only with 
heads of households, but also with representatives of various organisations 
including district local government officials, due to cultural or political 
reasons. They are sometimes unwilling to reveal mistakes and failures to 
outsiders. Even if they are willing to discuss such problems with an 
interviewer, cultural background and language barriers may also hinder the 
effectiveness of the interviews. Fortunately, being Ugandan, I was able to 
overcome most linguistic and cultural barriers successfully. 
With specific reference to the case households, most of them were 
comfortable answering the questions. This was probably because they were 
being asked to describe how they dealt about livelihood or farming issues. On 
several occasions when a question touched on a sensitive issue, the interviewee 
simply declined to answer (for instance, CS6-BOM, questions relating to 
bribes to a certain government official to obtain veterinary services). 
Moreover, during meetings with the interviewees, it was common to start with 
some irrelevant issues and then move into relevant research topics based on the 
interview guide. By so doing, the respondents felt relaxed and enjoyed the 
conversation, rather than feeling ‘forced’ to answer the questions. On many 
occasions, after the interview was completed, we had a meal or a drink together 
along with a lengthy informal discussion. In most cases, the participants 135 
included other people as well. These informal discussions were a rich source of 
interesting information and added greatly to the information gained through the 
‘one on one’ semi-structured interviews and field observations.   
4.5  Concluding remarks 
This chapter addressed one of the key issues of the study: the methodological 
perspective of the research. I explained how data was collected during the 
fieldwork and how it were analysed and presented in this thesis. In particular, 
the study approach and methods of data collection and analysis have been 
clearly spelled out. This was done based on a review of literature on the topic, 
the research objectives, and my experiences from the fieldwork. 
Having critically assessed qualitative research methods and their relevance 
for the research objectives and questions, this study used a combination of data 
collection instruments. Semi-structured interviews were used in conjunction 
with observations, informal interviews with the representatives of relevant 
organisations and local government officials, informal discussions with 
villagers in Isunga, as well as documentary analysis. The combination of 
different methods enabled me to minimize problems associated with individual 
methods, as well as check for the accuracy of information/data collected (Yin, 
2008; Stake, 2005).
164 The information collected from the case households was 
often consistent with data collected from other sources, either from Masindi 
district officials or documentary reviews or my own observations. This helped 
to ensure the reliability of the findings discussed in the next three chapters.  
 
 
   
                                                        
164 Guion and Flowers (2002) refer to this as ‘data triangulation’, which is a way of improving 
the quality of a study. 136 
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5  Finding agricultural labour in Isunga 
5.1  Introduction 
I showed in Chapter 2 that crop farming in Isunga and the surrounding areas is 
highly seasonal, with demand for labour peaking during planting, weeding and 
harvesting. During these periods, all household members are needed on the 
fields since lack of labour restricts farming. In the face of insufficient 
household labour, farmers have developed complex labour relations with each 
other to ease the burden. Before I explore the institutions that guide farmers’ 
labour behaviours in Chapters 6 and 7, this chapter presents the different farm 
labour arrangements in Isunga. There will be an emphasis on the organisation 
and operation of the various labour arrangements and farmers’ motives for 
using them. Section 5.2 presents the various labour arrangements used in 
Isunga during crop farming, before exploring how Isunga’s villagers access 
labour through farmers associations in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, I highlight 
the key issues to remember when exploring farmers’ labour behaviours and 
decisions. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
5.2  Labour use in crop production 
Labour is a major asset for many farming households, and the quality and 
quantity of labour available to the households (in terms of numbers, health, 
educational level and skills) form the basis of households’ farming strategies 
(Bryceson  et al., 2000). In Isunga,  where all farm work is done manually 
(using hand hoes and machetes) and during the rainy seasons, having access to 
adequate labour for crop farming directly affects the way farming is practiced. 
The common sources of farm labour in the village are: (a) household labour, 
(b) cooperative labour, (c) labour through interlocking relationships and (c) 
wage labour. Cooperative, hired labour and interlocking relations are used 138 
when a household’s labour force is inadequate to perform a particular task. 
These labour arrangements have many sub-categories and most of them take 
place through reciprocal relationships involving relatives, friends and 
neighbours. They differ in the way they are organised, the reasons for using 
them, the forms of reward for work done and the approaches to dispute 
resolution. Emphasis, however, is on how farmers access labour through such 
arrangements; that is, who works for whom, how the work is done and how 
agreements are negotiated. Table 6 lists the case households’ labour sources in 
a crop farming calendar per household, farm activity and source of labour. 
Table 6: Farm activity by labour source and household. 
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5.2.1  Household labour 
As discussed earlier, households in Isunga village are the basic units of crop 
production where land, labour and capital are carefully allocated to meet 
households’ crop production goals. Yet labour is the binding constraint on their 
farming activities, even in households viewed to have surplus of it, because of 
peak seasonal demands.
165 Household labour is used in all the case households 
and it accounts for most of the total labour used in crop production.
166 The 
CS1-JSBM case narrative below provides an indication of the importance of 
household labour in crop farming.
167   
CS1-JSBM (Bazilio): household labour and decision-making  
Every year, Bazilio cultivates 20 acres of cassava, groundnuts, upland rice and 
sunflower for cash. But he complains of a lack of labour to work the shambas, 
and uses it as a reason for not opening more land for cultivation. However, he is 
optimistic that the situation will improve  when his boys grow up. Bazilio’s 
labour needs are high during weeding and harvest periods when “…every farmer 
is busy taking care of his or her farm and no one wants to do leja-leja. If you go 
to them, they tell you, we are busy…you either organise ‘pur kongo’ or turn to 
your old friends in the ‘gurub’ for help or those who have worked for you in the 
past if you still have good relations…or you be nice to those you want their help 
in future”. The ‘displaced’ people sometimes look for leja-leja but “…they are 
difficult to negotiate with because once they want something or said a word…it 
is final”  Bazilio  said. In this household, domestic activities like cooking, 
looking after the children, cleaning, and washing, fetching firewood and water 
or brewing alcohol are performed by the women and the older girls. However, 
when it comes to procuring food for the family, all able-bodied members of the 
household (even children) are involved. No one is engaged in only one activity. 
With respect to crop farming, Bazilio’s  main tasks include felling trees, 
ploughing with oxen, digging holes and planting or sowing. Abwoli, Atenyi and 
the older children harvest, transport harvested produce, dry and winnow crops, 
select seeds, and rear pigs and poultry. Weeding and crop storage is done by 
everybody. Bazilio makes all the decisions when it comes to farming: what to 
plant, when and how to plant it and who should do so. 
                                                        
165 Netting (1993) also recognises that the quantity of labour available to farming households is 
a key determinant to wellbeing and food security in rain fed agriculture. 
166 In my discussion of the household as the unit of analysis in Chapter 2, I made it clear that 
households in Isunga provide the social basis of subsistence production and the organisational 
framework for the allocation of labour and the division of labour. This subsection is a 
continuation of the discussion. 
167 Some households even adjust supply to accomplish their farming tasks (see adjusting 
household sizes below). 141 
Since the household is patriarchal, the roles and status of its members are 
segregated by gender and age. A number of gendered activities within the 
family were also noted. Whereas Abwoli, Atenyi and the older girls spend more 
time in the fields, distilling Kipanga  gin for sale, collecting water and 
firewood, and doing other domestic activities, Bazilio  and the boys  engage 
more in income-generating tasks such as watering cattle and making bricks and 
charcoal. Bazilio does not participate at all in water collection, but the older 
boys sometimes do so when Bazilio’s bicycle is not being used.
168 
Adjusting household sizes 
Some people even adjust their household sizes by allowing other people to live 
with them (CS4-MOJM) or by borrowing children from other households to 
take care of their younger children (CS2-MDF and CS13-JKF) during cropping 
seasons (see picture 4). Child borrowing (piidi) is particularly common during 
digging and weeding periods.
169 Abwoli remarked,  
 
“...I do not get much help from my relatives because they are very far away, 
except  Susan. I borrowed her from my cousin to help me look after Mark 
because sometimes I have a lot to do in the shambas and I need someone to keep 
an eye on him. Susan wants to go back to her mother, but I would like her to 
stay for another year.” (Interview with CS2-MDF, October 2007)   
An important aspect of household labour that 
has emerged from the CS8-BRM (see Chapter 
2) and CS1-JSBM case study above, but true of 
the other households in Isunga, is that, although 
adult males take care of many of the heavy 
tasks, they get considerable help from the other 
household members. In eight of the case 
households, women work a lot in the shambas, 
but spend less time farming than the adult 
males, because of other responsibilities in the 
family such as taking care of children and 
cooking. Children too, help with some of the 
labour-intensive activities such as weeding and 
harvesting crops (see CS19-LOM below). But 
how much labour may be mobilised for a 
                                                        
168 I also saw in other households that when crops are head loaded to market, women and 
children do the work, but when bicycles are available for transport, men use them to transport the 
crops. 
169 The borrowed child is referred to among the Lwo speaking households as Lapiidi. 
Picture 3: Lapidi at work. 
Photo: Opira Otto, SLU. 142 
particular activity depends on the nature of the work and the age-gender 
composition of the household. Households such as CS1-JSBM with many 
young children usually have more limited access to labour to perform 
agricultural tasks; but as the children grow older, substantial amounts of 
household labour becomes available.  
5.2.2  Farm work parties 
In Isunga, farm work parties have different names depending on the form of 
the reciprocal obligations and nature of rewards. The ones used by the different 
case households are: (a) work party which is paid for with only food and Kwete 
beer (awak), (b) a farm work party on credit (diira), and (c) working for Kwete 
beer by farmer groups (pur-kongo).
170 This section looks at the existence and 
nature of awak and diira work-sharing practices in the village. In both cases, 
Kwete beer is an important form of reward.
171 Although work parties vary in 
size, organisation and the amount of food and Kwete beer provided, there are 
rules involved that do not appear in agriculture economics literature. 
Beer work party (awak) 
Awak is a non-monetary work-sharing practice in which a household issues an 
invitation to relatives, friends and neighbours to participate on a specific day to 
do a specific agricultural task. Such tasks could be land preparation; weeding 
or crop harvesting when labour demands peak throughout the village and every 
farmer is in need of extra help. This places extra demands on villagers to 
maintain good personal ties with potential labour-sharing partners (see Section 
6.2.1). For awak, it is compulsory for the host to provide ‘good’ food during 
work time and entertain participants with ‘good’ Kwete (maize or millet) beer 
after work.
172 Unlike the rotational labour practice (aleya) discussed below, the 
host has no obligation to attend future awak called by his guests. The process 
of organising awak, from the time the idea is hatched to when it takes place, is 
complex as it involves many actors. This is illustrated by the CS2-MDF case 
study below and my own experience from one awak in 2007.
173  
                                                        
170 Pur kongo and Pur cente are considered in Section 5.3 because of farmers groups (gurubs) 
unique attributes of offering various services to farmers, including accessing agricultural labour. 
171 Scholars like Donham (1999; 1981), Allen (1987), Swindell (1985), Erasmus (1956), Moore 
(1975), Geschiere (1995), Fafchamps & Gubert (2007), Fafchamps (1993) and many others, have 
all described agricultural work groups in which a host family provides guest labourers with food 
and drink. 
172 ‘Good food’ in terms of quality, rarity and quantity. 
173 See Miles & Huberman (1994) use of illustrative narratives as evidence presentation in 
qualitative case studies 143 
CS2-MDF (Abwoli): Getting extra hands through Awak 
The rain stopped earlier than expected and the ground was getting hard, thus 
making harvesting groundnuts difficult as some remained in the ground. Abwoli 
got worried and needed extra help, as further delays would mean using hoes to 
dig up the groundnuts, which is a very tedious work. She chose to organise 
awak. Awak gives quick results, but organising it is taxing and time-consuming. 
It starts with identifying a person who is trusted, easy to work with and whose 
social status in the village is good, to act as a Lakwena  (messenger). The 
Lakwena’s work is to identify and invite people with ‘strong chests’ for the 
work party. Together with Atenyi (CS3-MAF), they discussed who should be the 
Lakwena for the work party. From their conversation, it was clear that Abwoli 
wanted a Lakwena who is trusted in the community, someone whose words are 
taken seriously and able to mobilise hard-working persons for the task. Tojiira 
was chosen as the Lakwena  for the Awak, and the trio (Tojiira,  Atenyi  and 
Abwoli) discussed who should or should not be invited, the number of 
participants, the size of the shambas, what food and how much to cook, how 
much Kwete beer to make and the date for the Awak. Fifteen women, all with 
‘strong chests’ and known to Tojiira and Abwoli, were identified for the work 
party. Tojiira visited each of them to invite them to Abwoli’s Awak and told 
them that they should report early. Atenyi,  however, expressed her concerns 
about the number of participants and costs involved, especially for the food. The 
next day Abwoli visited her friend Rukia to ask if she could help with some 
cooking, and she agreed. On the day of the Awak, thirteen women turned up at 
around 8am, and by 3pm, two shambas of groundnuts totalling one acre had 
been harvested. While working, they joked, laughed and sang songs, either to 
enjoy themselves or keep in time with each other. Around noon, Abwoli served 
them food - smoked chicken in groundnut sauce (olel), goat stew, kwon (millet 
and millet bread) and some vegetables. After work, Kwete beer was served to 
the participants. They continued with their songs and danced deep into the night. 
The three participants, who did not drink Kwete or Kipanga, were served Coca-
Cola and given some of the harvest to take home. 
Since reputation and social relationships seem to have a strong bearing on 
farmer’s labour behaviours and decisions, the next challenge was to understand 
the rules involved in such labour practices. I did this by directly participating in 
Atenyi’s bean harvest work party.   
Field Observation: Awak’s rules of engagement 
Bongomin (CS19-LOM) was the Lakwena for Atenyi’s work party organised for 
the bean harvest 7 August 2007. The Awak started with nine persons (lumono), 
but by midmorning, five other persons (lunyango) joined us.
174 We harvested the 
                                                        
174 Lumono are participants invited in advance by the Lakwena, whilst Lunyango are those not 
invited at all, but heard of the Awak and turned up either to enjoy the Kwete beer or show that 144 
beans by uprooting them and bundling them to facilitate the transport home. 
Bongomin and the other participants came straight from their homes to the field. 
At around 10am, we had our ‘breakfast’ of freshly brewed Kwete beer and an 
hour later food was served.
175 Bongomin divided us into two groups and we ate, 
telling stories, joking, gossiping and giving one another advice, just as we had 
during work time. When the Kwete beer was served to wash the food down, 
there were only two of us who drank water.
176 We then took some time off to 
rest under a tree and went back to work for three more hours. Then, two jerry 
cans of Kwete (40 litres) were served and consumed in less than an hour. By 
1pm we had finished harvesting the beans, and went straight to Atenyi’s home to 
drink some Ajalata (weak Kwete). Both Atenyi and Bazilio thanked us for a job 
well done and prayed for it to stop raining for at least a week so that they could 
dry the beans. Atenyi then organised five bottles of Kipanga gin to accompany 
the Ajalata. Four of the participants who do not drink Kipanga were served 
Kwete beer in a big calabash; and one man who did not drink alcohol was served 
two bottles of Coca-Cola.
177 During the Ajalata drinking session, Bongomin not 
only controlled our behaviour while drinking, but also took a complaint to 
Atenyi about the content of one of the bottles of Kipanga, stating that it was 
“water that smelled Kipanga” (insinuating that it was not strong enough). 
Moreover, he also said how nice and strong the Kwete beer in the field had been 
and encouraged her to increase the quantity next time. Three persons who had 
not participated in the Awak, but were just passing by were also invited to share 
with us the Ajalata and “the water that smelled Kipanga”. In a conversation with 
Bongomin during the Ajalata drinking session, he said that one of the Lakwena’s 
duties is to see that order is maintained and that bad behaviour discouraged. He 
stressed, “...you misbehave, I throw you out and next time we don’t come for 
your Awak or invite you to participate in others. We also do not deal with 
sorcerers and selfish people.” 
Bongomin divided us into two groups based on age (younger and older).
178 
We all sat down, as no one is allowed to drink Kwete while standing up, “…it is 
a sign of poor upbringing”, one participant said. Bongomin poured the Kwete 
beer from the jerry-cans into two big calabashes (Labun) in stages. A small 
calabash (abit) and a plastic cup were used to take it from the Labun. In my 
group, we used the abit and passed it round from one individual to the next. The 
same happened in the group of younger people. As the drinking continued, the 
separation of the groups into older and younger people became less visible. By 
                                                                                                                                
they care. Such acts of caring gives them ‘good names’ and could make them qualify to be 
Lumono next time around. 
175 Farmers refer to it as Otur-Pur (hoe breaker) because when you drink one calabash too 
much, you might get tipsy, become aggressive while working the soil and in the process break 
your hoes’ pole. 
176 The first two Lunyango who came when we had just finished eating ate the left overs. 
177 This is an indication that farmers do not participate in awak just for the sake of drinking 
Kwete beer; there are other motivations too (see Chapter 6) 
178 If the group were mixed, then it would have been subdivided by gender. 145 
the time we had finished drinking Ajalata, a cross-generational drinking cluster 
was formed. Awak does not end with the last drop of the Kwete beer. The hosts 
are obliged to take over the roles of their guests on later occasions, and failure to 
do so is regarded as improper conduct. 
Beer work party on credit (diira) 
Diira is a work party on credit. It normally consists of ten to fifteen workers 
spending a day or less in the shambas.  It arises when a farmer lacks the 
resources to make Kwete beer, but is in dire need of help for a particular task. 
Food is served in the shamba when the work is done, but the Kwete beer is 
consumed on another occasion.
179Diira is more expensive than awak because 
food is served twice: on the day the agricultural task is performed, and on the 
day the Kwete beer is consumed. Because of costs, it is less common in the 
village, and mainly used by poor women farmers. Four case households (CS19-
LOM, CS7-ABF, CS13-JKF and CS3-MAF) mentioned using it during crop 
weeding periods at least once in the last five years. Its organisation and 
function is the same as that of awak except that the reward is given in the 
future, as much as three months later. In an interview with CS19-LOM, 
Margret explained why and when she uses diira.  
CS19-LOM (Bongomin): When I cry for help, they come
180  
Bongomin’s wife (Margret) believes that they are poor because they do not have 
enough labour to farm their land. She said, “...sometimes the need for labour is 
just overwhelming and we are forced to make difficult decisions. Last week 
Ronald had to skip school because he had to help his father prune tobacco...I 
told him to stop growing tobacco, but he does not listen to me. Tobacco makes 
us poorer and poorer because it takes all our labour and gives nothing back”.
181 
Growing tobacco is labour-intensive and takes longer to grow than the other 
crops: from preparing the bedding for the seedlings, sowing, digging the 
shamba, planting, transplanting, weeding, pruning, harvesting, curing to sales.” 
According to Bongomin,  the most labour-intensive period is transplanting 
tobacco. It requires careful management as detailed by the BAT people, and it 
has to be completed within a short period. During this period, everyone in the 
                                                        
179 Here, the quality or rarity of the food does not matter, but the Kwete beer has to be good and 
plentiful. 
180 According to the 2006 wealth ranking exercise, CS19-LOM was placed among the better-
off households of Isunga. But when shown the findings, Bongomin objected being a better-off and 
threatened not to participate in the interview if I insisted. My effort to make him understand that it 
was his fellow villagers who put him among the better-off households of the village did not help; 
and resolved to categorise the household as a poor one.  
181 Apart from being a high labour demanding crop, tobacco growers are also highly taxed (see 
Chapter 2). Hence comments such as, “okumatara nka kalima simonko”, translated, “drifting 
aimlessly as a tobacco grower”.  146 
household has to help. Yet Margret has to take care of the maize, beans, cassava 
and other crops to feed the family. Her labour power alone is never enough. She 
solves this problem by organising work parties with “...those who when you cry 
for help, they come”. During maize weeding periods, when she doesn’t have 
enough money or grains to organise Awak, she calls upon her friends and good 
neighbours for a diira. She tells them about the diira  by word of mouth, 
including the date and amount of Kwete beer that will be available.
182About the 
participants, she said, “…these are people who trust me and I trust them. People 
who can leave their work to come and stop me from crying are good. Of course, 
next time it is my turn to stop them from crying...and if you can’t pay back by 
working for them then you are a bad person.” Margret’s diira is usually not 
more than 10 people (Acholi and Lango) living nearby and only ‘good’ food is 
served. The Kwete  beer comes  later when sorghum or maize grains are in 
abundance, and the debt paid accordingly.  
Reflections on the beer work parties 
The above case examples show that work-sharing is anchored in personal ties, 
guided by collective rules and expectations that encourage people to share their 
resources with those in need. It showed that labour-sharing is possible when 
the social relationship encourages it, but trust must exist between the actors; 
hence remarks such as, “...those who when you cry for help, they come”. The 
cases also suggest that both awak and diira are used during labour-intensive 
periods. The significance of the cases therefore, is the obligations and 
expectations embedded in the people’s shared identity and social relations. For 
example, to access diira, farmers like Margret invest in social relationships to 
meet their farming targets. Moreover, the labour practice is seasonal in that, 
during certain periods when demand for farm labour is high, work is done on 
credit. The labour debt is paid when crops are harvested. Margret’s story also 
highlights the importance of personal trust and reputation in the social 
relationship of Isunga’s villagers, which as we shall see in the next chapter, 
plays a very important role in structuring, maintaining and implementing their 
labour exchange relations. 
The case stories used in both awak  and  diira  above showed that work-
sharing is motivated by social ties between family, friends and neighbours. 
Although such practices do not require the actors involved to make explicit 
agreements between them, there are expectations. It is a debt of honour that 
may be payable in future. However, some of the literature on work-sharing in 
Africa (McAllister, 2003; 2001; Rekdal, 1996; Allan, 1965) misinterprets what 
                                                        
182 With diira there are no lumono (early comers) and lunyango (mid-morning participants); 
those invited to participate, all come at the given time. 147 
labour arrangements such as awak and diira actually indicate. For instance, 
Allan writes,  
 
“…further evidence of the general existence of a grain surplus is to be found in 
the practice, almost universal throughout Africa, of the working ‘beer party’. 
Beer-making played an essential part in the economies of most of the traditional 
systems of food-production, and the changes of recent years have not greatly 
diminished its importance...” (ibid, 1965:44) 
The driving force is not a ‘grain surplus’ but the work to be done. Whilst 
Abwoli, Atenyi and Margaret provided Kwete beer to their Awak and Diira 
participants, this was out of thanks for their help, and of course, for them to 
relax. The Kwete beer was not used as a form of payment for labour power 
used in unit hours. The driving force is a household’s need for a much-needed 
labour at the most critical period of farming, not the Kwete  beer itself. 
Moreover, when the women were working, they joked, laughed and sung songs 
to enjoy themselves, and probably mostly to keep up with each other. With this 
in mind, it can be argued that Kwete work parties are not just occasions to 
work, but also moments for enjoyment, gossiping, eating, drinking, singing and 
dancing. As Geschiere  (1995)  observed, the inducement derived from the 
social or joyful nature of the work motivates work-sharing. 
5.2.3  Rotational labour exchange 
With  rotational labour exchanges (aleya),  farmers form small groups (3-8 
persons) to work each other’s farm on a rotational basis. The common number 
with the case households is five persons, who would move as a group either 
from day to day or garden to garden,  until the required task of all the 
participants are completed. The amount of work that each member provides for 
others is reciprocated almost exactly, and the labour exchange is completed in 
a matter of days. Aleya is common in Isunga and 14 of the case households 
mentioned using it for digging, weeding and/or harvesting crops when their 
household labour was inadequate (see Appendix 2).  
Driven by the lack of working capital to either hire labour or organise 
Awak, those households instead resort to sharing labour power. Most aleya 
groups are formed or renewed before the first rain. In the case of the latter, 
members meet to reflect on what happened during the previous season and then 
plan their farming calendar accordingly. At the meeting, they use kalulu 
(lottery) to decide who should receive labour first, second, third and so on. If a 
member missed a work session, he or she is required to either send a 
replacement or give a day’s labour to the host later. This is a very important 
rule for aleya  to work, and failure to comply with it usually leads to 148 
replacement. Also, no cash payments are made between the members, but food 
may be served if the shamba is far away or the task is performed during an 
entire day.
183 The CS5-AWM case study has been selected to show the key 
features of aleya in the village. 
CS5-AWM (Kapere): Rotational labour on a day-to-day basis 
Kapere’s labour and living conditions worsened when his wife passed away in 
2005; “...my wife’s departure left a deep hole in our farm labour requirements. 
My effort is now used mainly to get food”, he lamented. However, he has a 
network of people with whom he shares labour with, “…they are poor people 
like me that I have good relationships with”, Kapere said.
184 He primarily calls 
for their services during planting and weeding. The group includes six persons, 
who are ethnically mixed and active members of the Isunga Church of Uganda 
(Anglican Church). Their labour-sharing arrangement is based on a simple rota. 
Kapere explained how it works as, “…if we agree to weed our beans, then we 
may start with mine on the first day. We work together on my shamba and weeds 
as much as possible.
185 On the second day, we  go and work on A’s garden, then 
on B’s garden on the third day, on C’s on the fourth day, on D’s on the fifth day 
and, finally on household E’s garden on the sixth day. In this way, all members’ 
shambas are worked on from one cycle of labour sharing”. They agree the order 
of the work in advance, and arriving late is not tolerated. If a member refuses to 
work for  some reason, he is replaced and the village will find out about it. 
Kapere said, “…Isunga is bad, you behave like that, then prepare to work your 
shamba alone”.  Food is not served since members have their farms nearby. 
According to him, the aleya is the only available labour organisation for him 
considering his poor health and economic situation. Especially during times for 
planting and weeding, which normally are short, and without help from others, it 
would be hard for him to cope. Apart from the aleya  group,  Kapere  also 
receives help from his close relatives. They provide him with food, labour and 
other services, but he complains that support from them has been dwindling: 
“…without my relatives and in laws, I would have grave difficulties meeting my 
needs and that of my children. But of late, I don’t receive as much help as I used 
to when my wife died…may be they are tired of my problems or they may be 
facing similar problems”. 
It appears that the incentive to supply labour does not only include individual 
reciprocity, but also group monitoring and repeated interactions. For instance, 
on the first shamba or first day, each member has an incentive to work hard in 
                                                        
183 Unlike the awak where good food in terms of rarity and quantity is served, with aleya this is 
not important. 
184 One of the group members later lamented, “…this kind of work is not for the rich people 
who can afford to buy labour from us.” 
185 For explanatory purpose, I named the households A, B, C, D and E. 149 
order to encourage similar effort from the host in subsequent rounds due to 
individual reciprocity. On the other hand, group monitoring encourages work 
discipline as members do not want to be seen as shirking or doing kwere-kwere 
(shoddy) work (c.f. Geschiere, 1995). Thus, by working hard, a member sends 
a clear signal to the other members about his or her desire to continue sharing 
work with them. However, such incentives could also decline in later rounds 
because those individuals who have already hosted have no immediate 
inducement to supply their labour power to others. But because group members 
have something in common (ethnicity, kinship, friendship, similar fates or 
drinking beer together) each member has a high probability of future 
exchanges with other members of the group, and they continue sharing work 
and improving their reputation.
186  
Just like the examples of awak  above,  aleya  labour practices are also 
anchored in personal ties and guided by collective rules and expectations. 
Thus, labour-sharing is possible when the social relationship encourages it. But 
it also changes whenever the need for extra labour becomes too heavy to 
handle. When this happens, existing ties are weakened and relationships 
become unfavourable. This was made clear in the CS5-AWM case household, 
when Kapere hinted that he receives less help from relatives and in-laws than 
before. He proposed that this might be because they are tired of his problems or 
they may be facing similar problems, thus suggesting that labour-sharing and 
reciprocal exchange practices do not work at all times. It is clear from 
Kapere’s story that labour practices anchored in personal ties presuppose a 
social closeness between actors, and for this to be true, there must be trust. 
Scholars such as Rose-Ackerman (2001), Landa (1994) and others associate 
trust with social closeness in the sense of sharing the same categories of 
expected rights and duties, plus shared values and interests.
187 Accordingly, 
people feel confident in another person when they trust the other to have the 
ability, the desire and the good disposition to perform an exchange, or when 
their own familiarity with the others  allow them to make  requests. Rose-
Ackerman (2001), writes, 
 
                                                        
186 Following Furubotn & Richter (2005), in a game-theoretic framework, the above reasoning 
makes sense as a farmer who has already hosted in a one-time labour exchange has no incentives 
to supply labour power on the other members’ farms. 
187 Closeness could be viewed in many ways. For example as Musa remarked: “they are poor 
people like me that I have good relationship with….”, or “this kind of work is not for the rich 
people who can afford to buy labour from us.” It is therefore plausible that poorer households 
consider themselves close to each other, and share work or labour practices with each other more, 
whereas, the better-off households are probably never bothered by perceived closeness. 150 
“…trust is a relational response, not a result of blind loyalty that permits risks in 
dealing with each other” (ibid, 2001:543). 
Using Rose-Ackerman’s social closeness approach to cooperative labour 
practices illustrated above, casts doubt on Polanyi’s (2001)  reference to 
reciprocity as the movement of resources between correlative points of 
symmetrical groupings. For instance, Bazilio (CS1-JSBM) belongs to an Aleya 
group including three poorer persons from their Kamdini Reflect Group. This 
raises question of whether the labour relations between two wealth groups are 
actually done on equal terms as it emerged from the CD5-AWM case story.
 188 
It could also be that Bazilio and the poorer persons do not exchange labour for 
labour, but something else. 
5.2.4 Interlocking dimensions of agricultural labour relations 
There are also cases of interlocking exchanges involving labour during cropping 
seasons in Isunga. The ones mentioned by the case households include: 
sharecropping (land and labour), borrowing children for labour (piidi), Kipanga 
beer exchanged for labour and food crops exchanged for labour during harvest 
time.
189 Such exchange behaviour is not confined to villagers in Isunga. For 
example, in her analysis of labour practices in India, Hill (1986) pointed to 
sharecropping (land and labour) and debt bondage (land and capital).
190 Dual 
exchanges of resources exist in Isunga and surrounding areas and are important 
strategies to be able to cope with labour, land and capital shortages in agricultural 
production. The CS18-MOF and CS13-JKF narratives below bring out some of 
the key interlocking aspects of agricultural labour in Isunga.
191  
CS18-MOF: A case of sharecropping (land for labour) 
Min Peko has 36 acres of land, which she uses for cultivating maize, beans, 
sweet potatoes, cassava and green leafy vegetable for domestic consumption. 
She also grows sunflower (three acres) and tobacco (two acres) crops through 
sharecropping arrangements with three other persons (Onen, Adyebo and 
Akena).
192 Min Peko’s contribution is the land, securing a contract with the BAT 
(U) Ltd, the ox-plough and, when needed, buying leja-leja to help the men with 
weeding the tobacco. In return, she gets half of the crops. The men are also 
responsible for taking care of the six oxen and ploughing her food crops. They 
                                                        
188 See Donham (1999) for similar reasoning. 
189 See table 5.2 above for households involved in interlocking exchanges.  
190 See Klijn & Pain’s (2007) work on informal credit practices in Afghanistan where debt 
bondage is also mentioned. 
191 See also CS11-HJM (Hajji) about groundnuts and beans exchanged for labour in Chapter 7 
(Section 7.4).  
192 These are IDPs from Apac District in the Lango region, Northern Uganda.  151 
are free to use the animals for ploughing their fields and hire the ploughs to 
others too, but with her permission. She said, “…that is how I maintain my good 
relation with them. Whatever money they get is theirs. They are good people, 
except the young one who I have noticed is getting more and more into 
drinking…I’ll get time talk to him. They are like my relatives now you know. 
They also help me organise ‘pur kongo or awak’ when I want to open new 
fields.”  Min Peko refers to Onen  as,  “…someone who usually does not go 
wrong. I trust him and when he says so and so is good, my heart accepts.” 
Their sharecropping relationships started in 2004, when Onen approached Min 
Peko that he did not have money to rent land and wanted to ‘borrow’ two acres of 
her land for growing tobacco. Min Peko recalled, “…I told him there is nothing for 
free these days. If you are ready to share the harvest with me then fine, I can give 
you two or more acres. But I warned him of the many problems involved with 
tobacco growing, but poverty blocked his ears. The following day he came 
back…that he has no choice but to get into tobacco farming. I felt sorry for him 
and went ahead to renew my contract with BAT”. With the contract secured, the 
men could sell their tobacco directly to BAT (U) Ltd; get advice from their 
extension workers and get fertilisers from them on credit. Their sharecropping 
relationship is not without problems. However, when there are misunderstandings, 
they try to solve them amicably. Min Peko said, “…I tell them, whenever there is a 
problem, it is best we solve it ourselves, since no one can understand the problem 
better than us, and they agree with me”. Most of their quarrels centre around their 
relationships with BAT (U) Ltd. Min Peko said, “…last year, BAT did not buy 
many of the leaves and I had to help them pay the fertiliser loans we owe 
them…after all, the contract is in my name. BAT said our tobacco was of poor 
quality and refused to buy it…yet we all know the real reason was because they 
had filled their quota for the year and didn’t have money to buy more. The BAT 
people don’t treat farmers well, but we still go to them because they pay if you 
accept to be their slave and poverty makes us their slaves.” 
CS13-JKF: Child borrowing (piidi) and exchanging Kipanga for work 
Mama Toto’s main economic activities are farming and selling Kipanga and 
Malwa.
193 Although she owns less than an acre of land on which her homestead 
stands, she accesses land for farming by borrowing and renting it from those 
who have excess land. Still, she is constrained by labour for working it, and 
addresses it by organising awak, diira or exchange kipanga beer directly for 
labour inputs.  Mama Toto  is very popular with her Kipanga  and  Malwa 
customers because she sometimes gives it to them on credit. This has improved 
her social standing with them, and they in turn give her their labour whenever 
                                                        
193 The CS13-JKF (Mama Toto) household shifts between the Better Off and the Poor wealth 
groups during certain periods of the farming calendar. For instance, during maize, sorghum and 
tobacco harvest times, Mama Toto has good money because many villagers come for her Kipanga 
gin and Malwa beer. But during weeding periods, she struggles to make ends meet has very little 
money or no money at all on certain days. 152 
she needs it. Mama Toto greatly appreciates such exchange relationships, since 
it gives her access to extra labour when she needs it most. She said, “…some of 
them like my stuff. They drink it and pay back by digging or weeding my garden. 
Since I don’t have a husband to dig for me, my relationship with them is very 
important. I trust and respect them…although at times I do not like what they do 
when they take one bottle too much. I think they also like and trust me, since 
they keep on coming. Having such relations is very good since we do not have to 
spend much time discussing what to do, how much to work or the ‘strength’ of 
my Kipanga. We agree by word of mouth and it stops there…I think we have 
done well so far without many quarrels because we try hard not to quarrel. 
Sometimes when I desperately need help with digging or weeding and my 
business not doing well, I ask my friends (Alero and Wilobotek) to work my 
garden on credit, and I give them beer or money later. They have never let me 
down, although sometimes I do let them down by ‘paying’ them much later than 
agreed…the most important thing is to follow through on your agreements. But I 
worry that if I frequently break my word, then one day they might turn their 
backs on me…and the relationship breaks down completely. I hope not.”  
The above cases suggest that when crop production is restricted by the lack of 
labour, land or working capital, farmers enter into some interlocking 
relationships to access the input they lack. This is important as some 
households use it for building and maintaining social relationships in the 
village (see Chapter 6). The CS18-MOF sharecropping example showed that 
by making the oxen and land available to the landless farmers, Min Peko also 
secured a good source of farm labour and some of the crops from the land. 
Both accessed the inputs they lacked. Moreover, as Onen takes care of the 
oxen, which they use to work each other’s shambas, the reward he gets is the 
services the animals render him as well. Even Mama Toto’s story of borrowing 
Santa to ‘play’ with her young son (Jacob) is much more than about enabling 
Mama Toto to fulfil her agricultural or other roles. Mama Toto gets the much 
needed extra labour hours through piidi, but at a cost. She has to take care of 
Santa (feed, house and clothe her), as well as meet some obligations to Santa’s 
parents. For instance, apart from being nice to them so as not to sour existing 
relationships, Mama Toto is also expected to assist them in times of hardship 
(send them some money or food). The use of Kipanga gin to pay for farm 
labour when production is restricted by the lack of labour is equally important 
to explain interlocking exchange relations in crop production. It suggests that 
trusting and respectful behaviour is the basis for not only structuring an 
exchange relationship, but maintaining it too.
194  
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Uganda’s agricultural modernisation efforts only look  at one side of 
farmers’ economic behaviours, that is, the rational calculation of self-interest 
(GOU, 2010; GOU, 2000). Yet, as the Min Peko (CS18-MOF) and Mama Toto 
(CS13-JKF) examples have shown, there are alternative perspectives on the 
mechanisms and motivations of sharing resources that emphasise social 
interaction. Their labour-sharing arrangements are developed within their 
personal networks of reciprocity, which functions well in the strength of a 
rationale of moral, kinship and friendship values.
195  They are socially 
embedded exchanges that obey a socio-cultural logic that differs from the 
‘commercialisation’ ideas promoted by the government. So, households seek to 
gain their welfare through informal means rather than the market. 
5.2.5  Wage labour 
When households (poor or better off) do not have sufficient family labour to 
complete particular farm, they may also turn to hired labour to access the 
necessary labour. The three types of hired labour used in crop production in 
Isunga are: (a) piece work or day-to-day casual wage labour (leja-leja); (b) 
seasonal wage labour, and (c) working for cash (pur cente) by farmers 
groups.
196  Below are three case examples to highlight some of the 
characteristics of hired labour in the village. 
CS6-BOM (Zakayo): a case of leja-leja, pur cente and seasonal labour 
This household has enough land which Zakayo inherited from his father when 
he died. He uses it for crop farming and livestock keeping. Every year he puts 
aside 20 acres of land for growing beans, groundnuts, tobacco and sunflower for 
money.
197 This requires a lot of labour, but since the household has only two 
working members, they source extra labour from outside the household. Zakayo 
uses different labour practices depending on the task and periods of the farming 
calendar. For example, he employs two persons (Bali-Bali and Oturu) between 
April to July when the demand for labour in his household is very high, and 
pays them a monthly wage of 60,000 UGX per person (the wages are paid in 
advance but on a monthly basis until the contract expires) and 30 kilograms of 
beans to each of them at the end of their tenure in July. Zakayo  remarked, 
“…but sometimes due to too much rain or little rain, the harvest is poor we re-
negotiate the winye (agreement) and give less beans…like last year, they 
received 20kg instead of 30kg.” 
198 Both Bali-Bali and Oturu report to work 
                                                        
195 See Chapters 6 and 7. 
196 Pur cente is purposely pushed to the next sub section on finding agricultural labour in 
farmers groups. 
197 I asked him many times to disclose how much land he has, but he refused. But other sources 
said he has more than 300 acres in and around Isunga. 
198 See Chapter 6 for the significance of renegotiation of winye. 154 
from their homes and work all day, but Alice gives them lunch. Zakayo also 
lends them land if they ask for it “…it is the best way to keep them close to me,” 
he said. But whenever he is in acute need of extra farm labour for a particular 
task, he hires leja-leja or organises pur cente or pur kongo through Kica Ber 
Akiba group. Most leja-leja labourers want their work paid in cash, as soon as 
the task is done, but Zakayo mentioned four guys who sometimes work on credit 
and he pays them later. He remarked, “…they are my friends and I have known 
them for long”. Sometime, he pays their wages in advance before the work is 
done. “…when they need money in advance, I give it to them after careful 
consideration, but I don’t normally encourage it. I also give them a small credit 
when they’re hard up…but I assess the situation first and if my ‘heart tells’ me 
to give, then I do it. It is good for our relationships,” he said. When they take 
credit, it means they owe Zakayo their labour and work to pay it. 
CS9-MAM (Musa): We do leja-leja when we need cash. 
This is an IDP family from Oyam District. When they arrived in Isunga in 2001, 
they settled on two acres land of Nyamakere forest reserve. On this land they 
grow food crops and sunflower for money. Musa complained the harvests never 
provide for three months, because they don’t have enough land. “...but even if 
we had enough land, I don’t think we would have managed to cultivate it with 
just the two of us since our children are still young. Labour is a big headache, 
especially during weeding periods,” Anna added. Their farm labour situation 
worsens when they have to leave working their shamba altogether and go to 
work for others to get some money for buying basic commodities. Both Musa 
and Anna do not like to do leja-leja, but resort to it especially during the hunger 
season when desperately in need of cash to buy food. Anna said, “…it is not 
easy when you need money to take a child to the clinic or buy food and you 
don’t have the cash. Sometimes we do leja-leja, even when weeds are taking 
over our crops. I don’t like it, but it is the only option we have here.” They have 
some ‘connections’ and when they hear from them that a leja-leja opportunity 
exists somewhere or announced on the market day that work exists, they go to 
be recruited. Anna added that, “...during the hunger season, many people want 
to work, yet there is not much work. The rich ones know about it, and take 
advantage of it by paying little for the work. When you complain, they shout at 
you ‘Nga-Olwongi’ (who called you)…and tobacco farmers are the worst”. A 
stint of leja-leja labour (known as katala)
 is worked for between 1,500 UGX – 
2500 UGX, depending on the activity (digging, weeding or harvesting), the 
period of a farming calendar, how good one is at negotiation (patana) and the 
location of the shamba.
 199 If the shamba is far from home, they demand more. 
Musa takes patana very seriously and is very careful with his choice of words 
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katala for digging (opening land) was 2 tal by 20 tal (i.e. 4x40 meters); and for weeding maize 
was 3 tal by 20 tal (i.e. 6x40 meters).  155 
and this has helped him avoid many misunderstandings.
200 Agreements for leja-
leja are made verbally. The seller and buyer agree on what to do, how much 
should be paid for the work (i.e. wage per day or per katala) and the duration of 
the work. Nonetheless, sometimes conflicts are unavoidable, even if the winye 
were good. Musa remarked, “…I once worked for your friend Bazilio for three 
days, it took him months to pay me.”
201 
CS16-VLF (Sylvia): Even the poor hire labour 
Sylvia came to Isunga from Acholi in 1996 when her husband was killed by the 
government soldiers who suspected him of being an LRA rebel. She first settled 
in a village near Karuma, just across the River Nile. But when the Mutunda sub-
county authority started allocating parts of the Nyamakere Forest Reserve land 
to the IDPs, she got 2.5 acres.
202 She said, “...but being an old woman reduced 
my chances of acquiring good land. I had to weed a Local Councillor’s garden 
to get money to pay one of the persons allocating the land. Even then, I was 
given land in the middle of the forest because other people had refused to take 
it…and because I needed land, I did not hesitate to accept it”. On the land she 
grows maize, beans and leafy vegetables for her consumption, “…which I share 
with monkeys, baboons and wild pigs”, she remarked. Sylvia is hard-working 
and earns much-needed cash from selling firewood to Kipanga distillers, grass 
for thatching huts; packing charcoal in bags for others, doing piece work leja-
leja for others and selling wild vegetables like Ocuga and Akeyo on market 
days. She said, “…although selling firewood gives more money than doing leja-
leja, it requires a long journey deeper into the forest.” Sylvia also works more 
during the dry season, when she collects enough wood for sale and use during 
the coming rainy season. Sylvia’s other skill as traditional birth attendant earned 
her two goats, which she is very proud of and she is looking forward to the day 
they start ‘producing’. She saves some of the money earned and uses it to hire 
leja-leja  for opening up land (digging) at the start of the rainy season and 
“weeding maize and beans garden when it is about to be consumed by weeds”. 
Sylvia  does not like  working for other people, especially during the hunger 
season because it means abandoning her shamba, but she does it for the money. 
Sometimes, when she is really hard up, she begs for basic commodities like salt 
and kerosene from her firewood customers, including Mama Toto (CS13-JKF). 
                                                        
200 Reaching winye (labour agreement/contract) is discussed extensively in Chapter 6. 
201 Musa referred to Bazilio (CS1-JSBM) as my ‘friend’ because he housed me during my field 
work periods. The dispute between Musa and Bazilio and other forms of labour disputes as well 
as how they are resolved are presented and discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
202 The word ‘own’ is used because the ‘encroached’ land officially belongs to the National 
Forestry Authority (NFA). But since the NFA kept quiet when they moved in, they (encroachers) 
interpreted it as an acceptance by the government that whatever portion is cleared and farmed is 
theirs. Moreover, in 2006, President Museveni instructed the NFA not to evict any encroacher 
from any forest reserve in the entire country. 156 
Hired labour is common in Isunga and is mostly sought by better-off farmers 
that have enough money to pay for farm labour (CS6-BOM, CS1-JSBM), by 
labour deficit households such as female-headed households (CS16-VLF), by 
households headed by elderly persons who cannot complete demanding tasks 
such as felling trees, digging or sowing (CS16-VLF, CS4-MOJM) and 
households in need of money for income/consumption-smoothing (CS9-MAM, 
CS16-VLF). The above cases also brought out some distinct differences 
between leja-leja and seasonal wage labour that should be highlighted.  
Casual wage labour (leja-leja) 
This is probably the most common form of hired labour in Isunga, and all 20 
case households in this study have engaged in hired labour either as labour 
buyers or sellers in the last five years. Leja-leja wages are paid either by day or 
by task and they vary depending on type of work and persons involved. The 
daily wage is 2500 UGX, irrespective of the nature of the work. Wage by task 
is the most popular. As mentioned by Bazilio (CS1-JSBM), hiring leja-leja 
during weeding and harvesting periods is very difficult. They are also periods 
when nearly every farmer tries to enlist the services of others, but fellow 
farmers are busy with similar agricultural activities. Consequently, those who 
hire  leja-leja  during such periods succeed in accessing labour based on 
personal ties and connections rather than pure economics principles of supply 
and demand signalled by wages. Thus, although cash payment is used, wage 
contracts are influenced by social factors (c.f Bryceson, 2006; Harris-White, 
2004; Whiteside & Malawi, 1999).
203 
Compared to seasonal labour, the duration of work in leja-leja  is much 
shorter (usually less than a week). However, those who hire leja-leja include 
the better-off and the  poorer households, but for different purposes. For 
instance, as mentioned above, Sylvia’s advanced age makes it difficult for her 
to complete some of the more demanding tasks by herself. She earns money 
through non-farm activities, saves some and uses it for hiring leja-leja  for 
opening her gardens and weeding crops. But leja-leja labour-selling is more or 
less confined to poorer households because the households have to supplement 
their own low farm outputs or incomes.
204  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in Isunga’s rain fed farming system, the season 
of high labour demand usually coincides with the time when poorer households 
exhaust their food stocks. Therefore, casual wage labour provides an important 
opportunity for households short of food to survive these periods. Yet there are 
                                                        
203 I will return to this in Chapter 7 when discussing the durability of informality. 
204 Although women sell leja-leja labour, most leja-leja labour is sold by men and mostly for 
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times when food crop failure affects most of the households in the village, as 
was the case in 2007 when heavy rain destroyed most crops. Then demand for 
casual wage labour decreased since few farmers had the cash to hire labour, 
thus making casual wage labour an unreliable source of income for the poorer 
households. Furthermore, as it emerged from the CS16-VLF and CS9-MAM 
case examples, the involvement of poorer households in leja-leja  may also 
result in food shortages in the households. Simply because the need to engage 
in leja-leja to obtain an immediate supply of food means less labour input for 
their own shambas during the most critical periods of farming, which may 
result in smaller harvests and can create a vicious cycle of food insecurity for 
some of the poorer households. This is probably what Devereux (2001) had in 
mind when he suggested that casual labour can be an erosive survival strategy 
when farmers neglect their own farming.  
Some comments on seasonal labour arrangements 
Four case households employ seasonal labour for tobacco, sunflower 
production and for specific tasks (digging, planting and weeding).
205 They all 
belong to the better-off wealth group. The CS6-BOM example above showed 
how seasonal labour is organised in Isunga, where labourers such as Bali-Bali 
and  Oturu  are employed for several months during a farming calendar. 
Labourers report to work from their homes and no kin relationships exist 
between the employers and labourers. Although labour agreements  are 
normally only for one season, it is normally renewed if the relationship 
between the parties is good. The rewards labourers get for their services 
depend on the winye  between the employer and labourer, which could be 
purely cash or a combination of cash and ‘in kind’. In any case, the employers 
make all decisions on farm management and labourers are monitored to avoid 
shoddy work. 
The CS6-BOM case example also shows that seasonal labour arrangements 
provided Zakayo (the employer) with the means for risk-sharing and Bali-Bali 
and Oturu  (the labourers) with the means of income and consumption-
smoothing.
206 Bali-Bali and Oturu received their wages in cash and in kind; and 
the wages in kind included daily lunch and some beans after the end of their 
tenure.
207 Such payments in kind guarantee the basic survival of the labourers 
during the ‘hunger season’ when many households face food deficits. But most 
interestingly, both Zakayo  and his two labourers appear to bear the risk of 
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production failure. Zakayo’s statement that, “…sometimes due to too much rain 
or little rain, the harvest is poor we re-negotiate the winye (agreement) and give 
less beans…like last year, they received 20kgs instead of 30kgs”, indicates that 
labour contracts (winye) are amended so as to enable employers to share the risk 
of crop failure with the labourers. At this point, it is probably correct to suggest 
that reducing the amount of payment in kind (beans) after a bad harvest is similar 
to that of Hill’s (1986) sharecropping, in the sense that both the employer and the 
labourer share the risk of production. Therefore, seasonal labour arrangements 
can be regarded as a form of fixed wage contracts with a risk of sharing 
characteristics of share contracts (ibid, 1986).
208  
The labour arrangement above carries with it some advantages to both 
employers like Zakayo and labourers like Bali-Bali and Oturu. For Zakayo, it 
provides a means of risk-sharing under highly uncertain conditions of crop 
production. As mentioned several times in this thesis, relying totally on rain 
fed  farming,  Isunga  farmers occasionally face production failure due to 
unreliable weather. Moreover, the prices of key crops such as beans, maize, 
sunflower and tobacco fluctuate widely, thus adding another risk towards a fall 
in income for farmers who depend on it for cash. In such a situation, the risk-
sharing arrangement with labourers in a seasonal labour contract can help 
improve Zakayo’s income situation during bad times. On the labourer’s side, 
seasonal labour arrangements can guarantee food security for them during the 
lean period with payments in kind. For those households that exhaust their food 
stocks during the rainy season, the guaranteed provision of food crops such as 
beans is desirable.  
5.3  Finding labour in farmer groups  
All the case households mentioned belong or have belonged to a farmers group 
(gurub) at some point during the last ten years.
209 The gurubs are important in 
the livelihood activities of the villagers as they offer many services to their 
members, including saving and borrowing money (Kalulu)
210, drinking beer for 
leisure, solving disputes, moral support during hard times (e.g. when death 
                                                        
208 See CS18-MOF narrative in Section 5.2.3 above. 
209  See Appendix 3: Key characteristics of the farmer groups mentioned by the case 
households. 
210 The Kalulu credit system is practiced by members of a beer drinking group where every 
week, each member contributes 1,000 UGX to a group savings fund. But if a member had a bad 
week, he contributes a smaller amount, say 500 UGX or even less - but, may also give more than 
1000 UGX in good times. Each Sunday a different member of the group receives all the money 
collected from the previous week through a draw of names by the Chairperson of the drinking 
group, hence the name Kalulu (lottery). It follows very simple rules based on trust. 159 
‘visits’ them), and of course, work-sharing. Since the gurubs are quite similar 
in terms of  their organisation, functions and the rules that govern their 
activities, Kica Ber Akiba Malwa Drinking Group and Kony Paco Group, are 
picked to explore how Isunga’s villagers access much-needed farm labour 
through farmers groups (gurubs).
211 The emphasis is on how such groups 
emerge, function and are organised, as well as exploring the rules that govern 
their activities. However, the common denominator with the gurubs  is that 
social closeness and knowledge about each other is central to their existence 
and membership.
212  
Kica Ber Akiba Group: the beer pot friends of Isunga 
Sharing a glass of Kipanga gin, a calabash of Kwete beer or a pot of Malwa beer 
is a very important social and economic activity in Isunga. It is virtually 
impossible to get around the village, and not meet someone referring to beer 
brewing, distilling, selling or drinking. Kica Ber Akiba is a Malwa Drinking 
Group, but includes activities other than drinking beer and getting drunk. The 
gurub was started as an aleya in 2002 by six farmers who came together to share 
their labour to prepare their shambas, weeding and harvesting, but also to ‘enjoy 
life’ by drinking good Malwa beer at least once a week. Each member would 
contribute 1,000 UGX per week. When consuming the beverage, they discuss 
farming issues, politics, soccer and life in Isunga, in a relaxed environment. 
Until May 2007, Kica Ber Akiba was purely a male group because many 
men did not like the idea of women sitting together with them to drink. But, 
after a long debate, the critical men changed their minds and women joined the 
gurub. Since then, it has grown to include 23 fully paid members (15 men and 
eight women) all married with children. Five of the women are married to the 
men who were against women joining it. The other three are married to non-
members, but became members because they brew good Malwa beer. With 
such numbers, it became increasingly difficult to meet at members’ homes and 
continue with the same concept. Since then they have been meeting at Mama 
Toto’s drinking venue at the trading centre. The Chairman of the group said,  
 
“....during our earlier meetings, we talked a lot about why, every year, we don’t 
have enough food in our homes, get little money when we sell our crops…and 
we haven’t got the answers yet,” he said with a smile. “We also talked about 
                                                        
211 These groups are picked because I followed them longer than the rest and the information 
collected was more detailed. Kony Paco in particular has some unique rules and protocols that 
show how such a social institution has become more economic in nature and roles within the ten 
or so years of its existence. Kica Ber Akiba Malwa Drinking Group on the other hand clearly 
illustrates the social and economic roles beer plays in Isunga village.  
212 I suppose this could be the case with all collective labour practices. 160 
how to acquire more farm land, labour during weeding periods or money during 
hunger seasons. Those were tough days. We then resolved to cooperate more 
amongst ourselves since it would be easier to get help from each other and to 
work harder if we are to improve our lives. That is how the group came about.” 
(Interview with the Chairperson, FG3-KBG, November 2008) 
The membership fee is 3,000 UGX per year, plus the weekly 1,000 UGX for 
buying Malwa beer. Members also save 2,500 UGX per month to help each 
other during cash demanding times like funerals, marriages, sickness or trouble 
with the authorities.
213 The rules for the monthly contributions are not very 
strict. If, for instance, members have had a bad month, they can pay later; and 
can even attend ‘beer pot’ meetings without paying the 1,000 UGX. The 
Chairman remarked,  
 
“...farming is very difficult here without enough hands to work it. If your family 
can’t provide it, then you try other means like working in groups…one of our 
strengths is sharing work. We help each other with digging, weeding and other 
works when called upon. Since we are many, we divide ourselves into smaller 
groups and work hard to finish our farming tasks accordingly.” (Interview with 
the Chairperson, FG3-KBA, November 2008) 
One member of the gurub remarked later on that,  
 
“...the good thing with our group is, if you want to fight one member, prepare to 
fight all of us. Some people do not like us, so we have to keep together and 
always have someone trusted to watch your back, and ready to defend you when 
attacked. We also have a sure source of labour when in need…and through pur 
cente, we earn some money for the gurub.”(Comment by a woman member of 
the FG3-KBA, November 2008) 
Non-members can also engage the gurub to work their shambas, but for money. 
They charge 80,000 UGX for digging one acre and 60,000 UGX for weeding. 
Alternatively, they charge per participating member, 1,000 – 2,500 UGX per task 
(katala) depending on the nature of work, location of the shamba, the character 
or reputation of the person hiring the gurub, “…if you are not a nice or kind 
person, we charge more,” the Wonkom  remarked with a smile. The money 
earned is saved and used later. But sometimes, not all members turn up for such 
group work, and whenever this happens and no good reasons are given, members 
                                                        
213 The money is accessed through the Kalulu system mentioned earlier. Every last Sunday of 
the month, two members receive 15,000 UGX each through raffle draw of names by the 
Chairman (Wonkom). Names of those who have already got their rounds are omitted. It runs that 
way until all members get their shares. 161 
are  fined. The common punishment is  a person pays twice the amount a 
participant earned the group. For instance, if members worked for one katala 
each (i.e. 2 tals x 20 tals) and earned 2,500 UGX, then the fine is 5,000 UGX. 
This is a lot of money in Isunga, so it is best to attend. Those who refuse to pay 
or don’t comply with the other regulations, are considered ‘bad’ persons and 
expelled from the group altogether. Kica Ber Akiba Group members know and 
trust each other well and above all, share the same ethnic background. This has 
contributed to their success. Thus, as Moore  (1975),  Allen  (1987), Donham 
(1999) and other earlier scholars observed, groups like Kica Ber Akiba function 
on the basis of kinship and friendship values. 
Kony Paco Group: working for Kwete beer or money 
The Kony Paco Group was founded in 2001 by ten male farmers, and has since 
expanded to 26 households. The initial aim of the gurub  was to improve 
members’ maize and beans production; access cash credit through kalulu 
(lottery); celebrate Christmas, Easter and Independence holidays together; as 
well as stand up for each other during moments of happiness like marriages 
and bad ones such as deaths in their families. According to the Chairman of the 
gurub, they had to abandon most of their initial ideas in 2006 because members 
were not disciplined enough, and most of them found it difficult to pay the 
monthly fee. Instead, they chose to concentrate on helping members during 
digging and weeding by working for Kwete beer. In 2008, they introduced a 
new service, working for cash for members as well as non-members.  
 
“...every year we dig two shambas for each member and also help with weeding 
the crops. We do it as aleya. This year we started working for money. It is open 
to members and non-members with money who would need our service. For 
non-members, we select very carefully and just don’t just go for money. We do 
not work for sorcerers or selfish people no matter how much money they 
have...not even for those unfriendly women who don’t sell beer on credit. We 
know all of them,”  the Chairman said with a smile.  (Conversation with the 
Wonkom, FG4-KPG, May 2009) 
Since the sizes of the shambas vary from household to household, they use a 
measuring stick (tal) for measuring the areas to work on. Kony Paco’s tal is 2 
meters long, and the measurements for a digging stint (Katala) is 2tals x 20tals 
(i.e. 160 square meters); while for weeding it is 3tals x 20tals (240 square 
meters). The difference arises because opening up land is more difficult than 
weeding. It also emerged from the FGD that the gurub  practices price 162 
discrimination regarding work for cash (pur cente).
214 For instance, the known 
Kipanga dealers in the village like Mama Toto pay their katala according to the 
costs of a bottle of Kipanga  and their social standing in the village. If a 
Kipanga dealer is known for charging more than average per bottle or she is 
one of those who do not sell beer on credit, then she is considered unfriendly 
and charged extra. Interestingly, the officials of the gurub and elderly members 
are also given less katala out of respect for their age. 
Membership, leadership and rules of Kony Paco Group 
Membership of the Kony-Paco is based on households, where each household 
contributes 2,000 UGX per month, on top of the initial joining fee of 5,000 
UGX. The group promotes unity among members, and members try hard to 
support each other. For instance, if there is a death in one of the households, 
they come together and support the bereaved family through the difficult 
period. Kony-Paco is headed by the Wonkom (Chairman) and his words weigh 
more than others, especially when arbitrating disputes within the group and 
making decisions about punishments. On the other hand, he is not allowed to 
impose his wishes upon members, nor make decisions affecting the gurub 
without consulting members. He is to live by example and failure to do so may 
lead to heavy fines. One member remarked, 
 
“....in 2006, our Wonkom fought with Okello (a member of the gurub) at my 
Pur-Kongo. We had to punish him hard and denied him our labour until he paid 
30,000 UGX and two jerry-cans (40 litres) of Kwete.” (Participant at the FGD 
with FG4-KPG, November 2008) 
The other officials of the gurub are: Rwot Kweri (Chief of Hoe), Lakan Lim 
(Treasurer) and Askari  (security man). There are no female members in 
leadership roles, although five of the households are headed by women. In 
cases where the Wonkom is unable to perform his duty, the Rwot Kweri takes 
over. His other duties include keeping the measuring stick (tal), measuring the 
work stint,  making sure tasks are properly done, as well as tasting Kwete 
beer.
215 His other responsibility is to divide the Kwete beer among the members 
in age groups: ludito (senior members of the group), bullu (youth) and ludongo 
                                                        
214  Price discrimination here means a wage setting strategy that charges Kony Paco’s 
customers’ different wages for the same kind of service.  
215 He tastes the Kwete beer and determines if it is suitable for consumption. 163 
(the age group between ludito  and  bullu). Unmarried men (lubot)  are put 
together with the youth (bullu) irrespective of their ages.
216 
The work of the Lakan-Lim is to receive and keep the groups’ money safe 
until members decide what to do with it. They get the money from various 
sources as detailed above, and use it to celebrate ‘big days’ such as Christmas, 
New Year and Uhuru (Independence). The money can also be borrowed by 
members who find themselves in acute need of cash. They ask for it through 
the Wonkom who convenes a meeting and a decision is passed by consensus. 
The Askari on the other hand, is to maintain order during Kwete drinking, 
meetings and to make sure that Kony Paco’s rules are followed. He also assists 
the Rwot-Kweri measures the shamba to be worked on, calculates how much 
work members should do and the amount of Kwete beer to be consumed or 
money to be paid. Otherwise, members of the Kony Paco Group are very 
particular with the qualities of their leaders. For instance, according to the 
Rwot Kweri of the group, his ideal Wonkom is,   
 
“...someone who inspires respect for his behaviour in the village. We want a 
Wonkom who can promote unity and harmony in the group, a person whose 
words are sweet in our ears and with the ability to listen well, see things some of 
us can’t see...someone with the ability to intervene during bad arguments and 
always impartial when resolving disputes. We don’t want those who change like 
chameleons and speak with ‘double tongue’…those who talk bad of fellow 
members to others.” (Rwot Kweri, FG4-KPG, November 2008) 
Although the officials of Kony Paco seem to wield a lot of power, their activities 
and that of members are governed by many unwritten rules. At the start of the 
first rainy season, members meet to oversee existing rules and/or introduce new 
ones. They also discuss the leadership of the gurub, which quite often leads to 
the bad ones being replaced. According to the Wonkom, the most important rules 
are those that relate to measurement of how much work should be done during 
digging and weeding, in return for what quantity of Kwete beer or how much 
money per katala.
217 There are also rules about penalties for improper conduct or 
failure to carry out duties as agreed. The Wonkom narrated what happened to an 
old member, who unceremoniously left the gurub as follows,  
 
                                                        
216 The women who carry the Kwete beer are pushed to ludito, who can either give them some 
Kwete or nothing because it is assumed they have taken care of themselves or their portions are 
with the host. 
217 It is a common practice that rewards are adjusted according to the buying price of a bottle of 
Kipanga gin at the trading centre. 164 
“…Unyegiu  left the gurub and talked really badly of us when we finished 
weeding his tobacco. These days we don’t even greet him…and when his child 
died last month, he buried her alone. We never attended…he cried like a 
baboon. Now he wants to come back, but we won’t allow him back. He is a very 
bad person.” (Conversation with Wonkom, FG4-KPG, May 2009) 
 
In the focus groups, the following rules were mentioned. 
 
“...if the Kwete beer tastes bad, smells bad or is watery, the host is fined an 
equivalent of half of the agreed quantity in cash. If the Kwete is sour or too 
sweet, members discuss how to punish the host...depending on the households’ 
past records and other factors. For instance, if his wife does not give den (i.e. 
sell beer on credit), then they are harshly punished for being unfriendly.” (Rwot 
Kweri, FG4-KPG, May 2009) 
 
“...but if the Rwot Kweri also said that the beer is good and very nice when he 
tasted it, and it later turn out to be bad...say sour or smelly, then the Rwot Kweri 
is fined to pay himself (laugh).” (Lakan Lim, FG4-KPG, May 2009) 
 
“...if a member failed to turn up for work without a good reason, he is fined the 
amount leja-leja sellers get per katala and the money raised is paid to the owner 
of the shamba that he did not help. He is also fined 2,000 UGX for letting the 
gurub down and the money is passed to Lakan Lim to keep.” (Wonkom, FG4-
KPG, May 2009) 
The above remarks tell us that the functions of the rules are to limit the 
authority of the officials and shape membership into a binding contract. The 
fact that members meet at the beginning of each cropping season to revise old 
rules and make new ones, which all members agree to follow throughout the 
farming calendar, indicates the importance members attach to rules used in 
their labour relations. Moreover, having rules that punish those who refuse to 
attend work or meetings, do shoddy work, or try to leave the group altogether 
when their shambas  have been worked on, encourage discipline and unity 
within the group. This supports North’s  (2006;  1990)  thesis of rules as 
enabling and constraining institution. 
5.3.1  The economic character and roles of the gurubs 
From the above examples, it is clear farmers share their labour in four ways: 
first, through working for Kwete beer. It works in a similar way to awak and 
involves supplying Kwete beer in the shamba when the work is on-going, but 
food is not served. The second way is working for Kwete beer on credit (diira). 
This occurs when members want an agricultural task to be done, but do not 165 
have enough resources to make Kwete.
218 Members call upon the group to 
work on their land and supply the Kwete beer later. The third way is working 
for cash (pur cente), where members hire the gurub to dig or weed another 
garden than the one they are officially entitled to work. Working for cash is 
also open to non-members of the gurub who can afford it and meet the other 
conditions attached to it. Lastly, gurub members access each other’s labour 
through rotational labour sharing. They work each other’s shambas in turn, 
based on predetermined measurements. Unlike the awak,  in which an 
unmeasured shamba would be worked by carefully invited persons in return for 
‘good’ food and Kwete beer, in the gurubs, however, the area to be cultivated 
and the amount of Kwete to be supplied is established in advance under clear 
rules, making the gurubs more economic.  
Farmers  form  gurubs  because they lack  the key resources required for 
farming, especially labour. In so doing, they access a wider set of crop 
production resources. Memberships of the gurubs also reflect social groupings 
in the village. Isunga villagers were keen to explain what kind of people are 
members of a particular group or what kinds of persons belong to a particular 
organisation. For instance, members of Kony Paco are  Acholi  farming 
households and Kica Ber Akiba includes mostly Alur people and supporters of 
the Manchester United Football Club who enjoy drinking Malwa beer together. 
Such classifications show some signs of social segments in Isunga village. In 
addition, the various rules and protocols used in the functions of the groups 
make them appear as impressive institutions and more than simple mechanisms 
for sharing agricultural labour; and the fact that the groups exist at all is 
because they fill important needs in facilitating farming activities.
219 Even so, it 
is reasonable to argue that the many unwritten rules make the gurubs inflexible 
at times, and together with the tight controls placed on the officials, this might 
take away the freedom to make difficult decisions. This hinders the gurubs 
from growing into something big. Moreover, potential and innovative members 
can easily be left out if they belong to a ‘wrong’ social group, since 
memberships in most gurubs are ethnically-based and gender-blind. 
5.4  Some emerging issues  
In my quest to understand the organisation and operations of the various 
agricultural labour practices in Isunga, I found that some common features cut 
across them. This section highlights some of the issues that have emerged so 
                                                        
218 This is another form of diira, but organised through gurub membership and the benefit is in 
the membership of the gurub.  
219 C.f. Allen (1987) 166 
far, beginning with the role of seasonality and timing in crop farming and 
labour decision-making.  
5.4.1  Seasonality and timing 
Most of the farm work in Isunga is done during the rainy seasons, and labour is 
a key asset for most households.
220 Time therefore is of particular significance, 
and  it is crucial  that labour-intensive tasks such as planting, weeding and 
harvesting are completed quickly. Faced with this reality, farmers share farm 
work and exchange labour, which rests on reputation, trust and reciprocity.
221 
Hence remarks such as, 
 
“…farming is a very risky activity indeed and when we have bad harvests say 
due to drought or too much rain like  this year…we turn to our friends and 
relatives for help…we work hard to keep our names clean with them.” 
(Interview with CS10-KP2, July 2008). 
The seasonality of farming (and homogeneity of agro-climatic conditions) 
suggests that agricultural activities and crops grown are likely to be the same for 
all farmers in the village. This explains why work-sharing or extra labour is 
needed and common during periods of land-clearing, planting, weeding and 
harvesting crops. This should not come as a surprise to anyone. Erasmus (1956), 
Acemoglu et al.(2001)  and Collier (2007)  have all shown how different 
geographical and climatic factors can lead to the construction of different social 
structures and institutions.
222 In Isunga, farmers lend themselves to work-sharing 
and exchanging labour arrangements that rely on trust and reputation.
223 
5.4.2  Organisation and operations of labour arrangements in Isunga  
The agricultural labour arrangements mentioned above: household labour, 
various types of work parties, rotational labour, hired labour (leja-leja), casual 
wage labour, seasonal labour, farmer groups (gurubs) and working for cash 
(pur cente) are organised and operate differently. Their differences are largely 
based on the rewards involved, membership and the degree of reciprocity. With 
rotational labour (aleya),  for example, all group members are obligated to 
supply as much labour on the shamba of the other members, as they receive 
from them. Although the work is collectively performed in a group, the 
reciprocity is on an individual level and the labour time shared among the 
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222 See also Rodrik et al. (2002) and Sachs (2003) for similar views. 
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group members represents a one-off labour transaction in a particular round.
224 
If a group member fails to meet his/her labour obligation to the other members 
due to unforeseeable reasons, s/he can send a family member in his/her place 
or give his/her labour at a later date. Furthermore, no cash payments are made 
between group members, except that the host member may serve food, if the 
work is performed over a full day or if the field is some distance away. But this 
has to be agreed beforehand. Otherwise, most aleya groups are formed so that 
the task on each shamba can be completed on one day or half a day. With 
aleya,  the order of rotation is determined at random or sympathy among 
members if there is a compelling reason. 
Concerning work parties (awak and pur-kongo), the host assembles a group 
of people for a task and serves them ‘good’ food and sufficient Kwete beer 
when the work is completed on that day or later as is the case with diira. 
During awak, Kwete beer drinking begins while the work is still on going. In 
any case, an obligation exists for the host to reciprocate labour in the future to 
those who participated. All participants know that their contribution will be 
exactly matched in kind with future returns. It is determined from knowledge 
about the group’s size and what benefits they will incur through participation. 
The invitation to the work parties is based on character, i.e. you need to have a 
‘strong chest’, be trusted and have a good reputation in the village. It also 
emerged from the case interviews that due to costs associated with organising 
such activities, work teams are usually kept small (10-20 people). Group 
numbers are also affected by farm sizes and the activities in question.  
Another important feature of labour arrangements in Isunga concerns those 
who qualify for membership. The case studies, focus groups discussions and 
observations above indicate that the key determinants of membership are 
personal ties and connections. Quite often the composition of work groups 
such as aleya and gurub are based in part on family ties, friendship and/or 
ethnicity.
225 This, however, is not just unique to Isunga. Earlier scholars such 
as Erasmus (1956), Jay (1969), Stone (1996) and Donham (1999; 1981) have 
observed (in other parts of the world) that labour exchange groupings exhibit 
considerable homogeneity in social status and ethnicity, including age and 
gender compositions. A common argument for this is that it is easier to enforce 
rules and regulations among group members of identical socioeconomic status 
or ethnicity, because their shared experiences contribute to common values and 
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exchange. 
225 We shall discuss how this works practice in the next chapter. 168 
norms of behaviour; and because they are more likely to participate together in 
other transactions that build trust and reinforce these norms.
226 
5.4.3  Motivations for labour sharing  
What motivates certain people to share work or exchange their labour? 
Although literature has addressed this question, there are some reasons that are 
quite particular to Isunga. Firstly, as we saw with seasonality and timing above, 
to understand Isunga’s labour-sharing behaviour, we need to understand the 
context within which the villagers operate (see Chapter 2). Most households in 
Isunga do not have the necessary money needed to pay wage labourers. As 
such, work parties and rotational labour may offer the only means for gathering 
a labour force larger than the immediate household in this setting (Geschiere, 
1995).
227 With the drive to commercialise Uganda’s agriculture, the prevalence 
of labour-sharing (aleya, awak, diira or/and  gurub,  aleya)  is expected to 
decline as wage labour becomes more affordable relative to the costs of 
organising the various work parties. 
As Erasmus  (1956)  and Moore (1975)  correctly pointed out, one of the 
primary motivations for labour or work-sharing stems from the benefits 
associated with returns to group work (aleya, awak, diira, gurub, aleya). Thus, 
the number of workers is important for doing burdensome work such as land-
clearing where work-sharing simplifies the task of moving large logs and 
reduces the need to cut the shrubs and trees that are small enough for one 
person to move (CS6-BOM, CS4-MOJM). In addition, time is of particular 
significance and concerns the need for fast completion of time-sensitive 
tasks.
228 Thus, by reducing the duration of the activity by assembling people 
for a task, a farmer would stand to gain from this.  
Cultural  underpinnings of cooperative labour, particularly norms about 
sharing, mutual help and contributions to social welfare are also worth 
remembering. If these motivations for participation in aleya, awak, diira or 
gurub practices are significant, then the prevalence of such labour exchanges 
may persist even where there are active agricultural labour markets.
229 This is 
consistent with claims by Williamson (1985;  1981;  1979)  that non-market 
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need to be treated with some care; because, much as it may be true during planting and weeding 
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share of the output or soon afterward when crops are sold. 
228 Refer to CS19-LOM case story in Section 5.2.2. 
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institutions develop to substitute for market transactions until market trades 
become affordable. In the Ugandan context, although farm work-sharing and 
labour exchanges seem to play an important role in crop farming, it is not 
considered part of the agricultural commercialisation process.
230 However, it is 
reasonable to note that labour-sharing being replaced by increased 
commercialisation of labour will depend on many factors, including geography 
and agro-climatic conditions, mutual dependency, benefits and costs associated 
with returns to teamwork (c.f. Ponte, 2002; 2000). 
5.5  Concluding remarks 
This chapter has examined the agricultural labour arrangements observed in 
Isunga. Apart from their households’ own labour supply, farmers access extra 
labour through wage labour, work parties and rotational labour. The most 
common practices are leja-leja wage labour and aleya rotational labour. With 
rotational labour, farmers temporarily pool together their labour to perform an 
agricultural task on each member’s farm in succession. Labour hours are traded 
reciprocally without pay, with the possible exception of a meal if the farm is 
far away or members agree to work the whole day. In this way, they complete 
pressing tasks in a matter of days. Both work parties and rotational labour 
practices do not involve the use of money in the sense of participants receiving 
cash for their labour inputs. Instead, villagers offer each other mutual 
assistance during crop production. Such labour practices are  complex and 
embedded in patterns of social relations.  
Isunga’s farmers participate in work sharing or exchange their labour for 
various reasons. The clearest motivations include: (a) greater speed  in 
completing time-sensitive tasks such as planting, weeding and harvesting, (b) 
returns gained from teamwork due to the number of workers doing burdensome 
work and/or the need for the fast completion of time-sensitive tasks. Through 
their farmers groups, Isunga’s villagers have formalised the ‘business’ of crop 
farming in a practical way by working for Kwete beer and working for money 
(pur cente), thus making the gurubs more economic in character and function. 
To ensure their smooth running, they have put in place appropriate structures 
with officials, rules and accepted behavioural codes in their respective groups.  
Although the agricultural sector employs a considerable number of 
Ugandans, the role that labour occupies in the agricultural modernisation 
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debate is invisible and overlooked (cf GOU, 2011; 2010b; 2010a; 2007; 2000). 
This study has so far shown that labour is a very important factor of crop 
production. And those farm households who do not have enough of it, access it 
through work-sharing without the commitment of money. This is consistent 
with the principles of transaction cost economics discussed in Chapter 3, in 
which institutions arise because transaction costs make reliance on the wage 
labour market very expensive for the time-sensitive tasks. It was clear from the 
case examples that the defining characteristics of the agricultural labour 
practices include: (a) the reciprocal swap of labour time, (b) work-sharing, (c) 
the absence of monetary payments i.e. work parties and rotational labour, (d) 
the socially embedded nature of wage labour, and (e) the benefits from pooling 
labour rather than outputs across the households. However, labour relationships 
between actors with diverse resource endowments raise a number of social and 
economic issues on how farmers structure, maintain and enforce their labour 
relationships (i.e. labour  relationship formation, duration, regulation and 
implementation).
231 These issues still need to be discussed in the economic 
literature and require further study. In the next chapter, I explore how Isunga’s 
farmers structure, regulate and implement their labour transaction 
relationships. Using the guiding concepts and analytical framework proposed 
in Chapter 3, attempts are made to understand existing rules and institutions 
that farmers use in their labour relationships. 
                                                        
231 See CS4-MOJM relation with CS20-COM, CS18-MOF’s land for labour, CS6-BOM’s 
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6  The dynamics of labour relationships 
6.1  Introduction 
The last chapter discussed the existence, nature and functions of various 
agricultural labour arrangements in Isunga  village. Their prevalence is an 
indication of their significance in crop production. Moreover, there are norms 
and rules that govern their use. Whilst reviewing literature on institutions in 
Chapter 3, institutions were defined as socially established rules that organise, 
enable and constrain the people of Isunga village and their interactions. This 
portrays institutions as ‘rules of the game’ and farmers as the ‘game players’ 
who strategically use the rules to their advantage. This chapter explores the 
‘rules of the game’ of labour relations in the village. The purpose is to gain 
insight into the actual institutions that regulate farmers’ labour behaviour. The 
key question is: what institutions structure and enforce labour relations in 
Isunga village (and how)? Using the analytical framework proposed in Chapter 
3, I look into the factors that influence farmers’ labour decisions. The chapter 
has six sections. The next section investigates the institutions that enable 
farmers to structure their labour relationships. This is followed by a discussion 
on how they regulate and enforce their labour exchanges in Section 6.3. 
Section 6.4 looks at how farmers resolve their labour disputes, before making 
concluding remarks in Section 6.5. 
6.2  Structuring agricultural labour relations 
How do farmers find and choose their labour partners? Who are they? How are 
labour agreements reached? In the subsections below, I address these questions 
and show the different approaches used by villagers in Isunga to enter into 
labour relationships. Eight case households are used to explore the key 172 
dimensions of structuring, regulating and enforcing labour transactions in the 
village as summarised in Table 7 below. 
Table 7: Structuring, maintaining and enforcing labour relationships in Isunga. 




Personal relationship is key when 
choosing labour partners  
CS2-MDF, CS17-JOM and CS6-
BOM: identifying and choosing 
labour partners 
  Farmers gather information about 
potential labour actors 
CS13-JKF & CS17-JOM: 
collecting information about 




Trust, trustworthiness and reputation 
matters 
CS13-JKF & CS17-JOM: 
collecting information about 
potential labour partner 
  Most farmers dislike labour disputes; 
they collect information about 
potential partners. 
CS4-MOJM & CS17-JOM: 
Dealing with strangers 
Enforcing labour 
agreements (winye) 
Work sharing and labour transactions 
agreements are verbally agreed 
CS9-MAM and CS2-MDF: 
reaching winye and entering a 
relationships 
  Villagers work hard to avoid the risk 
of labour disputes  
CS4-MOJM, CS13-JKF & CS17-
JOM: collecting information 




Renegotiation of winye, involving 
third parties (acquaintances, the 
Isunga  LC) 
CS9-MAM, CS1-JSBM & CS19-
LOM: solving labour related 
disputes 
Source: Fieldwork 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
6.2.1  Identifying and choosing labour partners 
Villagers in Isunga  use many ways to identify and choose their labour 
providers and recipients. It emerged from the household interviews that most 
farmers generally prefer to work with people they know well (e.g. close 
relatives, in-laws, friends, neighbours) or who have a good reputation in the 
village. However, this does not mean that they do not use labour from strangers 
(unfamiliar persons). For example, some better-off farmers hire leja-leja labour 
from strangers too if they cannot use workers who they are well-acquainted 
with.
232 They do this because they can afford the uncertainties involved or the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour. Farmers take trust and being trustworthy very 
seriously and rely, above all, on trust that emerges from personal ties, which 
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have passed the test of time.
233 They invest wisely in having good relationships 
with fellow villagers because they know that “the longer a good relationship 
takes, the better it becomes” (CS4-MOJM). The case studies below show the 
importance of trust and reputation when identifying and choosing labour 
providers and recipients. 
CS2-MDF (Abwoli): Ears on the ground for people with smelly names 
Abwoli’s  labour behaviour is complex, and involves accessing much-needed 
farm labour through aleya, awak, gurub and leja-leja practices. She turns to 
these practices mainly for opening new fields (digging), weeding and harvesting 
crops when the demand for labour is at its highest. However, Abwoli complained 
of the difficulty of getting hardworking people. “…if you want those with 
‘strong chests’ then you better put your ears on the ground for a long time”, she 
said. As well as a small aleya group of five women, Abwoli is also member of 
the Kabarole Group: “...we are all Barullis but I prefer the small aleya group to 
Kabarole, because we only share labour and nothing else like contributing 
money every month”. Weeding is the most important farming activity in this 
household, but it is also labour-intensive. Therefore, Abwoli’s  ability to 
complete weeding in time is very important, as poor timing might enable weeds 
to compete with crops, thus resulting in poor harvests. She informed me that 
“…it takes a hard working person at least a week to weed an acre of maize. I 
am a weak woman [laughter], so look around for help”,  and added “…our 
village is mixed with many people I don’t know very well. So, when looking for 
help, I try hard to understand if they are trusted and how their names smell”. 
Abwoli interacts with people in many ways, and in the process she knows how 
their ‘names smell’ in the village. She also tries to befriend those with ‘strong 
chests’ or asks Bazilio  and her friends how they behave in the village
234: 
“…Isunga is very small and there are no secrets...especially after a glass of 
Kipanga, they say anything about anybody. I’ll for sure know or hear something 
about someone I want his or her help,” Abwoli added with a smile. She also 
builds her reputation and makes her name ‘smell good’ by allowing those from 
whom she would like services in future to drink her Kipanga gin on credit; and 
remarked, “…if you have a good name, attend burials, have a history of making 
good beer, people will always turn up for you and do a good job [laughter].” 
CS17-JOM (Nelson): having a trusting relationship 
Nelson  and  Dorothy  have relatives and good friends that they turn to when 
things are bad, including acute labour needs. Dorothy noted that “…they are the 
kind of people you don’t want to conflict with and we always try hard to 
maintain good relations with them.” But not all relatives help at all times or in 
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the way one would expect. Nelson said, “...my relatives are very proud and 
don’t do leja-leja. They only come to me for help when they are in trouble...not 
to help me cultivate.” Nelson and his labour partners verbally agree on what to 
do, how to do it, as well as how much to pay. But he is very particular when 
choosing  leja-leja  labourers. When unsure about a potential labourer, he 
consults his friends for more information and/or discusses his labour needs with 
them and they help get good people. He also talks to the Isunga LC1 people if a 
potential labourer is a Langi or Acholi to confirm if the person is a genuine IDP 
and not a LRA rebel – before he hires him/her. This generates some confidence.  
Both  Dorothy  and  Nelson  consider it important to build a trusting 
relationship with people they want to work with. According to Nelson, 
trustworthiness on both sides (labour provider and labour recipient) is a very 
important component of leja-leja work, and following through on what you have 
agreed to do or promised to do is a good indication of this. He said, “....it 
happened once, that a person I hired to weed my tobacco shamba for three days 
sent his 9 yrs. old child on the second day to work in his place because he was 
drunk. Do you trust such a person? I only hire people after checking their 
characters well”. Dorothy added, “…but finding good and hardworking people 
is never easy in Isunga, especially if you don’t know how to relate well with 
people.” Nelson is very particular with his choices of labour partners, “…when I 
am impressed by a person’s work, I become curious to know how he lives and 
behaves at home. I visit him to his home to thank him for doing a good work. 
Yes, I do…and this is a good occasion to form an opinion on his behaviour in 
another environment. By so doing, I gain his respect and a good relationship is 
built”; and added, “…sometimes I hear from the trading centre that so and so 
was not happy that I went to his house only to say thank you.” He also gets 
suspicious when dealing with unknown persons and the person in question 
wants to do the job differently to how others do it. Nelson said, “…I become 
very careful if a leja-leja seller asks for a bigger advance payment (dog-bur), 
because those who disappear are usually those given big advances”. 
A similar remark concerning trust and being trustworthiness was also made by 
Mzee Jalon when he said, 
 
“...the Alur people are many here, but I don’t deal with them because they are 
not trusted. They say one thing and do something else.
235 I rather deal with those 
‘displaced’ from Acholi and Lango, because they are more trustworthy and do 
not abandon work.
236 They are my main source of labour and I have dealt with 
some of them for about six years now...with no problem of kwere-kwere work.” 
(Interview with CS4-MOJM, September 2007). 
                                                        
 
235The Alur people are one of the many ethnic groups in the village. They hail from the eastern 
side of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda’s West Nile region.  
236 It could also be that it is because the ‘displaced’ persons from Acholi and Lango have no 
choice but to work and earn whatever amount of money that comes their way.  175 
As mentioned by Nelson (CS17-JOM) above, not all personal ties (kinship or 
friendships) are good. The case below gives another dimension of the problem. 
CS6-BOM (Zakayo): My relatives do not want to work for me 
Zakayo  has many friends and relatives in Isunga  and surrounding villages.   
However, his experience with his relatives concerning work sharing is negative. 
He lamented, “...when I ask them to help me open up new land, the majority do 
not come. Even those who show up are often difficult to deal with because they 
do shoddy work, and when I complain, they insult me, saying that I am a miser 
and give them too little Kwete beer to drink. I keep quiet because it is not good 
to be tough or punish a relative who does shoddy work or something that you 
really don’t like…than people who do not have close relationships with you.” 
He later added that, “…my uncle’s son does not participate in our Awak, no 
matter how much we tell him. But whenever he has problem, he comes to me 
first…and I help because I don’t want my name to smell bad. We Palwo are 
terrible people. If you don’t help a relative…they’ll sing with your name 
everywhere and soil it badly”. Bali-Bali and Ocora are good people “…I trust 
them and they trust me. But we also disagree, and when this happens, we don’t 
even think of the LC people.”
237 Zakayo added, “…they are bad people. I’ll 
never bring them into my problems. We are old enough to talk about issues and 
that is what we do whenever we have our many quarrels.”  
Isunga  villagers consider a person’s trust and reputation first and foremost 
when identifying and choosing labour partners. The above case narratives 
showed that choices are influenced by personal ties, connections and the level 
of contact between villagers. The cases stressed a reliance on persons whom 
they know well, because they want to avoid the risk of opportunistic behaviour. 
Better off farmers like CS4-MOJM, CS6-BOM and CS17-JOM on the other 
hand, can afford to care less and easily work with unfamiliar persons. The 
CS6-BOM story also shows that there is a negative side to kinships and 
personal ties. But despite Zakayo’s  reservations, most villagers still turn to 
their relatives, friends and neighbours for farm labour support. In fact, 
Zakayo’s remark appears to suggest that the reason for sharing labour with a 
relative, a friend or a neighbour stems from social pressure, i.e. “…if you don’t 
help a relative, they’ll sing with your name everywhere and soil it badly”. Thus 
if one refuses to share labour with someone close, such as a relative, an in-law 
or a friend, then s/he would be subject to family and community sanctions.
238 
                                                        
237 When I asked Zakayo to explain to me what he meant by gen (trust), he said, “...I mean 
someone you can rely on at all times…someone you leave in your house will not sleep with your 
wife; someone you are  in trouble, shall stand by you and when you die, cries the loudest 
(laughter).” (Interview with CS6-BOM, November 2008) 
238 See Hydén’s  (1983) economy of affection addressed in Chapter 7 176 
There are also farmers who do not care so much about personal ties. One such 
farmer is CS4-MOJM (Jalon) who does not prefer relatives and friends over 
strangers. He remarked, 
 
“...it is not my intention to give leja-leja work to a person simply because he is 
my friend or relative. If they want to work for me, they should be prepared to 
work hard for the money. If he is ready for this, then he is most welcome.” 
(Interview with CS4-MOJM, August 2007). 
As noted in the previous chapter, apart from dealing with relatives and friends, 
Isunga  villagers also turn to persons with whom they have something in 
common, e.g. being from the same ethnic or wealth group, praying in the same 
church, belonging to the same gurub, sharing the same destiny or fate such as 
the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) of Isunga. Such networks play 
important roles in shaping farmers’ labour behaviours and forming labour 
relationships among them. One farmer remarked, 
 
“...aleya  is not for rich people who can afford to buy labour from us the 
abaseege (the very poor). It is for us the poor” (Conversation with a member of 
CS5-AWM Aleya group, July 2007). 
 
Personal connections developed over time through trusting relationships are 
important avenues for sourcing agricultural labour, especially during the most 
critical periods of farming like planting, weeding and harvesting of crops. 
These are periods when the values of social proximity are discernible.  
Getting labour through recommendations 
Farmers in Isunga also make use of recommendations from fellow villagers. 
All opinions are taken into account, but the most reliable recommendations are 
felt to come from family members, close relatives, neighbours and people from 
the same gurub or ethnic group. The decisive factor is that, they should be 
persons whose trustworthiness and reputation are not disputed. Mama Toto 
(CS13-JKF), for example, relies heavily on her trusted Kipanga customers for 
her agricultural labour needs. But whenever her usual labour suppliers are 
unable to help her, she seeks new contacts through other customers’ 
recommendations. She said,  
 
“…one of my customers is really good and knows all hard working people in 
Isunga. Whenever I want help with digging or weeding, I ask him to do it and if 
he can’t, I ask him to look for someone who can do it and he does…of course 
not free, I give him a glass of Kipanga for the effort. If the recommendation 
comes from someone who has a good name and trusted in the village…you can 177 
sleep well, because the work will be done well.” (Interview with CS13-JKF, 
November 2008).  
Mama Toto’s remarks indicate that trust and reputation as a basis for giving or 
receiving labour can also come from a person in a position of trust and not the 
person who took the assignment.
239 Thus, reputation is the guarantee for proper 
behaviour of the person being introduced. Even the Isunga  village council 
(LC1), which many villagers consider corrupt and ‘useless’, is used by certain 
farmers to obtain information about potential labourers.
240 Nelson  (CS17-
JOM), for example, seeks recommendations from the Isunga LC1 each time he 
wants to hire an IDP for the first time.
241  
Although individual farmers are normally eager to share their labour with 
each other, they are often reluctant to do so with those whose integrity and 
capacity to honour their word is poor. All the case households hinted that they 
would rather avoid dealing with people they do not know and trust. But, if 
unavoidable, they would seek to engage with the person(s) in some other way 
to establish some trust between them first. For example, Zakayo remarked,  
 
“...sitting down with such a person will give me some confidence to think 
clearly, allow me to understand him…and develop some trust (gen) with each 
other” (Interview with CS6-BOM, May 2009).  
Nonetheless, what seems important so far is not only the ability and 
willingness to maintain existing labour relationships (CS13-JKF), but also the 
wish to establish and have successful labour relationships (CS17-JOM). The 
common denominator in both cases is the importance of reputation, trust and 
being trustworthy in a relationship. Thus, Isunga’s villagers work hard to build 
a trusting relationship with fellow villagers. 
Dealing with unfamiliar persons and relations based on morality and affection 
As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, Isunga is ethnically rich, with plenty of inward 
and outward migration, and not all villagers know each other very  well. 
Therefore, when villagers seek to deal with people whom they do not know, 
the ‘rules of the game’ for initiating a labour relationship are quite different to 
the ones presented so far. Even so, labour actors still have to develop a sense of 
trust between them before using labour. This could happen through informal 
meetings with the potential exchange actors or through their reputations in the 
                                                        
239 See CS13-JKF case story in Section 6.3.1 on building reputations. 
240 See Chapter 7 on the presence of the Ugandan State in Isunga village and how the village 
council operates. 
241 Refer to CS17-JOM (Nelson): having a trusting relationship above. 178 
village. Alternatively, they structure their labour relationships in a way that 
reduces the risk of disputes. Labour relationships could also be established or 
pushed forward by moral and affective factors.
242 Consider  Hajji’s  (CS11-
HJM) reasoning for giving beans to the poor widow although she came to work 
late. He said,   
 
“…she is a member of the village, a poor widow whose husband died not long 
ago and it is just not in my character to let her go empty-handed…Allah would 
never forgive me” (Interview with CS11-HJM, 2007). 
Nonetheless,  Isunga’s  farmers are often reluctant to enter into labour 
relationships with individuals whose integrity and capacity to deliver is 
questionable. One farmer said, 
 
“…but I do not want to work for someone I do not trust. To me, a trusting 
relationship comes first…and if I am working for you for the first time, I keep 
my ears open and see you with a ‘sharp eye’ so that I see, hear and understand 
your intention…” (Interview with CS20-COM, May 2009) 
To the above farmers, labour agreements (winye)  are reached, labour is 
exchanged or work is shared, once a trusting relationship has been established, 
since this can act as a guarantee for the enforcement of winye. Conscious of 
this, some farmers make efforts to get to know the backgrounds, characters and 
reputations of those they intend to establish a relationship with (see Section 6.3 
on building and maintaining labour relationships). 
6.2.2  Reaching labour exchange agreements
243 
Farmers in Isunga  establish their labour agreements after careful and time-
consuming negotiation. The duration and nature of the negotiation depends on 
the type of labour arrangement. As noted in the previous chapter, each labour 
arrangement in Isunga  has its unique means of reaching agreements. Since 
much has been said about the organisation and operation of work parties 
(awak, diira  and  pur cente) in the last chapter, I will now focus on how 
agreements are reached in leja-leja wage labour. 
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to explain prevalence of informality in the village, despite decades of institutional reforms that 
favours formality.  
243 Unlike contracts where an arrangement is accepted by all parties to a transaction and is time 
specific (See Chapter 3), winye is not time specific and goes on even after the work (transaction) 
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Negotiation for casual wage labour (leja-leja) 
Wage labour negotiations (patana) and agreements (winye) vary from person 
to person and farming activity. The duration and nature of the negotiations are 
guided by the desire of the persons involved to reach a good agreement that 
reduces the risk of disputes (nywere-nywere) during and after the work is done. 
Disputes are a costly component of a labour relationship if they arise. Farmers 
therefore prefer to avoid them altogether.
244During  patana, parties verbally 
agree on the tasks, time-frames and wages (either per day or per task). 
Interestingly, they avoid discussing punishment for work poorly done (kwere-
kwere) or a failure to complete the work all together. Instead they wait until a 
dispute arises, and then solve it. Regardless, farmers are aware that any 
opportunistic behaviour is bad and costly in the long run.
245 Instead, such 
incidents are discussed when they occur, and there is enough evidence that a 
particular aspect of the agreement has not been properly handled.
246 In May 
2009, I observed one such negotiation (patana).  
Field Observation: Patana for leja-leja wage labour
247 
On 28 May 2009, we followed a patana  between a leja-leja  labour buyer 
(Lawil) and a leja-leja labour seller (Lacat)
248 for weeding tobacco. Both Lawil 
and Lacat verbally agreed to establish a leja-leja labour relationship, and certain 
aspects of the winye that were not clear, were re-negotiated during the leja-leja 
work. Lawil and Lacat agreed on the amount of the work (katala) to be done, 
without really paying attention to the details of the agreement. After working for 
a couple of hours without food and water, Lacat  remembered that food and 
water were not mentioned during the first patana  and he needed some 
clarification from Lawil on this. Lacat had thought that since weeding tobacco is 
quite taxing and the katala rather heavy, the leja-leja included food and drinking 
water. Lawil on the other hand thought it included only drinking water. Because 
of this misunderstanding, both Lacat and Lawil had good reasons to revise their 
earlier agreement. They talked while working and laughed occasionally. They 
                                                        
244 See Section 6.4.2 on avoiding disputes 
245 See CS1-JSBM and CS9-MAM conflicts below. 
246 Resolving disputes of any kind in Isunga is quite complicated and operates mostly outside 
the more formal village council (LC). The reasons are presented and discussed in Chapter 7. 
247 The author overheard CS1-JSBM discuss with his friend (Lawil) that Lawil might not finish 
weeding his tobacco shamba on time if he did not seek help from outside. Lawil thought of Awak 
but CS1-JSBM advised him against it because it takes time to organise it. Lawil then thought of a 
one day or two days leja-leja causal wage labour. When I confirmed that Lawil is going to hire 
leja-leja, I sought Lawil’s permission to attend the patana (negotiation) and participate in the 
actual weeding with him to get to know the nature of the work. I cannot describe everything here, 
except for the negotiation aspect of leja-leja which is important for understanding the significance 
of patana in labour behaviour. 
248 Both Lawil and Lacat are fictitious names. 180 
finally agreed that, the katala of 3 tal x 20 tal (approximately 4 rows of tobacco) 
should be completed within the day, and that Lacat would receive 3,000 UGX 
(up 500 UGX from the first patana) for the work, with 1,000 UGX as advance 
payment (dog-bur). Lawil did not want to go by Lacat’s position on dog-bur, but 
Lacat insisted and also threatened not to work without it. They also agreed that 
Lacat would drink water, but get no food.
249 In spite of this, the actual time set 
to finish the work fell outside the time limit agreed during the negotiations. The 
katala was too much for Lacat to finish in one day, because the weeds were 
much. He later asked for permission to finish it early the following day instead, 
to which Lawil agreed. The following day, Lacat came with two other persons, 
all looking for leja-leja work and Lawil employed them. 
Two important aspects of patana emerged from the above. The first one is a 
confirmation that farmers do not want disputes in their relationships and when 
a particular working situation changes, further discussions are conducted. As 
observed above, both Lawil and Lacat never expressed negative opinion about 
another round of patana because they knew very well that if certain issues 
were not handled early, then it might lead to a conflict. Secondly, the use of 
dog-bur payments as a deterrent of bad behaviour is very interesting, as it adds 
another dimension of terms of payments  in the labour transactions. Lacat 
insisted on his dog-bur of 1,000 UGX and even threatened not to work if not 
paid, yet with a smile. At first I thought Lacat was rather mean, considering 
that Lawil also shared two roast cassavas with us. But in a conversation with 
Lacat later on, he explained that he insisted on dog-bur payment because Lawil 
has a ‘bad name’ in the village. He is known for loko doge (changing positions) 
and not paying his workers promptly. 
According to my informants, it is quite normal that work conditions agreed 
prior to the katala  (including wage rates) are changed if there are new 
developments. Such new developments could be working on a different 
shamba other than the one agreed, the distance of the shamba from the leja-
leja  seller’s home, working  when it is raining and/or digging instead of 
weeding. Under these circumstances, the labour seller renegotiates with the 
buyer or else it may be a source of dispute if the labour buyer decides to walk 
away from the arrangement.
250 However, if the ‘personal chemistry’ between 
the labour buyer and seller is good, then the buyer might agree to pay a higher 
wage. Winye could also easily be reached if the labour buyer is desperate to see 
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the work done within a short period of time, such as weeding crops, which if 
missed, could spell disaster for the farmer.
251 
6.3  Building and maintaining labour relationships  
Work-sharing and labour exchanges between individual farmers and 
households raise a number of issues concerning building and maintaining 
labour relationships. This section explores how farmers address these. 
6.3.1  Building labour relationships  
The study found that farmers in Isunga rely on reputation when structuring 
their labour relations, especially when there are no personal connections. All 
the case households reported that they share, give or receive labour based on 
reputation and shun dealing with bad and untrustworthy persons. This begs the 
question: how do Isunga villagers build their reputations? The following were 
mentioned during the interviews and group discussions: following through on 
agreements (winye) and promises; making payments on time (CS4-MOJM); 
not doing shoddy work; not walking away from a person in need (CS13-JKF); 
not talking behind people’s backs (CS1-JSBM); offering Kipanga to customers 
on credit (CS13-JKF) and lending land to others (CS6-BOM). All these have 
an impact of people’s reputations in the village. In the case below, Mama Toto 
(CS13-JKF) explains why and how she chose her helpers. 
CS13-JKF (Mama Toto): My name should ‘smell good’ to others 
Mama Toto is a single parent and relies on others for her farming activities. But 
whenever she needs extra help for farm work, she carefully identifies the 
persons for the work. One guiding factor is reputation (both her own and other 
people). She also knows that getting people with ‘strong chests’ to work for her 
is difficult, so she tries extra hard to make her name ‘smell good’ to others. She 
said, “...if your reputation is good, you’ll always have people to stand up for 
you; and the way  you treat others either makes your name smell good or 
destroys you… good names and reputation are important here”. Mama Toto 
builds her reputation by selling Kipanga  gin  on credit to her prominent 
customers, helping fellow villagers when they are in difficulties and by 
attending burials. She said, “…credit-giving has made me popular here. Some of 
them like my stuff, and exchange it with their labour power. This helps me a lot 
during digging and weeding times. Don’t forget, I don’t have a husband to dig 
for me…so my relationship with them is very important. I trust and respect them 
although at times I do not like what they do when drunk. I think they also like me 
                                                        
251 In Chapter 2, it was pointed out that with rain fed crop farming, all activities are intensive 
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or my beer since they keep coming back.” Isunga is a small village and it is not 
all that difficult to know how a person treats others. Mama Toto observed, “…so 
much is against me, and if I turn my back or start quarrelling with those who 
normally lends me a hand without understanding the reason why this time 
around they are not able to do so, then I may lose not only one customer but the 
other ones too. As you know, no one wants to deal with a person who treats their 
colleagues unfairly or a person who really enjoys seeing people suffer, like that 
lady (pointing to the direction of CS1-JSBM).”
252  Mama  Toto  treats her 
labourers with respect and care because she does not want to break up 
relationships with good and hardworking persons. She chooses her labourers 
carefully based on their character, and said, “...a person can be good or bad, but 
if I want him to help me...I check his character by assessing how he behaves out 
there or ask my customers…they tell me if he is good or bad and I make the 
right decision.” Mama Toto is also aware that as she is a single parent and a 
female IDP, she has to be extra careful and remarked, “…I also have to be very 
careful…otherwise my name shall be all over the place.” 
Based on the CS13-JKF account, having trusting and respectful relations is 
advantageous since labour actors do not have to spend much time negotiating 
issues relating to the kind of work, how much to work or the strength of her 
Malwa  beer  or  Kipanga  gin. The narrative also tells us that a person’s 
reputation does not only come directly from the relationship between labour 
actors, but also from their behaviour in the village. This is reiterated by Mama 
Toto’s emphasis about how an individual treats other members of the village 
could either hinder or help his or her reputation. In fact, one farmer (CS9-
MAM) supported this after a late payment conflict with a leja-leja buyer (CS1-
JSBM) when he forcefully remarked that,
253 
 
“...I don’t think I’ll ever work for them again…they treat poor people like 
human shit that smells.” (Interview with CS9-MAM, November 2008) 
The above point is supported by Landa  (1994:8)  and  Leeson  (2003)  in 
discussions of ‘tit-for-tat’ strategies in self-enforcing behaviour. That is, if a 
labour recipient or provider violates a contract, the aggrieved party informs 
others and the party who violated the agreement is punished. There is a penalty 
for cheating, and the labour sharing or exchange does not take place until the 
party who violated the agreement can demonstrate that s/he will not do it again. 
                                                        
252 Mama Toto’s gesture and remark about the CS1-JSBM prompted further probing and found 
that Bazilio and his wives are not popular among the new comers (IDPs), who accuse them of 
being arrogant and exploitative.   
253 See Section 6.4.2 below 183 
6.3.2  Maintaining existing labour relationships 
From the empirical presentation so far, little doubt exists about the fact that 
Isunga  farmers put considerable efforts in building good relationships with 
those whom they would like to share or exchange their labour power with in 
future. Even those villagers who already have positive connections with each 
other work equally hard to maintain and develop these relationships further.
254 
One farmer discussed how to maintain good and working labour relations: 
 
“....we sit and drink Kipanga, Kwete or Malwa beer, play Mweso
255 together, and 
are nice to each other by talking sweetly of them to other people in their 
absence. I also lend him land and do other things that are  good [smile]. ” 
(Conversation with CS6-BOM, November 2008) 
It appears that once a sense of trust has been established, they then do their best 
to transform the relationship into a long-term personal relationship by fostering 
informal contacts with one another. Both CS6-BOM and CS13-JKF household 
case studies indicated that good relationships are kept and maintained because 
investments in such social relations are important for securing future labour 
opportunities. This was more or less confirmed by another villager who said, 
 
“...you cannot practice farming by simply relying on your sweat (own labour). 
You have to get help from other people too, otherwise expect trouble. To get 
help from others requires good names and good relations with people. So we try 
our best to have good contacts with people, including devils like the LC 
people...just to be on a safe side.” (IDP farmer during a focus group discussion, 
November 2008) 
From the above case studies and remarks, it is evident that by investing in good 
personal relations with fellow villagers, non-opportunistic behaviour from 
them is upheld and the risks of labour disputes are significantly reduced. In 
other words, dealing with known and trusted persons lowers labour transaction 
costs.
256 This is because once a farmer has enough information about a 
potential labour partner and a trusting relationship has been established, then 
there is no need to incur additional exchange costs. From that time onwards, 
the farmer would spend less time on information, negotiation and 
                                                        
254 Some villagers like CS4-MOJM (Jalon), attempt to personalise the relationships with them 
after a couple of successful encounters, even when dealing with unfamiliar people such as the 
newly settled IDPs 
255 Mweso  is a popular board  game  across  much  of Uganda. For more information, see 
Shackell (1934) and Seppälä (1998). 
256 Cf. Fafchamps & Gubert (2007) and Landa (1994). 184 
implementation. Hence, costs related to searching for labour, negotiating it, as 
well as implementing the exchange would therefore be minimised (Eggertsson, 
1996; 1994; Williamson, 1981).
257  
This subsection has shown how Isunga’s farmers identify and choose labour 
exchange actors; how labour agreements are reached, as well as how they build 
and maintain their labour relationships. It came out clearly that trust arising 
from long-term relations (family members, relatives, and friends), praying in 
the same church, sharing the same fate (e.g. the Internally Displaced Persons), 
belonging to a gurub or drinking Malwa and Kipanga together, are important 
for structuring labour relations in the village. It also emerged that building 
personal relationships with fellow villagers is a very important strategy for 
securing agricultural labour and other resources. Hence, farmers very seriously 
take the reputation of other people into consideration when entering into labour 
relationships. I also showed that reaching winye is complex, yet it remained a 
very important step for structuring labour transactions in Isunga village. For 
winye  to be properly enforced, the persons involved ‘choose and use their 
words’ very carefully to avoid misunderstandings. These reduce the risks of 
misunderstanding each other, and avoid disputes that might arise due to 
opportunistic behaviours of the other actors. The next section gives evidence of 
how farmers implement labour agreements, and show under what 
circumstances disputes may arise. 
6.4  Enforcing labour agreements 
Williamson  (1998;  1993b; 1985;  1981)  and other scholars argue that when 
contracts work properly in accordance with existing ‘contract laws’ then they 
can prevent opportunistic behaviour by the parties involved in a transaction; 
and transactions take place without any interventions from outsiders (third 
parties).
258In this study, the people of Isunga do not work within the law of 
contract as understood by Williamson  (1998;  1993b;  1981)  and Bakibinga 
(2001).
259 But even if they were aware of them, the weak nature of the 
Ugandan state in the village makes the notion of enforcement irrelevant. As 
                                                        
257 Eggertsson  (1996;  1994)  observes that “when information is costly, various activities 
related to the exchange of property rights between individuals give rise to transaction costs. These 
activities include, amongst others, the making of contract, the monitoring of contractual partners 
to see whether they abide by the forms of contract, the enforcement of contract and the collection 
of damages when partners fail to observe their contractual obligations” (Eggertsson, 1996:9) 
258 Third parties and outsiders are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
259 Their logic of labour agreement (winye) is different from central legalism discussed in 
Chapter 3 where enforcement mechanism also entails direct punishment of contract violating 
party (jail times or fines). 185 
Jones (2008:64) would say, Isunga village is “…a situation where the state 
bureaucracy and local government system had withdrawn from the life of the 
village”. To examine how Isunga farmers conduct themselves when winye is 
reached, and under what circumstances labour disputes may arise, calls for 
clarification of the term dispute or else we run the risk of misunderstanding 
dispute as a key component of labour relationship. 
6.4.1  Labour dispute defined 
There are two ways to look at labour disputes: one defined according to the 
Labour Dispute (Arbitration and Settlement) Act of 2006 (GOU, 2006b), and the 
other defined by the Isunga villagers themselves. The difference between the two 
needs clarification. First, according to the Labour Dispute (Arbitration and 
Settlement) Act of 2006 (ibid, 2006b), the term ‘dispute’ means a ‘labour 
dispute’, 
 
“....any dispute or difference between an employer and an employee or 
employees, or a dispute between employees; or between labour unions, 
connected with employment or non-employment, terms of employment, the 
conditions of labour of any person or of the economic and social interest of a 
worker or workers.” (ibid, 2006b:5) 
Reading through the 2006 Labour Disputes Act, there is no mention of 
agricultural labour in rural Uganda, even though more than 80 per cent of the 
country’s labour force lives in the countryside and derives its livelihood from 
agriculture (GOU, 2010b; UBOS, 2007). 
As we saw with patana in Section 6.2.2, disputes arise in labour relations, 
but partners try their best to resolve them without involving third parties. They 
are flexible and make changes that fit into their context. Moreover, not all 
changes in winye lead to disputes. For instance, if changes to a winye were 
accepted by the persons involved, then there would be no dispute at all. But 
winye can be violated and disputes arise when a labour provider or recipient, 
attempts to change it without the other actor agreeing to it. In other words, 
labour disputes emerge because the persons involved in a labour exchange 
cannot agree on the changes in the winye. Consequently, the term ‘dispute’ is 
used to mean any disagreement between labour actors.
260 It includes reasons 
for the disputes other than the violation of a specific term of winye, which can 
occur either during or after the task has been completed. Thus, the results 
presented here cover individual farmers’ reactions to specific disputes arising 
                                                        
260  In  Isunga, there are many ‘words’ or expressions for conflicts, disagreements, 
misunderstandings or disputes. The common ones are nywere-nywere  and  kuku-kuku,  and 
sometimes they appear in the text because the author is familiar with them. 186 
from a particular transactional relationship at a particular time. But first, let us 
see under what circumstances labour disputes may arise. 
6.4.2  Nature of labour disputes in Isunga  
All the case households reported having had some kind of disagreement with a 
fellow villager about labour in the last ten years. However, many of the 
disputes involved leja-leja  wage labour with only very few cases from 
cooperative labour practices. Most leja-leja sellers spoke of their unhappiness 
with late or non-payment by some of the better-off households (CS9-MAM, 
CS12-JKF); the shamba is different to the one agreed on during patana (CS16-
VLF), and use of abusive and derogatory language (CS9-MAM, CS20-COM). 
Leja-leja buyers on the other hand, complained of certain leja-leja labourers 
doing shoddy (kwere-kwere)  work, working slowly and not finishing their 
katala  on time (CS1-JSBM) or disappearing once they have received their 
advance (dog-bur) payment (CS4-MOJM). As for cooperative labour practices, 
most disputes are usually due to less food or beer, watery and smelly Kwete 
beer, doing kwere-kwere  work, abstaining from gurub’s  work without 
permission, members starting to fight with each other, a member causing 
disturbances during meetings and/or young gurub  members talking 
disrespectfully to senior members.
261 All of the above disputes cannot be dealt 
with here.
262 Instead, the CS9-MAM case study is intended to show some of 
the unique aspects of labour disputes in the village. 
CS9-MAM: Delayed payment for work done 
In August 2007, Musa (CS9-MAM) cleared Bazilio’s (CS1-JSBM) sunflower 
garden. He slashed the grass, cut the shrubs, heaped the branches together, burnt 
them and spread the ashes, precisely as had been agreed during patana. It was 
tough work and it took  Musa  eight days to perform, but when it came to 
payment, Bazilio did not want to pay as agreed. Instead he referred Musa to 
Atenyi (Bazilio’s second wife), who according to Musa, “…is a bad woman who 
always yells at people. She shouted at me that I did not finish the work in the 
three days they gave me. Yet they know very well that we did not discuss the 
duration of the work but just to do the work, which I did well using my own 
machete and hoe. They even sent their small children to bring me water to drink 
on those days. After I finished the work on the eighth day, I happily went for the 
money and they changed their position”.  When  Musa  saw that Bazilio  was 
                                                        
261 Another interesting aspect of labour disputes mentioned during focus group discussions is 
when an official of a gurub ignores members’ opinions the official is punished for it. 
262 The study focused more on disputes involving leja-leja  dealers because it is the most 
common labour dispute in Isunga, and usually involve farmers of unequal status (labour buyers 
are mostly ‘better off’ while sellers are ‘poorer’). Indeed, I would have wished to make more of 
disputes between households or farmers of equal status but failed to get appropriate data. 187 
‘playing around’  with him, he went to the Chairman of the Isunga  LC for 
help.
263 He said, “…that was another problem altogether. He told me he did not 
have a pen and piece of paper to write down my ‘words’ and asked for 1,000 
UGX, which I gave him. When he pocketed it, he called his young son and told 
him to go to his big hut, open a tin box…he’ll find a black book with a pen 
inside; and that he should bring it. When I reminded him of what he told me a 
few minutes ago about the pen, paper and the money I gave him, he smiled and 
smugly said, “...go back to your home if you don’t want my services.” 
According to Musa, this kind of behaviour is common in Isunga: “…that is how 
they treat us here. Each time you want their help, they remind you that you don’t 
belong here. We even don’t have names, but are collectively called ‘displaced’.”   
The LC1 Chairman summoned Bazilio to get his version of the story “…but 
he did not ask for a pen and paper from him”. Musa continued, “…Bazilio 
accepted my version of the story, that he had some difficulties with money and 
that he will pay when he gets money…that he is trying hard and I should give 
him one more month. What a lie…all these months? ...one month to a poor man 
is like ten years. Well, I ‘accepted’ his excuse because of our past 
relationship…although I knew it was a big lie.” After a month, Musa went to 
Bazilio’s house every week for four weeks, without any luck. He then decided to 
go to Bazilio’s sister-in-law who lives at Mailo Kumi not far away from Musa’s 
home to talk about his problem with Bazilio  and get her help to solve it: 
“…instead she rebuked me and did not believe that Bazilio and her sister could 
behave in such a way. She refused to help me.” This experience did not quash 
Musa’s  spirit to fight on. Instead, he took his problem to the elders of the 
Kamdini Group, of which Bazilio is a member, and sought their help to make 
Bazilio pay him. He explained that, “…when Bazilio heard that I reported him 
to the elders, none other than his big-mouthed wife contacted me and begged me 
to withdraw the complaint from the group. She agreed to pay me and we put the 
whole thing behind us. She talked of how hardworking and good I have been to 
them all these years…and that the whole thing was a misunderstanding. I 
accepted. After all, it was not my intention from the beginning to speak of 
Bazilio to the elders or to the LC…I just wanted my money, nothing else,” Musa 
said. Two days later, Musa got his 10,000 UGX and a bottle of Kipanga gin.
264  
Musa’s story raises a number of interesting aspects of labour disputes in Isunga 
village.  His search for justice involved a number of approaches that are 
                                                        
263 Musa’s experience with the Chairman of Isunga Local Council is revisited in chapter 7 
when discussing the prevalence of informality in agricultural labour relationships. 
264 When I hinted to Bazilio that his name ‘smells bad’ among the IDPs and is ‘not trusted’ 
because he tricked Musa  to work for him without pay, his response was very negative and 
defensive. He literally accused me of being dishonest myself because I live in his house and still 
talk behind his back. He said, “...so you talked about me with him? That is not good. Yes, it was a 
small problem…Musa is a difficult person. When he wants something, he wants it straight 
away…there and then. I told him we did not have the money, but when we get it I’ll square him 
up. He never took it” (Conversation with CS1-JSBM, December 2008). 188 
probably adopted by most villagers adopt when faced with similar situations, 
notably: (a) talking it over with the person(s) involved, (b) seeking help from 
relatives, friends, neighbours,  and/or farmers groups and (c) turning to the 
Isunga  Local Council (LC1) even if they perceive the councillors as being 
dishonest.
265 Musa’s story also showed the extent to which farmers make use 
of the informal mechanisms to solve existing labour disputes.
266 Clearly, Musa 
had some payment problems over work he did for Bazilio. Instead of seeking 
help from the Isunga LC1 from the beginning, Musa began by renegotiating 
their winye first (i.e. addressing the issues informally), and only after failing 
with this approach, did he choose to go to the LC1.
267 In the process, he had to 
part with some money for the pen and paper. Although the LC1 Chairman 
summoned Bazilio, talked about the issue and agreed to pay Musa his money 
within a certain period, he never did. 
Many villagers stated that they rarely go to the Isunga LC people for help 
and when they do, they do so as a last resort. They try other methods first, and 
then go to the LC1 if they fail. The CS9-MAM  (Musa)  and CS1-JSBM 
(Bazilio)  labour conflict story above is not an isolated scenario. All my 
informants have  indicated that resolving labour disputes in the village is 
expensive, unpleasant and time-consuming.
268Apart from soiling one’s name 
and reputation, it may also destroy existing labour relationships. All these add 
to the cost of labour exchanges, thus having negative effects on crop 
production. It is therefore, in the interest of all those engaging in work sharing 
and labour exchanges to avoid disputes. 
6.4.3  Reducing the risks of labour disputes 
As argued in Chapter 3, not all transactions are enforced through formal 
institutions or require the involvement of third parties. Theory and empirical 
studies have pointed to the fact that there are social norms or informal rules to 
make contracts enforceable. Literature also tells us that when contracts work 
properly in accordance with existing contract law, they prevent opportunistic 
behaviour (Ostrom, 2005; Williamson, 1998; Eggertsson, 1994; North, 1991; 
North, 1990; Williamson, 1981). This implies that Isunga’s farmers, in their 
roles as social actors and as economic agents, can structure their labour 
exchange relationships in ways that reduce risks of labour disputes, thereby 
                                                        
265 Although Musa never used force or threats of it, it came out from one case study that this 
does occasionally happen. See Section 6.3.2 on the use of force to solve labour disputes. 
266 It also showed that even the more formal village council operates informally. 
267 It could also be argued that Musa’s going to the LC shows that the Local Council System is 
not as bad as farmers portrayed it after all. It does some good work despite its shortcomings. 
268 This is consistent with the contract arguments and the principles of transactions cost 
economics argument discussed in Chapter 3. 189 
making their labour transactions enforceable.
269  With this in mind, I 
investigated some of these institutional arrangements and the extent to which 
farmers in Isunga use them. 
From the household interviews, field observations and discussions with a 
cross-section of the community, it emerged that the strategies farmers use to 
identify and choose labour exchange partners, are also the same strategies they 
use for avoiding labour disputes: (i) dealing with people they have known for a 
long and have good connections with, such as relatives, friends and neighbours 
(CS5-AWM, CS13-JKF, CS4-MOJM), (ii) use of dog-bur  payments in the 
case of hired labour (CS9-MAM, FG3-KBA, FG4-KPG), (iii) gathering 
information about potential labour exchange actors’ character, reputation or 
trustworthiness and capabilities before and after the task is completed (CS13-
JKF, CS6-BOM, CS17-JOM and CS2-MDF); (iv) reaching good winye with 
clear dos and don’ts, and (v) and turning to the Isunga Local Council (CS9-
MAM, CS6-BOM and CS17-JOM). Many villagers felt comfortable with most 
of these approaches, except for the last one, which they turn to as a last resort. 
This suggests that they rely more on social (informal)  institutions than the 
formal  Isunga  Local Council to structure and maintain their labour 
relationships. Since some of the above approaches have already been discussed 
in Section 6.2.1, below is a presentation and discussion of other mechanisms 
not mentioned.
270 
Gathering information about potential labour partners 
The ethnic mix in Isunga sometimes makes finding people to exchange labour 
or share farm work with a tricky and difficult exercise.
271 Faced with such 
uncertainty, farmers attempt to protect themselves from any opportunistic 
behaviour by carefully assessing their potential labour partners, either by 
talking to the individuals in question or gathering information about them in 
other ways. For instance, CS17-JOM (a leja-leja buyer) collects information 
about IDPs leja-leja sellers by asking his friends or the LC1 Chairman about 
their background and character before hiring them. He said,  
 
“...I have land, but labour is my problem and when the boys are in school, a big 
gap is left and I fill it through leja-leja…mainly from the ‘displaced’ Acholi and 
Langi  because my relatives are very proud and don’t do leja-leja.  But when 
someone comes to work for me for the first time, I ask ‘little’ questions like if they 
                                                        
269 An economic agent is an actor and decision-maker (e.g. labour buyer and labour seller) and 
their behaviour is studied in the theory of the firm and the theory of the consumer. 
270 Since, most of the households’ stories were already used in previous sections or chapters, 
only relevant excerpts from the interviews are dealt with here. 
271 This is particularly the case when dealing with unfamiliar people for the first time. 190 
drink the poison of Isunga
272 or I go the LC1 Chairman to check whether the 
person is a ‘displaced’ Lango or Acholi to confirm that he is a genuine IDP and not 
an LRA rebel, before I hire him.” (Interview with CS17-JOM, August 2007) 
Bazilio (CS1-JSBM) and his wives too, explained that they usually have ‘little 
talks’ with other people at the market on market days, at the borehole when 
collecting water, during funerals or during their monthly gurub  meetings. 
During this process they hear a lot about other people. Abwoli (CS2-MDF) and 
Atenyi  (CS3-MAF) also get information from their Kipanga  customers and 
some friends at the trading centre. Atenyi remarked,   
 
“...I sometimes go to my friend Kilama, the shopkeeper at the trading centre and 
ask him if the person is an Acholi like him. He knows everybody in this village 
because he buys their maize and beans for Fanta.”
273 (Interview with CS3-MAF, 
November 2008) 
Some people go out to drink beer (Malwa, Kwete or Kipanga), play cards or 
mweso, or just sit and talk with fellow villagers. Such informal meetings enable 
them to get ample information not only about fellow villagers’ characters, 
behaviours and past actions before actually engaging with them, but also 
opportunities of where to find leja-leja or land for rent or sale.
274 The process 
of collecting information does not stop once a labour partner has been found or 
the work has been completed. It may in fact, continue during or after the work 
is completed. Mama Toto remarked, 
 
“...I visit them in the shamba just to ensure that they are doing the right things as 
agreed during patana.” (Interview with CS13-JKF, August 2007) 
By so doing, the risk of misunderstandings between the persons exchanging 
labour are reduced and the task (katala)  is smoothly executed. Although 
meeting labour partners in different environments is viewed by some farmers 
as a good opportunity to foster a relationship or to make sure that winye is 
correctly  followed, some people do not like it and consider it rather 
patronising.
275 One leja-leja seller commented,  
 
“...the Mzee came to my house after work and asked many stupid questions, yet 
I finished my katala well and even got paid...who does he think he is? I really 
                                                        
272  Referring to Kipanga gin 
273 Fanta is a produce dealer based in Kampala who frequents Isunga village during maize and 
beans harvesting times to buy crops for Kampala market. 
274 See the Meeting Pot of Isunga village in Chapter 2. 
275 See CS17-JOM case story in Section 6.2.1 191 
don’t understand why he came to my house.” (Conversation with a leja-leja 
seller, May 2009) 
Visiting others in their homes after work is completed is not a common 
practice, but it appears to serve two purposes: (a) to help identify relevant 
mechanisms for responding to a person’s behaviour so that the existing labour 
relationship is not lost, or (b) to build up one’s reputation for future activities. 
Under these circumstances, it is important to treat each other well, or else the 
relationship might turn sour and disintegrate. Some farmers in fact, use it 
purposely to know how to deal with an individual in a particular situation. For 
example,  Mama Toto  (CS13-JKF) investigated the reasons why a leja-leja 
seller (Awiny) did not show up as was originally agreed, because she is aware 
that finding good and hardworking people in the village is not easy. She went 
to Awiny’s home, because she does not want to end the relationship with this 
good and hardworking person. Even if she was annoyed with Awiny, she made 
sure she understood the reason why they were at loggerheads this time. She 
explained this by using an incident that happened a while back, 
 
“…last month (April), I gave your friend Awiny a bottle of Kipanga on credit, 
on the promise that he would weed  my maize field which was getting 
dangerously full of weeds. When he did not show up, I was angry, felt let down 
and went to his home to confront him, only to find that he had been struck down 
by malaria and had no money for treatment. I lent him 5,000 UGX to go to the 
clinic. Well, I could not do much but to tell him to come when he gets better. 
Since I didn’t like to lose my maize to the weeds, I had to organise a small diira 
to save it…I still turn to Awiny  whenever I need help with shamba  work, 
because  he is a good, hardworking person and usually keeps his word.” 
(Interview with CS13-JKF, May 2009) 
276  
If a person does not report to work as agreed, works slowly or poorly, some 
farmers like Mama Toto  try to find out why so that they make the right 
decision next time they need help. Mama Toto’s effort to treat Awiny with 
respect not only revealed the benefit of taking the time to gather information 
about people whose labour power you want, but can also be seen as a way of 
building one’s reputation in the village. By treating Awiny fairly, Mama Toto 
strengthened their on-going relationship. It also enhanced her reputation in the 
eyes of others. If she had played tough and been hard on Awiny, shouting, 
yelling, and accusing him of drinking her Kipanga for free, this would have 
                                                        
276 Mama Toto referred to Awiny as my friend because she saw us together a couple of times 
when I joined Awiny and his friends for a glass of Kipanga as I was struggling to understand the 
kinds of labour networks around CS13-JKF (Mama Toto).  192 




“…as a widow and displaced person, I cannot afford nywere-nywere. It becomes 
expensive for me to handle as I would have to struggle alone to solve it and may 
be look for other people to replace him. No, I can’t afford it.” (Interview with 
CS13-JKF, May 2009) 
Since the village is rather small, it can be a big problem if your name ‘smells 
bad’.
278 All my informants said that information relating to disputes generating 
behaviour such as shirking payments, doing shoddy work and other dishonest 
behaviour spread very quickly in the village. 
Advance payment for hired labour (dog-bur) 
This method is used in leja-leja wage labour and farmers groups’ work for 
money (pur cente). It is not applicable to cooperative labour practices (awak, 
aleya, diira and pur-kongo) that do not take cash as a means of reward. All the 
poorer households  stressed the importance of dog-bur  payment in leja-leja 
labour practices. Farmers treat it as an act of commitment, and once dog-bur 
has changed hands; there is no going back as it ties actors to the transaction. As 
the experience of Lawil and Lacat showed in Section 6.2.2, dog-bur payment is 
a good way for reducing risks associated with leja-leja labour transactions. 
This is because some better-off households have the habit of not paying once 
the work is completed. However, because of their wealth status in the village, 
the poorer households or people desperately in need of money or food still go 
to them for work. And as seen in CS9-MAM’s conflict with CS1-JSBM above, 
the significance of dog-bur (advance payment) in leja-leja transactions is clear. 
One IDP farmer also said that, 
 
“…some of the Palwos and Barullis are not good to us. When we first came, 
they would trick us to work for them and refuse to pay or delay to pay. Of 
course, it would make sense not to work for them altogether, but when you’re 
desperately looking for leja-leja and you get one with a person you have never 
worked for before…how would you know if he is bad or good? You just think 
about getting the money nothing else.” (Interview with CS20-COM, May 2009) 
Such opportunistic behaviour has made leja-leja labour sellers demand dog-bur 
payment at the start of leja-leja work. By so doing, the leja-leja buyer and 
                                                        
277 See CS13-JKF stories in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.3.1 
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seller are able to implement the agreement reached between them without the 
intervention of a third party. In other words, the dog-bur payment ties those 
involved to the labour transaction. From the perspective of the leja-leja seller, 
the method ensures that the labour buyer does not change his or her mind and 
walk away after winye has been reached and the work started. In essence, once 
the leja-leja buyer has paid the deposit, both parties have to comply with the 
transaction right until the end. However, if for other reasons the deal is 
cancelled or the leja-leja seller disappears after receiving dog-bur, then the 
leja-leja buyer loses the dog-bur money paid to the leja-leja seller (and the 
seller’s name begins to ‘smell bad’ in the village). Furthermore, the fact that 
the last payment is after the task (katala) is completed means that the leja-leja 
buyer withholds part of the payment until the work is done to the buyer’s 
satisfaction. In case the leja-leja seller fails to perform well, perhaps by doing 
shoddy work or failing to finish the work within the specified time, then it is 
very possible s/he will miss the remaining balance and there may be conflict. 
Therefore, for the labour relationship to continue on a warm footing and the 
leja-leja seller gets the rest of the money, s/he will have to stick to the winye 
and ensures that the labour buyer is satisfied. If not, then s/he would bear the 
cost of bad performance or dishonest behaviour.  
This section dealt with the nature of disputes that are common in 
agricultural labour dealings in Isunga. Most labour disputes are due to: shirking 
payments, late payment, not finishing the work (katala) on time, shoddy work 
or misunderstandings due to poor patana and bad winye. Furthermore, Isunga 
villagers do not like opportunistic behaviour that may lead to disputes, and 
hence try to prevent them by (a) dealing with those persons they have good 
contacts with, (b) using dog-bur  payments for ‘cementing’ leja-leja  or  pur 
cente  agreements  (winye), (c) gathering information about potential labour 
partners before patana and in few cases after the work is done, (d) reaching 
good winye with clear terms of work, and of course (e) using of the Isunga LC1 
as a last resort. But what happens when labour disputes do arise?  
6.5  Resolving labour disputes 
Although Isunga villagers work hard to avoid labour disputes, they do happen 
and when they do, those involved employ various tactics. As we saw from 
Musa’s  story (CS9-MAM) above, the tactics are mainly informal such as 
talking it over (renegotiation) with the other person or persons involved, 
seeking help from relatives, friends or neighbours, and using ‘legal’ procedures 194 
through the Isunga LC1 court or using force when despair creeps in.
279 This 
section further explores the ‘rules of the game’ of solving labour disputes and 
the extent to which farmers use them. 
6.5.1  Renegotiating winye 
Musa’s  story  revealed that before involving outsiders in their labour 
relationships, farmers in Isunga  prefer to settle their grievances by 
renegotiating winye with each other first. Only after they have failed, do they 
turn to other methods. Most farmers remarked that it is usually not their 
intention to turn away from their obligations once they reached winye; but 
sometimes they do because of factors beyond their control, such as a heavy 
rain, sickness or deaths in a family, which can deter one from reporting to work 
or completing the agreed work on time. Late payments or non-payments may 
also be due to similar reasons. For this reason, most farmers consider such 
delays to be ‘small problems’ rather than violations of agreements, because the 
actions are not caused by opportunistic behaviour, but rather unforeseen 
problems. Therefore, when faced with such ‘small problems’, they seek to 
address them by talking it over and they seem contented with this approach 
because it is simple and less expensive in terms of time and money. Moreover, 
as we have seen with CS13-JKF’s (Mama Toto) story above, it also helps to 
foster existing relationships with fellow villagers.  
Renegotiating  winye  does not involve third parties and most villagers 
remarked that it is probably the best method for solving existing nywere-
nywere. It also gives room to those involved in in dispute to safeguard their 
reputations. A female farmer explained,  
 
“...to talk to others about your problems is like walking naked before men. They 
will look at you and comment excitedly, that is why I usually tell people that 
whenever a problem arises, talk to each other about it and solve it because no 
one can understand the problem better than you. It is cheaper and helps you find 
the best solution to your kuku-kuku. But if you chose to take it to the LC, for 
example, they’ll ask all kinds of questions…including obal tic  (sitting 
allowance) and you lose even when you win the case.” (Interview with CS18-
MOF, May 2009) 
Renegotiations of winye are carried out informally in the homes of the persons 
involved, at the trading centre or other social places such as beer drinking 
venues without involving third parties. Isunga villagers prefer to discuss their 
differences in a peaceful way to try to find a solution to existing problems 
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rather than threatening each other. But if it turns out that one party is seen to be 
unreasonable, then the other could mention the rather ‘despised’ Isunga Local 
Council, essentially to speed things up. In such circumstances, it is easy to 
argue that the Isunga LC1 does have a positive influence on the process of 
settling labour disputes, but villagers do not value this. I will revisit the role of 
Isunga LC1 when discussing the durability of informality in Isunga in the next 
chapter. Here, I look at the role of elders in dispute mediation. 
6.5.2  Using wisdom of elders to solve disputes 
Apart from renegotiating winye and involving the Isunga LC1, labour disputes 
in the village are also resolved by elders. Although few in number, Isunga’s 
elders are very much respected for their good character, knowledge, and their 
words weigh heavily in most situations. Many villagers believe that their 
advanced age puts them in a unique position to mediate on matters concerning 
their community. Hence, they are called upon to discuss possible causes of 
conflicts and to find proper responses to it. I was privy to one such mediation 
effort in November 2008. Bongomin (CS19-LOM) told me of a case involving 
a neighbour who battered his wife so badly that he (Bongomin) had to report it 
to Ludito Acholi (Acholi elders). According to Bongomin, a member of their 
community (Odoki) and his wife (Ayaa)
280 did some leja-leja work (harvesting 
maize) for Mzee Ogwal. Their combined wages were handed to Odoki, but 
when  Ayaa  asked for her share when they got home, Odoki  responded by 
slapping and kicking her, even though Ayaa was visibly pregnant. Ayaa did not 
report what happened to the LC1 or Ludito Acholi. This angered Bongomin 
very much, who then chose to report the matter himself. He said, “…I had to, 
because it is wrong to do a thing like that to a pregnant woman”. The 
mediation hearing was scheduled for 30 November 2008. Unfortunately, there 
was a death in the family of one of the elders and the hearing had to be 
postponed. Even so, I was given the opportunity to understand how the hearing 
was planned, and below is my account of the discussions. 
Field Observation: Dispute mediation among the Acholi IDPs of Isunga 
In my discussion with the elders, I was keen to understand what defines the 
justice system used by the Acholi in Isunga. According to the elders, justice in 
Acholi  culture  is restorative and revolves around: trust, the establishment of 
truth, the voluntary nature of the process, the payment of compensation, and the 
restoration of harmony and unity of the household. One elder said, “…it is fear 
that usually keeps people from accepting their mistakes. Before we start any 
mediation process, the persons concerned must first accept and trust those of us 
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involved in the mediation. We also help them build their confidence in our 
mediation effort by giving examples of what happened in the past, and their 
consequences. We promote harmony and encourage the perpetrator to confess 
to his or her wrongdoing. The idea is to free those who have erred from fear and 
shame and to encourage them to take the right steps towards claiming their 
rightful place in the society.” 
When it is clear that individuals have committed wrongdoings, but refuse to 
admit their guilt, elders also take it upon themselves to encourage revenge from 
the other side. For instance, if Odoki is found to be in the wrong, but he refused 
to accept it, they would encourage Ayaa to go back to her maiden home. So that 
if Odoki really loves her, he’ll follow her and meet ‘men like him’ there who 
may also beat him up for mistreating their daughter. Alternatively, Odoki  is 
threatened that since he has failed to keep Ayaa in accordance to what he had 
agreed when marrying her, she can now go back home. Any man is free to take 
Ayaa,  and  Odoki  loses both the wife and the dowry he paid. One elder 
interjected, “…an Acholi man really gets scared when you talk like that to him, 
yet this is said just to ‘cool off’ the anger between Odoki and Ayaa’s people. 
Maybe Ayaa is still angry at her husband or even in the wrong, so it is better to 
buy time to cool off the existing tension.” Another elder added, “...we would 
also ask them to tell us what exactly happened, as we try to establish the facts of 
the conflict…which is important for resolving their problem. We mediate and we 
don’t pass judgements the way the LC people do. In our effort, the first task 
would be to establish the facts by talking to Ayaa and Odoki and their witnesses. 
We do this in the open and stick to getting the truth no matter how long it 
takes…even a stranger like you is allowed to say something.” Whether Odoki 
beat his wife intentionally, or under the influence of alcohol, or as continuation 
of an old problem, the elders would know and then advise them accordingly and 
determine the amount of compensation. 
According to the elders, any fight between a husband and wife that leads to 
loss of blood is bad and they discourage it by demanding heavy compensation. 
In their view, Ayaa was badly beaten by her husband and lost blood, which 
might affect the child she is carrying. One elderly lady (Damali) said, “…this is 
a very bad thing to do to a pregnant wife. We have not heard Odoki’s version, 
but I have seen him drink like a fish and behave badly when drunk. I am sure he 
is in the wrong and must pay Ayaa”.  Abuneri  agreed and stressed the 
importance of understanding the circumstances surrounding the fight first, 
before talking about compensation. He said, “…we must know whether Odoki 
was drunk or the fight was a continuation of earlier quarrels or if it was 
intended to harm Ayaa. If it is because of the money that Ayaa worked for, then 
Odoki is an idiot and shall pay heavily.”
281 They seek to get the facts by 
knowing the truth and then determine the right compensation, which can be 
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something like a goat or money. The presiding elder takes it from Odoki and 
gives it to Ayaa. One elder added (with a smile), “...he also has to pay for our 
‘sitting allowance’…not money, but nice Kwete beer.” 
It is not only fighting that the elders want to address, but other related things 
too. For instance, the fight could be caused by Odoki’s failure to take care of his 
wife and children. “…since they have land, why did they go to do leja-leja in the 
first place?”  Abuneri  mumbled. They all agreed that if Ayaa  had done 
something wrong,  Odoki  should have been the first to report to them, not 
Bongomin. He failed to resolve his domestic problem and resorted to kicking a 
person “carrying his blood”, and has become a source of conflict in his house. 
What the elders want is not to punish Odoki, but to stop the flow of the bad 
blood between them so that they may live ‘well’ again. 
Although the gathering was about domestic violence, and not directly a dispute 
between a labour provider and labour recipient, the root cause was the money 
from leja-leja work that Odoki and Ayaa had earned. The mediation hearing of 
what happened between Odoki and his wife did not take place during my stay 
in the village, but the discussions with the elders gave an interesting dimension 
of how villagers solve their disputes informally despite the option of using the 
Isunga  village council. Regardless, it showed the components, nature and 
complexity of the ‘other’ justice system that is very different from the more 
formal local council system, which is there to punish rather than promote 
harmony between people.
282 
6.5.3  Threats and use of force to resolve labour disputes 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, another way of resolving disputes between 
economic actors is by hiring individuals to act as ‘debt collectors’. The debt 
collectors of Isunga use threats or force to resolve disputes. Although it is 
illegal in Uganda, some people turn to such methods out of despair. In a 
conversation with CS3-MAF (Atenyi) in 2007, she referred to one person who 
used it, and thus became the talk of the village for a long time. She said,   
 
“...Mzee Luka
283 our neighbour over there (pointing) refused to pay a ‘displaced’ 
labourer without giving the reasons. The man gathered his friends and 
threatened to kill him. He got his money in no time. Some of the ‘displaced’ do 
not hesitate to harm you if you delay to pay them as agreed. We hear some of 
them killed many people in  Acholi  before coming here…I fear them.”   
(Conversation with CS3-MAF in September 2007) 
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In November 2008, I located the man at the centre of CS3-MAF’s (Atenyi) 
story to find out his version of the events.
284 This is what he told me, 
 
“…nyeri laming mada (he is very stupid), he made me work for him calo gwici 
(like a slave) without water to drink…what did he expect me to do? I narrated 
my problems to my friends from Tee-Cwa village and they agreed to deal with 
him. I really didn’t want to harm him but rather to force him to pay my money. 
One of the guys from Tee-Cwa is one-eyed and we call him Dayan. He lost his 
eye during a fight over a woman two years ago. He is bad news; his look alone 
can scare you…fierce with scars all over his face. With him in charge, we went 
to Mzee Luka (the debtor), caught him by the neck, and threatened him that if he 
did not pay within two days, Dayan would finish him off. The following day, I 
got my money, paid my friends three bottles of Kipanga for their efforts…I also 
drank it (laugh)”  
Ladit, to be honest, I will never do this again. It spoils people’s names (balo 
nying dano) and could easily have got me into trouble. But I was badly in need 
of money, approached him many times, but Mzee Luka just did not want to pay 
me. This made me very angry and I sought help from my friends. I only asked 
them to threaten him so that I could get my money…but I was also afraid that if 
Mzee was hurt, then I would be in deep trouble with the law.” (Conversation 
with Okumu, November 2008) 
Although  Okumu  successfully got his money by threatening to ‘finish off’ 
Mzee Luka, he was not very comfortable with the method, as shown by the last 
part of the conversation above. He also expressed remorse for what he did to 
Mzee Luka  and underlined “...I will never do this again, it spoils people’s 
names”. Other than this, none of the case households used threats or applied 
force to resolve their labour disputes; and neither did they say they were 
victims of such threats.  
6.6  Summary and key issues  
In this chapter we presented and discussed the institutions and institutional 
arrangements that Isunga villagers use to structure and enforce their labour 
exchange relationships. In my effort to understand which particular institutions 
(formal or informal) actually regulate agricultural labour exchanges in the 
village, the study found that the farmers of Isunga  use many different 
institutions when structuring their labour relationships, ensuring performance 
and resolving labour conflicts that may arise out of work-sharing or labour 
exchange relationships. But the role of informal institutions was more apparent 
than the formal ones.  
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The study demonstrated the importance of personal trust arising from long-
term relationships when identifying and choosing labour  partners. Family 
membership, friendship and other informal relations (such as belonging to the 
same ethnic group, praying in the same church or belonging to the same gurub) 
play key roles in structuring labour relationships in the village. Therefore, 
building such personal relationships is an important strategy to secure much-
needed farm labour, as well as to enforce it. At the core of this is a person’s 
trust and reputation in the eyes of the other villagers.  Labour exchange 
agreements (winye) are agreed verbally, which makes them rather fluid, and 
constantly renegotiated to reduce the risk of conflicts. However, farmers use 
winye in combination with other informal mechanisms to make their labour 
exchanges as smooth as possible. Such informal mechanisms include: (a) 
gathering information about potential labour partners, (b) using advance 
payment (dog-bur) in the case of leja-leja wage labour and work for cash (pur 
cente) by farmers groups in Isunga. In spite of what contract theory tells us, 
winye is used for smoothing exchanges and making them conflict-free, rather 
than as a ‘legal safeguard’ against opportunistic behaviour or use as evidence 
in courts.
285  
I  also found that the mechanisms used to identify and choose labour 
partners are the same ones they use to guarantee performance by their labour 
exchange partners: (a) dealing with individuals that are personally known to 
them; (b) making use of dog-bur payment practices in which a partial amount 
is paid in advance at the start of the work, and the rest after the work is done. 
This mechanism applies only to leja-leja wage labour transactions and work 
for cash (pur cente) carried out by farmer groups such as the Kony-Paco Group 
mentioned in Chapter 5; (c) gathering information about potential exchange 
actors’ characters, behaviours, personalities and capabilities through informal 
sources, such as family members, relatives, in-laws, friends, neighbours, beer 
drinking groups or other informal connections. In other words, they make use 
of informal institutional arrangements to reduce uncertainty of verbal contracts 
and to avoid disputes that might arise.  
It also emerged that the Isunga local village council (LC1) had very limited 
role as a formal institution in structuring, regulating and enforcing villagers’ 
labour exchange relationships.
286 A few people mentioned it with respect to 
curious farmers checking the background of newcomers to the village, such as 
the internally displaced persons to see if they were LRA rebels or genuine IDPs 
for example, and resolving disputes. Even so, the people of Isunga take their 
grievances to the village council for guidance only after informal mechanisms 
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have failed. None of the case households spoke of taking their grievances 
directly to the Isunga  LC1 court without first attempting to settle them 
informally. This is because informal means are less expensive in terms of time 
and money, and more effective than their village council. It also helps to foster 
on-going labour relationships. The informal mechanisms villagers use to settle 
their labour disputes include: (a) renegotiation of labour exchange agreements 
which involve direct bargaining with the persons involved; (b) informal 
mediation such as using elders committees, who put pressure on the persons 
involved to change their behaviour; (c) other persons with whom labour 
partners have informal relationships, such as relatives or friends. It is clear 
from the household case studies that these informal mechanisms work because 
Isunga villagers fear embarrassment (balo nying), damage to their reputation, 
and family or community sanctions.  
In the next chapter, we investigate possible explanations for the continued use 
of informal institutions and the minimal use of formal institutions in Isunga. 201 
7  Durability of informality 
7.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I showed how Isunga farmers carefully structure and 
implement their labour relationships. They work hard to reach good winye to 
avoid disputes or opportunistic behaviour that could lead to nywere-nywere. 
Even so, most labour dealings are carried out on the basis of personal trust. 
When faced with labour disputes, informal mechanisms are commonly used, 
and they only turn to the more formal Isunga Local Council for help as a last 
resort. This is despite years of institutional reforms that include introducing 
changes in labour dispute laws and processes. Why is this so? Why do farmers 
use informal institutions and informal mechanisms to access labour and solve 
disputes instead of the formal ones created by the government of Uganda? 
How has ‘informalism’ been affected by the development of commercial 
agriculture in Isunga? This chapter gives some possible explanations to the 
prevalence of informality in Isunga after three decades of neo-liberal reforms 
with a focus on the factors that may affect the operations of formal institutions 
in the village. 
In the next section, I discuss the factors relating to the characteristics of 
agricultural labour transactions in Isunga  (the role played by level of 
dependency and length of labour relations on farmers’ choices of institutional 
types). Section 7.3 recognises the presence of the Ugandan State in Isunga by 
looking at how the Isunga Local Council (LC1) works in practice, focusing on 
the role it plays in resolving disputes. This is followed by a note on the formal 
arbitration system in the country in Section 7.4. Subsequently, Section 7.5 
looks at morality and affection as sources of informality, before some 
concluding remarks in Section 7.6 202 
7.2  Characteristics of agricultural labour transactions 
In Chapter 3, I presented and discussed the frequency of labour transactions 
and level of dependency, and length of labour relations as the main factors 
relating to the characteristics of agricultural labour transactions. This section 
examines how these factors influence farmers’ uses of institutional types.  
7.2.1  Frequency of transactions and level of dependency 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the farmers of Isunga are aware that 
when labour is scarce, unique or specialised, such as using oxen for weeding 
and reasonable levels of dependency exist, then they choose governance 
arrangements that are based on trust and reputation so as to minimise the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour. Opportunism here is defined according 
to Williamson (1985) as,    
 
“…self-interest seeking with guile. This includes but is scarcely limited to more 
blatant forms, such as lying, stealing, and cheating. Opportunism often involves 
subtle forms of deceit ... More generally, opportunism refers to the incomplete 
or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, 
distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse. It is responsible for real or 
contrived conditions of information asymmetry, which complicate problems of 
economic organization.” (ibid, 1985:47-48) 
This study, however, did not see any significant role played by human asset 
specificity in labour transactions, apart from one case of using oxen for 
weeding tobacco. This is because the majority of Isunga villagers practice crop 
farming using rudimentary tools like hand hoes and machetes, and raw labour 
power. Moreover, in an environment where timing and planning are very 
important in decision-making, there are periods when the need for fast 
completion of time-sensitive tasks is high and every farmer is doing the same 
kind of work.
287 Farmers therefore seek to invest in social ties and in the words 
of one farmer “rest on each other’s  shoulders” (CS19-LOM). Thus, the 
relationships between labour providers and labour recipients involve some 
degree of mutual dependency, hence the relevance of social structure. 
Level of mutual dependency 
When a labour relationship is based on mutual dependency (e.g. CS4-MOJM and 
CS20-COM), both labour providers and recipients would bear some risks with 
respect to possible opportunistic behaviour. A labour provider would be in 
trouble if an agreement (winye) were not properly interpreted. For instance, a 
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leja-leja seller may fail to get his or her wage on time (CS9-MAM), a gurub 
member may be expelled from a farmers group  (see Section 5.3), an aleya 
member may miss other members’ labour contributions; a work party participant 
may miss future labour opportunities because his or her name is ‘soiled’ or 
‘smells bad’. There was consensus among the case households that it was 
difficult to deal with persons who do not follow their parts of winye. On the other 
hand, a labour recipient may also be negatively affected by the opportunistic 
behaviour of labour providers by doing shoddy work, working slowly or getting 
the ‘dog-bur’ payment and disappearing. These harm households that receive 
labour and hamper their crop production activities. It could also cause nywere-
nywere, which in turn results in the termination of their labour relations, 
something that most villagers do not feel comfortable doing. 
In principle, both labour recipients and labour providers could take their 
grievances to the Isunga  Local Council (LC1) for legal guidance, as 
recommended by the 2006 Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act 
(GOU, 2006b) and the 2006 Local Council Courts Act (GOU, 2006c). But as I 
will explain in the next section, the ‘legal’ route is always tricky. The Isunga 
LC1 is not all that popular among the villagers. Many villagers consider the 
LC1 court procedures to be costly and biased, with unpredictable outcomes. 
Moreover, turning to the Isunga LC carries with it other social costs associated 
with reputation and losing sources of farm labour. Thus, when a particular task 
has to be done fast, and the labour dealing is considered valuable, or may 
involve some sort of mechanisation such as use of animal traction (see CS18-
MOF in chapter 5), it is likely that the persons involved would structure their 
transactions in a way that reduces risk and uncertainty (c.f North, 2006; Landa, 
1994;  North, 1994;  Williamson, 1985). It is therefore not surprising that 
farmers structure their labour dealings in ways that are based on trust. This also 
explains why the case households used in this study stressed dealing with 
persons they know well or those persons whose names ‘smell good’ in the 
village. They put emphasis on core labour partners and work hard to build and 
maintain long-term relationships with them. Some of the better-off households 
(CS4-MOJM and CS18-MOF) indicated that when an existing labour 
relationship is good, then they would feel relaxed when doing patana and they 
know the task would be well done. Mutual dependency is therefore an 
important factor in explaining why Isunga villagers use informal mechanisms 
when structuring, regulating and enforcing their labour relationships.  
7.2.2  The duration of transactional relations also matters  
The study also found that the duration of labour relationships matters when 
deciding what institutions should govern labour relationships. All my 204 
informants stressed maintaining labour relationships that have passed the test 
of time, because it eases patana, reaching good winye and enforcing it without 
fear of opportunistic behaviour. They have come to know each other well over 
time (see Section 6.2), and winye  are reached without the intervention of 
outsiders (third parties) since both sides have gone through ‘experiential 
learning’ and know what is expected of them. As hinted at in the last chapter, 
once a labour relationship has been established and is working well, the parties 
involved try hard to foster it. All the case households said they take long-term 
relationship into account when looking for help or extra labour, or when 
deciding how to settle nywere-nywere. So, when  the duration of the 
relationship increases, those involved get more used to each other or familiar 
with each other’s expectations and build up trust. In this case, the use of 
informal institutions makes sense.
288 Zenger et al.(2002) also support this when 
they argue that  the use of formal institutions may be preferable in non-
recurring relationships given that, 
 
“…non-repeated interactions provide neither a shadow of the future increasing 
perceived benefits from cooperation nor a shadow of the past promoting the 
gradual development of relational norms and trust” (ibid, 2002:8) 
As will be discussed in section 7.5, the above findings are also affected by 
moral and affective factors. These contribute to the prevalence of informal 
institutions in the village and the minimal use of the Isunga Local Council (a 
formal institution) in settling labour disputes. The people of Isunga prefer to 
work with persons they have come to know well over time, instead of new 
faces. In the next section, I look at the presence of the Ugandan state in Isunga 
by examining how the local council system works in practice. 
7.3  Isunga village court and disputes settlement 
It was made clear in Chapter 3 that formal institutions in general, and legal 
procedures relating to courts in particular, play important roles in labour 
transactions if they are cheap and efficient. However, it emerged from the field 
study that the people of Isunga are cautious about taking their grievances to the 
Isunga LC1 (the only formal institution in the village).
289 Instead, they prefer 
informal mechanisms when faced with disputes because they are cheaper. In 
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the eyes of many villagers, the Isunga LC1 court is a source of injustice due to 
factors including bribery, corruption, incompetence, biased rulings, and the 
women complain of male domination.
290 Most villagers, even those who had 
no experience of taking disputes to the LC1, said that they do not trust the 
Isunga LC1 and stressed that dealing with it is a very ‘costly business’. The 
costs include money, time and effort throughout the entire dispute settlement 
process; and of course, the social costs associated with the ‘soiling’ of one’s 
reputation and breakdown of existing relationships. The sub-sections below 
examine these costs as driving factors of informality in Isunga.
291  
7.3.1  The costs of using the village court  
Both North (1991; 1990) and Williamson (1998; 1985; 1981) point out that 
transactions of any sort involving two actors or more are riddled with many 
potential problems (costs). These problems can arise before, during, and after 
the transactions have taken place. Therefore, the type of institutions farmers 
use affects these costs in many ways. In this way, the function of a particular 
institution is to influence the game players’ decisions in a given context. And, 
as argued by Coase  (1960), rational behaviour would imply that a more 
efficient institution (with fewer problems or lower costs) should be preferable 
over a less efficient one. This study supports Coase’s point since most people 
of Isunga are not enthusiastic about using ‘legal’ procedures to go about their 
labour dealings or settle disputes in court if there are high costs involved. This 
was the case with Musa’s (CS9-MAM) behaviour discussed earlier. Because of 
the high costs associated with the Isunga Local Council, farmers like Musa 
tend to avoid it as much as possible. However, those who turn to it, do so as a 
last resort and with a great deal of effort.
292 Fafchamps & Minten  (2001) 
observed that in an environment where the legal framework is poorly 
developed, reliance on informal ways to carry out transactions may be more 
appropriate for minimising transaction costs.
293  
As will be explored below, ambiguity of existing labour laws, regulatory 
procedures and inadequate legal support in the enforcement of contracts 
                                                        
290 C.f. Khadiagala (2001) 
291 For a study of the weak and disputed character of the Ugandan state in rural Uganda, see 
Ben Jones’ (2008) work in the Teso sub-region. 
292 Elsewhere in Uganda, Khadiagala (2001) reached similar conclusion in her work on the 
failure of popular justice in south western Uganda. 
293 Fafchamps & Minten (2001) define four economic factors which make legal enforcement 
mechanisms costly and less preferred: (i) the actual cost of legal action, including lawyers’ fees, 
bribes to agents of authority, and the opportunity cost of time, (ii) the expected time delay before 
compensation is received, (iii) the uncertainty surrounding the level of compensation, and (vi) 
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(winye) lead villagers in Isunga to place their faith and efforts outside the more 
formal local council to carry out their labour dealings. This behaviour is 
supported by Telser  (1980a)  who correctly argued that reliance on self-
enforcing agreements by parties to a transaction can be attributed to the fact 
that it is costly to use the assistance of third parties.
294 In the case of the Isunga 
LC1 court, it has the legal power to enforce agreements and assess damages 
when they are breached (GOU, 2006c).
295 The LC1 court can penalise persons 
who breach wage labour agreements. On the other hand, if the existing labour 
relationship between actors is very valuable then breaking it could incur other 
costs such as the cost of searching for new labour partners. The effect of such 
costs is obvious when a person is embedded in social networks, since using the 
Isunga LC1 court is likely to damage one’s reputation and future possibilities 
of finding support (see Section 7.4 below).
296 
Social costs of going to the Isunga village court 
As seen in the last chapter  Isunga  villagers are very careful with their 
reputations and going to the local council (LC1) court to solve existing nywere-
nywere may in the damage one’s reputation in the long-term. Isunga is a small 
village, thus information about those who behave badly, treat fellow villagers 
unfairly or those who have labour disputes, easily spreads throughout the 
village. The losing party is thus seen as a person who has displayed bad and/or 
unacceptable behaviour, which will affect his or her reputation negatively. 
People who have bad reputations are likely to be subjected to community 
sanctions. In the dispute between Musa (CS9-MAM) and Bazilio (CS1-JSBM) 
discussed earlier, the latter would find it difficult to get people to work for him 
in the future since many villagers do not like working for people who are 
dishonest or have behaved badly towards another villager. Interestingly, such 
community sanctions do not only apply to those  who lose a case; even 
‘winners’ can be in trouble. This is because there is an ethnic perspective to 
almost everything in Isunga. If for instance, the disagreement filters through 
the village and is portrayed as IDPs versus the Barullis, then some of the 
Barullis would be reluctant to deal with IDPs in the future. In this way, the 
reputation of the winning side is also damaged since the Barullis may think 
                                                        
294 See also Landa & Lu (1997) work on ethnic cooperation in Southeast Asia for similar 
arguments. 
295 Note that the LC1 court is based on a principle of punishment rather than that of promoting 
harmony through mediations discussed in Section 6.5.2. 
296 Harrison White (1981) whilst talking to Swedberg (1990:78-93) argued that people also use 
deliberate action with respect to embedding economic actions, the notion of embedding used in 
the sense of Karl Polanyi  (2001)  to mean that an individual’s economic transactions are 
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that he just wanted to punish their fellow Murulli man. A farmer came close to 
confirming this when he remarked, 
  
 “... I really do not know what I would do when put in Musa’s situation. But 
taking the case to the LC people would not be an option because it’ll ‘spoil my 
name’ among the Palwos and the Barullis who are very powerful here…and we 
are in their land. They are rich and might not help you next time you need their 
help or work.” (Interview with CS20-COM, November 2008) 
Thus pressing charges against a fellow villager in the LC1 Court, no matter how 
justifiable it might be, is seen by some villagers as a violation of behavioural 
norms. Therefore, they may not wish to push their counterparts too hard, simply 
because they want to keep their reputations intact. Thus, the need to preserve 
relationships acts as an incentive for villagers to rely on informal mechanisms to 
enforce their labour dealings. This makes sense, especially when we consider the 
hazardous way the Isunga  LC1 court mechanism operates with rampant 
complaints of unfair and unpredictable outcomes (see below). 
7.3.2  Outcomes of the Isunga village court rulings 
Apart from the cost issues outlined above, villagers also remarked that the 
Isunga LC1 court rulings are usually biased and unfair, and that the whole 
process of acquiring justice is quite unpredictable. This discourages many of 
them from using it. The shortcomings of the Isunga local council mentioned in 
the case studies, conversations with villagers (including some of the local 
councillors), as well as my own observations include: (a) weaknesses of the 
laws governing the local council system,  (b) decisions not based on legal 
considerations due to the councillors’ corrupt behaviour, (c) most of the village 
councillors are illiterate and incompetent, and (d) the court rulings being 
‘tricky’ to enforce.
297 The illustrations below reflect the biased, unfair and 
unpredictable nature of the Isunga village court.   
CS4-MOJM (Jalon): the LC ruled in our favour, but they refused to leave. 
Jalon is a Palwo elder, with a junk of land.
298 According to Jalon, land is no 
longer owned by the Palwo people as it used to be. Most of the land is sold and 
                                                        
297 It was very difficult to obtain data on agricultural labour related disputes from the Isunga 
Local Council (LC1), because they do not maintain a registry and most farmers use informal 
mechanisms to address existing conflicts. Still, it is important to show how disputes are solved 
through the Isunga Local Council Court, one of the products of the institutional reforms of the 
agricultural modernization agenda.  
298 Jalon told me the first time we met that he owns 50 acres of land, and the second time we 
met he increased this to ‘only’ 130 acres of land, but the Isunga LC1 Chairman said the Mzee has 
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the forests have been taken over by the government. This has led to many land 
conflicts in the village and surrounding areas. At the time of the interview in 
2007, Jalon was in conflict with a group of villagers. He said, “…the conflict 
does not involve me directly, but one of my cousins. My name comes in because 
I was involved in filing the case to the magistrate’s court in Masindi. I used to 
attend the court sessions regularly but stopped attending the court case last year 
because they kept on postponing it…now I am tired following it”. The source of 
the conflict is farmland that belonged to his late cousin (Okwera). Okwera 
rented the farmland to some Alur people from the West Nile when he was still 
alive. But when he died in 2006, the family of the deceased wanted to get the 
land back, but the Alur  (squatters) refused to leave. They argued that they 
bought it from Okwera and see no reason why they should leave. Jalon and the 
family of the deceased disagree, and the squatters don’t have any paper to 
support their claim. Jalon remarked, “…the Alur people are not trusted, they say 
this and do something else…I do not want them in my shamba”. The case was 
referred to both the Isunga  LC1 court and the magistrate’s court in 
Kiryandongo…and nothing has come of it yet. Jalon said, “…the LC first ruled 
in our favour, but the squatters refused to leave. Now I ‘hear words’ that the LC 
Chairman is encouraging them not to leave, and that the law is on their side. If 
it is true, then I think it is because he is an Alur and wants to protect his 
people…after all, they voted for him. Some people keep on telling me that if I 
give some of the councillors ‘something small’ (bribe), then we’ll get our land 
back. But why should I do it when I know we are in the right?”  Jalon is 
convinced some of the Isunga local councillors are hostile towards him. He said, 
“…one of them even witnessed against me before he became councillor…and 
every day he and the chairman sit and drink beer together”. 
Jalon’s dissatisfaction with the Isunga LC1 court above is supplemented by my 
experience of a court session in May 2009. 
Field experience: Before the ‘hyenas’ of Isunga 
On 31 May 31 2009, I accompanied Bazilio to hear a case before the Isunga 
LC1 Court. A fellow villager (Abiro) accused Bazilio of letting his cattle stray 
into his maize field, destroying the crop, and he wanted to be compensated.
299 
Abiro came with four witnesses, and Bazilio had his herdsman (Thomas) as a 
witness. The judge and prosecutor was the LC1 Chairman, with two of his 
                                                        
299 Of course, I tried to understand why they could not resolve the nywere-nywere between 
them informally instead of going to the LC since everyone seems to be against the LC people, but 
I got a rather unpleasant response from Bazilio saying that Abiro is an idiot (muciro) and I should 
go and ask him (Abiro) instead. Even my effort to talk to Abiro about the nywere-nywere did not 
yield any results. Instead, Abiro accused me for trying to get words from him and pass them to 
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councillors as advisors. We all sat in a circle under a mango tree.
300 Although 
the principal purpose of the court was to administer justice, it was in effect a 
‘reality theatre’, which drew a lot of interest to by passers and some villagers 
joined in when the court was under way. The exchanges between Abiro and 
Bazilio  were unfriendly and provided fertile ground for much laughter, 
murmuring and discussion. One councillor reminded the court that this is not the 
first time Bazilio is brought before them because of ‘his arrogance’ with his 
wealth and because of straying into Ekanya’s home and committing adulterous 
acts with his wife. To an outsider like me, the councillor’s remarks had nothing 
to do with the conflict between Abiro and Bazilio. Indeed, there was drama as 
Bazilio walked away accusing the village councillor of ‘spoiling his name’ and 
‘witch-hunting’ him for things he never did and just ‘soiling his reputation’ in 
the village. But Thomas stayed, raised his hand and pointed out that on the day 
and time Abiro said their cattle destroyed his maize shamba, he was watering 
the cattle at the dam. And that there are people who saw Zakayo’s cattle near 
Abiro’s shamba, and advised the court to talk to them instead. Bazilio  left, 
visibly angry and swearing to report the ‘big-mouthed’ councillor to the 
Mutunda sub-county chief for ‘spoiling his name’. The Chairman kept quiet, 
although occasionally smiled. The court ended abruptly, as the accused was not 
willing to be part of it. Instead, other villagers advised Abiro  to solve the 
problem out of court. Abiro murmured to himself and was equally disappointed 
as nothing concrete came from the effort, yet he had to pay for the local 
councillors’ sitting allowance. 
The local council court is by law to be an arena where grievances and disputes 
are addressed, and the main work of the Chairperson is to listen to both sides 
carefully and settle them without biases and to the satisfaction of the parties 
involved (GOU, 2006c; Khadiagala, 2001). The law also says that the local 
council court should consist of all members of the executive committee of the 
village, which was not followed in the above case and the village court should 
have adjourned to another time (ibid, 2006c:6). The unfairness in which the 
case was handled led to the court breaking in disarray. Bazilio left in anger, a 
signal perhaps that he doubted the court’s judgement. Abiro too, was equally 
disappointed as his grievance was not properly addressed and nothing was said 
about compensation for the maize crops that were destroyed. Thus, the unfair 
and unreasonable way in which the court conducted itself and dealt with the 
case, is a strong reason villagers spoke badly of their local council and refer to 
the councillors as ‘hyenas’.
301 
                                                        
300 At the start of the hearing, Bazilio introduced me to the gathering and asked if anyone 
objects to my presence. No one objected and I sat next Bazilio. 
301 In Palwo and Nyoro folklore, hyenas are viewed with contempt and are associated with bad 
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Although the law demands procedural fairness, this was not observed 
during the LC1 court sitting (GOU, 2006c). For instance, as a ‘prosecutor’, the 
Chairperson never advised Bazilio  (the accused person) of the case against 
him. He never explained the nature of the allegation to him, as a way of giving 
Bazilio a fair hearing as required by the law, nor the chance to question his 
accuser  (Abiro). Instead, the Isunga  LC1 Chairman allowed one of his 
councillors to make allegations more or less in support of Abiro, including all 
sorts of accusations that had nothing to do with the court. If anything, the 
conduct of the LC Chairperson and his councillors is a stark reminder that no 
matter how well the Government of Uganda creates the administrative, legal 
and/or political structures needed for an effective service delivery; much will 
depend on the attitude and conduct of the individuals in charge of those 
structures. But since the system relies on untrained ‘judges’, common sense, 
local norms and social ties easily influence the local council court outcomes 
(Khadiagala, 2001). 
Both the CS4-MOJM story and the field observation above reveal the 
limitations of the Isunga LC1 as an institution. Not only do they offer examples 
of how long it takes the Isunga LC1 to settle disputes, but also that ‘simple’ 
disputes could also become complicated due to the weakness of the local 
council system itself. This in turn makes the process of dispute settlement 
cumbersome, unpleasant and costly. Even CS9-MAM’s dispute with CS1-
JSBM discussed in Chapter 6 showed that Musa’s experience with the Isunga 
LC was financially and socially costly. With the above catalogue of evidence, I 
conclude that the cumbersome court procedures and lack of professionalism 
involved, bribery or corruption and use of ethnicity, all work in concert to deny 
justice to the people of Isunga. 
The Isunga local councillors as rent seekers 
In the CS9-MAM household case study, the Isunga LC1 Chairman’s decision 
to help Musa was influenced by informal payments. If we also consider what 
CS20-COM seems to suggest below, then there is the possibility for anyone 
with the means (social or strong economic position in the village) to influence 
the decisions of the Isunga local council. In a village where ethnicity weighs 
heavily and personal ties are important, there is no guarantee that Isunga local 
councillors do not make decisions and judgements based on their relations with 
a particular member of the society. Again, considering Mzee Jalon’s (CS4-
MOJM) critics of the Isunga Local Council above, it is apparent the Isunga 
LC1 court process is messy and unpredictable, court judgements are unfair and 
the outcomes are heavily questionable. Most villagers I talked to, even those 211 
who had no experience with the Isunga LC, talked of it as useless, corrupt and 
‘tribalistic’¸ and it called the councillors biased. One farmer remarked,  
 
“...here, you can win a case if you go to any of the councillors with some chai 
(meaning money) and he influences the others. Well, you may lose the money, 
but is much cheaper than going the full cycle of their process...with money for 
pens, papers, water and obal tic (sitting allowance) each time they gather. Where 
can a poor man like me get that money? Camusana (bribe) influences most of 
their decisions…and if you gave them ‘something small’ but lost the case, the 
fine is reduced or punishment less severe compared to when nothing was given.” 
(Interview with CS20-COM, November 2008) 
A woman farmer added, 
 
“…our councillors hunt for money and they chase it like chasing a rat. If you don’t 
have money, no one listens to you” (Interview with CS13-JKF, November 2008). 
With the possibility of ‘greasing the hands’ of the councillors open to both the 
accused and the accuser, those with the right resources can buy justice.
302 For 
instance, when the LC1 Chairman wanted money for ‘a pen and paper’ from 
Musa (CS9-MAM), the signal was clear i.e. if you want me to attend to your 
case, just pay.  
Weaknesses of the laws and regulations 
The fact that the local council courts are allowed to make ‘legal’ decisions 
even when councillors lack the knowledge and experience to validate the 
importance of a case, leaves a lot to be desired. The LC system appears to be 
an important source of injustice in Isunga and beyond. Uganda’s law on labour 
disputes does not clearly spell out procedures on how the LC1 courts should 
settle labour disputes. It also does not specify whether ‘court’ procedures 
involving labour disputes should be initiated in the LC1 courts, the 
Magistrate’s Courts or through the District Labour Offices. Therefore, given 
the overlap in the legal documents, labour disputes can in fact be handled by 
different offices with different outcomes. The evidence suggests that decisions 
made by the Isunga local council are influenced by a number of non-legal 
factors such as nepotism, friendship, ethnicity or membership of social 
organisations, and not based on any legal consideration whatsoever. This is a 
view shared by Khadiagala (2001) when she wrote, 
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“…the court’s personal knowledge of the disputants replaces the rules of 
evidence employed by formal courts of law.” (ibid, 2001:65) 
The CS9-MAM case study and my field experience narrated above involving 
Bazilio  (CS1-JSBM) provide examples of contradictory and inconsistent 
‘legal’ behaviour of the Isunga  village court, which in turn contribute to 
unpredictable results of their actions. These are strong enough reasons for 
villagers to turn their backs on the more formal local council court. Note that 
the settlement processes of land disputes, labour disputes, criminal (murder, 
robbery or theft) and civil cases such as wife battering are similar. Isunga 
villagers may take their grievances to their LC Chairman as required by the 
law. But if the process is handled poorly, then it is very likely that their 
experience from such a process prevents them from taking any grievance to the 
village council in the future.
303 One farmer noted,  
 
“....I had some problems with a fellow who got his dog-bur and disappeared 
without finishing his task, but I never bothered to report it to those LC hyenas 
because my experience with them concerning the land dispute with those Alur 
people we talked about last year, ‘opened my eyes’ and taught me never to 
trust the Isunga LC people, especially that useless Chairman who starts his 
day with a glass of Kipanga...he is a bad person.” (Interview with CS4-
MOJM, November 2008) 
Another woman from a poor household remarked, 
 
“…I took a small complaint to them, and when the chairman demanded a goat 
before he considered it, I just gave up. My friend Min Acii fought with Akiiki at 
the borehole, when the LC took the case up…they asked both Min Acii and 
Akiiki  for money for lunch, transport and sitting allowance. Hmm, transport 
within Isunga?” (Interview with CS7-ABF, November 2008)  
The above farmers are not alone when it comes to negative feelings about the 
Isunga  LC. During the interviews, group discussions and informal 
conversations, many villagers referred to several cases in which people they 
knew had some nasty experience with the Isunga LC. Their dissatisfaction is 
mainly due to the councillor’s corrupt behaviour, use of bad language and the 
unpredictable court processes. 
                                                        
303 See the New Vision Newspaper, 30 May 2007. Article: Why Local Councils overstep their 
power, in which a village court in Karamoja sentenced a man suspected of murder to death by 
hanging; and the sentence was implemented there and then. 213 
Issues of competence and knowledge 
Following the ‘players of the game’ discussion in Chapter 3, it would make 
sense for Isunga villagers to turn to the village council for guidance and not 
complain if their local councillors were competent and knowledgeable of the 
various laws in place. This would increase their confidence in the system, as it 
would guarantee fairness and predictability of the outcomes of the Isunga LC1 
court decisions. No such conditions exist in Isunga, and hence the outcomes of 
the local council activities are unpredictable. In an interview with the 
Chairman of Isunga LC (DO1-LC1) in May 2009, he confirmed the negative 
perceptions in the village about the council he heads. According to him, this is 
because most of his councillors are illiterate and some hardly read or writes. A 
number of them too, do not attend meetings regularly because they prefer to 
spend more time working their shambas, so he does most of the work alone.
304 
He also confessed that his knowledge of the labour law or other laws is quite 
low. But as the government’s representative in the village, he has to work 
anyway because that is what he is expected to do. In short, the Isunga village 
councillors lack the knowledge, competence and experience in the laws they 
are supposed to apply in their line of duties. This explains why certain villagers 
complain that the outcomes of their LC1 court rulings are usually unfair and 
difficult to understand.
305 
Difficulties in enforcing court rulings 
Another point of significance that could explain the prevalence of informality 
in labour dealings in Isunga is how the LC1 court rulings are enforced. All my 
informants mentioned that each time a court ruling delivered a favourable 
outcome; enforcement is left up to the persons involved. This adds to the 
uncertainty of the whole process since there is no guarantee that the person 
who won the case can manage to enforce the outcome. In view of this, it is 
probably correct to argue that the LC1 court rulings enforcement mechanism 
does not exist. If it does exist, then the local councillors do not make use of it, 
probably due to their incompetence and lack of knowledge.  
Also, the difficulty of enforcing decisions is a good enough reason why the 
institution of the LC1 court is not used. One woman farmer came close to 
supporting this statement when she said,  
 
“...our LCs are needy people (lukec), they work hard to get our money, take their 
time to decide on a simple issue and if they decide in your favour, it is upon you 
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want to participate in the political process of the local councils. 
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to follow it up.” (Woman farmer during a FGD with Labongo Lworo Women’s 
Group, November 2008) 
Nowhere  in the 2006 Local Council Courts Act, is there any mention of 
deadlines within which the process of enforcement must be completed. In the 
nywere-nywere  between  Musa  (CS9-MAM) and Bazilio  (CS1-JSBM), the 
decision taken for Musa to get his money dragged on for months. Many of the 
households interviewed said that most LC rulings and decisions take several 
months to be enforced. In some cases, judgements were not enforced at all. 
Faced with such a reality, many villagers doubt their ability to obtain fair 
enforcement of the Isunga  LC1 court rulings. Hence, they prefer informal 
mechanisms both outside the Isunga LC and within it, which in turn adds more 
to the unpredictable nature of the outcomes. Weighing up what literature tells 
us against how the Isunga local council operates in practice; it is safe to state 
that the continued existence of informality is in fact an intrinsic element of 
‘formality’ in so far as it is a response to the inadequacies of formalisation and 
operations of the Isunga LC. Therefore, the prevalence of informality appears 
to be an adaptive mechanism that reinforces the shortcomings of the formal 
local court system.
306 Although  Jones  (2008)  suggested that the judicial 
functions were the most popular aspect of the local council system in the Teso 
region, this study found the people of Isunga less enthusiastic about the ability 
of their local council to adjudicate fairly. The Isunga LC is simply not popular. 
7.4  A note on the formal arbitration and mediation system 
Both the Employment Act (GOU, 2006a) and the Labour Disputes (Arbitration 
and Settlement) Act (GOU, 2006b) meant that arbitration could be used as a 
tool to resolve disputes arising from labour transactions. In principle, 
arbitration offers some advantages over the LC1 courts, and one such 
advantage is the conclusiveness of the rulings.
307 While the local council courts 
are subject to appeal, despite taking long to wind a case up, there are no 
appeals with arbitration rulings. In addition, the proceedings and rules of 
arbitration are relatively simple compared to courts. Whilst the local council 
courts take place in the open and anyone can attend, arbitration proceedings 
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existing social structures in the village. 
307 Arbitration here means settlement of disputes  between parties to a contract (verbal  or 
written) by a neutral third party (the arbitrator) without resorting to court actions. It is voluntary, 
yet required by law. If both parties agree to be bound by the arbitration decision, then it becomes 
a binding arbitration. In the Ugandan context, the exact procedure to follow is governed by the 
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take place in private, thus ensuring confidentiality. Although the Ugandan 
government has put extra effort into encouraging arbitration in settling 
disputes, villagers in Isunga have never heard of it, and hence do not use it. 
Nonetheless, recognising its existence and function provides insight into the 
perseverance of informal mediation approaches in the village.  
The Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act of 2006 also 
provides clear provisions for workers to refer labour disputes to the District 
Labour Officer (another formal way of solving disputes). Ironically, Isunga 
villagers said they have never heard of such possibilities. Section 3 of the Act 
spells out why and how labour disputes should be referred to District Labour 
Officers. Subsection 3 (1) reads, 
 
“...a labour dispute whether existing or apprehended, may be reported, in writing 
to a labour officer, by a party to the dispute in such form and containing 
particulars as may be prescribed by regulations made under this Act...and a 
person making a report of a labour dispute under subsection (1) shall send a 
copy of the report immediately to the other party to the dispute.” (GOU, 
2006b:7) 
The Act also calls upon District Labour Officers to react within two weeks 
after receipt of a complaint. They do so by meeting the parties and 
endeavouring to conciliate and resolve the labour dispute (GOU, 2006b). 
However, in an interview with the Masindi  District Labour Officer (DO7-
MDLO), he admitted that the above sections of the Labour Disputes 
(Arbitration and Settlement) Act of 2006 probably work well when labour 
agreements are written. He said,  
 
“...my work would be easy when a labour agreement is clearly written…but in 
cases where agreements are verbally reached, the Act is as good as useless. I 
also think that is why I don’t receive complaints from farmers. Even the white 
collar workers, sometimes they just come to obtain information about our role in 
resolving disputes, but most of them never come back after their first or second 
visits” (Interview with DO7-MDLO, November 2008). 
These comments by the Masindi District Labour Officer show that there is very 
little reliance on the offices set by the government to resolve labour disputes. 
Two reasons can be articulated for this, either the long arm of ‘the state’ is very 
weak that it cannot meet citizens’ expectations, or the low use of state 
institutions (the Isunga LC1 and the Masindi District Labour office) show the 216 
importance of informal methods in resolving labour disputes in the presence of 
a rather weak state in the country side.
308 
Mediation as a mechanism for resolving labour disputes 
The Labour Disputes Act also gives space for mediation as a mechanism for 
resolving labour disputes. Section 24, on power of the Labour Officer states,  
 
“...a Labour Officer shall in exercising his or her powers under this Act, 
endeavours to secure the settlement of disputes, actual or imminent, by use of 
voluntary procedures, conciliation and mediation; ...and a Labour Officer may 
act as conciliator or mediator in a labour disputes or may nominate any other 
person to act in the capacity.”(GOU, 2006b:15) 
Although it reads well on paper, my informants made no mention of going to 
the Masindi District Labour Office to settle labour disputes. Otherwise, formal 
mediation involves using an independent, impartial and respected third party to 
reach a settlement instead of opting for arbitration or litigation. The mediator’s 
role is to advise the parties and offers suggestions on how to resolve their 
differences. It is not binding, yet recognised by the Ugandan state as one of the 
means to solve disputes (GOU, 2006b).
309 Although Isunga villagers (including 
the LC1 Chairperson) were ignorant about its existence, many of them 
complained that even if they were aware of the possibility of resolving labour 
related disputes through the District Labour Office, they would still hesitate to 
do so, because Masindi town is very far away. The LC1 Chairman observed,  
 
“…most of them do not have the money to travel to Masindi…and may be when 
they go, they come back empty-handed” (Interview with DO1-LC1).  
Reading through the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act of 
2006, one is struck by the lack of clear regulations on mediation, which in my 
understanding makes it a bad mechanism for settling labour disputes. In 
particular, there is no precise provision indicating how agricultural labourers 
should go about it.
310 Moreover, it is based on the assumption that such 
information is free and farmers can easily access it, yet this is not true. 
                                                        
308 See Jones (2008) for similar remarks. 
309 Unlike an arbitrator, a mediator has no power to force acceptance of his or her decision, but 
relies on persuasion to reach an agreement. Even so, mediations are usually informal in terms of 
the persons involved, time and place of mediation. 
310 The Masindi District Labour Officer did not even know what inhibits them from doing so. 217 
Breaking the rules, the LC Chairman as a dispute mediator 
In my interview with the Mutunda sub-county chief (DO2-MSCC), he revealed 
that although he was not familiar with the law on mediation and unsure 
whether he should do it, he has on many occasions mediated in disputes 
between community members when referred from the local councils. Even the 
LC1 Chairpersons mediate. According to the Chairman of Isunga LC, the most 
common labour dispute in the village involves the leja-leja people. Leja-leja 
disputes revolve around non-payment or late payment for work done, getting 
advance payment (dog-bur)  and disappearing “...especially the IDPs are 
notorious for this,” the Chairman stressed. Whenever approached by any of the 
disputing persons, he takes time to listen and mediate.
311 For instance, in the 
CS1-JSBM and CS9-MAM labour dispute narrated above, the LC Chairman 
mediated at one point; but did it in an informal way by assisting both Musa and 
Bazilio to determine the facts and scale of the dispute. When he heard Musa’s 
story and confronted Bazilio with the facts, the latter accepted as accused. He 
also helped them agree on what to do. However, he did not use his power and 
authority as the Isunga village boss to compel participation in the process and 
to make a decision for them to follow. The final decision was made by Musa 
and Bazilio and not enforced by some kind of law. The whole process was 
informal, non-binding and worked ‘well’ in the end.
312  
Since retaining a ‘good name’ is important in Isunga, if Bazilio continues 
behaving badly, or refuses to pay Musa  his money, other persons may get 
involved. For instance, Musa could use force or take the matter to the office of 
the Mutunda Sub-County Chief. This would not be good for Bazilio as his 
name might ‘get spoiled’. The whole village would get to know about his 
cheating behaviour and the consequences might be greater and more costly 
than the 10,000 UGX he owed Musa. Most likely other villagers would avoid 
dealing with him for showing bad behaviour, simply to avoid potential 
problems in future. Given the fact that Bazilio relies heavily on leja-leja labour 
for his farming activities, this would have severe consequences. 
7.5  Morality and affection as sources of informality 
Enough evidence exists from the household case studies in the previous 
chapters that labour transactions in Isunga are embedded in social relations and 
                                                        
311 When asked about the dispute between Musa (CS9-MAM) and Bazilio (CCS1-JSBM), he 
confirmed his involvement and that Bazilio was in the wrong. Still, he had to see between his 
fingers because Bazilio is a prominent member of the village and former LCIII councillor under 
their NRM party. 
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cultural conventions. More importantly, farmers’ labour behaviours and 
choices are fully rational. Hydén (1983; 1980) provides a clear exposition of 
the importance of the ‘economy of affection’ in African rural societies. The 
concept blends economic and social rationality and focuses on a range of 
survival and self-help strategies which otherwise would remain undetected or 
misapprehended (Seppälä, 1998; Lemarchand, 1989). Hydén (1983) defines the 
‘economy of affection’ as  
 
“…a network of support, communications and interaction among structurally 
defined groups connected by blood, kin, community or other activities, for 
example, religion.” (ibid, 1983:8) 
Therefore, the economy of affection is a defence mechanism, a way for people 
living in poverty to cope with the circumstances that are threatening their 
livelihoods.
313 It also serves the purpose of maintaining existing social relations 
since human agency is more than just pursuing one’s self-interest. It also 
implies judgements of responsibility and morally-guided actions (Hyden, 2002; 
Lemarchand, 1989;  Hydén, 1983). The subsection below explores how the 
‘economy of affection’ affects Isunga farmers’ choices of labour institutions 
and practices.  
7.5.1  Affective ties 
The collaborative efforts of the people of Isunga brought out several features of 
their individual, kinship and community dynamics. Their interactions at 
various levels of the village are consistent with the notion of the ‘economy of 
affection’. Below are three case examples that show how farmers exchange 
behaviour is influenced by moral and affective factors. They are presented in 
the form of episodes, sequences of events as observed and complemented by 
interviews  on the actual happenings from CS11-HJM, CS3-MAF and CS1-
JSBM households.  
CS11-HJM (Hajji): Groundnuts and beans for labour 
Hajji’s main economic activities are farming and trading in chicken. He mainly 
cultivates food crops (beans, maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, groundnuts and 
vegetables) and sunflower for money.
314 However, his major problem is lack of 
labour during certain periods when farming activities are seriously restricted by 
                                                        
313 Hyden (1983) also takes it as a comment on the weakness of state penetration in rural 
Tanzania, something he was criticised for.  
314 Hajji bought the land and the animals from his chicken business. He buys the birds rather 
cheaply from Isunga and the surrounding villages; transports them to Masindi Town and sells 
them at prices three or four times higher than the buying price.   219 
the lack of family labour. He addresses it by organising pur-kongo, receiving 
help from relatives and neighbours and/or hires leja-leja. The rewards vary 
depending on the source of labour, tasks and ages of the labourers.
315 In August 
2007, I observed how Hajji mobilised people to help him harvest beans and 
groundnuts that were getting spoiled due to heavy rain. Eleven people were 
involved: two persons from Rukia’s aleya group, three were Hajji’s friends, two 
were IDPs working for reward in kind and four were relatives (two cousins and 
two sisters-in-law).
316 They worked for roughly four hours, and after they had 
finished harvesting the crops, Rukia arranged to reciprocate her work to the 
other two. The IDPs and Hajji’s cousins were given some beans and groundnuts 
to take home.
317 Rukia’s aleya labour companions were not given any of the 
crops to take home, except a promise to get Rukia’s labour in return for their 
contributions. One of the relatives received some beans, but was also promised 
labour help by Hajji for the following day. Even the IDP lady who came late got 
some beans to take with her. According to Hajji, she is a poor widow whose 
husband died not long ago; and it is just not in his character to let her go empty-
handed. ‘...Allah would never forgive me for not helping such a person”, he 
said. Not all of Hajji’s friends who helped with the harvest were treated equally 
after the harvest. One was given some beans to take home, while the other two 
were not. Hajji explained that it is because they don’t have children yet. 
CS3-MAF (Atenyi): So many exchanges?
318 
During my first visit to Isunga  in 2006, I recorded numerous exchange 
encounters in my host family. The first exchange encounter observed in my new 
family was when the Chairperson of the Kamdini Study Circle visited the family 
on the second day of my stay. He approached Atenyi and enquired if Bazilio had 
returned the saucepan, which he had brought with some groundnuts to their last 
meeting. “…Jirani wants it back because the real owner came for it,” he said. 
Atenyi looked around but did not find the saucepan. The man left but promised 
to come back the following day. In the afternoon of the same day, Penina 
(Atenyi’s friend) passed by. Atenyi paid back 2000 UGX which she borrowed 
from her some time back, gave her two paw paws and a bowl of cassava flour. 
The cassava flour was from Atenyi’s mother, who had visited them the previous 
day. On the fourth day of my stay, Bazilio returned from taking his mother-in-
                                                        
315 When asked why he should use alcohol to mobilise labour which is against the teaching of 
their holy book, the Koran, he stated, ‘…when it comes to survival the Koran accepts even bad 
Moslems. After all, it is not me drinking the stuff’. 
316 In fact, three IDPs turned up, except that the third person came when the group was 
finishing work and was not counted but got some beans anyway. 
317 Quite a considerable portion of the beans was given away, as bigger shares were given to 
the two cousins and sisters-in-law. 
318 This is my recollection on informal exchanges during the first two weeks of my stay with 
CS1-JSBM (my host family) during the scoping exercise in 2006. 220 
law back to her home village, some 45 kilometres away.
319 In the evening, 
James visited the family. He is a guy Bazilio referred to “as a neighbour…we 
often help each other.” They chatted, and laughed for a while. Before leaving, 
James asked Bazilio to lend him 5,000 UGX to enable him take a sick child to 
the medicine woman. Bazilio ‘gave’ him 4000 UGX. This did not amuse Atenyi 
who had earlier asked Bazilio for money to buy paraffin, which he declined to 
give saying that he had no money. 
On the sixth day, a girl of about eight came looking for Atenyi. She is the 
daughter of someone Atenyi referred to as, “a member of our group with whom I 
have friendly relations. She often helps me.” Her mother sent her to get some 
salt. In the afternoon, Atenyi  went to the trading centre to ask Kilama  (a 
shopkeeper) if he could change a dress she bought for her daughter (Sarah) from 
the market the other day, but did not fit her. It was small on her. Atenyi talked of 
Kilama as “a few of those ‘displaced’ who often do me favours”. Kilama first 
declined, but changed his mind later on. In the evening, he sent his son on 
bicycle with a bigger dress, and an instruction to collect the tighter dress. On his 
way back, Atenyi  gave him some passion fruits. The following Saturday, I 
followed  Atenyi  to the market, where she met their LC1 women councillor 
(Lanyero). Atenyi lent her some money to buy a used pair of shoes for her son. 
In a conversation on our way back home, she talked of Lanyero as follows: “we 
lend money to each other when we are hard up. She is a kind woman with whom 
I share things with during good and bad times.” Three days later Atenyi 
attended  the circumcision ceremony and party at Hajji’s  place. When she 
returned home, she said “… we sang, danced and met Maria who I got to know 
through my friend Penina. Although we meet occasionally, we rarely discuss 
from the bottom of our hearts when we meet…but she is a generous person who 
helps me sometimes. This time we talked about a certain herb that she has which 
is good for skin rushes.” Three days later, she brought the herb. Atenyi gave her 
a small gourd of sour milk. 
Field Observation/CS1-JSBM (Bazilio): Food-sharing in everyday life 
On a sunny day in August 2007, Penina  (Atenyi’s  friend) came to the 
homestead. I was sitting under a tree but could hear their conversations loud and 
clear. Two particular statements caught my attention. Penina said, “…yesterday 
you gave me very little beans, as if you did not want to give it at all. How could 
you give just two mugs to a poor friend to feed six ‘mouths’? Atenyi laughed and 
replied, “...I know you want more, but I won’t give it to you because what you 
got yesterday was more than enough.” I thought Penina was a bit big-headed 
and wondered whether it was due to the closeness between them or just her way 
to communicate to get more beans. I asked Adyeri later on if her friends also 
share with her their crops, she replied: “…some do, but the majority never give 
us a grain. For instance, last year when you left, Bazilio had some problems 
                                                        
319 According to Barulli culture, if your mother-in-law visited you; you accompany her back to 
her home as a sign that all is well with their daughter. 221 
with the Balalo cattle keepers and was arrested for no reasons by the police. 
Only Penina showed sympathy and gave us some beans and groundnuts. The 
rest never even came close to us.” This statement suggests that those who share 
food or other resources with other people do not necessarily receive pay back in 
kind, and yet they continue to share anyway. On another day Atenyi gave some 
beans to a sick neighbour. She explained her action by referring to almighty God 
that “…God gave us this land, and from it we get our food. It would be a terrible 
thing for us who are healthy and have some food not to share it with those who 
don’t have. I would have lied that I don’t have any beans left, but they know we 
have. I do not want the provider of the land to punish my house. Our culture 
forbids lying”. Abwoli (CS2-MDF) added, “…we all know those with ‘strong 
chests’ and grow a lot of maize, beans or groundnuts. They also know that we 
have land and grow a lot of food. Sometimes they come and compliment you for 
working hard, or how good your crops look in the field, and then tell you in your 
face that they’ll come to take some during harvests, and they come.” Abwoli’s 
remark seems to suggest that those who have good harvests are in fact expected 
to share it with those who may not. The recipients too, conduct themselves as if 
sharing is a normal obligation on those who have more. I also observed cases 
that contradict Atenyi’s remarks. One day, a man clearly under the influence of 
Kipanga, which he bought from Atenyi, asked for some food to eat. He said he 
was hungry and had no food to cook in his house. Bazilio ‘shouted’ from one 
end of the homestead,  “…do not give him anything.”  When asked why he 
stopped his wife from giving food to a hungry man to eat, he replied, “…if he 
can have money to drink, then he is not needy. He is just careless, and I cannot 
share the little I have with such a person.” Bazilio was visibly upset.  
Although Atenyi (CS3-MAF) and Hajji’s (C11-HJM) exchanges differed a lot in 
terms of number and the nature of exchanges, the informal exchanges gave them 
access to other households’ resources. Their exchange partners too, accessed their 
personal resources. For instance, Kilama the shopkeeper offers Atenyi access to a 
collection of used children’s clothes in his shop that she would not have done 
without personal connections with Kilama. In a similar manner, Hajji helps a 
needy widow get some beans. Both Atenyi  and  Hajji  reported many informal 
exchange activities involving their relatives, friends, in-laws, neighbours and 
persons not very close to them. The nature of CS3-MAF exchange relations can be 
characterised in terms of mutual help, a key component of the economy of 
affection. For example, ‘…we often help each other’ (a neighbour), ‘…someone 
with whom I have friendly relations. She often helps me’ (member of a women’s 
group);  ‘…a few of those ‘displaced’ who often do me favour’  (Kilama,  the 
shopkeeper); ‘…we lend money to each other when we are hard up…..a kind 
woman with whom I share things (LC councillor), ‘…we meet once in a while, and 
whenever we meet, we rarely discuss from the bottom of our hearts. But she is a 
generous person who helps once in a while’ (Maria). Both Atenyi and Hajji gained 222 
from their relations by accessing resources that are otherwise difficult to get, and 
other people gained from them too.  
The above examples about food-sharing show the extent to which mutual 
assistance and sharing of resources are applied in certain households in Isunga 
village. Isunga’s villagers enter into such informal exchange relationships for a 
number of reasons, but more importantly, it is an investment in social ties for 
providing and receiving assistance in times of need (consumption smoothing) 
and maintaining existing relationships. It also confirms Hydén’s (2004; 1983) 
and other scholars’ assertions that exchanges of resources are motivated by 
kinship and friendship, other than pure economic gain (a social reality).
320  
These case examples are not unique or isolated to these particular 
households. Most Isunga  people  share food crops, exchange their labour, 
borrow land and other resources among themselves without the direct use of 
money, but through cultures that favour personal relationships. Yet, these kinds 
of institutional arrangements are not catered for in Uganda’s agricultural 
modernisation agenda. As we saw with the leja-leja wage labour in Chapter 5, 
markets are much more than just mechanisms of transactions. They are 
embedded in (social) institutions and are influenced by context: geography, 
agro-climatic conditions, culture, social relations, ethnicity or gender (Seppälä, 
1998; Apthorpe & Gasper, 1996). Seppälä (1998) writes, 
 
“…this fetishist notion of ‘market’ is very common in liberal economic theory. 
When we bothered to study the ‘realexistierende’ markets we find, however, 
social relations always impinging on them. The social relationships within this 
economy tend to have a component of affection but this component is not 
contrary to the market principle but a local application of it” (ibid, 1998:184) 
Following Seppälä (1998) and Apthorpe & Gasper (1996), markets are both 
institutions and mechanisms, and the difference has to be recognised and 
understood.
321 To that effect, Wood’s (2004) contribution is worth mentioning 
here. In particular, he reminds us that where the state is weak and unable to 
regulate the market, households tend to seek security and protection in 
informal institutions. He refers to such situations characterised by acute risks 
and insecurity as informal security regimes. It features heavy reliance on the 
community and family to meet welfare needs, and a presence of patron–client 
                                                        
320 I used food sharing examples other than labour sharing because I consider it the most 
appropriate data to explain the ‘economy of affection’, ‘embeddedness’  and/or the importance of 
personal relationships in resource sharing. 
321 See also Klijn & Pain’s (2007) work on the informal credit practices in Afghanistan as well 
as  Harriss-White’s  (2004)  work on India’s socially regulated economy to show that such 
behaviour exists in other parts of the world too.  223 
relations that are structured by hierarchies and power inequalities (ibid, 2004). 
In such situations therefore, farmers are risk-averse and trade short-term 
security for long-term vulnerability and dependence. In the process, it 
reinforces underlying patron-client relations that nonetheless provide some 
informal rights (Wood, 2007;  2004). Put together, these affect farmers’ 
decisions when choosing institutional types for labour relations.  
But there is also a dark side of sharing 
The case examples above and my observations also suggest that resource-
sharing is not automatically practiced at all times. Instead, villagers seem to be 
in constant negotiation with recipients about how much to share, and why. In 
the process, ethnicity, kinship, fear, respect or sympathy are vital variables that 
determine the outcomes of sharing. Those who are strategically good at using 
these variables in their negotiations (such as Penina) receive their share of the 
resource in question, be it extra labour, food, land or money. In both the CS1-
JSBM and the CS11-HJM examples, different forces that motivate them to 
share food with other people came out rather clearly. Yet, it also appears that 
obligatory exchanges bring power relationship to the provider by placing the 
recipient in debt. Hence remarks such as “…only Penina showed sympathy and 
gave us some beans and groundnuts. The rest never even came close to us” 
(CS3-MAF). The remark could also be an indication of a deliberate act or 
opportunistic behaviour by past receivers to avoid contacts after the exchange. 
This is because they are aware that if they keep in touch, then they’ll be 
reminded of their indebtedness and need to reciprocate one day. In a way, this 
places the receiver in a subordinate position to the giver. For this reason, 
avoiding contacts is probably a way for the receivers to mask uncomfortable 
‘give-and-take’ relationships between the stronger providers and the weaker 
recipients. As such, it seems that sharing is a constant struggle between 
obligation and indebtedness brought about by reciprocity, hence the 
informality involved. Neoliberal economics does not really explain this. 
Instead it looks at individuals as rational actors who always account for their 
costs and benefits. This creates a bias for short-term economic interests, while 
long-term social interests and security are disregarded (see Chapter 3).  
7.6  Summary and key issues 
This chapter explained why farmers rely on informal institutions in preference to 
state institutions in Isunga village when structuring and enforcing their labour 
relationships. The study found the following factors affect farmers’ choices of 
institutional types in labour transactions in Isunga: (a) the characteristics of 224 
agricultural labour transactions, (b) the costs of using the Isunga LC1 court, its 
biased rulings and the ‘absence’ or unpredictable enforcement mechanism, (c) 
the ineffectiveness of Uganda’s arbitration system, and (d) social and cultural 
factors based on morality, affection, norms etc. 
Regarding the Isunga  LC1 court, villagers associated it with high costs, 
stating that their rulings are usually unfair, biased and the court process is 
difficult to predict. Many reasons were given for this, including: (a) the Isunga 
local councillors being incompetent, corrupt and illiterate; (b)  the laws 
governing labour disputes are unclear and not understood by the councillors; 
(c) the process of implementing the Isunga LC1 court ruling is unclear, and in 
most cases left to the person who won the case to follow up thus causing 
further uncertainty about its outcome, compared to the informal mechanisms 
which are simple, straightforward and less costly; (d) going to the Isunga LC1 
court may also damage existing relationships or soil one’s reputation. We also 
found that although laws regarding arbitrations exists (GOU, 2006b), no 
villagers had ever heard of these. This has prevented villagers from settling 
their disputes through arbitration. Thus, the  problems relating to labour or 
contract laws and the inadequacy of arbitrations have all contributed to the 
prevalence of informality in Isunga.   
Moral and affective factors also influenced farmers’ decisions when 
choosing types of institutions for labour exchanges. It was evident that the 
notions of ‘social embeddedness’ and ‘economy of affection’ are alive and well 
in Isunga, where villagers rely on each other for their survival and agricultural 
labour exchanges. In particular, personal relationships (family memberships, 
friendships, or relationships that have developed over time) are important in 
their relations. This is because the community of Isunga tend to rely more on 
trust when structuring their labour exchange relations, and use of soft methods 
to settle their differences, just to avoid breakdowns of existing relationships.  
In the next chapter, I end my long research journey by discussing the key 
findings of the study as well as theoretical and methodological contributions of 
this thesis. 
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8  Discussion and Conclusions 
8.1  Introduction 
This final chapter discusses the findings of the study and reconnects to the 
research questions and objectives outlined in Chapter 1. The main research 
question is about the role and influence of institutions in agricultural labour 
transactions in a village in rural Uganda. From a theoretical perspective, the 
task was to develop a suitable analytical framework for exploring how 
institutions matter in agriculture labour transactions. This was followed by an 
investigation into the roles and influence of relational contracts, morality and 
affection, trust and reputation as well as kinship/ethnic identity in farmers’ 
labour behaviours and decisions. The chapter starts by discussing the key 
findings of the study according to the way that farmers structure and maintain 
their labour relationships, as well as how they enforce their labour agreements, 
including what they do if conflicts arise. This is followed by conclusions on 
both theoretical and methodological issues in Section 8.3. Key theoretical 
inputs of the study are presented in Section 8.4. Implications and issues raised 
by the study that require further research are presented in Section 8.5.  
8.2  Key findings of the study 
I began my research journey by acknowledging the growing awareness of 
institutions in explaining transactional relationships. This entry point provided 
the backdrop for the focus of the study: (a) to address key theoretical issues 
relating to institutions, and then (b) examine a real situational experience 
(labour relationships in Isunga village during crop farming seasons) to draw 
from it, insights into the role and influence of institutions in agricultural labour 
transactions in Isunga.  The key findings of the study are presented and 
discussed in the subsections below. 
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8.2.1  Structuring labour relationships  
The study found that crop farming in Isunga is complex, diverse and full of 
risks. To meet these challenges, farmers adapt many strategies, including 
sharing farm work. But for labour-sharing or exchange relationships to 
operate well, there need to be rules and regulations to govern and regulate 
farmers’ transaction behaviour; hence, the need to explore what rules apply 
to specific agriculture labour practices. And, given that the Government of 
Uganda has put considerable effort into reforming institutions relating to 
agricultural development (modernisation), the challenge was to establish 
which institutions actually regulate farmers’ labour behaviours and 
transaction decisions. I found that institutions embedded in social networks 
and structures, such as trust and reputation, kinship and ethnic identity, 
morality and affection, as well as an ‘informalised’ village council (Isunga 
LC1), are involved and sometimes work together to: (a) structure farmers’ 
labour relationships, 
322(b) secure the performance of labour actors, and (c) 
resolve disputes that come out of the relationships.  
Personal relationship as a form of institutions 
A key finding of the study is the importance of personal relationships, 
connections, trust, reputation and the informal networks farmers place in the 
formation and maintenance of labour relationships. Personal trust and 
connections that are embedded in social networks are tapped and used by 
farmers to locate both labour providers and recipients. Family members, 
friends, neighbours, in-laws and other relations based on factors such as ethnic 
belonging, coming from the same district or region, sharing the same fate, 
belonging to same gurub or drinking Malwa beer together, are all important 
sources of labour in Isunga. Such social relationships act as avenues through 
which individual farmers or farming households expand their labour-sharing or 
exchange networks.  
The study also found that trust and reputation that have passed the test of 
time are vital in agricultural labour relationships. Personal relationships and 
connections, the reputation of labour partners, and relationships developed 
during previous dealings are normally used as reference points for future 
labour dealings. Accordingly, Isunga people (farmers) prefer to deal with each 
other on the basis of good personal relationships rather than strict formal 
contracts (with set out rights and obligations, backed up by Uganda’s legal 
system or contract law), as required by the agricultural modernisation agenda. 
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The people of Isunga believe that building personal relationships with fellow 
villagers is more important than the use of laws and formal mechanisms to 
protect their contractual rights. As a result, the majority of farmers structure 
their labour dealings centred on relationships such as family members, close 
relatives, in-laws, friends, and neighbours. These may also be based on 
recommendations by third parties that are in positions of trust in the village. 
Farmers also secure much-needed labour by developing informal relationships 
with individuals who want their labour services by focusing more on those they 
trust or share labour with on a regular basis. 
Relational contracting and verbal agreements (winye) 
The use of relational contracts and verbal agreements  (winye)  in labour 
transactions is common.
323  During the course of the field study, ample 
evidence showing how winye actually controls the behaviour of those involved 
in labour transactions was uncovered (Chapters 6 and 7). In principle, 
Uganda’s contract law and institutions, such as the Isunga LC court and the 
Magistrate’s court in Kiryandongo town, make it possible for every citizen to 
use ‘legal’ means to secure performance by labour actors. In reality though, 
most people shun it because of high transaction costs due to local councillors’ 
rent-seeking behaviour, incompetence and erratic court outcomes. 
Interestingly, verbal agreements do not indicate the forms of punishment for 
someone who fails to accomplish his or her part of the deal in due time. 
Instead, they deal with such matters as and when they arise.  
It should also be underlined that winye have no, or if any, very little, legal 
benefits since farmers use it for purposes other than ‘legal’ safeguards to allow 
them to have recourse to the Isunga LC1 court or the Magistrate’s court in case 
of contract violations. Farmers in Isunga  use mainly use these winye  for 
specifying tasks in a labour transaction, so that each party knows what to do in 
order to meet the other’s expectations. This is important as it helps labour 
actors to avoid potential problems, such as when to complete the task, how to 
do so and the nature of the reward. Most farmers believe that carefully 
negotiated winye allow them to ensure that each party to a labour transaction 
understands its tasks and the other actors’ expectations. Hence, labour 
transactions can be carried out smoothly without a third party intervention, 
making the transactions more self-enforcing. 
Irrelevance of the village council (LC1)  
Another finding of the study is that the administrative arrangements set by the 
Government of Uganda to support commodity and inputs transactions are 
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rather limited. For example, the Isunga Local Council has a very limited role in 
providing information concerning agriculture or about potential labour 
partners, or in negotiating, preparing and securing labour agreements.
324 Even 
when faced with labour disputes, farmers prefer to solve their nywere-nywere 
outside the more formal LC1 court. Therefore, the ineffectiveness of the LC1 
as a ‘legal entity’ is a strong reason why the people of Isunga are less excited 
about using ‘formal’ mechanisms to secure transactions and protect their 
contractual rights. To remain relevant, the LC1 operates informally.  
Most Isunga people underlined that the LC1 court processes are very costly, 
with unpredictable and unfair outcomes (Chapter 7); contrary to what central 
legalism demands. If a dispute occurs, the persons involved would prefer to 
settle it themselves outside the LC system. They do it this way because they 
want to maintain harmony, and foster existing labour relationships and their 
reputations in the village, instead of tearing themselves apart before the LC 
court, which is accused by many of being corrupt, incompetent and ridden with 
ethnic division. There were also few cases where the LC1 was used essentially 
as a deterrent because its name ‘smells so bad’ that people rather avoid them. 
Such deterrent is common with leja-leja dealers, so that the persons selling or 
buying labour would know what to do in order to meet the other party’s 
expectations. This indirectly helps leja-leja dealers to avoid potential problems 
like delays in payment, shoddy work and so forth.  
8.2.2  Securing labour dealings 
To ensure effective enforcement of winye, the study found that labour partners 
use informal institutional arrangements for securing labour relations, and thus 
avoid potential labour disputes. The arrangements include dealing with people 
they have known over a long period (kin, friends, and neighbours), gathering 
relevant information about potential labour givers or labour receivers, and the 
popular use of dog-bur  (advance payments) in hired labour. Even during 
disputes, the perception amongst Isunga people is that dealing with individuals 
they have known for a long time can favourably help them solve labour-related 
problems. It is therefore not surprising that most labour relationships 
mentioned, observed and described in the interviews are based on personal ties 
and embedded in social relations. 
It emerged quite early during the fieldwork, that institutions that have 
developed over time in different situations allow farmers to acquire much-
needed labour and protects them from opportunistic behaviour such as non-
payment, delayed payment or shoddy work. These relationships help farmers to 
reduce their labour transaction costs because persons closely connected in 
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informal networks may not need to bear the informational costs of conducting 
background checks of the other party. To reduce uncertainty and probable 
misunderstandings, many farmers indicated that they would rather gather as 
much information as possible about character, behaviour, personality, 
capabilities and the reputation of a potential labour partner, before getting 
involved in any labour sharing, giving or receiving relations. Some people even 
went further to collect more information about other labour actors, even after 
the farm work had taken place. As mentioned several times in this thesis, they 
do so through informal sources, such as going to people with whom they have 
personal connections (family members, in laws, relatives, friends and/or 
neighbours). In some cases, they get the information they need directly from 
labour givers or receivers themselves, from the Kipanga/Malwa beer drinking 
venues, the ‘mango tree’ notice board at the trading centre or various farmers 
groups. Even the dreaded Isunga LC1 is consulted occasionally, especially by 
those with the ‘right’ ethnic status. 
The other mechanism the Isunga villagers use to reduce opportunistic 
behaviours amongst wage labourers are the institutional arrangements relating 
to payment. In particular, dog-bur (advance) payment is required by those who 
sell their labour efforts before the work starts and the last payment after the 
work is completed. For their part, labour buyers regard the use of dog-bur as a 
way of hindering the problem of poor performance (shoddy work). For 
example, dog-bur payments motivate labour sellers to do good work. Some 
buyers actually go to the shambas  and physically make sure the work is 
properly done and to their expectations. This kind of quality control 
mechanism leaves very little room for shoddy work. Moreover, if the leja-leja 
seller is found or seen to be underperforming, s/he is told to style up and stop 
doing kwere-kwere work or the remaining balance will not be paid. 
8.2.3  Settling labour disputes 
When a labour dispute arises, people in Isunga either turn to their LC1 court (a 
formal ‘legal’ mechanism) or solve it informally outside the LC1 court. But as 
shown and discussed in  the last two chapters, even the LC1 court solves 
disputes informally. Farmers in Isunga are very creative when it comes to 
handling labour disputes. Disputes can be handled through the LC1 court, 
mediated through the various elders committees in the village or farmer groups 
(gurubs) or through renegotiation of winye between the parties involved. It 
should, however, be stressed that these avenues are not mutually exclusive 
since interactions exist between them in the actual process of dispute 
settlement. As  we saw with the CS1-JSBM and CS9-MAM labour dispute 
settlement process earlier, some grievances may go back and forth between the 230 
Isunga  LC1 and other informal institutions or arrangements. In most cases 
however, farmers settle their nywere-nywere without involving the Isunga LC 
court because the court is not trusted. In some cases, they start with informal 
arrangements, and then go to the LC1 if attempts to settle their disputes 
through the former fail. Only one respondent (CS4-MOJM) reported taking a 
grievance to the LC1 without first making an effort to settle it informally 
through renegotiation or mediation. But he was keen to explain that it only 
happened once, and the conflict involved a newly arrived Internally Displaced 
Person (IDP) from the Lango region across the River Nile who got his advance 
payment (dog-bur) and then disappeared. 
Farmers underlined that they prefer informal arrangements to the LC1, the 
LCIII at the sub-county headquarters or the Magistrate’s Court in Kiryandongo 
town, when faced  with labour disputes because they consider informal 
arrangements more effective, less expensive and more importantly, it preserves 
existing relationships and reputations. The mechanisms used include the ones 
already mentioned above: negotiation between the persons in conflict, the use 
of mediation in which the mediator is a person of respect in the village, and the 
influence of certain individuals who in one way or the other can put pressure 
on the accused to change their behaviour. Such people include, some members 
of the Isunga LC1, village elders, officials in farmer groups, known Kipanga 
and  Malwa  sellers or/and persons with whom the affected farmers have 
personal ties such as relatives, friends, in-laws, and neighbours. The study also 
found that non-legal sanctions such as loss of face (balo nying dano), threats to 
one’s reputation (‘smelly names’) or community sanctions are taken seriously 
when it comes to labour relationships.  
Other mechanisms such as belonging to farmer groups (gurubs) where peer 
pressure plays a role, and the threat or use of force are sometimes used to settle 
labour disputes. Concerning the latter, villagers in Isunga rarely use it because 
the use of violence may get them into trouble with the law, which can be very 
expensive because of the bribes involved and the corrupt nature of the ‘legal’ 
system in the village and beyond. In cases where family members, relatives, 
and friends display opportunistic behaviour, some farmers said they ‘would do 
nothing’ or ‘just forget about it’. This is because taking a relative or friend to 
the LC1 ‘hyenas’ would make their names ‘smell bad’ in the village, thus 
tarnishing their reputation (balo nying dano). They would instead use other 
informal arrangements to settle the dispute in question if need be. 
In cases where a labour recipient or provider is introduced by another 
person who has a personal relationship with them, terms of winye are often 
complied with. But should any opportunistic behaviour occur or disagreements 
arise, then they would prefer to quietly resolve this and keep it within 231 
themselves, as they would not wish the ‘introducer’ to ‘feel embarrassed’ if 
they violate their part of the labour bargain or are seen as ‘bad’ people. The 
pressure not to embarrass the introducer acts as a means of enforcing relational 
contracts and the driving force is trust and being trustworthy in the eyes of 
others. In the Isunga context, the trust farmers refer to emerges from their own 
experience with people they have known over long periods of time. 
Moreover, apart from understanding how the LC court system works in 
practice, the study also found that the role of the Isunga  LC in resolving 
labour-related disagreements is rather minimal. In those few situations where it 
is used, as exemplified by the CS1-JSBM and CS9-MAM case studies, it is 
done only when informal mechanisms have failed and one of the parties look to 
the LC1 as the only way to solve the conflict. Although the study found that 
the role of informal institutions is more evident in dispute resolution, it does 
not mean that formal institutions like the LC system have no role to play. They 
do. For example, it can be used to make negotiations work by helping parties in 
dispute to understand their tasks and expectations. In this way, both parties can 
avoid potential disputes and make their labour transactions self-enforcing. 
Quite often, both the Isunga LC and other informal mechanisms are used in 
combination to settle disputes. Sometimes, the Isunga LC1 is used to check the 
background or characters of potential labour transaction actors, used to make 
negotiations work (i.e. by mentioning the LC more or less as a threat to each 
other) and/or the Chairperson being used as a mediator for settling nywere-
nywere. Nonetheless, the fact that the LC institution is used informally to help 
enforce agreements or settle disputes showed that the LC1 plays some role in 
labour transactions. 
8.3  Main conclusions of the study  
My study of institutions drew together a huge body of scholarship 
encompassing different disciplines within the social sciences and a large 
number of overlapping ideas and themes. In the process, I found that 
institutionalists’ ideas and their contributions for understanding economic 
behaviour are not lucidly organised. Therefore, the first conclusion concerns 
what institutions are and how they are identified.  
8.3.1  What institutions are and how they are identified 
Understanding the range of ideas and the interconnections that make them 
valuable in a study of this kind requires engaging with the different disciplines 
and perspectives that have a claim to institutionalists thinking. This study 
showed that when the different institutional perspectives are acknowledged, it 232 
is possible to differentiate between them. This is important because without 
sufficient  theoretical differentiation it would be difficult to apply our 
understanding of the scope of institutional influence to the task of examining 
real-world experiences and challenges. Early parts of Chapter 3 took up the 
different perspectives on institutions, as well as the difficulty of defining 
institutions. This helped me get a workable definition for what an institution is 
and is not; as well as providing a theoretical framework to inform and guide 
the empirical analysis required to carry out the household case studies. The 
thesis used the ‘rule approach’ of institutions as the essential qualifying 
criteria, and reasserted that institutions are simply ‘rules that structure social 
interactions’.
325  Subsequently, central legalism (contract laws, regulatory 
frameworks) and social institutions (trust and reputation, kinship and ethnic 
identity, moral and affections) were identified to address the issues related to 
real-life encounters of institutions in labour dealings in Isunga. This progress in 
definition based  on a review of numerous sources, not only allows for a 
methodical review of existing definitions, but also challenges persisting and ill-
informed preconceptions that limit the relevance of institutions because of a 
poor definition. So, the study suggests that it is possible to identify specific 
institutions for the purpose of empirical investigation, and use the clarity 
achieved to deal with issues related to real-life encounters. 
The thesis concludes that whilst particular schools of thought and 
disciplines may pay greater attention to some types of institutions, the overall 
definition is probably not all that important. Instead, attention should focus 
more on the other important intricacies and debates relating to the nature of the 
influence of institutional types on livelihood activities. As regards the study of 
labour relations in crop farming, it is clear that such analysis enables a better 
understanding and assessment of how and why the character and roles of 
certain institutions change (or not change) in the current era of modernisation. 
8.3.2  Why and how institutions matter in labour transactions 
The focus of this study has been on drawing insights that address the key 
questions of why and how institutions matter in agriculture labour transactions 
in a village in rural Uganda. While empirical research showed that institutions 
are involved in transactions, this study provided qualitative support, informed 
by theory, necessary to address the research questions of why and how 
institutions matter in agriculture labour relations. The conclusions drawn from 
the household case studies are significant as institutions are shown to be central 
to agriculture labour dealings in Isunga. As explored in Chapter 2, historical 
experiences indicate how institutions are intricately involved in processes of 
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development that have shaped Uganda’s agricultural sector, and transformed 
labour in rural Uganda the last 100 years. Therefore, it would be ridiculous to 
even suggest the possibility of modernising the agricultural sector without 
admitting the central role of institutions in the allocation and use of inputs 
(labour, land, capital) in crop production. This study clearly showed that the 
changes that created the agricultural sector in Uganda were institutional in 
many ways. Thus,  making reference to agricultural modernisation without 
focusing on the institutional involvement at local levels is simply a misnomer.  
The study also confirmed what other studies achieved elsewhere that the 
institutions that matter are not simply those that are officially codified in 
writing (formal ones); it underscored that institutions such as statutes and 
regulatory organisations, only form a small part of the agricultural 
modernisation story. As empirically fleshed out in Chapters 6 and 7 (especially 
the section on how the Isunga LC court works in practice) different institutions 
appear always to matter and work together. Therefore, the study concludes that 
at all stages of agricultural development it is the mix of formal (state) and 
social institutions that are at play in shaping the economic roles and activities 
of farmers. In this case, there is not much point in simply isolating institutional 
significance on the basis of how ‘formal’ institutions are. 
8.3.3  The changing character and roles of some institutions 
The study also presented institutions as social and relational, hence as socially 
embedded, socially constructed and socially constructing – an indication that 
character and roles of institutions also change. This research confirmed that the 
institutions that matter in transactions manifest themselves in different social 
spheres, either as formal (contract law/central legalism) and/or informal (trust, 
reputation, moral, affection, kinship/ethnicity) institutions. In Isunga, it is 
smallholdings and socially-motivated exchange norms and behaviours that 
matter most. However, the village does not exist in isolation. It is associated 
with ‘markets’ and organisations beyond Isunga. This makes room for other 
institutions to come into play, mix and change the regulatory organisations that 
hitherto exist. In any case, institutional influences are manifest not only in the 
farming households, but in commercial and administrative spheres as well. 
Consequently, the influence that institutions have on the households or Isunga 
village is related to and influenced by institutional influences, activities and 
outcomes outside Isunga.  
It came out very clearly from the empirical chapters that institutions across 
different spheres (administrative, economic, cultural or political) interact to 
influence and shape each other. But some institutions are more ‘significant’ in 
their influence, while others are eventually reconfigured or reorganised in 234 
response to the role and influence of these important essential institutions. This 
certainly explains how institutions such as pur kongo and pur cente became 
more economic, both in character and in terms of the role they play in Isunga 
(Chapters 5 and 6). Through a detailed study of the institutional and societal 
antecedents, interactions and outcomes over a 12-month farming calendar, the 
study was able to gain insights into the changing role and character role of 
social (informal) institutions like pur cente, elders mediation committees, pur 
kongo and gurubs. 
Lastly, the fact that farmers’ labour behaviours and decisions are embedded 
in social and cultural relations, sits rather awkwardly with the Ugandan 
government’s assumption that the ‘market’ is the ideal vision for smallholder 
farmers, and the road to prosperity. The visions individualises farming 
activities, yet farmers get their livelihood security (or safety nets) from taking 
care of each other, thus securing collective welfare.   
8.4  Contributions to knowledge and reflections 
This thesis provides a more insightful work that goes beyond mere description 
of outcomes narrowly based on a lean logic of neoliberal economics in 
agriculture. It gets deeper into Uganda’s agricultural modernisation experience 
from colonial era to date to seek out relevant contextual information and 
specific data with which to further examine the nature, role and experience of 
institutions in agricultural development. In so doing, this thesis opens up new 
avenues for further studying the role of institutions in factor markets and rural 
development. As such, this study should be of particular interest to those 
seeking to draw common insights and possible implications for institutional 
designs and policy-making for agriculture sector. Three specific contributions 
tied to theory and methodology are underlined: (a) the need to include ‘non-
formal’ institutions in agricultural development discussions, (b) the conceptual 
and analytical tools used to studying agricultural labour institutions can be used 
to study other aspects of agriculture, and (c) qualitative case study 
methodology answer the difficult, yet important questions about why farmers 
choose certain institutions for labour transactions, and how this happens.  
8.4.1  Theoretical reflections 
In the Ugandan context, when reading policy documents and other papers on 
institutional reform, it is striking to see that institutions are discussed as if there 
are only formal institutions.
326 The neglect of non-formal institutions in the 
reforms designed to modernise the country’s agriculture during the last thirty 
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years could be a reason for the disappointing results of various reforms so far. 
For that matter, studying either formal or informal institutions separately may 
be misleading and unrevealing. Or by simply focusing on the role of either 
formal (state) institutions or social institutions while ignoring the way they 
interact also fails to fully reveal how agricultural labour transactions work in 
practice. This study attempted to fill this gap by examining both types of 
institution and their roles in agricultural labour transactions at what North et 
al.(2007) would refer to as lower level social order (Isunga village).  
Although my findings showed that the role of social institutions (e.g. trust 
and reputation, moral and affection, kinship and ethnic identity) is important in 
Isunga peoples’ relations, this does not mean that state (formal) institutions 
have no role to play in Isunga’s labour dealings. It was found that when solving 
disputes, the supposedly formal village council (LC1) and social institutions 
interact with each other in a number of ways and their interaction allows 
farmers to structure and enforce their labour dealings at low costs. In situations 
when winye are unclear, they are renegotiated and informal arrangements are 
used to reduce the risks of disputes. On some occasions though, formal 
enforcement mechanisms such as the Isunga LC1 can influence negotiations 
(patana). But in clearly specified transaction agreements, in which tasks and 
expectations are properly understood by the parties involved can make  the 
process of transactions self-enforcing by reducing likely disputes.  
Furthermore, in their roles as social actors and economic agents, farmers 
actively ‘informalise’ formal institutions, such as when the Isunga LC officials 
are involved in dispute settlement, but use informal procedures that are not 
related to legal or administrative procedures (e.g. ethnic status, nepotism, 
bribes and kickbacks). Therefore, this study underscores the theoretical points 
made earlier that different institutions can be used in combination and they 
should not be seen as mere alternative ways to regulate and govern contractual 
relationships.
327 In their interaction, formal and social institutions do not 
necessarily conflict with each other. Rather, they complement each other to 
produce better outcomes that suit the context of the users.  
This study also demonstrated that although institutions that are rooted in 
Uganda’s contract law create room for farmers as economic agents to use 
written contracts as a means to carry out labour transactions, this does not 
mean anything to the people of Isunga who seem happy with their verbal 
agreements  (winye)  and relational contracting. Labour agreements are 
frequently changed during the process of implementation of the ‘winye’  if 
deemed necessary, yet with ease. But when faced with the challenge of 
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opportunistic behaviour that brings into dispute the terms of winye, non-legal 
sanctions such as loss of the future labour sharing or transactions possibilities 
or reputation are used. Violations of terms of agreements and consequent 
disputes are rarely settled by ‘legal’ procedures in the Isunga LC1 Court. The 
study found winye  to be a very flexible form of relational contract, and 
flexibility in farmer’s relationships is important for labour dealings to take 
place as it allows the actors involved to minimise their transaction costs.  
The conceptual and analytical framework used to study agriculture labour 
arrangements in Isunga village could restructure future studies on the role of 
institutions in the transactions of other agricultural inputs (land, capital and 
technology) and specific commodity (tobacco, cotton, sunflower, beans, etc.). 
Since the concept of institutions is understood differently by many scholars, 
this may generate problems in any  empirical study if not well handled. 
Therefore, by discussing different ways of defining and classifying institutions, 
the framework has contributed to a good understanding of agricultural labour 
dealings investigated in this study and has minimised problems associated with 
its findings. The framework also provides an opportunity for understanding 
why one type of institution is used more than another. This is very important 
since it adds to our understanding the role of various institutions in agricultural 
input transactions. The framework identified possible factors that affect 
farmers’ decisions when choosing institutions for work sharing and labour 
exchanges during crop production. These included: (a) the characteristics of 
agriculture labour transactions, (b) the transaction costs of using institutions for 
handling labour dealings, (c) unfair and unpredictable outcomes of 
enforcement mechanisms, as well as (d) social and cultural factors like 
morality, affection, kinship/ethnic status, trust and reputation. Therefore, by 
covering all these factors, this thesis gives a more complete and comprehensive 
understanding of why certain institutions are preferred over others. 
The empirical evidence from the village of Isunga validates the theoretical 
assumptions to generate understanding of the factors that affect choices of 
institutional types in agricultural labour relationships. This study, therefore 
reinforces earlier points that: (i) the ambiguity of laws and regulatory 
procedures normally leads economic agents to place more emphasis on social 
institutions, especially informal mechanisms of dispute settlement, since this 
can help them to avoid high costs of using formal mechanisms such as courts 
(Fafchamps & Minten, 2001; Telser, 1980a); (ii) the length or frequency of 
transactional relationships influence the choice of institutions (Williamson, 
1998;  1985); (iii) the reliance on trust and reputation, norms, conventions, 
long-term relationships and so forth is also supported  by moral, affective or 
cultural factors that have passed the test of time and that determine the 237 
individual’s behaviour (Shipton, 2007;  Hyden, 2004;  1983), hence (iv) 
transactions are embedded in social relations and structures (Granovetter, 
2005; 1992; 1985). 
8.4.2  Methodological reflections  
In Uganda, most existing empirical studies on the role of institutions on 
anything to do with agricultural development have employed statistical and 
econometric analysis using quantitative data, which to my understanding fails 
to provide a proper understanding of the role of institutions in transactions 
(Pender  et al., 2004;  Appleton & Balihuta, 1996).
328 For example, using 
quantitative methods in econometric analysis may help to conclude that certain 
institutions are used more by particular persons in a particular area, yet may 
fail to explain why this is so and how it happens. The qualitative case study 
approach applied in this study provided detailed information on how 
institutional types matter and why they matter in a rural settings where many 
Ugandans live and practice farming. 
By applying case study methodology to examine how farmers influence or 
get influenced by the various institutional structures used in agricultural labour 
relations, this study found the case study approach to institutional study useful 
in seeking to elucidate the resilience of work sharing (awak, diira, pur-kongo, 
gurub) and labour exchanges (aleya) in the face of repeated assaults on it in the 
name of agricultural modernisation or commercialisation. Instead of applying 
methods and postulates of pure economics to farmers’ labour behaviour, the 
case study approach was useful in that it looked at the diverse roles of 
institutions in identifying, structuring, securing, maintaining and mediating the 
relationship between different labour actors. The insight derived from this 
approach and analysis could help inform Uganda’s policy makers and 
development practitioners target interventions more effectively. Such 
interventions may involve treating commodity and factor markets as social 
institutions, rather than as a place to go buy and sell labour, as suggested and 
promoted by the Ugandan government today. An understanding of the complex 
nature of agricultural labour practices in Isunga (and similar villages in rural 
Uganda), which seek to make sense of their existence and nature, is a good 
precursor for understanding why various market-oriented agricultural reforms 
in Uganda since 1986 have not produced expected outcomes as anticipated by 
economists and donor organisations. 
Also, individual farmers’ stories in the case study approach showed that 
different social interactions develop and change depending on the context and 
resource-availability in the households. This approach places emphasis on the 
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role of the individual farmer and his or her household; hence, it is important in 
the analysis of how individual actors position themselves in relation to other 
actors to ensure that their labour needs are achieved. Of course this involves 
strategizing and manipulating the ‘rules of the game’ of labour transactions to 
achieve the best outcome. Therefore, the case study approach was useful in 
unravelling the process of structuring, securing and maintaining labour 
relationships among Isunga’s farmers. For exploratory purposes too, the case 
study was useful for understanding how different labour practices are 
embedded in social relations as well as the rules used to govern and regulate 
work sharing and exchanges. Hence, by collecting and analysing primary data, 
using the qualitative case study methodology to answer the research questions, 
this study has not only provided a more complete picture of the role of 
institutions in agricultural labour transactions, but also filled a methodological 
gap in the institutional literature. The use of various sources of data collected 
by different methods in a single study at a local (village) level did not only 
reduce bias and increased the accuracy of the data, thereby enhancing the 
validity of the research, but also allowed this study to capture a more complete 
and comprehensive picture of the studied phenomena.   
8.5  Implications of the study 
Given the points raised in Section 8.4, the implications from this study relate 
mainly to the policy issues and practicalities that farmers are faced with. 
Following the findings of this study, there is a need to revisit and even 
challenge some prevailing assumptions about the appropriate role of the 
Ugandan state in the development (modernisation) of the agricultural sector. 
This study would support the argument that generalising state intervention 
(e.g. commercialisation of rain fed smallholder agriculture) as being 
completely positive is simplistic and misses the point. It would also suggest 
that the simplistic construction of the modernisation policy dichotomy 
Uganda has been following since the mid-1980s clearly fails to address 
important issues that matter to farmers. Therefore, there is a need for 
agricultural and rural development policy that advocates that the state should 
only initiate certain official acts of critical institutional design. Hence, far 
from making it an argument for state intervention, it becomes an argument 
for effective institutional support for agricultural development in rural 
Uganda. An important question raised by my results is: what kind of state 
intervention is really appropriate for agricultural modernisation, for what 
purpose and in what way?  239 
There is also a need to critically look at the nature of state involvement or 
intervention in relation to the strength of the agricultural sector in rural 
development, prevailing institutional weaknesses and the critical events 
affecting farming, such as climate change, crop price volatility, rural urban 
migration, political instability etc. Arguably, numerous shocks and events 
underline the need for state action to support the development of essential 
institutions needed to overcome the adverse effects that may arise. Of course, 
this raises the question of political will, state competence in intervention as 
well as institutional design. Since ample evidence exists to the effect that the 
local council (LC) system is not doing well, it also calls for administrative and 
political arrangements that enable the state apparatus to be well connected with 
the socio-economic realities facing rural Ugandans whose work and livelihoods 
are dependent on farming. Actually, a more conscious attention to the role of 
social  institutions in agricultural transactions would also require a clearly 
worded acceptance of the need for mechanisms that can engage with and 
mediate between different interest groups (actors). This requires the need to 
understand the interests and implications involved, and to consider the losses 
and gains involved, including the political implications (e.g. loss of voters).  
Another important policy implication relates to how Uganda should take on 
the challenge of institutional design for agricultural development in the future. 
This study suggests that a requirement for any institutional design should 
appreciate the country’s economic history and history of agricultural 
development more, especially rural labour transformation, crop sector 
development, capital/credit usage, as well as land policy and tenure reforms. 
For this reason, future institutional design has to involve broader 
institutionally-aware analysis that establishes an understanding of the broader 
context and historical legacies, as well as specific institutional analysis that 
engages with the current realities in rural Uganda, critical events and on-going 
developments within the agricultural sector. Such analysis needs to take on 
board not just developments in the country’s agricultural sector, but also the 
unfolding effects of external influences such as new technologies, powerful 
donors influence, crop market shocks, critical agro-ecological changes and 
socio-cultural factors. Of course, this study does not suggest that institutional 
design is the panacea, but rather argue that more attentive design is likely to 
benefit rural farmers, especially smallholders. 
Suggestions for further research  
As might be expected, a study of this kind inevitably raises further issues or 
questions that warrant further research and detailed investigations. A central 
question raised in this vein is how to develop strong and contextually 240 
appropriate institutions for agricultural development in rural Uganda. While 
accepting the importance of institutions and recognising the need for more 
effective institutions in Uganda’s agricultural or rural development, it still 
remains the case that not all institutions are formal, official and directly 
accessible for design as portrayed in the various documents on agricultural 
modernisation  (GOU, 2011;  2010b;  2010a;  2003;  2000). Social institutions 
play a significant role and are by definition not available to policy makers to 
design. Further study to understand in some detail the role and nature of social 
institutions in a modern economic sector, and the effects of deliberate 
institutional design on these institutions and their economic effects, would 
enrich scholarship and learning on rural development. 
In my literature review, I found that writing on the unexpected 
consequences of deliberate policy actions, such as agricultural modernisation 
in Uganda, is rather thin. The purpose of further research in this area should 
also aim to gain insights in relation to specific crops (tobacco, sunflower, 
beans, maize, etc.) and thoroughly scrutinise its cross-sector applicability. 
Given the continuing challenge of modernising Uganda’s agriculture, 
achieving country-wide insights would also generate useful knowledge 
beneficial to all those involved or interested in Uganda’s agricultural and rural 
development. Connected to this investigation should be questions of political 
will, social engagement processes, technical competence and the role and 
influence of external factors and powerful economic players (e.g. multinational 
companies, donor countries and international financial institutions).  
Finally, more research that seeks to extend this study beyond the village 
level, sector (crop farming) and one factor study to include other production 
factors (land,  credit, capital and technology) in the light of institutional 
transformation, would be useful in agricultural and rural development 
discourses. It would also be useful to continue to monitor the latest 
developments in the agricultural sector, with ‘eyes’ on the unfolding effects of 
agricultural commercialisation taking place against a background of falling 
smallholding productivity, climate change, land grabbing, rural urban 
migration of youths looking for better opportunities, and the involvement of 
more foreign players in distributive and even productive activities (food crops 
and biofuel production). It would also be valuable to establish the extent to 
which changes in crop farming have antecedents, parallels or equivalents in 
other sectors (animal husbandry, forestry and fishery), including how various 
markets work in practice in these sectors and subsectors. Can lessons be learnt 
from other sectors and subsectors? Can crop farming offer direct insights to 
other sectors? The future shall tell. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Interview guides and field questions 
1.  About the case households  
a.  Size and composition (age, sex, marital status); religion; 
b.  Family type, size and composition, ethnicity, household’s history; social 
relations; gender/age (roles, tasks, responsibilities); 
c.  Education (children, spouses, parents, view on);  
d.  Sources of income (farming, non-farm and off farm): motives, channels, 
reliability, scale, household member, contributions, and how it is 
organised;  
e.  Access to land, land rights (ownership, renting, borrowing, squatters, 
size of land);  
f.  Labour availability/accessibility (seasonal variations, on/off farm, 
gender variations, individual/family/collective labour practices; intra 
household division of tasks and responsibilities,  
g.  Education (wife, husband and children; views of education) 
h.  Employment and Livelihood activities: what is your main source of 
income?  
i.  What problems (if any) have you experienced while undertaking the 
above mentioned activities? (e.g. land acquisition, marketing, credit 
facilities, marginalization, heavy work load, mobility, etc. ) 
 
2.  Nature, scale and functions of agricultural labour arrangements in Isunga 
a.  What is/are your source(s) of farm labour?  
b.  Do other labour arrangements exist in the village? Have you used it? 
Why did you use it/them? 
c.  Why do you share work? 
d.  How does it work? How is it organised?  
e.  How were you rewarded? How did you reward them? 
 
3.  Identifying and choosing labour transaction actors 
a.  Who do you share labour with, receive labour from or give labour to? 
What is important when choosing your labour exchange partner? 
b.  How long have you known each other? How close are you?  
c.  Describe your labour relationships with him/her/them (family members, 
relatives, friends, and neighbours); if recommended, by whom?  256 
d.  Have you got some key people you share labour with, give labour to or 
receive labour from? How do you maintain the relationships? What are 
the benefits (or costs)?  
e.  How do you reach winye? What happens during nywere-nywere? What 
causes it? Do you go to the LC for help? 
f.  Do you think building relations with other people is important? How do 
you build relationship with others? Any specific benefit(s)? 
g.  To what extent do you consider other peoples’ reputation important in 
the establishment of exchange relationships? 
h.  Do you get help from other people when negotiating winye? Why? 
What? How? 
i.  Do you belong to a gurub? Which one(s)? Why did you join it? What 
does it do? What benefits do you receive from it? 
 
4.  Reducing risks of nywere-nywere 
a.  Is winye violated? Why? How do/did you resolve it?  
b.  How do you avoid nywere-nywere or kuku-kuku? What methods do you 
use to keep ‘your name good’?  
c.  How do you gather information about potential labour partners? What 
information do you obtain from these sources?  
d.  What is dog-bur payment? How does it work? Any other practices of 
payment that you have used? Describe    
 
5.  Resolving labour nywere-nywere  
a.  What causes nywere-nywere? How do you resolve it? What methods are 
involved? How does it work? 
b.  How is the LC involved? When do you go to them? 
c.  What influences you the most when choosing to settle disputes through 
the LC1 court or the other ones?  
d.  Have you ever experienced any nywere-nywere the last five years? If 
yes, what were the disputes about? 
e.  What method(s) did you use to settle it? Did you like it? If no, what 
methods would you use? Why? 
f.  Did you renegotiate the winye? How? Where did the renegotiation take 
place? Did it work out well? How? Do you still deal with him/her/them 
after the nywere-nywere? 
 
For those who had experience in dispute settlement through mediation 
a.  Why did you do it? What was the problem? Why is the LC not good? 
Have you been before them? Where did the settlement take place? Did it 
work out well? 
b.  Did you try other methods of settlement before seeking mediation? If 
yes, what were they?  
c.  Did you pay any fee to that mediator? If yes, how much was it? To what 
extent do you think that mechanism is effective?  
 
For those who had experience in dispute settlement through the Isunga LC1 court 
a.  Have you taken kuku-kuku to the LC? Do you know of someone who 
has done it? Why did you report him/her/them to the LC? 
b.  Please explain how you settled the nywere-nywere? 
c.  Before going to the LC, had you tried other methods? Which ones? Why 
did it fail? 
d.  How long did it take to settle your nywere-nywere through the LC?  257 
e.  Do you still share/exchange labour with him/her/them after taking 
him/her/them to the LC?  
 
For those who had experience in dispute settlement through other methods  
a.  Please specify and describe other methods you have used to settle 
nywere-nywere?  
b.  Why did you choose this method, and not the other ones?   
c.  What problems are associated with the methods used? And…? 
d.  Have you ever chosen “take the loss and terminate the relationship” as a 
way of settling disputes. Why/Why not? 
e.  Why did you use this method? Have you ever used a third party in 
settling disputes? If yes, specify who. 
f.  Why did you choose this method? Have your known anyone who used 
other methods in settling disputes? Who is she/he? How did it work? 
Was the problem solved? Under what circumstances would you think to 
use this method?  
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Appendix 2: Profile of the case households according to wealth differences 
 
HH Code  HH Profile  Key characteristics 
Better Off Wealth Group 
CS1-JSBM  Husband (Bazilio) 45 yrs 
Murulli, Protestant, two 
wives (Abwoli & Atenyi), 
19 children and 6 
dependants;  
Owns house, 180 acres of 
land, 32 cattle, Ox-plough 
27 (8 working members) 
Earns income by renting out land, selling charcoal 
and produce; keeps livestock with the help of a 
herdsman 
Engages in crop farming using family labour, wage 
labour, receives labour for land, Bazilio is a member 
of the Kamdini, MURDA and Kabarole Groups 
CS4-MOJM  Jalon is a 72 yrs old Palwo 
man, Protestant, married to 
Min Kapere 52 yrs; 23 
children; 
Owns a house, 3 huts, 12 
cattle, ox plough, 70 acres 
land,  
5 (4 working members) 
Maize, beans and tobacco farming, rents out land, 
ox-plough hire 
Family labour, hires wage labour (leja-leja and pur 
cente), work parties for opening land, 2 seasonal 
labourers, member of MURDA, sharecropping with 
CS20-COM 
Shares food crops with relatives, lends cash to his 
labourers,  
CS6-BOM  Husband (Zakayo) 42 yrs 
old,  Palwo man, 
Protestant, wife (Alice), 4 
children;  owns house, land 
and livestock, 
6 (2 working members) 
Crop farming on rented land, runs a kiosk 
Household labour, awak, aleya and leja-leja labour 
practices, friends and neighbours 
CS17-JOM  Husband (Nelson) 44 yrs 
old, wife (Dorothy), 5 
children, owns house &3 
huts,  10+ acres of land, 11 
cattle, 5 goats some 
chickens 
7 (four working members) 
Tobacco and sunflower farming; trading in produce 
Family labour; organises awak and pur kongo for 
opening land, weeding and harvesting; hires labour 
(piece work casual labour); 2 seasonal labourers to 
help with tobacco and sunflower farming. 
CS11-HJM  Husband (Hajji) 40 yrs 
old, wife (Rukia) 35 yrs, 7 
children; 
 Owns house, 8 acres of 
land, 11 cattle, 5 goats 
some chickens 
9 (three working members) 
Earns income from crop farming and trading in 
chicken 
Cultivates his land using family labour, work 
parties, buys labour (leja-leja) and gets labour for 
food. Rukia is a member of aleya group 
Shares food with others 
CS18-MOF  Min Peko is a 54 yrs old  
Palwo, abandoned wife;  
Owns a house, 2 huts, 36 
acres land, 6 oxen, 8 goat, 
5 chickens and motor bike 
She cultivates sunflower, tobacco, beans and maize 
crops. Sources of income include: delivering babies 
(as Traditional Birth Attendant), remittance from 
children, land renting, sharecropping; 
Employs a housekeeper (Nakito); practices crop 259 
9 (2 working members)  farming using her own labour, awak, labour for 
land, buys leja-leja labour, labour from 
sharecroppers. 
Poor Wealth Group 
CS2-MDF  Abwoli is Bazilio’s first 
wife. Munyoro, Catholic;  
2 pigs and some chickens, 
Bazilio’s first wife, owns 
kitchen 
11 (3 working members) 
Abwoli accesses 4 acres of land from her husband, 
farming, brews and sells Kipanga gin, selling 
vegetables 
Family labour, Awak, Aleya, buys leja-leja, 
borrowed child, receives labour for food crops, 
labour from their Kabarole group, friends and 
neighbours 
CS3-MAF  Atenyi is CS1-JSBM’s 
second wife, owns 1 hut 
(kitchen), 1 goat, 2 pigs 
and 6 chickens,  
7 (2 working members) 
Murulli and Protestant 
She accesses 4 acres of land from CS1-JSBM; 
Farming, brews and sells Kipanga gin and Kwete 
beer, selling vegetables 
Family labour, Awak, Aleya, buys leja-leja, child 
labour (piidi), receives labour for food crops, labour 
from Kabarole group, friends and neighbours 
CS8-BRM  Husband (Bangkwon) 26 
yrs old IDP from Lango, 
Born Again (Pentecostal), 
wife (Betty) and 3 young 
children;  
Owns 2 huts, 2 acres land, 
2 oxen, 1 goat and 8 
chickens 
5 (2 working members) 
Borrow 4 acres from friends and neighbours, rents 2 
acres from Mzee Ogwal in Kazebe village; Sources 
of income are crop farming, Bangkwon’s LC1 
meeting/sitting allowance  
Gives and takes small cash credit from relatives, 
share food crop with CS9-MAM (an in-law) and 
other relatives. 
Practices crop farming using household labour, 
aleya, gurub labour and ox plough sharing with his 
father-in-law 
CS10-KPM  Husband (Kilama) 36 
years old, wife (Acii) 31 
years old, 5 own children, 
2 dependants aged 15 & 17 
years old; owns 3 huts, 8 
acres land, 6 chicken, a 
bicycle 
9 (4 working members) 
Acholi IDP, Atheist; wife 
is Catholic 
Earns income from selling crops, selling bricks and 
Kwete beer; sells poached game meat, sells leja-leja 
when the going gets tough; Kilama is also produce 
buyer agent. 
Kilama is also a member of Konya Paco Group 
through which he accesses farm labour. Practices 
farming using family labour, work parties, 
rotational labour.   
Borrows small cash from friends and relatives, buy 
on credit from Akiki (a shopkeeper at the centre). 
CS12-JAF  Sarah is a 17 year old 
Murulli woman; she takes 
care of her 3 siblings, 
parents died of AIDS; 
owns 8 acres of land, 2 
huts, 2 goats and 7 
chickens. 
4 (2 working members) 
Practices crop farming, rents out 4 acres of land to 
IDPs, food crops sharing, do leja-leja when hard up, 
sells cassava chips to pupils of Isunga P.7 School. 
A member of Kabarole Women Group, access extra 
labour through aleya; has weak ties with her 
relatives. 
CS14-ACM  Husband (Tom) 27 years  Both Tom and Ayoo belong to the Lango ethnic 260 
old, wife (Ayoo) 24 years 
old, no children of their 
own but takes care of a 5 
years old relative, own 3½ 
acres land, bicycle, 4 pigs; 
runs a small kiosk. 
3 (2 working members) 
group. Rents 3 acres from CS1-JSBM for growing 
sunflower and sorghum. Tom is a member of 
Bedmot Akiba (a Malwa beer drinking group). 
Sources of income are crop farming (sunflower and 
sorghum) and the kiosk.  
Labour for farming comes from the two, leja-leja, 
awak and pur cente from the Kony Paco Group.  
CS15-OJM  IDP from Acholi; husband 
(Bongomin) and wife, 2 
adult children, owns 4 
huts, 3 acres of encroached 
land.  
4 (4 working members) 
Crop farmer, earns money by selling their labour, 
Kipanga gin, firewood and bricks. 
Share sunflower with a land owner in Kazebe 
village, access farm labour through aleya and awak 
practices. The boys borrow rent land from a Jirani. 
CS13-JKF 
 
IDP from Acholi, widow 
(Mama Toto), 5 children, 
owns 2 huts, one acre of 
land, 4 goats & 4 chickens 
6 (2 working members) 
Sells Kipanga gin and Malwa millet beer, crop 
farming 
Family labour, Awak, buys leja-leja labour, receives 
labour for beer, child labour (Piidi) 
 
CS19-LOM  Husband (Bongomin) 51 
yrs Acholi, wife (Margret) 
29 years old, 3 children 
between 2 and 10 years; 
Owns a bicycle, 3 huts, 10 
acres of land, 4 goats and 
some chickens,  
5 (2 working members) 
Bongomin is a member of Ludito Acholi (Acholi 
Elders Committee) and Kony Paco Group 
Cultivates food crops as well as tobacco and 
sunflowers for cash using household labour, 
awak labour practices, hire Leja-Leja when cash 
is available 
Margret also accesses farm labour through Diira 
(work party on credit) and aleya consisting of 5 
Acholi women  
CS20-COM  Husband (Anywar) 26 yrs 
old IDP from Acholi, wife 
(Jenny) 22 yrs old, their 
2yrs son, a dependent 
(Okiya) 16 yrs old.  
Owns 2 huts, 3 acres land, 
some chicken & a bicycle. 
4 (3 working members) 
Rent 2 acres from CS4-MOJM for growing and 
maize/beans; land for labour (sharecropping) with 
CS4-MOJM. 
Sources of income includes: tobacco and sunflower 
farming, Jenny sells vegetables and Kipanga gin 
Labour sources include household labour, awak 
labour practice and buying leja-leja when in dire 
need of extra hand. 
Very Poor Wealth Group 
CS5-AWM  Widower (Kapere) 37 yrs 
old, HIV+,  Kuku man,  
Owns 2 huts, 2 acres of 
land, 2 young daughters, 
few chickens,  
3 (1 working member) 
Crop farming 
Family labour, participates in Aleya labour, receives 
food, labour and various help from relatives and 
friends 
CS7-ABF  Abandoned wife (Rose) 41 
years old,  HIV+, 3 sons, 
83 yrs old mother-in-law , 
a brother;  
Sells firewood, local brews and second hand clothes 
on okicon (big market) days; share food with some 
neighbours, borrow cash from CS11-HJM. 
Practices crop farming using family labour and 261 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2007, 2008, 2009 
Owns 2 huts, owns 3 acres 
of land and 6 chickens. 
5 (1 working member) 
Aleya with six other persons. 
CS9-MAM  IDP from  Lango, Husband 
(Musa) 32 yrs old, wife 
(Anna) 26 yrs, 4 children: 
owns 2 huts, 2 acres land 
encroached from forest 
reserve, 5 chickens 
6 (2 working members) 
Musa rents 3 acres from Mzee Ogwal on credit, 
sources of income are farming, selling their labour 
efforts when hard up; share food crops with 
relatives and friends during harvest periods. 
Practices farming using family labour, awak, aleya 
labour; also exchange their labour power for 
maize/beans during hunger season. 
CS16-VLF  Widow (Sylvia) in her 60s, 
IDP from Acholi, lives 
alone. Owns 2½ acres of 
land, one poorly built hut, 
2 goats, 4 chickens 
Crop farming, selling firewood, wild fruits and 
vegetables, TBA, sells leja-leja at times 
Own labour, buys leja-leja for opening land and 
doing some difficult tasks  262 
Appendix 3: Key Informants 
DO1-LC1  Chairman of Isunga Local Council (LC1). Interviews in July, August 
2006, July 2007, November 2008 and June 2009 
DO2-MSCC  Mutunda Sub-County Chief. Interviews in August 2006, July August 
2007 
DO3-MURDA  Coordinator of Mutunda Rural Development Association. Interviews in 
July-August 2007, November 2009 
DO4-MADFA  Coordinator, Masindi District Farmers Association. Interviewed in 
August 2007 
DO5-NAADS   Coordinator, National Agricultural Advisory Services, Masindi District. 
Interviewed in August 2007 
DO6-MDAO  Masindi District Agricultural Officer. Interviewed in August 2007 & 
November 2008 
DO7-MDLO  Masindi District Labour Officer. Interviewed in November 2008 
DO8-LC5  Chairman of Masindi District Local Council (LC5). Interviews in July, 
August 2006, July 2007 and November 2008 
 
Checklist  Key Informants (local governments and NGOs) 
•  Nature of problems in Isunga village and surrounding areas 
•  Agricultural related policy 
•  Livelihood security 
•  Specific farming problems 
•  Gender roles in agriculture 
•  Sources of income 
•  Working relationship with civil society (NGOs), farmers and 
frontline ministries 
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Appendix 4: Farmer Groups and Guide for Focus Group Discussions 
 
FG1-KWG  Chairlady of Kabarole Women’s Group. Interviewed in November 2008. 
Group discussion with some members in June 2009. 
The group provides saving and credit facilities to members and loaning is 
according to shares (i.e. three times the amount saved) 
FG2-LLWG  Wonkom of Labongo Lworo Women’s Group. Interviewed in November 
2008 
Improve members economically and enable them to contribute to towards 
household financial demand; enable women to socialise and improve 
access to information. 
FG3-KBA  Kica Ber Akiba Beer Drinking. Chairman interviewed in November 2008, 
participation in beer drinking in November 2008 and June 2009.  
It is an important source of income to the women brewers and the LC1 
(through the fees paid) 
FG4-KPG  Kony Paco Group. Interviewed members in November 2008 and attending 
gurub’s meeting in May 2009. 
Members share and exchange labour among themselves in rotation; if 
death occurs they contribute to the bereaved family to help them through 
the difficult period.  
FG5-LAC  Group discussion with members of Ludito Acoli Elders Committee 
Settles many conflicts among the Acholi of Isunga without involving the 
LC1; resolves conflicts through application of Acholi customary rules and 
values; they are rewarded for every conflict/dispute is solved; promotes 
peace and harmony among the Acholi in Isunga. 
The Acholi elders are also involved in various decision-making and their 
opinion is respected by the community; the elders are also important 
source of information because of their experience/vast knowledge. 
FG6-KRG  Chairman of Kamdini Reflect Group. Interviewed in November 2008 and 
June 2009. Participation in group’s meeting in July 2007 
Runs a credit savings scheme. Loans are given to members on a monthly 
basis at an interest of 5 per cent of the principle. The group considers 
itself successful in that loans are paid in time. Members attribute it to 
discipline, trust among members, good cooperation and hard work. 
Members share and exchange labour among themselves in rotation; if 
death occurs they contribute to the bereaved family to help them through 
the difficult period.  
Most decisions are taken during their monthly meetings on the last 
Sunday of the month. At the meetings, they review and discuss what 
happened to members in the last month, new/old challenges, but more 
importantly decide on who should get the monthly loan. 264 
 
  Checklist - Focus Group Discussions 
•  Agriculture: Land use (crop production - where, when, how, who 
and why); motives (food/cash crops, quantities, seasonal 
variations); differences in modes of production; labour (where, 
when, how, who and why); decision-making (who, how and 
why); changes (how, why and outcome); land tenure (intra 
household, division of land, decision making rights, rights of 
produce, income); Crops and labour marketing (what, how, who, 
where); support/Information (where, who, how, on what, why, 
official, individual networks); availability of other resources 
(cash, inputs, credit), cooperation 
•  Rules operating in labour practice: Kinship, cooperation and trust 
within the communities. 
•  Mechanisms for maintaining labour exchange relationships. 
What happens when dispute arise? Ways of solving disputes 
•  Problems faced at household levels and village levels 
•  Coping mechanisms 
•  Income and livelihood activities 
 